NAPOLEON I

A BIOGRAPHY

AUGUST FOURNIER

BLACKWELL'S
Oxford, England

4. b. 66

249/2

RECENT HISTORICAL BOOKS.

A HISTORY OF WALES FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE EDWARDIAN CONQUEST. By JOHN EDWARD LLOYD, M.A. With Map. 2 vols. 8vo, 21s. net.

THE ROMAN EMPIRE: Essays on the Constitutional History from the Accession of Domitian (81 A.D.) to the Retirement of Nicephorus III. (1081 A.D.) By the Rev. F. W. BUSSELL, D.D., Fellow and Tutor of Brasenose College, Oxford. 2 vols. 8vo, 28s. net.

IN DEFENCE OF THE REGALIA, 1651-2: being Selections from the Family Papers of the Ogilvies of Barras. Edited, with Introduction, by the Rev. DOUGLAS GORDON BARRON, M.A., F.S.A. (Scot.). Medium 8vo, 16s. net.

THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE: THE PERIOD OF CONFLICT, 1834-1860. By HOSEA BALLOU MORSE, Member of the Royal Asiatic Society. With 6 Maps, 12 Illustrations, Diagrams, and Plans. 8vo, 20s. net.

THE LAST YEARS OF THE PROTECTORATE, 1656-1658. By CHARLES HARDING FIRTH, M.A. With 3 Plans. 2 vols. 8vo, 24s. net.

THE HOUSE OF LORDS DURING THE CIVIL WAR. By CHARLES HARDING FIRTH, M.A. 8vo, 7s. 6d. net.

THE DAWN OF MODERN ENGLAND: being a History of the Reformation in England, 1509-1525. By CARLOS B. LUMSDEN, Barrister-at-Law. 8vo, 9s. net.

THE RISE OF SOUTH AFRICA: a History of the Origin of South African Colonisation and of its Development towards the East from the Earliest Times to 1857. By GEORGE EDWARD CORY, M.A., King's College, Cambridge, Professor in the Rhodes University College, Grahamstown, South Africa. In 4 vols. 8vo.

VOL. I. FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE YEAR 1820. With Map, Plans, and Illustrations. 15s.

A HISTORY OF MALTA DURING THE PERIOD OF THE FRENCH AND BRITISH OCCUPATIONS, 1798-1815. By the late WILLIAM HARDMAN, of Valetta. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by J. HOLLAND ROSE, Litt.D. Cantab. With 2 Illustrations. Royal 8vo, 21s. net.

ENGLAND IN THE AGE OF WYCLIFFE. By GEORGE MACAULAY TREVELYAN. 8vo, 6s. net.

GARIBALDI'S DEFENCE OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC. By GEORGE MACAULAY TREVELYAN. With 7 Maps and 35 Illustrations. 8vo, 6s. 6d. net.

GARIBALDI AND THE THOUSAND. By GEORGE MACAULAY TREVELYAN. With 5 Maps and numerous Illustrations. 8vo, 7s. 6d. net.

THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH: a Chronicle of Contemporary Politics, 1901-1910. By HENRY GYLES TURNER. 8vo, 9s.

THE MAID OF FRANCE: being the Story of the Life and Death of Jeanne d'Arc. By ANDREW LANG. With 3 Maps and 3 Portraits. 8vo, 12s. 6d. net.

THE ELECTRESS SOPHIA AND THE HANOVERIAN SUCCESSION. By ADOLPHUS WILLIAM WARD, Litt.D., Hon. LL.D., Master of Peterhouse. Crown 8vo, 10s. 6d. net.

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO., 39 Paternoster Row, London;
New York, Bombay and Calcutta.

THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND.

Edited by the Rev. W. HUNT, D.Litt., and

REGINALD LANE POOLE, M.A., LL.D.

8vo. 12 vols. 7*s.* 6*d.* net per volume.

VOL. I. FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE NORMAN CONQUEST (to 1066). By THOMAS HODGKIN, D.C.L., Litt.D., Fellow of University College, London; Fellow of the British Academy. With 2 Maps.

VOL. II. FROM THE NORMAN CONQUEST TO THE DEATH OF JOHN (1066 to 1216). By GEORGE BURTON ADAMS, Professor of History in Yale University. With 2 Maps.

VOL. III. FROM THE ACCESSION OF HENRY III. TO THE DEATH OF EDWARD III. (1216 to 1377). By T. F. TOUT, M.A., Professor of Mediæval and Modern History in the University of Manchester. With 3 Maps.

VOL. IV. FROM THE ACCESSION OF RICHARD II. TO THE DEATH OF RICHARD III. (1377 to 1485). By C. OMAN, M.A., Chichele Professor of Modern History in the University of Oxford; Fellow of the British Academy. With 3 Maps.

VOL. V. FROM THE ACCESSION OF HENRY VII. TO THE DEATH OF HENRY VIII. (1485 to 1547). By H. A. L. FISHER, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of New College, Oxford; Fellow of the British Academy. With 2 Maps.

VOL. VI. FROM THE ACCESSION OF EDWARD VI. TO THE DEATH OF ELIZABETH (1547 to 1603). By A. F. POLLARD, M.A., Fellow of All Souls' College, Oxford; Professor of English History in the University of London. With 2 Maps.

VOL. VII. FROM THE ACCESSION OF JAMES I. TO THE RESTORATION (1603 to 1660). By F. C. MONTAGUE, M.A., Professor of History in University College, London, formerly Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. With 3 Maps.

VOL. VIII. FROM THE RESTORATION TO THE DEATH OF WILLIAM III. (1660 to 1702). By RICHARD LODGE, M.A., LL.D., Professor of History in the University of Edinburgh; formerly Fellow of Brasenose College, Oxford. With 2 Maps.

VOL. IX. FROM THE ACCESSION OF ANNE TO THE DEATH OF GEORGE II. (1702 to 1760). By I. S. LEADAM, M.A., formerly Fellow of Brasenose College, Oxford. With 8 Maps.

VOL. X. FROM THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III. TO THE CLOSE OF PITT'S FIRST ADMINISTRATION (1760 to 1801). By the Rev. WILLIAM HUNT, M.A., D.Litt., Trinity College, Oxford. With 3 Maps.

VOL. XI. FROM ADDINGTON'S ADMINISTRATION TO THE CLOSE OF WILLIAM IV.'s REIGN (1801 to 1837). By the Hon. GEORGE C. BRODRICK, D.C.L., late Warden of Merton College, Oxford, and J. K. FOTHERINGHAM, M.A., Magdalen College, Oxford; Lecturer in Classics at King's College, London. With 3 Maps.

VOL. XII. THE REIGN OF QUEEN VICTORIA (1837 to 1901). By SIDNEY LOW, M.A., Balliol College, Oxford; formerly Lecturer on History at King's College, London; and LLOYD C. SANDERS, B.A. With 3 Maps.

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO., 39 Paternoster Row, London.
New York, Bombay, and Calcutta.

NAPOLEON I.



Bertie Greathead, pinx. Walter L. Colls, Sc.

Napoleon (1803)

NAPOLEON I.

A BIOGRAPHY

BY

AUGUST FOURNIER

MEMBER OF THE IMPERIAL AND ROYAL AULIC COUNCIL, ETC.

TRANSLATED BY

ANNIE ELIZABETH ADAMS

NAPOLEON (1803).

From a painting by Mr. B. Greathead, who was detained in France after the rupture of the Peace of Amiens, and was kindly treated by the Bonaparte family. His painting of Napoleon was considered by Madame Mère the best likeness of her son.

Reproduced by kind permission of Sir Edward Durand, Bart., from the picture in his possession.

FRONTISPIECE

VOLUME II

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO

39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON

NEW YORK AND CALCUTTA

Napoleon (1803)

NAPOLEON I.

A BIOGRAPHY

BY

AUGUST FOURNIER

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA
MEMBER OF THE IMPERIAL AND ROYAL AULIC COUNCIL, ETC.

TRANSLATED BY

ANNIE ELIZABETH ADAMS

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

H. A. L. FISHER, M.A.

FELLOW AND TUTOR OF NEW COLLEGE, OXFORD

WITH A FRONTISPIECE AND FOUR MAPS

VOLUME II

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO.
39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON
NEW YORK, BOMBAY AND CALCUTTA
1911

CONTENTS OF VOLUME II.

CHAPTER XIII.

PAGE

THE SITUATION IN FRANCE. BAYONNE AND ERFURT, 1808 1

Dissatisfaction in France. Measures taken by Napoleon. Official report of 1807. The prevention of poverty and begging. The Jewish question. The Sanhedrin in Paris. Financial policy. The new nobility. The Dukes of the Empire. Endowments in the Army. Restrictions on literature. The censure and the stage. Newspapers. The Tribunate abolished. Judges and Senators. The cult of Imperialism. The University. The Catechism. Napoleon and Josephine. The idea of a divorce revived. Characteristics of Napoleon. The Court at Fontainebleau. The bombardment of Copenhagen. Breach between Russia and England. Napoleon and Russia. The Oriental question. Napoleon incites Alexander to war with Sweden. Double-dealing. Failure of Austria's intervention at London. Tuscany annexed. Friction with Rome. Napoleon's demands. The Papal States occupied. Napoleon's letter to Alexander. Proposed Indian expedition. Spain. Godoy's manifesto. The Fontainebleau Treaty. Flight of the Portuguese Royal family. Dissensions at the Spanish Court. Napoleon in Spain. The French expedition. Bayonne. Joseph becomes King of Spain. Napoleon's error. The Spanish nation in revolt. The capitulations at Baylen and Cintra. Their influence on international politics. The attitude of Austria and Prussia. The policy of the Czar. Meeting of Alexander and Napoleon at Erfurt. Talleyrand and the projected Russian marriage. The treaty of October 12th, 1808. Goethe and Wieland.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE CAMPAIGNS IN SPAIN AND AUSTRIA. MARIE LOUISE, 1809, 1810 62

The "Grand Army" goes to Spain. Napoleon restores his prestige. Inadequate measures of the Spaniards. Espinosa, Tudela, and

PAGE

Somosierra. Napoleon in Madrid. Sir John Moore's expedition. Napoleon moves against him. Moore escapes. Soult defeated. Napoleon leaves Spain. His purposes there only partially realized. Cause of Napoleon's departure. Fouché and Talleyrand. Austria's threatening attitude. Austria's overtures at Berlin and St. Petersburg. The German nation looks to Austria. Financial questions. War unavoidable. Napoleon's preparations for the campaign. Austrian plan of operations. Manifesto issued by the Archduke Charles. The revolt in the Tyrol. Fontana Fredda. Berthier's mistake. Napoleon joins his army. The Austrians' mistake. Abensberg and Landshut. Eggmühl and Ratisbon. Significance of the French victories. The French advance on Vienna. Napoleon at Schönbrunn. Crossing the Danube. The battle of Aspern. The French on Lobau. Failure of the Austrians to turn their victory to account. Fluctuations of policy. Attitude of Frederick William III. Reinforcements for both armies. Raab. Wagram. Effect of recent experiences on Napoleon. The armistice of Znaim. The intrigue at Altenburg. Napoleon moderates his demands. The attitude of England, Prussia, and Russia. Negotiations in Schönbrunn. The peace of October 14th, 1809. Napoleon's life attempted. Dissatisfaction in France. Josephine divorced. Consent of the ecclesiastical authorities. Relations with Russia. "Poland" and the Poles. Overtures of marriage at St. Petersburg and Vienna. Secret negotiations. The official wooing. Marie Louise Empress. The King of Rome.

CHAPTER XV.

NAPOLEON IN HIS ZENITH, 1810-1812 116

The resistance of the nations. Napoleon excommunicated by the Pope. Pius VII removed to Savona. Papal States incorporated in the Empire. The Council of the Empire. Europe and the Papacy. The war in Spain. Annexation of Spanish territory as far as the Ebro. Joseph's protest. Masséna's expedition to Portugal. Napoleon and his commercial warfare with England. The Continental Blockade, a product of the Revolution. Napoleon and the ships of neutral powers. The Trianon Edict. Destruction of English goods. Licences. Decreased foreign consumption. The commercial crises of 1810 and 1811. Overtures to England. Holland's intervention fails. Holland incorporated in the Empire. Relations with Denmark and Sweden. Naples. Sicily. The financial situation in England. The finances in France and the Emperor's treasury. The mastery of the world. Friction with Russia. The Polish ques-

PAGE

tion. Champagny's report. Russian armaments. Turkey. Russia and the neutrals. Oldenburg. The Czar's plans for the offensive. French armaments. Diplomatic delays. The original cause of the war. Napoleon's domestic policy. The Confederation of the Rhine. The Franco-Prussian alliance. Metternich and the Austrian alliance. Successful overtures to Sweden and Turkey. Russia's ultimatum. Napoleon holds his Court at Dresden. Goethe and Napoleon. Historical significance of Napoleon.

CHAPTER XVI.

Moscow, 1812 180

Warnings and remonstrances. Napoleon resolved on war. His care of his army. Organization of the "Grand Army". Position of the Russians. Plans of campaign. Errors on both sides. The Emperor's original intention. Lithuania and de Pradt's mission. Vilna. The first disorders. Barclay and Bagration. Drissa. Hardships of the advance. Vitebsk. Napoleon's delay. A brief rest. Smolensk. The Russians draw off. Napoleon decides to continue the advance. Chauvinism in the Russian camp. Kutusoff. Borodino. Moscow. The entry of the French. The fire and the incendiaries. Napoleon awaits proposals of peace. The Czar remains firm. Napoleon's expectations disappointed. Plans of retreat. Departure from Moscow. Fighting at Malojaroslawetz. Choice of routes. The retreat. Fighting at Viasma. Hunger and cold. Smolensk. Fighting at Krasnoi. "Stragglers". Pitiful condition of the army. The Beresina. Collapse of the bridge at Studjanka. The fighting on November 28th. Terrible scenes. The army breaks up. The Malet conspiracy. The 29th Bulletin. Napoleon leaves the army. He arrives in Paris.

CHAPTER XVII.

Leipzig, 1813 234

The political situation. New coalition against Napoleon. New armaments. The mood of the nation. Yorck's defection. Its significance. Napoleon's appeal to the nation. The Fontainebleau Concordat. The finances. The Emperor and popular representation. The speech from the throne, February 14th, 1813. Napoleon's summons to the Confederation of the Rhine and to his allies. Frederick William III and the Tauroggen Convention. The Czar's Polish plans. Metternich's peace policy. The Emperor Francis refuses Napoleon's demands and concludes a truce with Russia. Prussia mobilizes. Territorial

PAGE

policy and national enthusiasm. The Russo-Prussian treaty of alliance. Prussia declares war on France. Saxony. England and Sweden. Failure of Metternich's peace policy. Austria as armed mediator. The Emperor in command. Defects in the new army. The battle of Lützen. The King of Saxony. Austria and the Allies. Napoleon's threat at Vienna. He desires a separate peace with Russia. The battle of Bautzen. The armistice of Plöswitz. The Emperor Francis in Bohemia. The truce extended. Effects of the British victories in Spain. Napoleon accepts Austria's intervention. The Prague Congress. Napoleon declines Metternich's ultimatum. The Emperor Francis declares war. The rival armies. Various plans of war. Napoleon and Blücher. The fighting at Dresden. The Allies withdraw. French defeats at Gross-Beeren and on the Katzbach. The military situation. Kulm. A new plan of operations. Ney defeated at Dennewitz. Sufferings of the army. The Teplitz treaties. Blücher marches off to the right. Result of his movement. Napoleon at Düben. Leipzig. The fighting at Wachau and Möckern. Merveldt's mission. October 18th. Napoleon loses the battle of Leipzig. The retreat from Leipzig. Ruin of the French army. The fighting at Hanau. Napoleon in Mayence.

CHAPTER XVIII.

ELBA, 1814 322

Princes and peoples. The French nation. Shortage of money and of fighting material. Ferdinand of Spain. Pius VII. The break-up of the Empire. St. Aignan's mission. The Allies' manifesto. Feeling in France. Lainé's report. The closing of the Legislative Body. The Allies' plan of operations. The advance on France. Through Switzerland and across the Rhine. The Conference in Langres. Brienne and La Rothière. Napoleon at Troyes. The negotiations at Châtillon broken off. Caulaincourt's offer. Crisis in the allied camp. Napoleon's victories over Blücher. He turns against Schwarzenberg. Resumption of negotiations at Châtillon. Blücher's advance. The division of the allied armies. The fighting at Bar-sur-Aube. Craonne and Laon. Napoleon in Rheims. The Treaty of Chaumont. Metternich and Caulaincourt negotiate for peace. Napoleon's obstinacy. Historical reason for it. New plan of operations. Arcis-sur-Aube. Captured dispatches. New manifesto to the French. Napoleon at St. Dizier. He hastens to Paris. Too late. The Allies enter the Capital. The Emperor deposed by the Senate. Attitude of his marshals. Abdicates in favour of his son. Marmont's defection. Unconditional abdication. The treaty with Europe. The Emperor leaves Fontainebleau. Elba.

PAGE

Energetic administration. The idyll of Marciana. Marie Louise does not come. Napoleon and the Italians. The situation in France. The army Bonapartist. Talleyrand and Mariotti. Dissensions at the Vienna Congress. Napoleon's calculations. Leaves Porto Ferrajo. Disembarks at Cannes. Laffray. The army goes over to Napoleon. Grenoble. Lyons. Paris.

CHAPTER XIX.

WATERLOO, 1815 392

Peace and liberty. The new Ministry. Benjamin Constant. War instead of peace. Napoleon outlawed by Europe. Failure of his overtures to the Powers. Depression and anxiety in France. Feeling in the army. The National Guards. The "Additional Act". Restrictions irksome to Napoleon. Public opinion hostile to the Constitution. The *Champ de Mai*. The Second Chamber and the new Peers. The speech from the Throne on June 7th, 1815. Armaments in France. Wellington and Blücher. Plans of campaign. The French advance. Napoleon assumes the offensive. Disposition of his troops on June 16th. Ligny and Quatre Bras. Memorable decision at the Prussian headquarters. Grouchy marches east. Napoleon turns against Wellington. Grouchy's dispatches. The position at Belle Alliance. Order of battle on June 18th. Grouchy fails to reach the battlefield. The battle of June 18th. Napoleon in flight.

CHAPTER XX.

ST. HELENA, 1815-1821 429

Paris during the campaign in Belgium. Napoleon at the Elysée. The Council of Ministers. The *coup d'état* in the Chambers. The Emperor compelled to abdicate. The abdication on the 22nd. Napoleon at Malmaison. The Provisional Government hostile to Napoleon II. From Malmaison to Rochefort. On board the "Saale". Napoleon surrenders to England. The traces of the Hundred Days. The verdict of Europe. St. Helena. The prisoner and his guardian. The Court at Longwood. Napoleon's manner of life. His conversation. Religion. The State. Women. Declines projects of release. The policy of the exiles. Truth and romance. The "Letters from the Cape". Failure of Napoleon's hopes on the Opposition in Parliament. Napoleon seriously ill. His death. Intellectual legacy. The campaign of 1815. Dictated works. Napoleon's instructions to his son. The principle of nationality. The Bonapartist legend. Napoleon and the historian's task. Knowledge and truth.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

PAGE

CHAPTERS XIII.-XX. 461

APPENDIX.

I. Napoleon's Letters to Talleyrand, 1807 . . 507
II. Napoleon's Letters to Champagny, 1807-1808 . 510
III. Napoleon's Letters to Maret, 1813 . . . 527
IV. The Emperor Francis to the King of Prussia and the Czar of Russia, July 3rd, 1813 . . . 529
V. Metternich to Maret, August 12th, 1813 . . 531
VI. Count Neipperg to Metternich, October 1st, 1821 532

MAPS.

(At the End of the Volume.)

I. The Campaigns in Spain and Portugal, 1810-1814.
II. The Russian Campaign, 1812.
III. The Campaigns of 1813.
IV. The Campaigns in France and Belgium, 1814-1815.

FRONTISPIECE.

Napoleon (1803).

Reproduced by kind permission of Sir Edward Durand, Bart., from the picture by B. Greathead in his possession.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE SITUATION IN FRANCE. BAYONNE AND ERFURT.

It would be a mistake, and at the same time an injustice to Napoleon's powers of penetration, to assume that he was actuated solely by political considerations in coming to terms with Russia in 1807. The real motive in inducing him to call a halt on the banks of the Niemen was the state of public feeling in France. He could not afford to forfeit entirely the nation's goodwill and approval, and he was already in no small danger of doing so. The great mass of the people had been wholly out of sympathy with the war of 1805, and it was only the Emperor's unparalleled victories and the lavish contributions to the Treasury that had made them tolerate it. But when in the following year the wasteful strife was renewed, they began to see that their soldiers were no longer fighting for the country's interests, but to satisfy the insatiable greed of an alien, whose oppression must inevitably provoke resistance from the States of Europe. They began to question if the Emperor's policy were really the best for France, and from this time forward no success, however great, was able to dispel this doubt. It is said that even the victory of Jena made scarcely any impression in Paris. When the news came of Prussia's downfall, of the entry into Berlin, and the rout of the enemy, no one could withhold their admiration from this genius to whom nothing seemed impossible—except peace, the long-desired, permanent and general peace which these brilliant successes only seemed to imperil anew. From such reflections there grew up an ever-widening discontent with the empire, and although it hid itself anxiously from the innumerable spies of the Imperial police, Napoleon learned of it in spite of all. Sometimes it would be a daring witticism

from the Boulevards, more pointed than pleasant, sometimes a stinging sarcasm from the Faubourg St. Germain, or an indiscreet newspaper article. Even had he lacked definite information, he could not have failed to know that the French people, whose sons he demanded for his battles, no longer rendered this sacrifice believing it was for the good of the nation, but feeling that in their secret hearts they were turning against him. He was too wise to underrate this symptom. Although he felt himself able to cope with any popular movement, thanks to the magnificent army which he had attached to himself personally, he had learned this much from the Revolution, that a popular current of opinion must be treated as a distinct political factor. What would become of him should France ever cease to honour his drafts in the future? That must never be allowed to happen. And so because he recognized the nation's need of peace and its abhorrence of continual war, he came to terms with Russia, and from Tilsit had the news diligently disseminated in France that the war for the Blockade was nearly at an end. Then he returned to Paris and sought to make his people forget the conqueror and regard him instead as a dutiful Sovereign solicitous for his people's welfare.

He was welcomed back with the same demonstrations outwardly as in the previous year, illuminations, applause, addresses and speechifying, more bombastic even than before. The President of the Court of Appeal, for instance, told him that henceforth he belonged not to ordinary History but to the Heroic Age—and he listened gravely as became the contempt he doubtless felt. At the opening of the Legislative Chambers he read a speech from the throne expressing to the French nation his pride and satisfaction as their Sovereign; and in the Council of State a report was drawn up on the condition of the country, setting forth the blessings of the Emperor's rule in eulogistic terms. A report of a similar kind had already appeared in 1804, and another in March, 1806, after the war, both chanting the same theme—Napoleon's unwearying care for his people and the constant interruptions to his labours from without. The result was

that France turned furiously upon her enemies and hailed with acclamation the man who had overthrown them by rapid and brilliant victories. Such had been the case in 1805, but now the conditions were no longer the same, and if the Minister of the Interior meant to gain credence for his statement that the Emperor was not planning any further conquests nor desiring more of those blood-stained laurels which others had compelled him to gather, he must find a new theme for his official utterances. This was done, and now the story ran that although Europe had wickedly forced war upon the Emperor, he had not allowed it to prevent him from fulfilling his duties as a Sovereign, all the less so as the war itself had been conducted in the interests of France, i.e. of her commercial prestige. In his report of 1807, the Minister varied his theme somewhat and related of the Emperor that: "While visiting the soldier in his tent amid the snows of Lithuania, his watchful eye was turned on France, on the dwellings of the poor, on the workmen in the factories, and it was only when we heard of his success far away that we were conscious of his absence". Some branches of trade had certainly suffered; but it was only a temporary depression, for the war in progress was a fight for commercial independence, and every conquest the Emperor made was a future gain for French trade. It was no small benefit the Emperor had conferred in having laid the scene of the struggle so far distant, "that while the rest of Europe was convulsed by war, France could look calmly and confidently into the future, hoping for peace, yet not exhausted by the struggle, ready for the great destiny prepared for her by him on whom she had bestowed her confidence, her glory, and her affection. This expectation of a mighty people has been fulfilled; its hopes have been surpassed. The era of prosperity has come, who can fix its limits!"

This specious flattery contained two facts for which there was some foundation. In the first place Napoleon himself considered the commercial war with England really serviceable to French interests; and in the second, even during the course of the war he had not ceased to take an active part in

the administration of the country. For the delegation of his authority to Cambacérès was a mere formality; the couriers to Warsaw, Osterode, and Finkenstein were laden with questions even about insignificant details.[1] Nevertheless from such a distance it was impossible to undertake any very vigorous measures, and it was only now on his return that he was able to give his undivided attention to the affairs of the interior. Napoleon well knew how little fair words from his Minister had been able to effect. France required deeds to convince her that his guidance alone could secure her prosperity and her honour.

Immediately on his arrival Napoleon asked for the figures of French exports and imports and for information as to how Italy and the Confederation of the Rhine could be made of use to French trade. The new commercial code was published. The Bank was ordered to reduce the rate of discount. To prevent destitution and to help the needy, State workships were opened in all the departments, so as to put an end to begging. Napoleon laid great stress on this project and recommended it strongly to the Minister of the Interior, adding: "We should not pass through this world without leaving traces behind us to commend our memory to posterity". For similar reasons work was again resumed on the public buildings which had been planned and begun after the victorious campaign of 1805. Roads were made over the Simplon and Mont Cenis, new canals were cut, telegraph lines established to accelerate correspondence, the crypt of St. Denis, destroyed during the Revolution, was restored, a new town founded in La Vendée, triumphal arches erected in Paris, the building of quays along both banks of the Seine was continued and the capital improved by running a wide street—the Rue de la Paix—from the

[1] Pasquier ("Mémoires," I. 299), treats Napoleon's attention to the details of administration in the midst of great political and military events as affectation, "Charlatanism," and his numerous decrees about minor matters which appeared without delay in the "Moniteur," as a means of displaying his extraordinary attention to everything. Be that as it may, it was certainly an excellent expedient for ensuring the efficiency of the administration.

Tuileries to the Boulevards; the Louvre was completed, the Rue de Rivoli laid out, three bridges built,—le pont des Arts, le pont d'Jéna, and le pont d'Austerlitz,—and a triumphal column erected in the Place Vendôme, etc. These undertakings provided work for many hands and warded off destitution so effectually that it was possible to forbid begging.

Amongst the various evils requiring redress, there was one especially which had engrossed Napoleon's attention even before the war with Prussia—the extreme and incessant poverty of the rural population in the Eastern departments. The cause of this was at last traced to the usury of the Jews. In 1791, the National Assembly had granted to the Jews the same civil rights as Frenchmen, and since that date Jewish merchants had flocked into France from other countries, and, settling in the departments of the Rhine, had there established themselves mostly as money-lenders. After Bonaparte had succeeded in restoring order and security throughout the country, they had congregated in large numbers in the German-speaking provinces. According to an official report submitted to Napoleon in April, 1807, by the Minister of the Interior, in the department of Alsace alone the sums demanded since 1799, on mortgages held by the Jews, amounted to upwards of 30,000,000 francs; and Marshal Kellermann affirmed that the usual rate of interest exacted was over 70 per cent. The majority of these settlers managed to avoid military service. For a moment Napoleon thought of declaring all debts upon mortgages at extortionate rates null and void, but eventually he adopted milder measures. On May 30th, 1806, a decree was published suspending for one year all compulsory sales arising from mortgages on land held by Jews. An assembly of Jewish Rabbis was immediately convened to confer with the Government authorities in devising a remedy for these evils. At this conference usury was declared to be a punishable offence, and in order to create a definite influence, the historic Sanhedrim, which had not met for centuries past, was summoned to Paris. There during February and March, 1807, it held its sittings and passed a series of resolutions in which the members of the

Sanhedrim forbade their co-religionists to practise usury, encouraged the young men to learn trades, to occupy the land rather than be merely traders in money, to consider themselves Frenchmen and to act as such. So matters stood when Napoleon returned from his campaign. But as these resolutions did not seem to him to offer a sufficient guarantee, he had a special law drafted for the Jews, the principal conditions of which were: that all interest exceeding 5 per cent was to be reduced by the proper authorities; all interest above 10 per cent was to be declared extortionate and the debt cancelled; no Jew was to conduct business without permission from the Government authorities, nor to advance money on mortgages without a lawyer's deed. Jews who were not resident in Alsace at the time of the decree (it was published on March 17th, 1808), were not allowed to settle there, and only in other departments by becoming proprietors of land. Every Jew was held liable for military service and was deprived of the right of paying for a substitute. These measures were certainly contrary to the *Code Napoléon* but they served their purpose. Within a few years the reports from the eastern departments, where 60,000 out of the 77,000 Jews resident in France lived, showed distinct improvement, and Napoleon was able to allow exceptions to be made in increasingly large numbers until complete equality before the law had again been reached.[1]

The Emperor's solicitude for the material prosperity of the nation was closely bound up with his financial policy. Hitherto he had conducted his wars without materially increasing the taxes or asking for loans. "As long as I live," he had written Marbois on May 18th, 1805, "I shall issue no paper money." The best way of lessening the nation's dislike of his wars was to show them that they did not entail any pecuniary hardships. Up till the present his system of requisitions in foreign countries had seconded this policy, and the fact that he kept the main body of the standing army on

[1] The March decree was annulled in 1808 for Paris and the Seine department (*vide* Sagnac, "Les Juifs et Napoléon," "Revue d'Histoire," mod. III. 476).

foreign soil, even in time of peace, was no small saving to the nation. Yet withal there was not nearly sufficient money, and 1805 had witnessed a painful experience. At the beginning of the war the taxes had not been increased, the money required being obtained by advances in hard cash from a company of financiers (with Ouvrard the banker at their head) who were in the habit of discounting bills from the tax-gatherers on the income due in the ensuing year. The same company also financed the Spanish royal house, to whom they advanced the subsidies exacted by France, being repaid at a high rate of interest on the arrival of the silver fleet from America. But now that war had been declared between Spain and England, the transmission of the silver was suspended and the company thereby involved in serious embarrassments, to extricate it from which the Bank of France was obliged to exhaust all its supply of ready money. Thereupon a crisis ensued, many large firms became bankrupt, and capitalists grew nervous. This was in December 1805, at the time when Napoleon was negotiating for peace with Austria. His presence in France became indispensable, and he afterwards related—so Mongelas declares—that this circumstance more than any other induced him to sign the Treaty of Pressburg, as it would have been easy for the Austrians to create delays which would have been most embarrassing for him. But a recurrence of such circumstances had to be guarded against in future. On that occasion the peace, the newly restored confidence of the people, and the 40,000,000 francs of war indemnity paid by Austria had averted unpleasant consequences. Now, after the second victorious campaign, the millions exacted from Prussia, Poland, and Westphalia were taken to endow not only a war treasury but also a "Service Bank" (Caisse de Service) which would render the assistance of bankers unnecessary in future and could even advance moneys upon the taxes. An audit office was established at the same time to control the administration of these finances.[1]

[1] Fresh taxation was nevertheless indispensable. The tax on wines and spirits in July, 1804, was increased in April, 1806, by a further tax

The Emperor thus contrived to demonstrate to the French that his wars not only entailed no fresh sacrifices upon them, but that owing to his victories they contributed to the upkeep of the State. The material condition of the country had really improved. For although the blockade had injured commerce, and all classes of the population suffered from the great increase in the price of sugar and coffee, the exclusion of English manufactures had nevertheless proved instrumental in developing French industries. Owing to a general peace being expected, and to the improvement in the country's credit, the price of Government 5 per cent rentes rose in 1807 to 99, a figure they never again reached during the Emperor's reign.[1]

But Napoleon knew only too well that a highly cultured nation like the French needed more than material prosperity, that it had other wants which could not be met with money and food, and these he fancied he thoroughly understood. In 1797, at the close of the Italian campaign, when he first thought of making himself master of France, he remarked in confidence to a friend, "The French require glory and the satisfaction of their vanity; as for Liberty, they do not realize what it means!" That certainly was the belief on which he acted. From every field of battle he had convinced them afresh of the glory of their arms, and so had fed their national pride. Now he intended to satisfy their personal vanity. On August 12th, 1807, he sent a curious autograph note to Cambacérès in which he said: "As it is human nature that a man should wish to leave his children, besides a sufficient fortune, some token of the esteem in which he is held," he reserved to himself the right of bestowing further titles of nobility upon such as had rendered conspicuous service to the State, in the same way as the titular dukedoms had been founded in the previous year. Ministers, senators, councillors of state, presidents of the legislative body, and archbishops were to

on their consumption; tobacco was dealt with in the same way; and in March, 1806, a small tax was again levied on salt. The direct taxes, however, were not increased.

[1] *Vide* Blanc, "Napoléon I, ses institutions civiles et administratives," p. 324.

receive the title of count, which they could pass on to their heirs in accordance with the laws of primogeniture, provided they could guarantee an annual income of 30,000 francs. The presidents of the electoral colleges and of the courts of justice (who were all appointed for life), the attorneys-general, and the mayors of the larger towns throughout the country were all to be made barons, and could also transmit their title provided they could endow it with an annual income of 15,000 francs. Members of the Legion of Honour could pass on their knighthood if they could ensure an income of 3000 francs, but high dignitaries were to ensure to their heirs an income of 200,000 francs, in order to preserve their princely rank. All this was diametrically opposed to the laws of inheritance as set forth in the *Code Napoléon.* But the Emperor sought to justify the whole proceeding by explaining to the Senate that these titles as well as the new dukedoms carried with them no political privileges, and that the fundamental principle of equality remained intact. The senators, delighted with their titles, bowed their assent, and in March, 1808, the law took effect.[1]

But these marks of favour to civilian officials dwindle into insignificance beside the rewards heaped upon his companions-in-arms. He now proceeded to bestow Italian titles

[1] Shortly after the laws creating the new nobility had been passed, Napoleon expressed himself pretty much as follows to M. de Rémusat: "Liberty is a necessity felt only by a not very numerous class dowered by nature with higher faculties than the average. It can therefore be restricted with impunity. Equality on the other hand pleases the multitude. I am not offending them in granting titles without asking obsolete questions about their birth. These titles are a sort of civic crown which can be won by deeds. Clever men give those whom they govern the same impetus as they themselves possess. My impetus being to ascend, something is required to move the nation in the same direction. Not that I am blind to the fact that these nobles, especially the dukes whom I have made and dowered so handsomely, will become somewhat independent of me. Titled and wealthy, they will try to escape me and assume what they call the dignity of their position. But they won't run so fast but what I shall be able to make up on them!" After his overthrow, he looked upon it as a mistake to have made his creatures rich and independent of himself.

on his marshals; Soult became Duke of Dalmatia; Mortier, Duke of Treviso; Savary, Duke of Rovigo; Bessières, Duke of Istria; Duroc, of Fruili; Victor, of Belluno; Moncey, of Conegliano; Clarke, of Feltre; Caulaincourt, of Vicenza; Masséna, of Rivoli; Lannes, of Montebello; Marmont, of Ragusa; Oudinot, of Reggio; Macdonald, of Taranto; Augereau, of Castiglione; Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte Corvo; Davoût, Ney. and Lefebvre were given respectively the German duchies of Auerstädt, Elchingen, and Danzig; and Berthier the principality of Neufchâtel.[1] These titles carried with them rich estates, entailed according to the law of primogeniture, and taken from the domains which Napoleon had reserve dto himself in Poland, Italy, and Germany. The Emperor at this time dispensed 11,000,000 francs, one half being in specie, the other in revenues. Of this sum Berthier received 1,000,000 francs; Ney, Davoût, Soult, and Bessières 600,000 each; Masséna, Augereau, Bernadotte, Mortier, and Victor 400,000; the others 200,000.[2]

Nor was the victorious army forgotten. Of the 18,000,000 francs devoted to this purpose, 12,000,000 went to the rank and file, and 6,000,000 to the officers, the distribution being so arranged that privates maimed in battle received a triple share. Those soldiers who had lost a limb in war received a pension of 500 francs; officers and non-commissioned officers who had distinguished themselves were granted annuities up to

[1] A few dukedoms were also conferred on civilians: Cambacérès was made Duke of Parma; Maret, Duke of Bassano; Lebrun, of Piacenza; Fouché, of Otranto; Gaudin, of Gaëta; Champagny, of Cadore.

[2] In later years the incomes of the marshals were largely augmented; Berthier, who was Prince of Neufchâtel, Vice-Constable, Marshal, and Master of the Hounds, received yearly 1,355,000 francs; Davoût, Duke of Auerstädt and Prince of Eckmühl, 910,000; Ney, Duke of Elchingen, and after 1812 Prince of Moscow, 728,000; Masséna, Duke of Rivoli, and after 1809 also Prince of Esslingen, 683,000. Moreover, under the Empire the income of a Minister seldom fell below 200,000 francs, while that of the Foreign Minister was even more. The Ambassadors, who represented the power of the Emperor in foreign countries and were expected to do so in splendid style, received salaries more than sufficient; Caulaincourt, for instance, who was then leaving for Russia, received from 700,000 to 800,000 francs.

10,000 francs yearly. The Emperor's one aim in all this was to attach the army the more securely to himself, the less he felt certain of the sympathies of the rest of the nation. He had long been aiming at denationalizing the army as much as possible, so that it might not cease to serve his international plans. On that account, therefore, and not purely for financial and political reasons, he left the Grand Army in Germany and Poland, which countries were not to be evacuated till Prussia had paid her exorbitant war indemnity. The Guard alone was allowed to return to France, where it received strict orders to mix as little as possible with civilians.

In interesting himself thus in the material prosperity of the country, in flattering the nation's vanity and love of glory, Napoleon thought he had done quite enough for France, which he once cynically called his "mistress"—one so devoted that she sacrificed both treasures and life for him. He remained true to his conviction that Liberty was not a necessity for the bulk of the people, but merely a "pretension" of those whom he scornfully styled "*Idéologues*," whom he blamed for the anarchy at the Revolution and whose influence on public opinion he combated with all his might. Hence the increasing stringency of his measures against newspapers, magazines, and books; his solicitude to keep the debates on the laws from the public; his attacks on the independence of the bench—which had hitherto afforded a refuge for those who opposed his system of compulsory benefits; his plan of preserving the rising generation from the temptations of unrestricted intellectual activity by providing them with a practical and uniform method of instruction: hence, too, his unwearying zeal in promoting and supervising these measures.

We are already aware of Napoleon's dislike of Madame de Staël, who had been exiled from France "because," as Napoleon said, "she could make people think who would never have dreamt of doing so, or who had forgotten how to do so". From Finkenstein he wrote Fouché that he was glad there was no more talk of her.[1] In 1802, Chateaubriand had

[1] Madame de Staël's fate was shared by Madame de Récamier and Madame de Chevreuse, the latter of whom, when stricken by a fatal illness,

dedicated his "Génie du Christianisme" to the "Restorer of Religion," but his hostile criticism of the Enghien incident having incurred the Emperor's deep displeasure, and his influence in the *salons* of the opposition being held dangerous, he too was banished from France. Shortly before Napoleon's return in 1807 he contributed an article on Spain to the "Mercure de France," and certain allusions it contained, too plain to be misunderstood, led to the newspaper being suppressed,[1] thereby depriving him of his property That he was spared an even harder fate was due to his friendship with Fontanes who, like many another, had placed his talents at the service of the all-powerful Emperor. Jacques Delille, the poet of the "Homme des Champs," and "Imagination," and translator of the "Æneid," was left untroubled, thanks to the high esteem in which he was held, and to the inoffensive nature of his subject-matter. Many poets, following his example, carefully avoided all political and social problems and confined themselves to minor matters which they treated, as if in compensation, with consummate skill. We are probably not wrong in ascribing to this period of restricted thought and imagination some measure of the high value attached in France to the art of exquisite expression and perfection of form for its own sake. On the stage, to which the Emperor devoted special attention, he would not allow anything to be presented dealing with recent times. In any case, plays were to belong to a period previous to Henri IV, whose popularity was extremely distasteful to him. "I hear there

begged to be allowed to return to Paris to consult her doctor. This permission was refused and she died in exile.

[1] In this article, which reviews a book of travels by Laborde, the following passage occurs: "When everything trembles before the tyrant and his favour becomes as dangerous as his displeasure, then the historian appears as the avenger of the nations. In vain Nero trusts to his luck, Tacitus is already born; unknown he grows up by the ashes of Germanicus and already Providence has delivered the glory of the master of the world to an unknown child." When Napoleon read these lines he exclaimed indignantly, "Does Chateaubriand think me a fool not to understand" (Ségur, "Mémoires," II.). After that, in discussing Tacitus with savants, he invariably condemned that historian's partisanship.

is to be a tragedy produced—'Henri IV,'" he wrote to Fouché, "that period is still too recent not to arouse the passions. The drama should choose its subjects from antiquity." Before allowing Mozart's "Don Juan" to be performed he required to be convinced that it contained nothing dangerous to the "mind of the public". Tragedies and comedies on modern subjects were also forbidden "for," says Madame de Rémusat, "no one dared to depict on the stage the faults and foibles of the different classes of society when all society had been restored by Bonaparte, whose work had to be respected". Even the classical dramas of Racine and Corneille were subjected to a rigorous censorship and were seldom presented on the stage without emendations and omissions. In Corneille's play, for instance, the speech in which "Heraclius" alludes to his obscure origin and to his having risen from being a warrior to becoming Emperor, etc., was suppressed so as to prevent all inconvenient inferences. In 1807, the Paris theatres were restricted to nine in number.

If the state of matters in the higher walks of literature was bad, that of the daily Press was even worse. Under the Consulate, we saw the beginning of the censorship of the Press; under the Empire there only remained four independent newspapers in Paris—"Le Citoyen Français," "Le Mercure de France," "Le Journal des Debats," and "Le Publiciste". Even these names displeased the Emperor; he would neither tolerate "Citoyens" nor "Debats," and so the "Citoyen" had to change its title to the "Courrier Français" and the "Journal des Debats" to the "Journal de l'Empire". These newspapers were in constant danger of being suppressed. In 1805, when they ventured to comment upon the luxury of the Imperial Court, the editors were told that the times of the Revolution were past, that in France there was only one party, and that the Emperor would not allow newspapers to bring forward anything against his interests. A year later Napoleon wrote Talleyrand: "I intend to have the political articles for the 'Moniteur' written at the Foreign Office, and after I have watched for a month how these are done, I shall then forbid other newspapers to

discuss politics except in accordance with the 'Moniteur'." [1] The Paris Press, as was inevitable, lost both in force and character, which was not at all what the Emperor wanted. He wanted praise. Just as he had stifled all criticism of his Government in literature and in the newspaper Press, he now proceeded to silence it in the Tribunate, the only body which was entitled by the Constitution to the right of discussion. Though it now sat with closed doors, still he was not satisfied. Accordingly at the last sitting of the Legislative Body in December, 1807, a Senatus Consultum was tabled, announcing the dissolution of the Tribunate, summoning its members into the Legislative Body, its President into the Senate, and fixing forty as the age limit for membership in the Legislative Body. Napoleon, who was then only thirty-eight, well knew how precipitate youth often is in dealing with political projects, and he wanted only sedate, tranquilly disposed men in this Body, still called Legislative, though the name was now a mere form. His will alone gave France her laws, all else was empty show. Hence he was now able to issue a decree attacking the irremovability of the judges, as guaranteed in the Constitution, by requiring every judge to pass through a five years' probation before being definitely declared irremovable, the final decision resting with a Commission of Senators nominated by the Emperor. Hence, too, he was also able to revive the old institution of imprisonment for political offenders. And all the while the Senate was co-operating with obsequious diligence, heedless of the veiled disgust of all honest men at such unrestrained servility. Little it cared though people judged it as "Tiberius" does the senators in Joseph Chénier's play :—

> Ils cherchent tous les jours leurs avis dans mes yeux,
> Reservant aux proscrits leur vénale insolence,
> Flattant par leurs discours, flattant par leur silence,
> Et craignant de penser, de parler, et d'agir,
> Me font rougir pour eux, sans même oser rougir.

[1] "Corr.," XII. 9933 (March 5th, 1806) from a copy in the Vienna State archives.

But Chénier wisely kept his "Tiberius" in his desk and blew a loud blast for the Emperor in his "Cyrus". People talked in whispers of "despotism" and "tyranny," but whispers do not carry far. One day when Suard, one of the ablest publicists of that time, was praising Tacitus and his descriptions of the Roman Emperors, Napoleon remarked, "that is all very well, but he should have shown us why the people of Rome tolerated the bad Emperors and even loved them. That is what would have been of the first importance for posterity to know."[1] There he laid his finger on the real foundation of his own power. Well he knew that the moment had not yet come when France could dispense with him. Madame de Rémusat was lamenting one day to Talleyrand that she was obliged to live at Napoleon's Court because of his evil qualities and the way in which he sowed enmity between friends, and even between husbands and wives, and traded on the weaknesses of his servants, dividing them, so as to control them all the more surely. Talleyrand, who had not the faintest affection for Napoleon, answered her: "Do not compromise your kind heart by any attachment to that man, but rest assured that with all his faults, he is indispensable at present for France; he holds the country together, and for this object each of us must do his utmost." Therein lay the Emperor's secret.

Napoleon had thus provided against any breath of unfavourable criticism disturbing the respect and esteem which his Government enjoyed with the masses. "Public opinion makes and unmakes Kings," he remarked. He had long cherished the idea of protecting the rising generation from such dangers by educating them in the cult of imperialism, very much as the Jesuits imbued their pupils with Ultramon-

[1] Two years later he remarked to Narbonne: "Make no mistake. I am a Roman Emperor but of the best type of the Cæsars, of those who founded. Are you not struck by the resemblance between my government and that of Diocletian, by this net which I spread to such a distance, by the Emperor's eyes which are everywhere, by this civil authority which I have been gradually able to strengthen in an Empire absorbed in war?" (Villemain, "Souvenirs contemporains," I. 128).

tanism. He had laid the basis of his system in his Consulate days and now he was about to add the finishing touch by the institution of the "University". Just then circumstances favoured his plans.

In 1804 the great Diocesan Seminaries had been founded in conformity with the stipulations of the Concordat. Soon after the clergy had attached to these the so-called "little seminaries" which, like the State *lycées* or colleges, prepared candidates for professional careers. These ecclesiastical schools, like the secondary State schools, were open to all, and were none the less popular that their teachers had contrived to throw suspicion upon the religious instruction and the moral tone of the imperial schools, and to discredit their methods of instruction. Napoleon, however, intended that the whole administrative organization should be considered as his own work. Criticism he would not tolerate, hence he resolved at the earliest possible opportunity to rid himself of this competition in the education of the youth of France. "In the founding of a great uniform system of education he saw the most fitting means of uniting moral with political opinions," as he remarked at the Council of State in March, 1806. A few weeks later on May 10th, 1806, he issued a decree announcing that a corporation was to be founded under the name of the "Imperial University" which would have the exclusive charge of public instruction and of the entire educational system. "His Majesty" (so runs the report drawn up by Fourcroy, the head of the Education Department) "wishes to found an institution where instruction will not be exposed to every passing craze, . . . and the constitution and statutes of which shall be so national in their character that no man will lightly presume to alter them. If this hope is fulfilled, His Majesty believes this institution will prove a safeguard against the pernicious theories of universal revolution. His Majesty wishes to carry out in a State of 40,000,000 subjects what Sparta and Athens possessed, what religious orders have tried to attain but only with imperfect success. What an advantage if the method of instruction recognized as the best were then to

hold good immediately for the whole Empire, so that all living in the same society might share the same knowledge and the same principles, so that one mind and complete harmony of sentiments and efforts might benefit all."[1] A transition period of four years had been contemplated but the Emperor was urgent, and so on March 17th, 1808, the statute was drafted and became law without the authorization of the legislature. Henceforth the University comprised all the branches of public instruction, and all educational establishments, public and private, from the primary schools to the Faculties. Public schools were founded and administered by the University, private schools were sanctioned and supervized by it.[2] It had its own budget in the form of an endowment of 400,000,000 francs invested in French rentes, which was kept separate from the State budget, "so that education might not suffer from the fluctuations of the national exchequer". At the head of this corporation, comprising the entire scholastic profession of France, was a Grand Master appointed by the Emperor. He was assisted by a Chancellor and a Treasurer and a University Council of thirty members, ten of whom were elected for life by the Emperor, the other twenty by the Grand Master for one year. This University Council was to draw up the regulations for the schools, choose the text-books and exercise disciplinary powers over the members of the University, i.e. over all the teachers in France. A certain number of the latter, the masters at the Lycées, for instance, had to bind themselves to remain celibate, and all were exempt from military service. The teachers in the secondary schools were trained at the "École Normale". Those who distinguished themselves prominently received, besides promotion, a title of honour from the Grand Master and became

[1] Taine, "Le régime moderne," II. 157, from Beauchamps, "Recueil des lois et règlements sur l'enseignement supérieur".

[2] The only exceptions were a few of the higher technical schools such as the École polytechnique, which was organized on a military basis, the Museum of Arts and Sciences, the Scientific Schools, and the great ecclesiastical seminaries.

titular officers of the University. The whole country was divided for educational purposes into districts which were called "Academies," each of which was under a Rector and an Academic Council corresponding to the University with its Grand Master and its Council.[1]

The educational system of France was thus strongly centralized and under the same absolute control as the other departments of the State. It had its cordial admirers and equally cordial detractors. Certainly the boys at the Lycées got a better education than the young aristocrats who were tutored at home. But the rigid nature of the school curriculum left little scope for originality on the part of the teachers, and if it is one of the highest functions of a school to bring out and develop individual talents, so that such gifts may be made of the utmost service for the general welfare, this system produced exactly the opposite results and did so of set purpose. For after all, the ultimate aim of this institution was simply the furtherance of the Emperor's personal system. But although the government had delegated to the University the entire department of education, thereby easing itself of no small load, it still kept the supervision and control of it in its own hands. The decisions of the Grand Master had to be submitted to the Council of State which had the power to annul them. Throughout the departments the schools were visited by the prefects, who reported upon them to the Minister of the Interior. It was this office that prescribed the first text-book for the University—the Catechism. It had been drawn up in 1806 in collaboration with Cardinal Caprara, the Papal Legate, whom Napoleon had frequently extricated from financial embarrassments. It contained the political creed of the rising generation in France. Here are the terms in which it was expressed: "We owe to our Emperor,

[1] In founding this University, Napoleon was only providing for boys' education. He would not hear of public education for girls. "Girls," said he, in reply to an urgent representation on the subject, "are best educated at home by their mothers. Public education is not for them, as they are not intended for public life." Madame de Staël was constantly in his mind.

Napoleon I, love, respect, obedience, fidelity, military service, and the tributes ordained for the defence of the Empire and of his Throne; we owe him also fervent prayers for his welfare and for the spiritual and material prosperity of the State. We owe him all these duties because that God, who founds empires and disposes of them according to His good pleasure, has crowned him with manifold gifts both in peace and in war, establishing him as our Sovereign, making him the instrument of His power and giving him His likeness on earth; and especially because it is he whom God has raised up in these troublous times to re-establish the public worship of the holy religion of our fathers and to protect it, who by his great and active wisdom has restored and maintained public order and who by his mighty arm defends the State; and because he is the Anointed of the Lord, through consecration by the Pope who is the head of the Church universal." In reply to the question as to what was to be thought of those who were unfaithful in their duties towards the Emperor, the Catechism replied: "According to St. Paul they sin against the ordinances of God, and are guilty of everlasting damnation".

So the little underfed lieutenant of Valence was now God's "likeness on earth," and an object of veneration to the most highly cultured people in the world! And yet he was not satisfied. On the day he was crowned Emperor, in December of 1804, he said to Décrès (Minister of the Marine) that he had been born too late in the world's history, and that nowadays it was impossible to achieve anything really great. When Décrès demurred to this, he added: "I grant you my career has been brilliant and I have risen high. But what a difference from ancient times! Look at Alexander the Great. After he had conquered Asia, he declared himself the son of Jupiter, and except his mother, Olympias, Aristotle, and a few Athenian pedants, all the East believed him. Nowadays if I were to declare myself the son of the everlasting Father there isn't a fish-wife but would hiss me! The nations are much too enlightened now and there is nothing great left to do." In other words he was not satisfied.

No one saw this more plainly than his entourage. From

the Empress to the humblest lackey the whole Court suffered from this perpetual discontent. Josephine, who still remembered the time when the young general had looked upon a union with her as a stroke of good fortune, was now far beneath him and trembling at the prospect of a divorce. Not that Napoleon really desired to part from his life's companion to whom he had grown accustomed, but the question of the succession to the throne had forced the matter upon him. For Louis's son, whom the Emperor had once thought of adopting and who had been called after him, had died during the last campaign, and his little brother was only two years old and delicate.[1] Besides that the alliance with the Czar had suggested to him the idea of a union "beseeming his present rank," with a member of the Russian Imperial house. In the event of his suit being acceptable, he counted that the strong bond of relationship would render the northern Power more amenable to his will, and so of all the princesses of marriageable age in Europe the Czar's two sisters received the preference. This idea of having a son to inherit his power found a warm supporter in Fouché, the "Jacobin grown rich," as Napoleon called him, who had lately fallen out of favour with the Emperor owing to his tardiness in discovering a republican plot under General Maret. Fouché was now endeavouring by all the means in his power to blot out the bad impression and to retain his position. He saw his opportunity in the chance of a new marriage and advocated it warmly, regardless of the fact that during the Consulate days, when Napoleon's brothers had pressed for a divorce, he had ardently championed Josephine. Now, however, he argued that if Napoleon bequeathed his Empire to a son, that would prevent the return of the disastrous Bourbon regime—specially disastrous for wealthy Jacobins—and would induce England to make peace; otherwise the English would continue their resistance in the belief that the Empire would pass away with the Emperor. Under such circumstances it was not easy for Josephine to maintain her position. She

[1] In 1807 the third son of King Louis and Queen Hortense, who afterwards became Napoleon III, was not then born.

was all submissiveness and tender devotion ; she gave up using the familiar and affectionate "*tu*," and addressed the Emperor even in private as "Your Majesty". She carefully avoided giving her dread lord any cause of annoyance, and was invariably graceful, amiable, and a nonentity. The Court took its lead from her and was nervously submissive. It is significant that when Napoleon came back victorious from Tilsit she dreaded his return, remarking that "the Emperor is so prosperous he is sure to find fault a great deal".

This mingled fear and deference was characteristic of the whole Court. Since the campaign of 1805, Napoleon had changed in so far that he now carefully avoided all familiarity with anyone, no matter whom, and hedged himself round with elaborate ceremonies. If, by accident, he ever unbent so far as to fall into a confidential tone, he was careful to efface the impression at once by a few curt remarks. None of his brothers dared sit down in his presence, nor address him first, and none of them used the familiar "*tu*" in conversation with him. Frequently at evening receptions, when the Court circle numbered over a hundred, no one ventured to speak; all waited in silence till his Majesty appeared. And then, if he was in a bad mood, annoyed at the insolence of the English newspapers alluding to him as "General Bonaparte," and giving him somewhat rough handling, the whole Court felt the effects. For instance, he would say to a lady, after asking her name, "Dear me, I was told you were pretty!" or to an elderly gentleman, "You have not much longer to live". In such moods he discarded all semblance of courtesy. The pensive melancholy of the Consulate days had now degenerated into sheer bad temper, and it became more and more difficult to serve him. During this period of his greatest successes it seemed as if he wanted by his ill-humour to prevent people from thinking that he meant to rest content with the high place he already occupied in the world, and to make sacrifices for peace by allowing himself and the nation to rest. Pasquier relates that "usually after great successes he affects an anxious mien as if he wished people to understand that his greatest plans were not yet nearly completed and

therefore they need not think there was nothing more to be done". Such was the experience of those who came much in contact with him, and who never found him less accessible that at those times when one would have expected the genial influence of success to have mellowed his nature and rendered it responsive to gentler emotions.[1] When one of his Ministers congratulated him on the peace of Tilsit which made him Master of Europe, he replied: "You are like the rest. I shall not be Master until I have signed the Treaty of Constantinople, and the present treaty delays that for quite another year." He was eagerly straining after the ultimate goal of his ambition, and coveting for himself the glory of an Alexander.[2]

Napoleon was at this time leading a very irregular life. He would often prolong a sitting of the Council far into the night without feeling the slightest fatigue. Not infrequently he would rise and work in the middle of the night, dictating to his secretaries with such rapidity that they had to use a species of shorthand in order to follow him. At other times he would lie for hours in a hot bath, Corvisart, his physician, having once prescribed this in the hope of it soothing his nerves. But it had been of no avail. His irritability was constantly increasing and sometimes took the form of hysterical fits of weeping. This man who felt so well amidst the hardships of a campaign, and who in the stress of battle never flinched, even during the most trying crisis, once in his own house would fly into a passion on the slightest provocation. Many a garment he tore to pieces in his impatience, because it inconvenienced him in some trifling way, and it was a constant source of anxiety to his attendants that his State uniforms should be a perfect fit. Yet as a rule his appearance was slovenly, for within the last

[1] Cp. Barante ("Souvenirs," I. 217), "The Emperor was only gentle and courteous to every one when things were going badly," with Josephine's remark, "The Emperor is so prosperous that he is sure to find fault a great deal" (Rémusat, "Mémoires," III. 170).

[2] *Vide* the "Mémoires" of Molé, one of the Emperor's favourites, in the "Revue de la Révolution," 1888, and Napoleon's conversation with Barante, 1812, in the latter's "Mémoires," I. 372.

two years he had grown stout, and his gait and carriage were far from kingly.

Meanwhile his Court had become much more imposing. On returning from the late campaign he blamed Fouché for not having been sufficiently strict with the aristocratic *salons* of the Faubourg St. Germain, where his ways were unfavourably discussed and he himself turned into ridicule. Fouché then told the *ancien noblesse* they could only disarm the Emperor's anger by making conciliatory advances. As a result many bearers of ancient names who had held aloof since the death of the Duc d'Enghien, now presented themselves at Court and lent it an added splendour. Just at this time, too, the Princes of the Confederation came to Paris to pay personal homage to their new master or to beg some fresh favour of him. One of the Mecklenburg princes was assiduous in his attentions to Josephine, thinking that the surest way to reach his ends! Others, such as the Crown Prince of Bavaria and the Hereditary Prince of Baden, regularly attended the sittings of the Council of State when the Emperor presided. Dalberg was also there. He had come to solemnize Jerôme's marriage to Princess Katherine of Württemberg and to request a constitution and a concordat with Rome, for the Confederation. In the latter he was unsuccessful. For Napoleon the Confederation was merely an auxiliary force, and in view of his present relations with Rome, a concordat was out of the question. Of all these German Princes, Dalberg was said to be the only one with whom it was possible to keep up an animated conversation. Most of the marshals, the veterans who had helped the Emperor to win his victories, came to Court not in uniform as became soldiers, but in levee dress as courtiers, for Napoleon did not care to be reminded of the close intimacy of the battlefield and of the sacrifices of war. He sometimes spoke of his comrades-in-arms with unsparing candour. Of Davoût he remarked that he "might gain any amount of fame, he would never know how to carry it off"; Ney he described as "ungrateful and fractious"; Bessières, Oudinot, and Victor as "mediocre." Lannes and Soult alone had the courage to differ with him in military

matters. The former still persisted in addressing him as "*tu*," which Napoleon had to put up with, as Lannes was indispensable. All the others were cowed by his overshadowing personality. Even the brutal Vandamme once admitted that he began to quake whenever he came near that "devil of a man".

In the latter part of the summer of 1807, the Court was at Fontainebleau. Performances were given there by the first actors of the "Comédie Française," concerts by the greatest Italian singers of the day, and there were balls and hunts and other festivities, but little mirth with it all. Here as elsewhere Napoleon was engrossed in State affairs and generally out of humour. "How I pity you!" said Talleyrand to M. de Rémusat, who was Prefect of the Palace. "Your task is to amuse the unamusable!" The rigid etiquette, the chilling silence of the official receptions, the invariable tragedies—for comedy was prohibited—were tedious and exhausting to all, a fact which did not escape the Emperor. He asked his famous diplomatist what was the reason of it? Talleyrand replied: "You cannot summon pleasure at the beat of drum, and you look exactly as if you were saying to each of us, as you would do in the army, 'Now then, Gentlemen and Ladies,—Forward! March!'" But Talleyrand could take liberties few others dared. Napoleon declared he was the only man with whom he could talk. Yet he would not on any account have let Talleyrand think himself indispensable, and he disliked the feeling that part of his success was due to his Minister. Furthermore, since 1805, Talleyrand had been against rather than in favour of Russia, and now under the changed conditions he could no longer fittingly hold his official post. And so after the campaign Napoleon gratified his old wish to become a high dignitary, and appointed him Vice-Grand Chancellor, with a munificent salary. His portfolio as Foreign Minister was then bestowed on Champagny, previously Minister of the Interior. Although in demitting office Talleyrand lost much of his influence and all his initiative, Napoleon continued to seek his advice, and every evening the veteran diplomatist

might be seen hobbling into the Emperor's room, where he remained closeted with him for hours. There was certainly no lack of subjects for serious discussion.

Suddenly, right in the midst of the Fontainebleau Fêtes, came the astonishing news that England had sent a fleet with an expeditionary corps to surprise and attack Denmark, had bombarded Copenhagen for three days (September 2nd-5th, 1807) and had taken captive the Danish fleet stationed there. These tidings fell like a thunderclap on the Imperial Court. No one, not even Napoleon, had anticipated such swift and vigorous action from the hitherto dilatory Britain. It afterwards transpired that through some indiscretion the English Government had learned from Tilsit that Denmark would soon be forced to join the continental alliance and that her fleet would close the German Sea and the Baltic against British vessels. To guard against this emergency the London Cabinet had ordered the attack on Copenhagen. And so although the energetic Prince Frederick, who was regent of Denmark in place of King Christian VII, then in his dotage, had concluded an alliance with France on October 30th, 1807, it was of no avail, for the Danish fleet was already lost and the passage of the Sound could no longer be defended against the British.

In acting thus England had solved the great question left open by the Tilsit Treaty; all chance of an amicable arrangement between Britain and the Continental States under Napoleon's control was now at an end. Russia in her capacity of intermediary, having failed to bring about a peace, she had now in conformity with the terms of the secret alliance, to declare war against England. This she did on November 7th, 1807. The Czar was not without serious misgivings, for trade with Britain was a necessity for his empire. Russia's prosperity depended upon the export of her rich field and forest produce, which was shipped for her by Britain, who also was best able to dispose of such produce effectively and economically. And, moreover, the absence of home industries made the Russian consumer dependent on British goods. The classes affected by this state of affairs were the landed nobility,

on whom fell the first brunt, the merchants, and the financiers, all of whom found themselves threatened with enormous losses. The army, who had previously wanted peace, was more dissatisfied than ever to find that they had shed their blood for a cause which seemed likely to ruin their country. In short, the opposition to the continental blockade was almost universal and manifested itself occasionally with ominous frankness; and ultimately it proved largely instrumental in bringing about the rupture with Napoleon. For the present, however, the Czar was convinced that no victory could be won over Napoleon for a long time to come, and so he maintained his autocratic attitude, though secretly feeling little confidence in his powerful ally.[1]

After all, the essential point for him was that he saw in the alliance a means of securing possession of the Turkish principalities of Moldavia and Walachia, as well as of Finland, which was still a Swedish province. If he succeeded in obtaining both these objects—Napoleon had given his consent, though only verbally—he would then be able by means of these successes to combat the opposition effectively. It was on these points that the allies were soon to differ, not indeed openly, but in secret. Savary, who in December, 1807, had been succeeded by Caulaincourt as French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, kept the Emperor accurately informed of the hostile trend of opinion in Russia, as did also Soult and Davoût, who had remained in Poland and Prussia with their corps. Napoleon knew from his own experience how suddenly the Czar let himself be persuaded into adopting political opinions diametrically opposed to those he had previously held, and hence he never lost sight of the possibility of a change of policy at St. Petersburg. We know it was one of Napoleon's principles to treat his friends as those who might at any time become his enemies. Under the existing circumstances it would have been the easiest thing in the world for Russia to transform herself into an opponent, and therefore Napoleon deemed it

[1] In November, 1807, he answered Schöler, the Prussian Ambassador, who had warned him not to trust the Emperor too far, that trust was simply out of the question with Napoleon.

unwise to help such an ally to extend her power. He resolved not to assist her in procuring the Turkish principalities on the Danube, which would give the Czar that immediate control of the Eastern question which Napoleon meant to reserve exclusively for himself and to direct in accordance with French national interests.[1] He even declared it was indispensable for him to maintain an army of observation along the Russian frontier, and he delayed the evacuation of Prussia by making exorbitant demands on that country.[2] There was yet another consideration.

In Turkey, as we have already seen, current opinion was hostile to France; none the less the Porte carefully avoided any open rupture, so as to afford no pretext on her part for the dreaded partition of her territory. On the other hand, if she were openly attacked, she would then be forced to seek help from England. As that would mean the opening up of a wide channel to British trade and the closing of the gateway of the East against France, Napoleon was determined at all costs to prevent it. Hence the necessity for bringing the Balkan Peninsula absolutely under his own control. It was for this reason that he had previously demanded Corfu, which he now had hastily fortified. On learning that Russia had declared war against England, he immediately ordered his

[1] In January, 1807, Talleyrand wrote Hauterive that France wanted Turkey undivided, "so that others might not be strengthened by annexing parts of it, and in order to secure for French trade in the south the most 'profitable' indeed the only source of its prosperity" (Driault, "La Politique Orientale de Napoléon I," p. 384). In 1806 Codrika, former Secretary to the Turkish Embassy, had submitted to Napoleon a scheme for placing European Turkey under a French or South German Prince, under Napoleon's protection, while the Sultan, as ruler of Asiatic Turkey and Kaliph, was to reside in Bagdad; and Egypt, the emporium of commerce between Asia and Europe, was to fall to France.

[2] In a convention signed on July 12th, 1807, the Prussian negotiator, General Kalkreuth, had allowed the French to impose the condition that Prussia should be evacuated at certain dates and stages as agreed upon, but only on condition that the indemnity was paid in full or that its payment was amply guaranteed. As this indemnity had been arbitrarily fixed by Napoleon at over 150,000,000 francs, there was little prospect that King Frederick William could ever fulfil the required condition.

Minister of Marine to assemble a fleet which he hoped would reconquer Malta and Sicily, and, by attacking Gibraltar, deprive Britain of all access to the Mediterranean. At the same time and with the same end in view, he requested the Sultan to grant his troops free passage from Dalmatia through Albania and he also reinforced the corps in Dalmatia. That was asking a good deal of Turkey—to have asked more would probably have driven her into the arms of Britain, while to have asked the surrender of the Danube principalities to Russia, her hereditary foe, would certainly have done so. Hence it was never mentioned. The Czar afterwards declared that at Tilsit, Napoleon himself had been the first to suggest a transfer of these principalities as a bait to win him over to his anti-British policy. However, Russia's declaration of war against George III had accomplished this, and so no further heed was paid to the promise. On the other hand, in accordance with the Tilsit Treaty, Napoleon negotiated for peace between Russia and Turkey, and on August 29th, 1807, through his mediation a truce was signed at Slobosia, but as it contained no word of the surrender of the two principalities, and merely ordered both sides, Russians and Turks, to withdraw their troops, the Czar refused to sign it, left his army in the aforesaid principalities, and urged Napoleon to fulfil his promise. The latter replied by two skilful moves on the political chessboard by which he completely checkmated Russia in the East.

In the first place he professed his willingness—with profuse assurances of his friendship for the Czar—to assist Russia in obtaining the Danube provinces, provided she consented to let him annex Silesia, in which case he would immediately evacuate Prussia. But if the Czar did not withdraw his troops from Walachia neither would he withdraw his from Germany. Napoleon was in a very strong position; for as Silesia was the province which divided Prussia, then almost annihilated, from Austria, it dominated both countries and even Warsaw. To have annexed it, therefore, would have given France a great preponderance in East European affairs, and at the same time have provided her with an excellent base for operations against Russia's flank, should that Power

at any time attempt to gratify her ambitions in Southern Europe. Napoleon himself could not expect Russia to consent. Only recently the Czar had demanded at Paris through his ambassador, Tolstoi, that the King of Prussia should at length have his land restored to him, hence he could not now with any show of decency assist in the spoliation of Prussia. He therefore declined, and the Russian troops remained on the Danube. Napoleon thereupon proceeded to enlarge at Constantinople upon his own good offices, and upon the wickedness of the Russians who did not want peace; and so successful was he in his representations that he actually induced the Turks to close their ports against the British. The French divisions accordingly remained in Prussia, and as this was felt by the Czar to be a standing menace, Tolstoi persistently repeated his demands, and also requested that the Danube principalities be granted to the Czar as a guarantee. France, they declared in St. Petersburg, could obtain compensation for herself in Turkey—such as Albania—but to that Napoleon would not consent, for it would only have been the beginning of that dismemberment from which he wished to deter the Czar, at least until the war with England was ended.

Napoleon's second move against Russia was as follows: Gustavus IV, either from fear of sharing Denmark's fate, or from personal dislike of Bonaparte and his system, had adhered to his alliance with Britain. Napoleon now reminded the Czar of the clause in the treaty in which this contingency had been foreseen, and urged Alexander to declare war against his brother-in-law, the King of Sweden, and to conquer Finland for himself, adding that Bernadotte was waiting in Holstein with an army corps ready to co-operate. Indeed, in a letter of February 2nd, 1808, he even encouraged the Czar to extend the Russian frontiers on the Swedish side as far as he liked, and promised him all the assistance possible, as he was animated by a "desire for Russia's fame, happiness, and greatness". Although he would much rather have had the Danube principalities than Finland, the Czar acceded to the proposal, and during the last week of February, 1808, while his

Minister in St. Petersburg was beguiling the Swedish Ambassador with false assurances, his troops suddenly crossed the border into Finland. Relying on the promised support from France, he had expected this expedition to be a simple matter, and had consequently not withdrawn any of his troops from the Danube. But it proved far otherwise. The Swedes, supported by Britain, offered a victorious resistance and the whole undertaking proved full of difficulty. The Czar found himself compelled to augment his expeditionary force, and as he could not withdraw his troops in Poland on account of the French occupation of Prussia, he was obliged to bring his reinforcements from the Danube provinces, and consequently to renounce his hopes of conquest there in the meantime. This would not have been necessary had Bernadotte supplied the promised help. But that he did not do, for it was Napoleon's aim to involve Alexander so deeply in Finland that his plans in Turkey would simply collapse. "France," the Czar complained to Caulaincourt, "pledged herself to support Russia's efforts against Sweden by effective help. Why has General Bernadotte suddenly come to a standstill in his march?" The French Ambassador in reply talked of the difficulties of crossing the Belt to Schonen. But the true reason is stated in Napoleon's letter to Talleyrand on April 25th, 1808, where he says: "I could not throw my troops so lightly into Sweden; it is not a place where I have anything to gain". In another letter he sharply reprimands Caulaincourt for having given the Czar some excellent military advice for the conduct of war with Sweden. Meanwhile, the French divisions in Poland and in Prussia were concentrated, and strong fortifications thrown up at Modlin, a strategic point at the junction of the rivers Bug and Vistula, in readiness for any emergency; for the dissatisfaction in Russia was daily increasing and there was no knowing what might happen.

Napoleon's attitude towards Russia must be borne in mind in judging his treatment of the other European States during the same period. Needless to say, under existing cir-

cumstances neither Prussia nor Austria could escape from the sphere of his sinister power, for the incessant occupation of North-eastern Germany not only held Russia in check, but also threatened and circumscribed the politics of the two central European States. Scarcely had Alexander issued his manifesto against England when the Prussian Court at Memel was obliged to recall its ambassador from London (November 29th, 1807). In February, 1808, Napoleon bluntly told King Frederick William's brother, who had gone to Paris to try and obtain some reduction of the debt, that the evacuation of Prussia was one of the important factors in international politics and not a question of money—which was tantamount to saying that even if the King met all the French demands, his country would not be rid of French troops. Brockhausen, the Prussian chargé d'affaires, shows clearly in his reports that he considered France did not feel altogether confident of being able to maintain her influence with Russia, and that it was her fear, lest the opposition there might bring about a change of system, that made her strive to prolong her occupation of Prussia.

With Austria, Napoleon employed somewhat less summary methods. During the last two years that Power, in spite of her financial embarrassments, had re-organized and increased her army and was therefore to be treated more warily. But it was the veriest formality on Napoleon's part to request Austria to mediate with Britain for peace, to demand the return of the Danish fleet, and if this were refused, to recall her ambassador. In reality it was a command, which the Danube Power, hard pressed by the Franco-Russian alliance and threatened from the North by a French army, could not refuse, and so in November, 1807, Count Starhemberg, the Austrian ambassador, submitted his request in London. England declared herself willing to open negotiations provided Napoleon offered an adequate basis. But there the matter ended. On November 11th, the British Government had replied to Napoleon's blockade decrees by granting all non-French vessels the right to call at blockaded ports by purchasing

permission to do so at London or Malta. Napoleon then threatened to confiscate all vessels in French ports complying with this measure (November 23rd), and further declared as lawful booty all such as submitted to the British right of search (December 17th, 1807). He had previously ordered all letters from England to be destroyed. The atmosphere was therefore not favourable to peace. On January 1st, when Starhemberg requested that negotiators should be sent to Paris, the London Cabinet refused his request and desired a different meeting-place, as well as information as to the basis for negotiations. Shortly before this King George had replied to Russia's declaration of war by sending a message severely criticizing Napoleon's harsh treatment of Prussia. This was followed by an article in the "Moniteur," accusing the English nation of weakness and calling their Ministers freebooters. Austria's mediation was therefore fruitless, and so Starhemberg demanded his passports. Before leaving he informed the English Government in strictest secrecy that in spite of appearances Austria remained friendly to Britain. It was an advantage to Napoleon to have kept Austria and England apart at this time, for without English subsidies Austria was not strong enough to undertake extensive operations. Fortunately, in October the French had at last condescended to evacuate Braunau, but they took care to adjust the settlement of the frontiers in Italy in their own favour and greatly to Austria's disadvantage. Meanwhile France was making overtures at Vienna with regard to the partitioning of Turkey. Austria was to share in the spoil, and the Archduke Charles and the Minister Stadion, at Napoleon's instigation, were hoping to secure a large portion, including Bosnia, Servia, part of Bulgaria, and a strip of land extending to Saloniki. When Napoleon's conduct to Russia at this time is borne in mind, it is impossible to repress a smile to see the Corsican's alluring wiles still finding such credulous dupes. It would have required exceptional circumstances to have induced Napoleon to allow Russia a share in the partitioning of Turkey, and he was probably quite sincere in this case in leaving something for Austria so that the Czar's

empire might not become too powerful.[1] For the time being, the Turkish plans were of practical value to Austria, because they afforded her an adequate pretext for arming—for any emergency.

It was not only in the East but also in the South and the West that the consequences of the blockade decrees and the Tilsit Treaty made themselves felt. The proceedings with Spain and Portugal will be dealt with later. Here suffice it to say that in the end of 1807 Napoleon dominated the policy of the whole Iberian Peninsula. When he was able to impose his will with such effect on the great Powers, he was much more drastic and imperious in his treatment of the lesser States where resistance was simply out of the question. Take Italy, for instance. Entering the port under an American flag, English wares had found a refuge at Leghorn, where they were stored and distributed, being sent North sometimes as far as Leipzig. The widowed Queen of Etruria, who, unwisely for herself, had gathered around her an anti-French entourage, declared she could not shut her ports against a neutral flag. Thereupon, about the end of August 1807, Napoleon sent 6000 troops under General Miollis to invade Tuscany and confiscate all British goods found there, and shortly afterwards he informed the Queen that she must cede her country to France, and that compensation had been reserved for her elsewhere in accordance with arrangements made with Spain. In December, French troops occupied Florence; and on May 30th, 1808, Tuscany, Corsica, Piedmont, and Elba were declared constituent parts of France and divided into three departments.

There was now only one small State in Italy which defied Napoleon's system, that of the Pope. It bordered on two

[1] "Hauterive's Mémoire," Driault, p. 386. "The partition of Turkey would necessarily have made Russia a sea power; it would have acquired fleets, an extensive coast-line, harbours, and about 150,000 born seamen." Its adverse influence on French trade would have been inevitable. It was therefore safer to share Turkish territory with Austria, and to build up a barrier against the East. On the whole, the subject of dismemberment was merely a theory, a kind of threat to induce England to make peace.

seas and could not be left out if the continental blockade was to be rigidly enforced. We have already seen how matters stood between the Pope and the Emperor before the last war. During the campaign the French Ambassador, Alquier, had zealously endeavoured to induce the Holy Father to recognize Joseph as King of Naples, and to enter into what was called the Italian Federation, which was under Napoleon's suzerainty, but without success. The Pope would only recognize Joseph on condition that the neutrality and independence of the Holy See were also recognized, i.e. that he should not be required to enter the league hostile to Britain. On receiving this refusal Napoleon had written Eugène Beauharnais from Dresden on July 22nd, 1807, a characteristic letter which he was to submit to Pius VII. "The present Pope," so runs the letter, "is too mighty. Priests are not made for governing. Why will he not render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's. . . . If a stop is not put to this disturbing of my States, the time is perhaps not far distant when I shall recognize the Pope only as Bishop of Rome and as on the same footing with the other Bishops of my States. I shall then not hesitate to summon the Churches of France, Italy, Germany, and Poland to a Council and arrange matters without the Pope's assistance." On the same day instructions of a more practical character were sent to the ambassador in Rome, who was to request the Pope to admit twenty-four Frenchmen into the College of Cardinals, and to grant Caprara, the Papal Legate at Paris, full powers to conclude a treaty settling the questions then in dispute. Both requests were refused. On the other hand the Curia sent Cardinal Bayanne, who was also the French nominee, to France to appease the offended potentate and to grant what had been refused him scarcely a year before—his coronation as Emperor of the West. The increase in the number of Cardinals was still not granted, and the Pope again declined to join the Italian Federation. This last point was indispensable to Napoleon for the success of his schemes in the Mediteranean. "What the Emperor of the French especially desires," runs Champagny's letter to Caprara in which Napoleon's dictation is

unmistakable, "is that the temporal Sovereign of Rome should be in harmony with France and not hold himself aloof from her interests and politics. The interests of humanity and the voices of sixty million subjects call to him, 'Force England to live in peace with us and to give us back our ports, our shores, our ships, our maritime and commercial relations'. If the Pope alone on the Continent desires to adhere to Britain, would it not then be the duty of the Head of the Empire to unite at once to the Empire that part of his dominions which was alienating itself by its political attitude, and to annul the gift of Charlemagne when it is being used as a weapon against his successor? As yet the Emperor would be content with incorporating in his Empire only the three Papal Legations of Urbino, Macerata, and Ancona, as these are indispensable to connect Upper Italy with Naples." Such were the principal demands; others were, the suppression of the religious orders in Italy, an increase in the number of the French Cardinals, and the inclusion of Venice in the Italian concordat.

The threat of annexing the three Legations produced a most painful impression in Rome. Three years previously Pius had undertaken the long and toilsome journey to Paris, in spite of the consciousness of thereby discrediting himself somewhat in the eyes of the Catholic world, in the sole hope of winning back the territories of Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna; yet here he was about to lose a further portion of his land and that the part with the richest revenues. The cardinals who had previously for their own financial advantage advised the coronation journey, now urged him for the same reasons to yield. He did so at last and declared himself ready to make common cause with France against England, and to admit French garrisons into Ancona and Civita Vecchia. Napoleon had not only expected this submission, he had prepared for it. Without waiting for the decision of the Curia, in December, 1807, he ordered General Lemarrois to march without delay into the aforesaid Legations. Meanwhile at Paris he persuaded Cardinal Bayanne to sign a treaty sanctioning all his demands, even the one

requiring that in future one-third of the College of Cardinals should be Frenchmen. Napoleon's real aim in acting thus was to goad the Pope out of his conciliatory attitude into resistance, so that he might then get possession of all the Papal territory; and in this he succeeded. Deeply incensed at the arbitrary occupation of his Eastern provinces, Pius refused to ratify the treaty concluded with Cardinal Bayanne and declined outright to enter the federation against England. This was exactly what Napoleon wanted. He now denounced the Pope to the world, not without a certain plausibility, as the disturber of "the great work of peace"—reason sufficient to justify Charlemagne II in taking back the gift of Charlemagne I. In the end of January, 1808, General Miollis received orders to occupy Rome, and on February 2nd he arrived there. His instructions were to banish all non-Roman prelates, to enrol the Papal battalions in the French army, to disband the Pontifical Guard, and to take over the administration of the country. All this was completed by April, 1808, and the Papal States were then virtually a French province.

On February 2nd, the day on which his troops entered Rome, Napoleon sent the letter to the Czar counselling him to declare war on Sweden. England's attitude towards recent events had induced him to take this step. For the coalition of the continental Powers against Britain had not produced the impression in London that the Emperor had intended and expected. The blockade decrees, instead of forcing Britain to negotiate for peace, had produced exactly the opposite effect, and when Parliament met in January, 1808, the speech from the throne announced the firm intention of continuing the struggle. In London they were only too well aware of the opposition in Russia, of the spirit of revolt that was steadily gaining strength both in Prussia and in Austria, and of the fact that even Sweden was ready to enter the lists against France. Hence the necessity for Napoleon to attach the Czar to himself by even stronger bonds, and so he wrote the letter of February 2nd. In addition to the Swedish proposals therein mooted, there were some high-flown ideas ex-

pressed in high-sounding language, well calculated to impress a pupil of the idealist La Harpe. The English, the letter falsely declared, wanted war to the uttermost; peace therefore could only be attained by far-reaching measures. "An army of 50,000 troops, French, Russian, and perhaps also Austrian, could be thrown into Asia by way of Constantinople; once they reached the Euphrates, England would sink prostrate at the feet of Europe. I am already in the field in Dalmatia, and your Majesty on the Danube. Within a month of us coming to an agreement the army could concentrate on the Bosphorus; the effects of this would be felt in India, and England would be conquered. I refuse none of the preliminary conditions, which seem necessary for such a great object, provided the mutual interest of our States maintains the balance of power. This matter can only be settled by a personal interview with your Majesty or by a frank discussion between Rumjantzoff (the Russian Chancellor) and Caulaincourt, and by sending a delegate favourable to our system to Paris. . . . Everything could be drawn up and settled by the middle of March; on May 1st our troops would be in Asia, yours in Stockholm. Then, threatened in India, and banished from the East, England would sink under the pressure of circumstances. Your Majesty and I would certainly have preferred to enjoy peace in our wide empires, labouring only to animate them by efficient and benevolent administration and to make them happy. But the enemies in the world will not allow it, and so we are forced to go further than our intentions. It is always wise and politic to do what Fate ordains and to go whither the irresistible trend of events impels us. This crowd of pygmies who do not see that the comparison of the present must be sought for in ancient history, not in the newspapers of last century, will then yield; they will follow at our beck, and the peoples of Russia will rejoice in the fame, wealth, and happiness which will accrue to them from these great events. In these few lines I lay bare my inmost thoughts to your Majesty. The work of Tilsit will decide the fate of the world."[1]

[1] "Corr.," xvi. p. 498.

It is doubtful whether these sounding periods produced much effect on the Czar, whose character was a strange mixture of idealism and shrewd calculation, heroic aspirations and pusillanimity. The words "Constantinople" and "Bosphorus," which had not been mentioned since the Tilsit days, were certainly well calculated to impress a grandson of the great Empress. For it was Napoleon, who had so emphatically rejected the idea of seizing Constantinople, who now re-opened the subject. What a success for the Czar if he were able to realize Katherine's cherished project! It would also prove an effectual means of silencing the opposition in his own realm. Hence Alexander adhered to his alliance with France and so far Napoleon gained his ends. Viewed in the light of subsequent events Napoleon's conduct in this matter produces the impression that if he did not actually instigate the Czar to assume a hostile attitude towards England, he certainly took advantage of it to reassure himself of the Czar's support. The French Ambassador at St. Petersburg now began to discuss the dismemberment of Turkey, but all final arrangements were reserved for the interview, and no mention was made as to where or when it was to take place. During the days that the Russian Minister Rumjantzoff and Caulaincourt were conferring at St. Petersburg, the French ambassador received instructions from Paris that as the Emperor wanted peace to be maintained on the Continent, he was to do his utmost to prevent a renewal of hostilities between Russia and Turkey. Yet it was precisely at this time that Napoleon said to Count Metternich, the Austrian plenipotentiary in Paris, that there was no question of the dismemberment of Turkey, but should that ever come to pass, Austria could not view with equanimity any increase of Russia's territory and would require the support of France, for it was to the latter Power's interest to see that Austria preserved the balance of power against Russian aggressions in the East.

As for the Indian project, its importance lay in the possibility of involving Russia in a distant expedition, so as to be rid of her as a competitor in Turkey; and for this reason it

seemed more feasible to Napoleon than formerly. One of the articles in the Treaty with Persia at Finkenstein referred, as we have seen, to India, and mention was again made of it in the instructions to Caulaincourt in November, 1807. "We can now—i.e. when all Europe combines against England—think about an expedition to India. The more chimerical it appears, the more it will alarm England when it is actually undertaken, and what could not France and Russia accomplish! Forty thousand Frenchmen, to whom the Porte would allow a passage through Constantinople, in co-operation with 40,000 Russians advancing over the Caucasus (no longer the Bosphorus) would be sufficient to spread terror through Asia and to conquer it. With these possibilities in view the Emperor has sent his Ambassador (General Gardane) to Persia." In the end of January, Napoleon had received a brother of General Decaen who had captured the Isle de France, and it is possible that his information, describing the Indian expedition, especially by sea, as presenting few difficulties, confirmed the Emperor in making these representations. It is said that after this officer had zealously combated and removed the Emperor's objections, Napoleon repeatedly caught his face in both hands and caressed it, evincing the liveliest delight.[1] Algiers and Tunis were now added to his plans; after losing Egypt he had thought of them as compensation. The watchful Metternich, who firmly believed that the Emperor was now thinking of reconquering Egypt, which had always formed part of the Indian project, wrote home on January 18th, 1808: "Egypt is like an old axiom which he must defend". As a matter of fact the Emperor was thinking of sending an expedition of 6000 men to Aboukir. Before doing so he deemed it advisable to assemble fourteen men-of-war at Toulon and force Britain to withdraw her fleet from the Mediterranean by threatening her with an invasion of Ireland and other maritime projects. These demonstrations he reckoned would be over about the middle of September, and the expedition could then set sail—so wrote Napoleon on May 26th, to the Minister of Marine.

[1] *Vide* "Prentout L'île de France sous Decaen," p. 466.

Napoleon was at this time in Bayonne, whither he had gone on an errand of vast political importance. It was in connexion with Spain, whose King, Charles IV, was an idle and incapable monarch, its Queen an object of infamy, the people miserably poor and oppressed, and all of them were under the rule of the "Prince of Peace," who submitted unresistingly to the hegemony of their powerful neighbour. At Napoleon's bidding Spain had declared war against Britain, which had cost her her ships, her trade, and part of her colonies, while her very existence was imperilled by France, from whom she had constantly to purchase it anew by heavy contributions in money and troops. When Napoleon began his war with Prussia in 1806, it had seemed for a moment as if the Court of Madrid was about to tire of its habitual submissiveness. The Russian ambassador sought to induce Spain to join the coalition, and Britain threatened to fan the flame of rebellion in the Spanish Colonies of South America, while the fate of the Bourbon King of Naples, Ferdinand IV (a brother of the King of Spain), so intensified the popular hatred of Napoleon that when it became known he was about to enter the lists against the renowned army of Prussia, preparations for war were begun in Madrid in the hope that he might be defeated. A premature manifesto, on October 5th, spoke in ambiguous terms of the necessity of taking up arms. But the document was ill-timed. Only a few days later the battle of Jena was fought, and at the news of that brilliant victory the projected resistance was instantly abandoned. The mobilization was discontinued, — the French Ambassador had been told it was directed against Portugal,—and the Prince of Peace again lavishly protested his devotion to France.[1]

But the whole trend of events had been rightly gauged by the French Ambassador who sent his master a full report on

[1] In a publication issued in 1808, and manifestly inspired by Napoleon, an effort was made to show that Spain had already attempted to intrigue against France as far back as 1805, but there is no further proof of this statement.

the subject. The Emperor read this dispatch and the famous manifesto at Berlin just as his ultimate goal of universal dominion seemed at last within reach, and when he was actually preparing for his final move eastward to attain it. Eye-witnesses tell us that he turned white with excitement, but he controlled himself, nor did he let Spain know that he was aware of her projected change of front, of which he had also learned from intercepted dispatches from the Prussian Ambassador at Madrid. He received her renewed professions of devotion as *bona fide* and soon made her act up to them. He demanded a contingent of 15,000 of the recently mobilized troops, and sent them to the mouth of the Elbe to fight against the English; he insisted on the blockade being rigidly enforced, and on the Spanish fleet joining the French fleet in Toulon; and he saddled the Government of Madrid with 25,000 Prussian prisoners-of-war, to be fed and housed. If Spain at that moment had only possessed a strong and popular Government she would at once have opened her harbours to Britain and have declared herself against France. The years following proved that there was no lack of the sinews of resistance. But the Government was feeble and most unpopular. Godoy, the "Prince of Peace," and the guilty Queen were both cordially hated, and the Crown Prince had the sympathies of the people largely because his mother and Godoy were scheming to keep him out of the succession. It was on these differences between the Government and the people, and among the members of the reigning family, that Napoleon counted to build up his own power in Spain, so that while he was actually engaged in his enterprise in the East he could feel France was secure in his rear, and be able to reckon more confidently than hitherto on the co-operation of Spain. The difficulty was "how" to set about it. After reading Godoy's manifesto he resolved to drive the Bourbons from this throne also and to bestow it upon a member of his own family, a decision in which he was probably influenced by Talleyrand, who reminded him that Louis XIV in his day had placed a scion of his house on the

throne of Spain.[1] This goal he reached by a devious path the first stage of which was through Portugal.

In Tilsit it has been arranged that the Court of Lisbon should be summoned to declare war on Britain and, in the event of refusal, be treated as an enemy. Spain was called upon to co-operate; and this was no small request, for the Crown Prince John of Portugal, who had been appointed Regent when his mother became insane, was the son-in-law of Charles IV. Yet the Spanish Ambassador in Lisbon sided with the French Ambassador when the latter demanded the closing of all Portuguese ports against British vessels, the dismissal of the British Ambassador, and even the imprisonment of all British subjects in Portugal and the confiscation of their goods. The Portuguese Minister, who had secretly come to an understanding with Britain, replied consenting to the closure of the ports, but not to the confiscation of goods, nor to the imprisonment of British subjects, who nevertheless received an unofficial hint to leave at once. Napoleon had resorted to these exacting demands with the deliberate intention of provoking resistance, and was intensely annoyed at this compliance. He at once proceeded to act. On September 30th, 1807, the French and Spanish Ambassadors left Lisbon, and on October 18th, 20,000 French troops under Junot crossed the frontiers and invaded Portugal. On October 27th, a secret treaty between France and Spain was signed at Fontainebleau by the terms of which Portugal was to be conquered and divided into three parts. The northern portion from the Douro to the Minho, was to be given to the Queen of Etruria as compensation for Tuscany; the Southern part, the province of Alemtejo and Algarvia with the title of a principality was to be given to Godoy; while the central portion was to remain in the hands of France until a general

[1] Pasquier ("Mémoires," I. 329) declares Talleyrand had already spoken of this to Napoleon in Poland. It is highly probable that the matter was again discussed at Fontainebleau. Possibly Talleyrand hoped by stimulating his master's ambition to strengthen his own position again. Talleyrand was then acting as Deputy Arch-Chancellor of State for the Viceroy Eugène.

peace had been concluded. The Portuguese colonies were also to be divided and the King of Spain was to receive the title of Emperor of America. In the drafting of this treaty, which the Emperor had planned during his journey back from Tilsit, Champagny, the Foreign Minister, had been purposely passed over, and it was Duroc who was ordered to sign it; Talleyrand also was kept in the dark. Murat alone was in the secret, and here at last he foresaw the possibility of wearing a royal crown. The fact that Godoy was to share in the spoils was a guarantee that the treaty would be ratified at Madrid, for even before the last war Godoy had vainly sought at Paris to secure provision for himself at Portugal's expense. On the same day the arrangements for the military part of the enterprise were settled in a separate convention. France was to advance on Madrid through Spain with 39,000 troops, (11,000 of whom were Spaniards) while 16,000 Spanish troops were to occupy North and South Portugal. A special article granted France the right of assembling at Bayonne other 40,000 troops, who, however, were not to intervene unless Britain landed troops in Portugal.

On seeing all these preparations for hostilities, Prince John had hesitated for a moment as to whether he would place himself unreservedly in the Emperor's hands. Then he read in the "Moniteur" of November 13th, 1807: "The Regent of Portugal is about to lose his Throne. The fall of the house of Braganza is a new proof of the inevitable destruction awaiting all those who adhere to Britain." No choice was left but flight, for a little country like Portugal could not struggle single-handed against France and Spain. On November 27th, 1807, the Royal family sailed for Brazil to seek a home beyond the seas. A few days later Junot entered Lisbon with a handful of jaded troops, only to find the city without a leader, unable even to attempt resistance. The Portuguese flag was hauled down from the citadel and the tricolour run up in its place.

The Fontainebleau treaty owed its significance not so much to its political aspect as to its military terms. The Spanish troops were to be sent westwards, which meant

that a French army could then advance on Madrid unopposed—precisely as Napoleon had intended.[1] That he was able to accomplish this was largely due to the state of matters at the Court of Madrid, where the dissensions in the Royal family had just then reached a climax. The Crown Prince had been intriguing against his mother and Godoy to get the government into his own hands, but on the plot being discovered the King issued a manifesto accusing his son of high treason. Both parties turned to Napoleon for "advice," the Crown Prince supplementing his appeal for protection against Godoy by suing for the hand of a Bonaparte Princess.

Judging that the time was now ripe for him to act, Napoleon admonished Charles IV not to delay the expedition against Portugal by squabbles in his palace, and at the same time he gave the bearer of the letter secret instructions to get accurate information as to the state of feeling throughout the country, as to the strength of the fortresses and of the army, and the distribution of the troops (November 13th, 1807). Shortly afterwards, on December 6th, General Dupont, who commanded the second French corps, comprising 40,000 troops, received orders to cross the Spanish frontiers and march upon Vittoria and Burgos, although as yet there was no sign of British troops landing. Napoleon was at this time in Upper Italy, and at Venice, early in December, he met his brother Joseph and offered him the throne of Spain, exclusive of the territory north of the Ebro. But as Joseph declined, Napoleon then seemed to favour the idea of a family alliance with Spain.[2] In Mantua he saw Lucien and sug-

[1] In the marching orders for October 17th, Junot received instructions to furnish accurate descriptions of all the provinces through which he would pass and to obtain information about the roads and the nature of the country, sketches of which were to be made by the officers in the engineers, as it was important to know these facts ("Corr.," xvi. 13,267).

[2] Miot de Melito, Joseph's intimate friend, gives December 2nd as the date of the brothers' meeting, and of Joseph leaving Naples. But Miot errs when he represents the King of Naples as accepting his brother's offer; Masson in his "Napoléon et sa famille," holds that the Emperor spoke of his intentions to his brother, but did not offer him the throne; that offer not having been made till February. Napoleon at this time was only

gested a marriage between his eldest daughter Charlotte and the Crown Prince, provided Lucien would divorce his wife, in which case Napoleon was prepared to offer him the throne of Portugal or even of Spain. "Do you not see it falling into the hollow of my hand, thanks to the follies of your beloved Bourbons and to the stupidity of your friend the Prince of Peace?" Lucien, however, would not consent to the divorce, and on his agreeing to the project of marriage (which was to be kept secret in the meantime) a proposal was immediately brought forward in Madrid to surrender all Spanish territory as far as the Ebro to France, as compensation for which the whole of Portugal was to be taken. But all these plans were vague, the one substantial fact was that between November and January, 50,000 French troops poured into Spain and took up positions near Valladolid and Burgos. Murat was made commander-in-chief and ordered to occupy the Spanish fortresses in the North. No one knew exactly why the French troops were there. The Spanish people assumed they had come to set the Crown Prince upon the throne and to overthrow the hated rule of Godoy, and consequently hailed them with delight. Ferdinand himself shared this view, owing to the fact that the French Ambassador, Beauharnais, had entered into relations with his party. Charles IV, on the other hand, wrote an anxious letter, begging for

thinking of marrying his niece, Lucien's daughter, to Ferdinand of Spain, as was evident at the meeting with Lucien in Mantua on December 12th, ten days after the interview with Joseph at Venice. It is quite probable that Napoleon fell back on this project after Joseph's refusal. If he really offered the throne to Lucien at Mantua, as the latter records in his memoirs (II. 113), he certainly would not have done so without having previously offered it to the older and better qualified brother; and if he expressed himself unfavourably of Joseph, probably these circumstances induced him to do so. The idea of dethroning the Bourbons was possibly forced into the background, but not the intentions with regard to England, who was to be dissuaded from peace by provocative measures. The occupation of Lisbon, the incorporation of Leghorn and Ancona, and the new blockade decrees were sufficient provocation, not to speak of the strong reinforcements of troops in Spain during November. Compare also Coquelle, "Napoléon et l'Angleterre," p. 185, on the failure of Austria's mediation in London.

some explanation and asking that the treaty of October 27th, dealing with Portugal and the proposed family alliance, should be made public. Napoleon answered falsely that the troops were intended to prevent the landing of a British army, and that they would therefore march to Cadiz, but that the time was not yet ripe to publish the treaty, nor for the Prince's marriage. It is evident that things were purposely held in suspense, and among the various phases of this complicated intrigue the one thing clear is that Godoy saw through it. He advised the Court to fly south, but when preparations were made for doing so the people thought Godoy was trying to thwart the change of system proposed by Napoleon, and at Aranjuez, where the Court was staying, they demolished Godoy's palace and took him prisoner. The King was then obliged to dismiss his favourite and to abdicate in favour of his son (March 18th, 1808).

This, however, did not fit in with Napoleon's plans. He had hoped that the Spanish Royal family would flee the country, as the Portuguese Royal family had done, and then, as in the other case, he would have interpreted the fact of the flight as proof of them siding with Britain. Instead of this, however, immediately after Murat's entry into Madrid, the new King, Ferdinand VII, arrived there amidst the joyous acclamations of his people, the majority of whom now came to the conclusion that the French had opened the Prince's path to the throne, a presumption fatal to Napoleon's plans. He at once set about devising a means of separating the young Sovereign, whom he had not yet recognized, from his people, and for this purpose Savary was sent to Madrid. He was to tell Ferdinand that the Emperor himself was on his way to Spain, and that it would be wise to go to meet him and to request him to recognize his accession. The young King travelled immediately to Burgos and then on to Vittoria, still, however, without seeing anything of the Emperor. On the other hand he received a letter from him, stating that before recognizing his accession to the throne, Ferdinand must assure him in a personal interview that Charles IV had abdicated of his own free will and not under compulsion.

This interview was to take place at Bayonne. As an enticement the letter stated that "the marriage of a French Princess with your Royal Highness I consider entirely in harmony with the interests of my peoples, and I regard it as an opportunity of once again connecting myself with a reigning family with whom, since I ascended the throne, I have had reason to be satisfied." [1]

Many warning voices in the young King's entourage were raised against the journey to Bayonne; the inhabitants of Vittoria even wanted to prevent him crossing the frontier. Yet what else could he do? On every side the French were encamped and the invitation was practically a command. Savary afterwards related: "At Vittoria I thought for a moment my prisoner was going to escape me; but I called him to order and terrified him." [2] On April 20th, Ferdinand, virtually a prisoner, arrived in Bayonne, whither Godoy and the Royal parents had also been invited by the Emperor.

It is scarcely surprising to learn that the young King did not find what he had expected. Napoleon not only refused to recognize him as King but ordered him unceremoniously to restore the Crown to his father, feeling certain that Charles IV would no longer care to return to a country where his rule was abhorred and where the grossest affronts awaited him and the Prince of Peace. At first Ferdinand

[1] "Corr.," XVII. 13,750. The letter is dated April 16th. Five weeks earlier, on March 27th, Napoleon had written to his brother Louis in Holland: "I am convinced I can only establish a firm peace with England by making my influence powerful throughout the Continent, I am resolved to place a French Prince on the Spanish throne. . . . If I were willing to make you King of Spain, would you accept? (Rocquain, "Napoléon et le Roi Louis," p. 165). Louis declined, alleging that he had only just taken his oath to the Dutch. Napoleon was probably moved to this action by the reports of extensive smuggling in Holland carried on by the British under the American flag, so much so that the Emperor was contemplating the incorporation of the whole country in France (*Vide* letter to Gaudin on March 29th, 1808, "Corr.," XVI. 13,697).

[2] Rémusat, "Mémoires," III. 381. Compare Napoleon's letter to Bessières ("Corr.," XVII. 13,756): "If the Prince of Asturias comes to Bayonne good and well; if he turns back to Burgos, take him prisoner and bring him to Bayonne".

refused; but when news reached Bayonne of an insurrection at Madrid, traced to his instigation, and when Napoleon threatened to treat him as a rebel, he consented and handed back his Crown to Charles IV who laid it confidingly in the hands of Napoleon, from whom Joseph received it on June 6th, 1808.[1]

By guile and sheer brute force Napoleon had reached his ends, and Spain was now indirectly under his sceptre. But whether it would remain so was yet to be seen. If it did, then Britain would be face to face with a hostile Continent, for from the Pillars of Hercules to the Vistula all Europe bowed to the behests of the Colossus. Even the Czar would then no longer venture to hold aloof and pursue a path of his own. Now, indeed, Napoleon could look forward to the time when virtually at his beck a Russian army would cross the confines of the old world to fight in the distant East for the overthrow of his only adversary.[2]

[1] Joseph's temporary fall from favour was partly due to his first refusal and also to personal resentment owing to his having deviated slightly from some orders he had received from Napoleon, and for which he was bitterly reprimanded by the latter on March 25th. Two days later the Spanish throne was offered to Louis. According to Masson, another offer was made to Joseph on February 20th, which he declined because he would again have been required to cede Northern Spain as far as the Ebro and to have made concessions regarding the colonies. The whole truth about the matter will not be made clear until the family correspondence of this period has become more generally known (*vide* the agreements of May 5th, May 10th, and July 5th, in De Clercq, II. 246). The Imperial decree of June 6th, proclaiming Joseph King of Spain, is given in the "Moniteur" (*vide* also Murat, "Murat en Espagne," p. 409).

[2] Among the publications of the year 1808, there was one entitled "The March of the French upon India," in which the expedition is talked of as already settled; 30,000 Russians and 30,000 Frenchmen supported by Persia and countenanced by the disaffected Nabobs, were to put an end to English rule in India. Indeed the writer even declared that a Prussian contingent was to co-operate. All this was to be made known widely, so that people might believe that the ardently desired general peace could only be obtained by a victorious struggle with England. It was a gigantic idea this, to keep the dissatisfied elements in Europe occupied in Asia so as to demonstrate to the nations of Europe that this step was indispensable for their welfare!

The letter on May 26th to the Minister of Marine was written on the assumption that the Iberian Peninsula was secure, and the many letters on the subject which issued from Bayonne contained further developments of the Emperor's great plan for obtaining for France the mastery of the Mediterranean and for persuading Russia to march upon Asia. In reviewing his successes in the past year Napoleon must have experienced a keen gratification which would go far to remove any misgivings he might feel as to the morality of his transactions. Still, there was always the risk that these successes might not prove lasting, and there was one thing he had overlooked in his calculations, one of those elements he could neither understand nor measure, because he no longer possessed the faculty for doing so. Had he accepted the command in La Vendée in 1795, he would there have learned by personal experience the heroic courage of which a people is capable when they have been insulted, deceived, and driven to despair. Then, perhaps, he would have avoided the error he now committed in Spain in undervaluing popular sentiment and in deceiving the nation. He might then have followed Talleyrand's advice and riveted the popular young King to his own interests by marrying him to a French Princess and confirming his accession to the throne, instead of driving him from it. Ferdinand was certainly a worthless fellow, and Napoleon's design to raise the status and civilization of Spain was highly commendable. But the decisive factor was that the will of the nation opposed this design with irresistible vigour, as the Emperor soon learned to his cost.

In July, 1808, Joseph entered Madrid, and the Crown of Naples fell accordingly to Murat. Charles IV and his Queen and Godoy went to Compiègne and ultimately to Italy. The young Prince Ferdinand remained under surveillance at the Château of Valençay in France as the guest of Talleyrand. The new King brought with him to Spain a new Constitution drawn up at Bayonne by representatives of the three estates; he brought with him also capable Ministers and a sincere determination to raise the impoverished kingdom to new strength and splendour. But he found the whole country in revolt,

and although there were able and dispassionate statesmen in Spain, who could recognize the advantages of a new and well-organized administration, and were ready to give their services, yet their prudent counsels were powerless against the embittered passions of millions of their countrymen who regarded the way in which they had been tricked and overpowered by foreigners as a national disgrace which must be avenged. Moreover, in a nation which had triumphed over the infidel Moors and the heretical Reformation, religious pride formed part of their patriotism, and this foreign despot was the man who had robbed the Pope of his throne. In short the nation "refused to ratify the treaty of Bayonne," as Napoleon afterwards declared, and took up arms victoriously. The revolt began in Asturias and during May it spread with incredible rapidity. Messengers were sent to Britain to ask for help, and they met with a willing response. Everywhere leagues were formed, generally under the guidance of the monks, and in many towns "Juntos" were established, i.e. councils governing for Ferdinand VII, who alone was recognized as King. At first the French troops had marched through the country unopposed, but ere long they found themselves harassed by "banditti". At Saragossa the population fought heroically against their besiegers and compelled them to retire. The same thing happened at Valencia, and although Bessières won a victory on the plains near Medina de Riosecco on July 14th, in the mountainous country Dupont's corps, numbering 17,000 troops, was forced to surrender near Baylen on July 23rd. At the tidings of these successes the insurrection spread the whole length and breadth of the country, so that even the King's Council of Ministers was affected by it. Joseph indeed no longer felt himself safe in the capital, and in the end of July he fled to the north and withdrew the whole of the French troops behind the Ebro. Meanwhile the British auxiliaries under Wellesley had landed in Portugal, and on August 30th, 9000 troops under Junot were forced to capitulate at Cintra, though on the most honourable terms. To crown all, at the news of the great revolution in their own country, the Spanish soldiers encamped in Funen, Langeland,

and Jütland, broke away from their French officers and were soon sailing homewards on British ships.

These tidings were a heavy blow to Napoleon. He had left Bayonne in July, never doubting but that the rebellion would be easily and quickly suppressed. On hearing of Dupont's capitulation he was beside himself with rage;[1] but the news from Cintra struck home. What had happened there cut him to the heart; for it meant that the British were masters of Portugal and that the cordon was broken. If the breach was to be repaired, the troops in Spain must be largely reinforced, and the *Grande Armée* or part of it, at least, withdrawn from Germany. That was tantamount to renouncing his high-flown Oriental plans and to letting go his commanding position in Eastern Europe, by means of which he had held Russia, Prussia, and Austria in check for a whole year. It was all the more disastrous occurring as it did at a time when the two German States had shown symptoms which might easily be fanned into war if the pressure were removed.

All the proceedings in Italy, the incorporation of Tuscany and the spoliation of the Holy See, had been anxiously followed in Vienna. Then came the news of the transactions at Bayonne and the distrust deepened. Austria felt it was no longer any use to be docile and to carry out willingly all that this powerful despot thought fit; there was no advantage in being his ally, she was sure to be caught in his traps in any case. A like fate seemed to threaten all the ancient dynasties of Europe, and Austria was pre-eminently a dynastic State, for the heterogeneous elements of which she was composed were bound together by their loyalty to the reigning family, so that here a danger threatening the Crown was regarded as danger to the State. Hence Austria was arming. During May and June, 1808, under the pretext of carrying out the Turkish plans suggested by France, reserve and

[1] The recent work of Clerc on the capitulation, and of Titeux on Dupont, show that the latter does not deserve the unmeasured anger the Emperor vented on him, but rather that the Emperor was himself to blame for leaving his general without the necessary reinforcements.

militia forces were organized on modern lines and the people enlisted in crowds in the rapidly formed battalions.[1] Napoleon summarily demanded explanations, and in July he threatened war, but just when every one believed it to be imminent word came of the disasters in Spain and forced him to abandon this intention for the time being. The corps of Ney and Victor were withdrawn across the Rhine. Davoût moved back from Poland into Silesia, while Mortier remained stationed in Franconia so as to keep Austria under observation. Towards the latter Power Napoleon soon adopted a much milder tone and sought to remove her suspicions. "Do you know why I have brought about these changes in Spain?" said he to Metternich at St. Cloud on August 25th. "Because I must be perfectly secure in my rear. There the throne was filled by the Bourbons, and they and I cannot reign at the same time in Europe. With other dynasties, it is different, and I make a great distinction between the houses of Lorraine and Bourbon." Metternich thereupon consented to have the military forces replaced on the previous establishment and to recognize the new Kings.

In Prussia as in Austria the whole country was secretly in a state of ferment, necessarily suppressed owing to the presence of the French and their adherents. In the previous year, after the battle of Eylau, some old Prussian and Hessian officers formed a conspiracy to raise the country between the Weser and the Elbe, provided Britain landed an army in North Germany. After the Peace of Tilsit the presence of the French troops and the burden of their support had further embittered the national discontent. Secret meetings were held which fanned the hatred of the French and the eagerness for war, and in April, 1808, at Königsberg, the "Tugendbund"

[1] On August 10th, Andréossy, the French Ambassador, writes home: "From what I see and hear on all sides, Austria has never presented such a military aspect as now, and the Austrian Government has never stirred up such enthusiasm as at present pervades both gentle and simple. The '*Moriamur*' of the Hungarians under Maria Theresa never produced proportionately so many combatants nor so quickly armed and drilled as the appeal of the Government Commissaries and the enrolment have furnished for the militia."

was founded. Originally it was quite a harmless institution, but ultimately it lent its name to all the secret societies hostile to France. Meanwhile the Government, led by Stein and Scharnhorst in co-operation with Colonel Gneisenau, was labouring to regenerate the State and the army, and to fortify both for the impending struggle. These three men, under the influence of the defeats inflicted on the French troops in Spain, concluded that the Revolution, incarnate in the Emperor, could only be combated by the same means as had raised France to such oppressive power. This unrest could not in the long run have escaped Napoleon's observation, and even if it had, an intercepted letter from Stein to Prince Wittgenstein, dated August 15th, 1808, would certainly have opened his eyes. For there it was plainly stated that the national hatred was to be encouraged, and that if Napoleon refused Prussia's proposals, the plans drawn up in the previous spring would be resumed. Yet Napoleon fancied he had destroyed Prussia by two battles in Thuringia, and that it was thanks to his complaisance that she existed at all! He turned his discovery to account by compelling Prince William on September 8th, 1808, to sign an oppressive treaty, some of the conditions of which were that all Prussian territory as far as the fortresses of the Oder was to be evacuated, Prussia was to pay 140,000,000 marks, in the event of war to furnish an auxiliary corps along with Austria, not to increase its army beyond a total of 42,000 troops, and to raise no militia.[1]

Even in Turkey, where Napoleon had displayed the greatest diplomatic astuteness, it seemed as if the fruits of his toil were about to escape him. A fresh revolt had broken out at the Porte and Mustapha IV had been driven from the throne and his brother, Mamud II, proclaimed Sultan on July 28th, 1808. Under his rule France no longer met with a spirit of compliance. Her ambassador was reproached with the fickleness of France's policy, and formed the impression that Turkey

[1] Considering his unfavourable circumstances it is surprising to find Napoleon imposing such hard terms on Prussia. The likelihood is he wanted to have some means at hand for humouring the Czar by modifying certain conditions.

was now more intent on a separate peace with Russia than on retaining the friendship of France. It seemed as if the giant fabric of Napoleon's power over the Continent was about to give way just as it neared completion. The Emperor immediately recognized the seriousness of the situation and also the means of repairing it. The only power able to compel Prussia and Austria to maintain peace till he had set matters right in Spain, was Russia. His plan was therefore to endeavour to secure her goodwill. His conduct towards the Czar had certainly been very ambiguous. The conferences over the partitioning of Turkey had led to no tangible results, and France's attitude in the Swedish-Russian conflict had roused grave suspicions in the governing circles at St. Petersburg. Still, the unfavourable impression might be blotted out. The evacuation of Prussia was one concession made to Alexander, and Napoleon hoped by making a second, in connexion with the principalities of the Danube, to reach his ends. Hitherto Napoleon had postponed a settlement of this question on the pretext of waiting till they could meet to discuss matters together, but now this interview was to take place. Scarcely had the news of Joseph's flight reached Paris when a special envoy left for St. Petersburg bearing an invitation for a meeting at Erfurt (the Czar had himself suggested this town) as well as a notification that the French troops were evacuating Prussia, and a request that Russia should protest at Vienna against the Austrian armaments. Everything now depended on the Czar's decision. Austria had approached Russia, Britain had made overtures to her, the King of Prussia in a confidential letter had indicated that he would not be sorry to make common cause with the Court of Vienna, and all of them knew that the Czar at heart was not in sympathy with the French alliance. Had he only lent a helping hand at this time they might have achieved what came to pass five years later.

But the Czar did not fall in with his neighbours' views. He knew Napoleon required his help, and hence that he would leave him, although reluctantly, a free hand in the East. The war in Sweden had taken a more favourable turn, and

Russia was again at liberty to prosecute her plans in the south. To let his chance slip a second time, to ally himself with Prussia and Austria and oppose France, meant that the capture of the long coveted principalities, must be postponed indefinitely. Besides, the Czar was vain, and he wanted to show the opposition in his own country, by means of a new and brilliant success, that he had made a wise choice for Russia's greatness when he allied himself at Tilsit with the French Emperor. To renounce the alliance would have been to confess that he had been mistaken. The longer Napoleon remained involved in Spain, the sooner the Czar might look forward to gain his desire in the East. Hence it was to his own interest to see that nothing occurred to interrupt Napoleon's undertakings in the Iberian Peninsula; hence, too, the necessity for tranquilizing Austria and Prussia, for if they took up arms the French troops would then need to march eastwards and the Russians westwards, instead of remaining in the south ready to snatch the prize now so near. The Czar's interests coincided with Napoleon's as to the necessity for keeping Austria and Prussia with their swords sheathed until the Spanish expedition was over. He therefore earnestly dissuaded his friend, King Frederick William of Prussia, from joining Austria in any warlike action, and advised him to ratify the oppressive convention of the previous September, promising that at the forthcoming interview at Erfurt, he would endeavour to obtain more favourable terms with regard to the indemnity. On the Prussian patriots, Stein especially, the impression produced by conversations with the Czar was that he was simply biding his time before taking action against France. In deprecating hostilities between Austria and France, the Czar laid stress upon the fact that such a war would oblige France to suspend operations in Spain in order to fall upon Austria with all her might, an argument which the others exploited for their own ends.[1] But at Vienna, the Czar

[1] Lehman, "Stein," II. 566. That Stein judged rightly in this matter is seen by a letter from Alexander replying to his mother, who reproached him for his visit to Erfurt. "What other means had Russia of maintaining the alliance (unavoidable and necessary for him) with the dreadful

admonished them to keep the peace, so that he might be spared the painful necessity of fighting as their enemy. He then left for Erfurt.

Here, from September 27th onwards, fête succeeded fête, and only after all was over it transpired that the Corsican's life had been threatened by a Prussian conspiracy. Here as at Tilsit, Napoleon did the honours and received his Imperial guest with the utmost pomp and magnificence. His grenadiers provided the military accessories, the Princes of the Confederation the political ones. The actors of the *Comédie française* performed the masterpieces of the French drama before an audience of kings. On one occasion when Voltaire's "Œdipe" was being played, as Talma uttered the words,

"L'amitié d'un grand homme est un bienfait des dieux,"

the Czar rose, and amidst the applause of the house shook hands cordially with Napoleon. Yet nothing was further from both than a feeling of sympathy with each other, and what seemed like a spontaneous outburst of such was deliberate calculation. The Czar had not been won over by Napoleon, whose insatiable aggressiveness he looked upon as a veritable scourge. "Let the torrent run its course," as he once said. Both parties, however, saw that it was to their advantage to appear friendly and allied in the eyes of Europe, and they regulated their behaviour accordingly.

At Erfurt more is known of the political interviews of the two sovereigns than was the case at Tilsit. The subjects discussed during the afternoons, without eye-witnesses, and even the attitude of both parties, have been minutely recorded. Napoleon, who had drafted a treaty in Paris, submitted it to the Czar, of whom he remarked to Talleyrand that after the first meeting he found him "willing to do everything that one asked of him". But this impression was erroneous. The two allies were certainly not long in coming to an agree-

Colossus, than by falling in with his ideas for the time being and showing him that he could prosecute his plans without distrust? All our efforts must be directed towards obtaining a free breathing-time and working in the greatest secrecy to increase our forces" (Martens, XIII. 306).

ment upon several important points in the treaty which Napoleon himself had further modified, and they soon decided to take common action in making overtures of peace to England, but with regard to Austria, whose attitude was of vital importance, Napoleon met with unexpected resistance. So exasperated was he with his ally that on one occasion he flung his hat on the floor in a fit of passion and stamped on it, whereupon the Czar threatened to leave. Before his departure from Paris the Emperor had remarked to Talleyrand, who accompanied him on this occasion, "We are going to Erfurt. When I return from there I shall have a free hand in Spain and feel secure that Austria will be held in check". Austria, in spite of Metternich's assurances, had not yet stopped her armaments nor recognized the new kings—by the grace of Napoleon. Now, however, owing to Russia's attitude, she was forced to do so. Talleyrand states in his memoirs that in one of the secret terms of the treaty shown him by the Czar, Napoleon requested the latter to find some pretext for placing an army corps near the Austrian frontiers. Thereby not only would Austria be held in check, but also Russia, by thus annoying her neighbour, would be hampered in carrying out her plans against Turkey. This request, however, was not complied with. The Czar merely consented to support his ally in the event of hostilities breaking out between Austria and France. To the Austrian delegate Herr von Vincent, he remarked that no one was justified in interfering with the measures of a sovereign.

Napoleon complained that Alexander had changed since the Tilsit days, and attributed this to the effect of the reverses in Spain. Yet another idea was in his mind. "Do you know," said he one day to Talleyrand, "why no one openly goes with me? Because I have no children and they think that France, as it is at present, will only last my lifetime. That is the secret of all that is happening here. Hence my career demands my divorce, for I have no successor, and Joseph counts for nothing as he has only daughters. I must found a dynasty, and I can only do so by marrying a princess belonging to one of the reigning houses of Europe." Talley-

rand was to find out Russian feeling on the matter, and if a marriage were arranged with one of the two sisters of the Czar, he was to give the latter all the requisite assurances on the Oriental question. Talleyrand undertook to sound the Czar; but the old diplomatist was no longer the faithful counsellor of earlier times, and during these last weeks, on seeing the unfavourable influence of the events in Spain on the Emperor's prestige in France and at foreign Courts, he had secretly become wholly alienated from Napoleon. He now falsely assured the Czar that he had attempted, though without success, to dissuade the Emperor from undertaking the Spanish expedition, and he sought to commend himself by adopting a tone of disapproval in private conversation. For this he had ample opportunity at Erfurt. In his daily meetings with the Czar, in the reception rooms of Princess Thurn-Taxis, he supplied Alexander with the arguments for resisting Napoleon's anti-Austrian demands, and condemned his aggressive policy from the point of view of a patriotic Frenchman. "The Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees," said Talleyrand, "are the conquests of France, everything else is the Emperor's conquest and not essential to France." As Caulaincourt also shared this view, Alexander was only too easily persuaded to offer resistance to the Emperor. To the question of an alliance by marriage between the two Imperial families, the Czar gave an evasive answer, alleging that the decision did not rest with him alone but also with his mother; Napoleon thereupon avoided any more explicit statement. Here again nothing tangible had been obtained. The final result of all these conferences at Erfurt was a new treaty of alliance signed on October 12th, 1808, the terms of which were to be kept secret "for ten years at least". The first article stated that the two Powers would unitedly submit proposals of peace to England upon the basis of present possession ("uti possidetis"), a useless proceeding, considering the fact that it was precisely France's aggression on the Continent that England was combating, and that she was sure to protest against Russia's conquest of Finland and her acquisition of the Danube as boundary. In the event of Britain rejecting

their proposals, the allies pledged themselves to wage war against her with all their forces. In Article 8, Napoleon recognized the extension of the Russian frontier to the Danube, he renounced his rôle of mediator, and promised, should war break out between the Sultan and the Czar, not to intervene unless Austria interfered with Russia's action. On the other hand, Russia was to make common cause with France if the latter Power were attacked by Austria. For Prussia the Czar obtained a reduction of the indemnity to 120,000,000 francs and an extension of the period of payment for thirty-five months, concessions, as Napoleon was careful to remind his ally, which were granted as proofs of his friendship for him. It was decided to annul the stipulation in the Tilsit Treaty granting additional territory with 400,000 inhabitants to the King of Prussia, in the event of Jerôme acquiring Hanover.

So after all Napoleon had given his signature to what he had so long refused, and the principalities of the Danube were Russia's at last. He himself had only gained one point, and for which an interview was not necessary. He could restore order in Spain without being threatened from the East in the immediate future. On the whole, therefore, he had met with a political defeat, the details of which can be gathered from Talleyrand's memoirs and the Austrian despatches.[1] Consciousness of this probably produced the ill-humour which accounts for the shocking want of good taste displayed by Napoleon on various occasions during the Erfurt visit and which history has carefully recorded. One day, for instance, he invited Prince William of Prussia, who was there representing his royal brother, to hunt hares over the battlefield of Jena. Another day, when some French troops were passing through the town, he reviewed them in presence of the Czar, questioned them upon the various heroic deeds they had

[1] I cannot concur with Driault in regarding the Czar's temporary relinquishment of the dismemberment of Turkey and his acquisition of the Danube principalities only, as a success for Napoleon. The surrender of the latter was an ominous concession, one which ultimately drove Turkey into the arms of England, and so shattered France's commercial supremacy in the East. (Driault, "La Politique orientale de Napoléon," p. 352).

performed against the Russians, and then conferred upon several of them crosses of the Legion of Honour. On a certain occasion he is said to have called out to one of his allies of the Rhine Confederation, "Be quiet! King of Bavaria". Talleyrand made a characteristic observation in relating this incident to Mongelas. "We Frenchmen," said he, "are rather more civilized than our Emperor. He has not yet got beyond the civilization of Roman History." Although Napoleon did not always treat princes with due deference, he showed marked attention to the great literary men of Germany whom he met during his stay at Erfurt. On October 2nd, he received the immortal poet of "Faust" in a special audience. Goethe himself relates that Napoleon greeted him with the words "*Voilà un homme!*" chatted with him about "Werthers Leiden," the drama, and tragedies of fate, which he relegated to less enlightened times, because nowadays politics took the place of fate. After a few queries as to the poet's relations with the ducal Court at Weimer, the interview ended. But a few days later, on October 6th, they met again at a Court ball at Weimar to which the Grand Duke Charles Augustus had invited the two Emperors. The French actors had previously given a performance of Voltaire's "Mort de César," and the conversation turning on this tragedy, Napoleon suggested to Goethe that he should write a play giving a loftier and more imposing picture of Cæsar's death than Voltaire had achieved. "The world should be made to see," said the Emperor, whose meaning is very transparent, "that Cæsar would have made them prosperous and that things would have been quite different had he only been left time to complete his noble plans." A tragedy such as that would be a lesson alike to kings and nations. This conception of Cæsar's character was in accordance with a long-cherished conviction of Goethe's who, in his Strazburg days, had planned a tragedy on these lines. Hence he was much struck by Napoleon's suggestion and also by his remarks on "Werther". When the Emperor exclaimed, "Come to Paris! I request you personally. There you will find a wider outlook and abundant material for your poems,"

the impression produced on Goethe was so great that he seriously contemplated a visit to Paris. He ultimately abandoned this intention owing to the many difficulties in the way, but he never wavered in his admiration of the Emperor's greatness. Just as Napoleon had challenged Goethe to think well of Cæsar, i.e. of himself, so he wished to inculcate in Wieland a better opinion of the Roman Emperors than was generally prevalent. He repeatedly discussed Tacitus with Suard, Müller, and others as if he was afraid they might compare him only with the successors of Augustus. With Wieland he conversed about Christianity, calling it a "matchless philosophical system which, by reconciling man with himself, secures public order and the peace of the State, as firmly as it does the happiness and the hopes of the individual". There was no mistaking the significance of Napoleon's conduct in paying much greater deference to the princes of German literature than to the princes of the various hereditary States. He meant to show the world that, in spite of crown and sceptre, he felt himself nearest of kin to those whose greatness was due to their genius, and not a mere appanage of birth.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE CAMPAIGNS IN SPAIN AND AUSTRIA. MARIE LOUISE.

ERFURT had provided Napoleon with a much-needed respite for enabling him to continue the struggle in Spain. But as it was hard to say how long this respite might last, he immediately took steps to suppress the rebellion by dealing as rapid and as heavy a blow as possible, so as to recapture the lost throne for his brother. It was not only necessary for Napoleon to secure his power but also to restore his prestige, for the world was not to be allowed to think that he had blundered when he robbed the Spaniards of their national Sovereign,—nor even that he could blunder. He did not feel himself sufficiently secure, nor was his nature noble enough, to confess a fault without fearing that he might thereby belittle himself. These considerations co-operated in deciding him to cross the Pyrenees in person at the head of a large body of troops and give Europe a convincing proof that resistance to him was impossible. The French troops which had been defeated in Spain were mostly young and inexperienced recruits. Now, however, he was about to lead forth the conquerors of Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland. It was no small hardship for these troops who had been absent from France for three years to be allowed merely to pass through their native land. Napoleon sought to inspirit them by stirring speeches full of flattery and fair promises, and he gave secret orders to the municipalities of the towns along the line of route to celebrate their march with fêtes, banquets, speeches and songs expressing confidence in them and extolling their martial ardour. He wished his soldiers to think that this new war was at the

country's desire and that her hopes centred in them.[1] The troops went to Spain under the command of their tried generals, Lannes, Soult, Bessières, Ney, Lefebvre, Moncey, and Victor, with Berthier as chief of the general staff. Including the Guards and the cavalry reserve, there were to be eight army corps engaged in quelling this insubordinate people, and Junot, who had been defeated at Cintra, was to re-enter the field with 20,000 men. The whole army, numbering over 200,000 troops, was admirably equipped, well-clad, and in excellent condition.

In comparison with the efforts put forth by Napoleon to regain his lost prestige in Spain, those made by the Spaniards themselves were lamentably inadequate. Instead of following up their victories at Baylen and elsewhere by pursuing the French and driving them out of the country, and then putting it into a state of defence, they abandoned themselves to

[1] Two of Napoleon's decrees to the Minister of the Interior in September, 1808, are specially characteristic. "I wish you," he says in one of these, "to arrange that the prefects of departments which are on the route show special attention to the troops and by every means maintain their willing spirit and their love of glory. Speeches, songs, free performances at the theatre, and banquets are what I expect from the citizens in honour of soldiers who return victorious." Two weeks later he writes: "The troops have been fêted at Metz, Nancy, and Rheims. I wish the same treatment shown them in Paris, Melun, Sens, Saumur, Tours, Bourges, and Bordeaux, which will make three times for the same troops. You will give me an estimate of what that will cost per head. Get some songs written in Paris and send them on to the various towns. These songs are to treat of the glory the troops have already won, and of that which they are about to win, and of the liberty of the seas which will be the result of their victories. These songs are to be sung at the banquets. Have three sorts written, so that the soldiers do not hear the same lot twice." These commands were obeyed to the letter. Fézensac in his Memoirs (p. 199) informs us: "The march of the various corps through France was a veritable triumphal procession. The municipalities of the various towns vied with one another in welcoming them. Everywhere military fêtes were got up and banquets given. Compliments, speeches, and war-songs followed one another, all celebrating the victories gained by the 'Grande Armée' and predicting new ones." That the Emperor had privately arranged the whole affair and paid for it out of his own pocket no one ever knew.

tumultuous rejoicings, and blind to the dangers ahead, they fondly imagined that the liberation of their country was already accomplished. The number of troops available was greatly exaggerated, as was also the ability of their generals and the courage of the soldiers, upon whom this over-hasty resting on their laurels proved most disastrous. The juntos in the different towns were jealous of one another and worked at cross-purposes; and it was the same with the various generals. The nation had hitherto been accustomed to an autocratic regime, and now, finding itself suddenly without a leader, it fell a prey to anarchy and sedition. Let the French enter the country if they like; we shall surround them right and left and take them prisoners—this was not the opinion of the rank and file, or of some junior officers, but of a council of war held in September. Indeed sober newspapers even spoke of "carrying revenge across the Pyrenees". Meanwhile their army, which they had boastfully estimated at from 300,000 to 400,000 troops, whereas there were only slightly over 100,000, was left without sufficient cavalry, the soldiers were not trained how to manœuvre, and no provisions were made even to feed and clothe them. Instead of placing all the forces under a commander-in-chief, the conduct of military affairs was entrusted to a war committee who were to direct operations from Aranjuez. Under such unequal conditions, the Spaniards were bound to be speedily and cruelly disillusioned.

Napoleon had hoped they would carry out their threat to advance and surround his army, and from Erfurt where he was at the time, he sent orders to let the enemy's left wing, numbering about 30,000 under General Blake, penetrate as far as possible into Biscay and Navarre, when it was to be attacked from the rear by large bodies of French troops which were to slip in between it and the Spanish centre. In the end of October, however, Lefebvre delivered battle too soon, and the enemy fell back from Durango upon Valmaseda, thereby frustrating the Emperor's plan. On November 5th, 1808, when Napoleon arrived at the French head-quarters at Vittoria, Lefebvre, who had not been supported by Victor's

corps, had again been compelled to retreat, for which he was severely reprimanded by Napoleon, who still adhered to his plan for breaking through the enemy's lines. The Spanish centre, consisting of 25,000 men under Castaños, was posted on the Ebro between Calahorra and Tudela, while their right wing under Palafox was at Saragossa. The main body of the French troops now advanced between Castaños and Blake in the direction of Burgos, while two corps were detailed to follow close on the heels of Blake. Burgos was captured on November 10th, after the overthrow of an insignificant Spanish reserve army, and on the 11th, Blake was defeated at Espinosa, his line of retreat cut off, and he only escaped Soult by abandoning all his baggage. He fled to Astorga, where the remnants of his troops were received into a small Spanish corps under Romana to whom he resigned his command.

The second task to which Napoleon now set himself was to crush Castaños, who had meanwhile joined forces with Palafox. For this purpose Ney was sent from Burgos with his own corps and some reinforcements to Soria, so that from there he might either fall upon the enemy's rear or cut off his retreat while Lannes, advancing from Navarre, attacked him in front. The frontal attack took place as arranged and, on November 23rd, Lannes won the battle of Tudela. Palafox was forced to fall back on Saragossa while Castaños fled to the south, where he would certainly have been captured by Ney but that the latter, misled by exaggerated reports of the enemy's strength and doubtful what course to pursue, had decided to remain in Soria. Nevertheless the two Spanish armies had been scattered.

There still remained the British auxiliaries in Portugal to whom Junot had capitulated, and who were now marching under Sir John Moore on Salamanca, while 10,000 British troops were advancing from Corunna. Napoleon was as completely ignorant of this movement as Moore was of the Spanish defeats. The Emperor, who had proceeded through Burgos to Aranda, expected that the British troops would march from Lisbon through the valley of the Tagus upon

Madrid, and therefore concentrated his efforts upon gaining possession of the capital. Leaving Moncey to besiege Saragossa, he advanced towards the Sierra de Guadarrama, which encloses and protects the plain to the north of Madrid, while Lefebvre to the right of the main army and in advance of it, marched on Segovia by way of Valladolid, and Ney on its left proceeded in the direction of Guadalajara. The pass of Somosierra was defended by 12,000 Spaniards, who being provided with artillery might have given the French some trouble. For on the slopes of the mountain and on the solitary road, here very steep, they had placed sixteen cannon behind which a strong detachment of infantry lay concealed. On November 30th, before daybreak, Napoleon sent his tirailleurs to climb these heights, and hidden by a heavy mist they reached the top. The road was then cleared by the Polish Lancers, who rushed up-hill at full gallop in the teeth of a murderous fire, slew the gunners, and drove back the Spanish infantry, who fled in headlong rout. The road to Madrid was free.

In the capital itself the contrast between the previous boastful self-sufficiency of the Government and the fact that the French were already at their gates, roused the fiercest excitement. But the rage of despair which it brought in its train only heightened the enemy's advantage. The victor now stood forth as the restorer of order, and by the severity with which he repressed lawlessness he succeeded in calming a large part of the population, and even to a certain extent in gaining their favour. On December 4th, Madrid surrendered to the Emperor, and on the same day he issued four decrees which completely revolutionized the government of the country. The Inquisition was suppressed and its domains declared national property; all feudal rights were abolished and also the provincial tariffs; the monasteries were reduced to one third of their number, and the monks who voluntarily joined the ranks of the secular clergy were pensioned by the State. Joseph, who had followed his brother's victorious army, protested that the Emperor was interfering with his rights as King and wanted to abdicate; but this he was not allowed to do. Napoleon told him, as he did also the people of Madrid,

that he came as a conqueror, because the Spanish rebellion had annulled the deed of Bayonne, and that he would only recognize the rights of the victor. He laid his hand heavily on the defeated. In Burgos he had already published a decree of proscription, and those under suspicion might count themselves lucky to escape with deportation to France; their goods were confiscated. As in all else Napoleon did, so here too there was a purpose underlying this severity, and that was to make the Spaniards long for the gentler rule of Joseph. In a proclamation of December 7th, he held up to the Spaniards his brother's clemency and constitutional government. "It rests with yourselves to determine whether this Constitution shall henceforth be your law. But if all my efforts prove vain, and if you do not justify my confidence, then I have no choice left but to treat you as a conquered province and find another throne for my brother. I shall then place the crown of Spain upon my own head and I shall find means to make it respected by the unruly, for God has given me both the strength and the will to conquer all obstacles." The desired effect was produced. In Madrid, citizens, Government officials, and even the clergy, took their oath to King Joseph, and also in the provinces, although only in those where the French had already been. It was by their religious fervour that the Spanish people had been roused to such energetic resistance, and Napoleon's aim was to compel the nation to submission by an oath based upon their religious faith.

Whilst the Emperor was thus engaged at Madrid, Sir John Moore and his troops had long since reached Salamanca where they had remained, for owing to the tidings of the Spanish defeats they had not ventured to continue their advance. Napoleon was in ignorance of this fact, and still believed the British troops to be marching direct on the capital. On December 14th, he ordered Victor and Bessières to proceed to Talavera and beyond that, while Ney was to leave behind part of his troops to hold in check the remnants of Castaños' corps, and to advance with the remainder on Madrid. Only a couple of days later he learned the true state of the case through Soult, who was stationed near Valladolid to maintain com-

munications between the main body of the French army and France. At first Moore's tactics seemed to Napoleon incomprehensible, then he saw how he might make them disastrous for the British. Soult, who had only recently been told to advance into Galicia, now received reinforcements and the order to draw Moore as far west as possible, whilst Napoleon himself with 40,000 troops would march out from Madrid in a north-westerly direction, cross the mountains into Old Castile, and fall upon the rear of the enemy.

The plan was good, but it was only partially successful, for Moore had got word of Napoleon's previous order to Soult to proceed to Galicia, and instead of continuing his advance towards Valladolid, he had swerved to the north, so as to effect a junction with the British troops approaching from Corunna before risking an attack on Soult. By so doing he widened the distance between himself and Napoleon, who again had somewhat underrated the difficulties of the march over the Guadarrama pass and across the plains of Old Castile; and these were neither few nor small. In the mountains the troops suffered severely from snowstorms and hoar-frost. On December 22nd, when they were making their way across the pass of Espinar, the horse-guards were obliged to dismount and make a path, leading their horses, while Napoleon himself accompanied them on foot. Next day a thaw set in and the swollen, swift-running rivers presented a new danger, for as there were no bridges, they had to be forded. All this hindered the progress of the troops, and it was with the greatest difficulty that they got as far as Astorga. Meanwhile Moore, having at last discovered the actual state of matters, had directed his course on Corunna. The start he had already got of his pursuers enabled him to escape the danger of being caught between Soult's army and that of the Emperor. All the French could now do was to follow in close pursuit. This the Emperor entrusted to Soult, he himself leaving Astorga and returning through Benavente to Valladolid. Had he foreseen that the British troops on arriving at Corunna and not finding the transport fleet there—it did not arrive till the following day—would range themselves in

battle order, and that Soult with his 16,000 troops, in spite of heavy fighting, would be unable to prevent them embarking, he would in all probability have led the pursuit himself. But that he could not foresee, and thinking his own share of the task finished, he ordered Soult to occupy Portugal, and on January 17th, 1809, he left Spain and returned to Paris.

Of the two ends he had in view in the Spanish campaign only one had been gained. With a few rapid blows he had laid low the conquerors of Baylen and restored his prestige as an invincible general. But the second end had not been gained, the resistance in Spain had not been crushed. Battles had been won, armies defeated, routed and scattered, but the country was not conquered nor the nation subdued. In the south the remnants of the conquered armies were able to rally and prepare to renew the struggle, and the British, by means of their fleet, could land in Portugal or elsewhere. The great military critic, Jomini, declares that to have subjugated the country would have required a systematic campaign lasting two years and an expenditure of from 3,000,000 to 4,000,000 francs for the up-keep of the army. But Napoleon at this time was hard beset. His preponderance in Europe was giving way at its base; for it was one of the consequences of his world-wide policy that it involved him in new difficulties before he had had time to solve those already existing.

Until recent times people have generally credited the story of Napoleon receiving letters at Astorga on January 2nd, 1809, the contents of which caused him keen anxiety and led him to return to France, taking the Guards with him. These letters were supposed to contain news of vigorous preparations for war in Austria and of a secret reconciliation between those two enemies of long date, Talleyrand and Fouché. These tidings, it was thought, prevented the Emperor from continuing to take part in the campaign in Western Spain. Lanfrey and other historians have treated this tale as sheer Napoleonic invention, declaring that the Emperor wanted an excuse for escaping from the situation in Spain—just as he had done in

1805 in order to avoid the invasion of England—and that he hoped by dealing Austria fresh blows to augment still further his military fame. But this view is not correct. Later information, e.g. Maret's "Souvenirs" and various documents of Pasquier and Metternich, have shown that the intrigues of Talleyrand, Fouché, and others, who looked upon the Spanish expedition and the whole foreign policy of the Emperor as disastrous for France, were no trifling matter. Metternich certainly exaggerated greatly in regarding these intrigues as a conspiracy, and in treating a clique of malcontents as a political faction aiming at the overthrow of the Empire, which would have to be reckoned with. Placing facts in this distorted light was only calculated to lead the Vienna Cabinet into repeating the error they committed in 1805, when Mack advanced on the Iller.[1] In any case there was this much in it, that in Paris it was believed there was a serious danger of Napoleon losing his life in Spain, and Murat was already talked of as his successor. The latter and his consort, Caroline Bonaparte, who were still smarting from their disappointment at receiving the throne of Naples instead of that of Spain, did not discourage this project, which was disclosed either by Josephine, Lætitia, or Eugène; the evidence on the point is conflicting.[2] The Emperor, who was at

[1] "We have at last reached the time when allies seem to offer themselves from the very heart of French Empire," so runs a dispatch from the Austrian Ambassador, dated December 4th, 1808. "And these allies are not low contemptible intriguers. Men worthy to represent their nation request our support, and this support is to our own interest and that of posterity" (Metternich, "Nachgel Papiere," II. 255, 264, 317).

[2] Pasquier's account is the most probable ("Mémoires," I. 354). According to him, the Viceroy Eugène had captured a letter directed to Naples and sent it to the Emperor in Spain. La Valette had warned Eugène to be on his guard. The letter in question was evidently one from Caroline, who was then in Paris, to her husband. Napoleon took no notice of the matter to his relatives, even Fouché was too valuable to him and too dangerous to be dismissed at a time when European complications might possibly again necessitate the Emperor's absence from Paris; but Talleyrand had to submit to a tirade of violent and insulting reproof. "You are a thief," said Napoleon, "a blackguard, to whom nothing is sacred. You would sell your own father. I have loaded you

all times prone to distrust, was keenly affected by the news, and returned to France at once, just as he had done after the battle of Marengo on the receipt of similar tidings. On January 16th he left Valladolid, and on the 24th he reached Paris.

But an even more urgent reason for Napoleon's return was Austria's attitude. For not only had this Power declined to recognize Joseph's accession to the Spanish throne, in compliance with a combined request from France and Russia, she had zealously been pushing forward her military preparations while the Emperor was engaged in Spain, and now seemed bent on war. Possibly some hint had reached Vienna that in Napoleon's circle there was an idea that the federative system of the Empire might be more securely established if Austria were dismembered. In October, 1808, the Austrian Minister, Stadion, declared to the Emperor Francis that "he saw no means of saving the monarchy and securing its future existence except by meeting the danger in good time, and instead of leaving the initiative to Napoleon with his hostile plans, taking a decisive step to settle quickly and permanently the strained political relations with France". Now that Napoleon was involved in Spain, Austria's chance seemed to have come. Metternich, who went to Vienna expressly to give his advice at the councils and to relate his impressions, described the French fighting force as not greatly superior, and declared that the war in Spain kept away so many "that the Austrian force, so greatly inferior to that of France before

with gifts and yet there is nothing you are not capable of doing against me. For months past, when you thought my affairs in Spain were looking bad, you tell every one who will listen to you that you had always disapproved of the enterprise, whereas it was you who first suggested it and constantly urged me on. Who was it but you who betrayed to me the hiding-place of that unfortunate young man (d'Enghien)? Who was it that advised me to be severe with him? Now I have it in my power to crush you like glass, but I despise you too thoroughly to take that trouble." These reproaches were justified, for only shortly before, on December 8th, Talleyrand had written a letter to Napoleon at Madrid full of flattery, which could not fail to confirm the Emperor in his Spanish plans (Bertrand, p. 478).

the Spanish rising, would now at the outset of the war be at least equal to it". In a dispatch of December 4th, 1808, he estimated that Napoleon had only about 200,000 troops at his disposal for operations in the East, and on the same day Stadion assured the Emperor Francis that the time was ripe "to turn to account at once the forces of the Austrian State, the reorganization of which had proceeded with such cheerful perseverance since the beginning of the year". On January 15th, Stadion's brother wrote from Munich that if Austria would go forward energetically with an imposing show of strength, Bavaria would support her. From Berlin, Wessenberg wrote that the only fear there was lest Austria did not actually begin the war. The state of the finances also urged immediate action. The army could only be maintained at its full complement till spring, when some step would need to be taken. For weeks back they had been asking Britain for subsidies, but these were only to be paid once war had actually broken out. Then too Austria was expecting other help besides the Spanish entanglement and the English subsidies. Certainly Stein and his party, who had advocated a national rising in Prussia, could no longer be counted on, for at Napoleon's remonstrance this able Minister had been dismissed and was now living in exile in Austria. Nevertheless although Stein's fall had not brought about any real change of policy in the Königsberg Court, there was unmistakable evidence of its sympathy in the fact that Count Goltz, the Prussian Minister, communicated to the Austrian Ambassador the Convention Prussia had signed with France on September 8th, and assured him that although the King might not be able to break away from his engagement at the very outset, he would seize the first favourable opportunity of doing so and range himself on Austria's side. In any case these assurances were taken into account at Vienna.[1] Yet it was

[1] Beer, "Zehn Jahre Osterreichischer Politik," p. 361, quotes von Goltz's letter to his cousin, who showed the passage to the Austrian plenipotentiary Wessenberg. Gaede ("Preuszens Stellung," 1809, p. 43) doubts if Goltz was authorized by the King to make such declarations, which is corroborated on p. 54.

difficult to ascertain how far the Sovereign's views and plans were accurately represented by his Minister. The Czar Alexander I, on returning home from Erfurt through Königsberg, invited King Frederick William to visit him in Saint Petersburg, hoping to remove him from his surroundings where all were eager for war, and to persuade him to adhere to the September Treaty. In this he succeeded. When King Frederick William returned to Prussia in the middle of February he would not hear of taking any share in the struggle; he warned Austria to preserve the peace, and, at the outside, to confine herself to warding off any attack from Napoleon; as for himself, he (King Frederick William) would not consent to separate from Russia. Now Stadion's programme was based on the idea of not leaving Napoleon time to concentrate his forces and attack Austria with superior numbers, but to fall upon him at once, while he was still in the thick of his Spanish embarrassments and his troops elsewhere engaged.

Frederick William's decision completely destroyed the hopes the Viennese Court had built on aid from Prussia, and Austria was now destined to find she had been equally mistaken with regard to Russia. Metternich's letters had shown Talleyrand's attitude towards the Czar, and the fact that at Erfurt things had not run too smoothly between the two Emperors became patent on the return of Vincent, the Austrian diplomat, who while there had received a hint to the effect that the Czar was not ill-pleased at Austria's military preparations. Hence the Vienna Court doubted the sincerity of the Franco-Russian alliance in spite of the ostentatious friendship of the two monarchs, and hoped that even though the Czar did not alter his policy, he would at least remain neutral in the event of a Franco-Austrian war. Napoleon, however, had proposed through Caulaincourt that the Czar should receive half of Galicia in return for effective military support, and so now, hoping that the arguments which had succeeded with Prussia would answer with Austria, Alexander bluntly told Prince Schwarzenberg, the Austrian Ambassador, that he must fulfil his engagements to Napoleon,

and since the Viennese Court was undoubtedly the aggressor, Russia's military support was in that case, by the terms of the Erfurt Treaty, pledged to France (March 2nd). But the Czar wished to have the utmost possible liberty of action in the East and was not desirous of furthering Napoleon's schemes of world-wide conquest, hence when he found that, in spite of all, Austria remained bent on war, he sent a secret assurance to Vienna on April 15th, that he would avoid taking energetic measures against Austria, and again on April 20th, that his troops had orders to avoid hostilities as far as lay in their power.

But though both the Czar and King refused to go to war with France, there were many in their respective countries who differed from them in this matter, and who proved so numerous a body that they had to be reckoned with. It is a historical fact of no small significance that at this time neither Alexander nor Frederick William represented the opinions or the will of their peoples. Just as in Austria, since the Bayonne incident, public opinion had been running strongly in favour of war,[1] so also in Germany and Russia, hostility to Napoleon had become a national sentiment making itself daily more manifest. "If the King hesitates any longer in coming to a decision in harmony with public opinion, which calls loudly for war with France, a revolution will be inevitable." These words were written by the Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs and were addressed to the Queen. Prince Augustus urged his cousin not to let things drift until the nation took matters into their own hands. Even personal enemies of Stein, such as Beyme, implored the King to break with Russia and to accept the homage of his old provinces on the farther side of the Elbe. Others pointed out that if Austria emerged victorious from this war of liberation, there was the danger of her acquiring a foothold in Northern Germany, for Silesia was already seeking to return under Austria's protection. Ernst Moritz Arndt frankly proclaimed to the

[1] On March 18th, 1809, the French chargé d'affaires at Vienna wrote home: "In 1805 the Government alone wanted war, neither the army nor the people desired it: in 1809 Government, army, and people want it.

world, "Liberty and Austria shall be our battle-cry; long live the House of Hapsburg!" A wave of enthusiasm passed over Germany and made itself felt even in Vienna in spite of the hostile admonitions of King Frederick, who was again, as before Jena, wishing to abdicate. Stadion was perhaps not so far wrong in acting on this impression and founding his calculations rather upon the German nation than upon its Princes, and finally in compelling the cold-hearted Emperor Francis "to point the pistol" at Napoleon's head. Unlike Metternich, Stadion was no friend to Prussia, but, like Stein, he ardently desired the co-operation of all German nationalities in the struggle for independence. As a mediatized earl of the Empire, he probably cherished the idea of Austria, the hereditary realm of the Emperor, emerging successful from the war while the King of Prussia still delayed and wavered; and success would mean confirming the Austrian supremacy in the nation for all time.

What Austria actually hoped to gain by the war can be seen from the instructions given on January 29th to Count Wallmoden, plenipotentiary in the negotiations with England, viz., "to get back again to the point of internal strength and consistency which the country possessed after the last treaties previous to the Peace of Pressburg . . . but with the understanding that we reserve the right of making certain minor arrangements relative to the improvement of our frontiers and of our position with regard to Germany, should circumstances prove favourable; all the more so, as two younger branches of the reigning family have been despoiled of their legitimate possessions during the wars of the Revolution, and must either be reinstated in their hereditary territories in Germany or Italy, or else be indemnified." Further on occurs the following: "Austria's wish is, should she succeed in destroying Napoleon's system of tributary States, to see each legitimate proprietor reinstated in the territory belonging to him before the time of Napoleon's usurpations. This principle would be applied first in Spain; then in Italy, to the King of Naples, to the Pope, and to the King of Sardinia; in Germany to the King of Prussia, the Elector of Hesse,

the Duke of Brunswick, and to the King of England in reference to Hanover; and also the present Duchy of Warsaw ought to revert to Prussia. The Court of Vienna further extends this principle to those German Princes whom, in the impending war, it would be obliged to treat as enemies, and whose reinstatement in their hereditary dominions at the close of the war it is willing to guarantee in advance, on certain conditions which will be in accordance with their conduct during the war.[1]

It is difficult to gauge accurately how much Napoleon knew as to Austria's intentions when he suddenly left Spain. A great deal of information reached him, generally by way of Munich, as to her armaments, her intrigues to rouse the Tyrol, secret agreements between the Tyrolese nobility and the Government at Vienna, and many other things all pointing to a renewal of hostilities. During the Spanish campaign Napoleon had never lost sight of Austria, and although he had only left 60,000 troops in North Germany under Davoût, and 30,000 under Oudinot in the South, he was hoping soon to strengthen these forces substantially. He demanded from the Senate the conscription of 1810, 80,000 youths of barely eighteen years, and drafted them into the Rhine Army. In addition to this he brought up the strength of every regiment to five battalions, withdrew two divisions and the Guards from Spain, and ordered two more divisions who were already marching thither, to return to Germany, so that by the middle or end of April he had at his disposal there over 200,000 troops, exclusive of the army in Italy. It was then announced in Paris and abroad that the Spanish affair was settled and the country subdued. He was firmly resolved on beginning a new contest if Austria did not submit, and was making the most careful preparations for it. Once again he

[1] They were even prepared "to grant the King of Sardinia a sufficient increase from his ancient States, so that he might not be obliged at every war to range himself under France's flag and serve as vanguard to her armies". It is certainly, at least, a great exaggeration to declare, as has been done, reasoning from this same document, "that Austria's aim in 1809 was to secure the mastery both in Germany and in Italy" (Oncken, "Zeitalter der Revolution," II. 439).

meant to show to the world that his supremacy was inviolable, so that henceforth none might cherish the hope of agitating against him with impunity while he was engaged elsewhere. In his eyes a State expressing any independence in its movements was a rebel and worthy of punishment. He had yet another motive for acting thus.

During former wars the troops had not only lived at the enemy's expense, they had also brought in enormous sums of money. The Spanish campaign, on the contrary, had proved exceedingly costly and had not furnished any indemnities. Consequently the finances had suffered severely and relief was urgently needed. There was a heavy deficit. Rentes fell to 78 and were only maintained at that figure with difficulty. "He is short of money," said Rumjanzoff to Metternich in talking of Napoleon. "He made no secret of it to me. He wants a war with Austria so as to get it."[1] In Vienna, on the other hand, Zichy, an ex-Minister of Finance and now a member of the conference, likewise demanded "War, seeing the state of business demands it!" The lofty aims of the mastery of the world on one side, and the liberation of the world on the other, were thus closely interwoven with the material needs of the respective countries. War was inevitable, seeing both parties wished it. For Napoleon it was doubly important that Austria should appear to be the aggressor, not only that he might be able to claim Russia's help promised on that condition, but that it might seem to the French nation as if he were again being forced into war by foreign Powers. He also required more time for his armaments, which were not progressing rapidly, for the recruits had only been enrolled in the middle of February and they had still to be drilled. In the beginning of March he gave orders to concentrate the forces in Southern Germany and it was not till the end of the month that he arranged the strategic disposition of the troops which was to be completed by April 15th, under the supervision of the general staff. He hoped the hostilities would not begin before that date, but

[1] Metternich, "Nachgel Papiere," II. 281. The Russian Ambassador added: "And when he is finished with you, he will turn to us".

rather later, about the end of April or the beginning of May, so he wrote Eugène Beauharnais on March 27th.[1] By that time the 200,000 troops of the army in Germany would be massed round Ratisbon, which was to be the head-quarters; but in the event of the Austrians beginning hostilities earlier than was expected, they were to occupy the line of the Lech with Donauwörth as their base. Should they succeed in taking up their position at Ratisbon, with Davoût at Nuremberg, Masséna in command of the fresh troops from France at Augsburg, and Oudinot with the Bavarians at Ratisbon, they would then be ready for any emergency. The enemy, whose main body Napoleon knew to be in Bohemia, might either invade Bavaria at Cham and march direct on Ratisbon, in which case the French divisions in the Valley of the Regen could quickly concentrate and hold them in check; or they might proceed to Nuremberg or Bamberg, running the risk of being cut off from Bohemia; or, debouch to the north and attack Dresden, whereupon the French would at once enter Bohemia and follow then into Germany. If the Austrians manœuvred to outflank both wings of the French army, the French were then to attack the Austrian centre, keeping open their retreat on the Lech and their communications with Augsburg. Everything depended upon when, and in what direction, the Austrians began the war—for on Russia's account they must be made to take the first step.

In the bureaux of the Austrian head-quarters staff the new campaign against France had long been under consideration. As early as October, 1808, a plan had been drawn up according to which Davoût was to be attacked in Saxony, and the Princes and people of North Germany were to be incited to rise against Napoleon. The Hungarians at their Diet in September had granted other 20,000 recruits for the line regiments and had thus strengthened the power of the Government. Then ensued a period of vacillations. In the immediate entourage of the Emperor there were two distinct

[1] Du Casse, "Mémoires du Prince Eugène," I. Berthier wrote Masséna on March 21st that the Austrians would not begin hostilities before the end of April (Saski, "Campagne de 1809," I. 328.)

currents of opinion. Stadion and his party advocated taking the offensive as soon as possible, while the other party, that of the Archduke Charles, counselled extensive armaments for defensive purposes in case of Austria being finally attacked. The month of January passed without any decision being arrived at; the only point on which they were all agreed was that their armaments could not be ready before the end of March. In the beginning of February, the Emperor Francis at last decided to take the offensive. A new plan of operations was then drawn up, according to which one corps under the Archduke Ferdinand was to march in the direction of Warsaw, a second force under the Archduke John was to rouse the Tyrol to insurrection and to invade Italy, while a third corps under Hiller was to take up a position on the Inn, but the main body of the army under the Archduke Charles was to be concentrated in Bohemia, so as to operate from there in the direction required by the position of the French main body (February 8th). When at length the separate corps began to assemble in Bohemia, news arrived that the French had invaded Suabia, had thrown up fortifications at Ingolstadt and Augsburg, and that Davoût was marching on Würzburg, which showed plainly that the enemy was concentrating in the valley of the Danube. Fears were now felt lest the French might press forward to the right bank of the Danube, overpower with their vastly superior numbers the solitary corps under Hiller, and proceed against Vienna while the main body of the Austrians, advancing from Bohemia on the Danube, might find difficulty in effecting the passage of the river and after all arrive too late.[1] Others again ad-

[1] These reasons the Austrian Colonel Stutterheim claims to have heard on "good authority". There were differences of opinion between Mayer, the Quartermaster-General, and the Archduke Charles as to the plan of operations. Mayer himself relates that his objections were at once promptly dismissed by the Archduke and he himself transferred to the frontiers and not re-admitted to the Council of War till after Wagram. Mayer was the original author of the October plan of hostilities, and afterwards still adhered to his firm conviction that they should immediately advance from Bohemia, a view which the Archduke did not share. Mayer's somewhat intolerant zeal in advocating his view led to the Arch-

vocated a bold sortie from Bohemia, and after long hesitation between the two plans, about the middle of March, it was decided to advance upon the French with four of the corps assembled in Bohemia, not directly, however, but by a detour through Linz so as to unite with Hiller's division and assume the offensive by crossing the Inn instead of going through the Bohemian forest. Two army corps, under Bellegarde and Kollowrat, numbering in all 49,000, were to be left behind in Bohemia with orders to march by the direct route on Ratisbon, so as to rejoin the others in time for the decisive action. In consequence of this resolution a whole week was lost. It was the 9th of April before the Austrians 120,000 strong, were ready to cross the Inn, and on the same day the Archduke Charles declared war.

A few days previously, the Prince had issued an army order telling his troops their mission was to liberate the Continent. "The freedom of Europe has taken refuge under your standards; your victories will break her fetters, and your German brothers, who are still in the ranks of the enemy, are awaiting their release from you." He then appealed to the German nation: "Austria draws her sword not merely for her own independence but also for the liberty and the national honour of Germany". In a manifesto written by Gentz, Austria proclaimed to the world that she was not fighting against France, but only against the system of incessant expansion which confused the political situation and was the cause of all these troubles. It was not a war of one State against another which began in 1809; it was not a struggle for the greater or lesser extension of a political sphere of influence, but a strenuous effort to assert the independence of the nations against one Power which had long ceased to recognize the demarcations of State boundaries and was striving to obliterate these and to impose upon the nations of Europe the revolutionary system of centralized equality.

duke's request to have him transferred (February 21st). See my remarks on Krone's "Austrian History during the French Wars," in the "Histor. Zeitschrift," vol. LVIII. p. 554.

But before the hostile armies had met in Bavaria the war had broken out elsewhere with terrible violence. On passing into Bavaria's hands, the Tyrol had been divided into three districts, its name abolished, the provincial diet suppressed, conscription enforced, and ecclesiastical reforms instituted. These measures, the last especially, had roused a bitter hatred of Bavarian rule both amongst the nobility and the peasants, and had left it with only a few supporters among the more liberal-minded citizens in the larger towns. The promises of the Austrian emissaries and of the Court circle at Vienna fed this bitterness, and when war was seen to be inevitable the peasants of the Tyrol rushed to arms, defeated the Bavarian troops, compelled them to capitulate, and made themselves master of the capital, where the Austrians entered shortly afterwards amidst the acclamations of the populace. At the same time the army of the Archduke John, advancing from Carinthia, had defeated the French under Beauharnais at Pordenone, and again in the battle of Sacile or Fontana Fredda, on April 16th, 1808, and had driven them back as far as the Piave and the Adige. Meanwhile the Archduke Ferdinand had invaded Poland victoriously, and on April 20th had entered Warsaw. These successes were all the more valuable as even with the delay in the Austrian advance caused by the change of plans, Napoleon had been taken by surprise, for he had not expected an attack till some weeks later. Much depended now on the ability of the main body of the Austrians to turn their favourable circumstances to good account by rapid and decisive action.

Berthier, who had the chief command of the army in Germany till the Emperor's arrival, was by no means equal to his task. Instead of following Napoleon's explicit orders to recall Davoût to the Lech and to concentrate the army there, i.e. at all costs to combine before action, he left Davoût posted at Ratisbon and detained Oudinot and Masséna on the Lech, thinking he had thereby provided for all emergencies. He adhered strictly to the letter of the instructions which named Ratisbon as the goal, heedless of the fact that this choice was conditional on certain circumstances which

did not occur.[1] Hence the army, which now with Bavarians and Würtembergers numbered slightly over 160,000 troops, instead of being concentrated, remained for several days split up into two parts which might have been overpowered and defeated in turn by the advance of the combined Austrian forces. But the Austrians by their slowness missed this favourable chance. They took six days, from April 10th till April 16th, to march from the Inn to the Isar, a distance the French troops shortly afterwards covered in two days, and when the Archduke left Landshut on the 17th to march on Ratisbon and assume the offensive against Davoût, Napoleon had already reached the Danube, bringing with him the means of extricating his army from its perilous situation.

On the evening of the 12th the Emperor had learned in Paris by means of the signal telegraph that the Austrians had crossed the Inn and that war had been declared. He left immediately.[2] For four days and nights he travelled with scarcely a break. On the 16th he reached Ludwigsburg, where he learned of the measures taken by Berthier and condemned them all. For instead of the troops being concentrated at Augsburg and Ingolstadt as should have been

[1] Recent accounts of the war of 1809, making the Emperor himself and his letter of April 10th responsible for Berthier's proceeding, are to my mind not justifiable. In this letter mention is again made that Davoût is to fall back via Ratisbon on the Lech if the Austrians commence hostilities before the 15th. "Prevenez-le que tout porte à penser que les Autrichiens vont commencer l'attaque et que s'ils attaquent avant le 15, tout se replie sur le Lech. . . . Si l'ennemi ne fait aucun mouvement . . . . le duc d'Auerstedt aura son quartier général à Ratisbonne." On the 12th, after Napoleon had learned of the Austrian attack, the same order is repeated. "Je suppose que vous êtes à Augsbourg et que vous avez centralisé toute mon armée sur le Lech." ("Corr.," XVIII. 15,048, 15,059).

[2] At ten o'clock Maret, to whom the telegram was delivered, wakened the Emperor, who had fallen asleep, and who at once decided to leave at midnight, and was only with difficulty persuaded to postpone his departure till 4 o'clock in the morning. A Cabinet Council was held during the night. Josephine accompanied Napoleon on his journey, attended only by a lady's maid (Floret's Journal of April 13th).

done, exactly the opposite had happened. He immediately gave orders to concentrate the corps without Davoût, between Munich and Augsburg, and he then proceeded to Donauwörth where he arrived on the 17th. Here he at once noticed the mistake the Austrians had made through their dilatoriness, and annoyed as he was at the way in which Berthier had blundered, the enemy's proceedings consoled him greatly. The next day he ascertained their whereabouts and was told that the Archduke had crossed the Isar and swerved to the north. At first he would not believe it possible, and it was only after repeated assurances that he credited the statement. "Then," said Monthion, "he drew himself up, his eye glittered, and with a joy which betrayed itself in glance, voice, and gesture, he exclaimed, 'Then I have them! Their army is lost! We shall be at Vienna in a month!'" He was wrong; he was there in three weeks.[1]

Napoleon's conduct of the war during this campaign has always been reckoned one of his most brilliant achievements. No attempt will be made here to follow it in detail; we shall confine ourselves to the results it produced. The Austrians might even yet have defeated separately the two French armies, seeing that the distance as the crow flies between Landshut and Ratisbon was only seven miles and that between Augsburg and Ratisbon only sixteen, for as has been justly remarked, during the first Italian campaign, with less time and space at his disposal, Napoleon had defeated separately the two Austrian armies sent to the relief of Mantua. But the Austrians continued their advance at the same deliberate pace as usual, and being uncertain as to whether Davoût was in Ratisbon or already retreating to the west, they divided their forces, one column marching north while two others advanced on Abensberg and Rohr to attack the marshal on his flank, and thereby prevent his junction with

[1] Ségur's narrative ("Histoires et Mémoires," III. 321), which gives this incident as happening when the Emperor stepped out of his carriage on the morning of the 17th, is untenable, because neither Monthion nor Berthier were present then. Napoleon wrote that day to Berthier that he wished he had left Monthion behind ("Corr.," XVIII. 15,073).

the Bavarian troops.[1] Meanwhile, on the 17th, Napoleon had issued his orders; Davoût was to fall back from Ratisbon on Ingolstadt along the right bank of the Danube and open communications with the Bavarian troops under Lefebvre on the Abens, while Masséna was to advance from the Lech to the Inn and ultimately to the Isar. Lefebvre was urged to move with the utmost rapidity, as the Emperor had finally decided to unite his army by drawing back the left wing and advancing the right wing and at the same time—his favourite manœuvre—threatening the army's line of retreat at Landshut. "*Activité, activité, vitesse!*" he exclaimed to Masséna, and the troops surpassed themselves, nearly 50,000 of them covering 100 kilometres in forty-eight hours. These movements were carried out successfully amid victorious engagements with both wings of the Austrian columns and in spite of the risk involved in the flank march required of Davoût. The latter, on the 19th, had found himself opposed by vastly superior numbers, but as the Archduke did not bring nearly all his forces into action,—his east column actually marched past northwards in the closest proximity as if they were in no wise concerned,—Davoût carried the day and so made it possible for the Emperor to concentrate the other corps at Abensberg, where the Archduke was again defeated on the following day. This second defeat was partly due to the fact that Napoleon's attack was directed against the Austrian centre where Thierry's brigade was not adequately supported by the adjoining left wing and by the corps under the Archduke Louis, while the commander-in-chief was himself incapacitated by a nervous attack from directing the movements of the right wing, which took no part in the action, holding itself in reserve for Davoût. As a result Napoleon pressed forward with the main body of his troops between the Archduke Charles and the Austrian left wing, and drove the latter (the corps of Hiller and the Archduke Louis) in front of him as far as Landshut, where on the 21st,

[1] Radetzky, who took part in this campaign, looks upon this division of the forces for the sake of taking Ratisbon as the second great mistake of the Austrians, the first being the march via Linz.

after an easily won victory, the Austrians were forced across the Isar.[1] As this movement had been successfully carried through without the left flank of the French army being attacked, Napoleon came to the conclusion that the Archduke with the main body of his army was pressing forward to Landshut by a different road—a mistake, and one which might have been disastrous to Davoût, who had been left behind to oppose Charles and had received no reinforcements beyond the Bavarians under Lefebvre. The Archduke had not gone south, instead of that he had got into touch with a corps advancing from Bohemia on Ratisbon and so was numerically far superior to Davoût. But the latter attacked with great vigour, and the Archduke, unaware of Napoleon's march south and fancying he was face to face with the French main body, remained on the defensive and so the French escaped disastrous consequences. By noon on the following day—the 22nd—when the Archduke renewed the attack, Davoût had already received reinforcements from the south, and the chances were again in favour of the French. For on realizing his error Napoleon sent off Vandamme and Lannes to reinforce Davoût, then with the main body of his troops he set out northwards, leaving a small force behind to follow through Neumarkt in pursuit of Hiller. On the afternoon of the 22nd he reached Eggmühl just as the battle was at its height, and decided the fortunes of the day. The Austrian centre under Rosenberg was defeated by Vandamme, their right wing driven back by Davoût, while Lannes threatened to out-flank their left. But in spite of heroic valour the Austrians, only about half of whose forces were engaged, could not hold their ground, and after a cavalry charge which they were unable to parry they withdrew to Ratisbon. Here on the 23rd another engagement occurred,

[1] The defeat at Abensberg on April 20th was attributed at the Austrian head-quarters entirely to the young Archduke Louis. Stadion, on the 23rd, wrote home to his wife: "This action of the Archduke Louis seriously affects the progress of our affairs. Now it is absolutely necessary for the Archduke Charles to defeat the French, but I do not feel that he can, as he has now two corps fewer at his disposal."

the loss of which confirmed the Archduke in his resolve to cross the Danube and make his way to the capital through Bohemia. Napoleon, however, without attempting any pursuit of the Prince, but merely keeping him under observation, now ordered the advance on Vienna.

Long afterwards at St. Helena, Napoleon repeatedly declared that his greatest and most skilful military manœuvres were those of Abensberg, Landshut, and Eggmühl, those of Eggmühl being in his own opinion the finest of all. Military critics will perhaps not altogether agree with him here, for the first two engagements did not make supreme demands on his genius and the Eggmühl affair was simply a brilliantly retrieved error.[1] Nevertheless, when one reflects that only a week before he had found his army divided and in the greatest confusion, in presence of the concentrated forces of the enemy, and that within a few days he had united his own army and divided that of his enemy whom he had then defeated, there is no gainsaying the fact that his success was richly deserved. Another quality which equally compels our admiration was the tireless activity of his mind; for till his goal was reached he neither slept nor rested, and barely ate. "Work is my element," said the captive of St. Helena, "I was born and created for work. I have known the limits of my bodily strength, and of my eyesight, but never of my capacity for work."

The significance of the victories in Bavaria was not limited to their brilliant success from a military point of view. They were the decisive events of the whole war and completely changed its character. Austria had meant to assume the offensive and had laid her plans accordingly; now she was compelled to fall back on the defensive, nor did she ever again assume the offensive outside her own borders. Five days previously Austria had stood forth as the champion of Europe, now she was only the defender of her own soil, for the defeat of the Archduke Charles had compelled the Archdukes John and Ferdinand to relinquish the conquests

[1] Just as after Marengo, Napoleon again sought to conceal his error and to represent Davoût's isolation as a deliberately planned manœuvre.

they had made in Italy and Poland. At the Austrian headquarters the deepest despondency prevailed. The Archduke Charles wrote the Emperor from Cham where he had retreated: "If we have another engagement like this, I shall have no army left. I am awaiting negotiations." But in spite of the great losses, reckoned at over 50,000 lives, in this five days' campaign, the Emperor Francis had no intention of relinquishing the struggle. At this time he was under the influence of Stadion who was far from giving up his hopes of success. "All is not lost yet," wrote Stadion to his wife, "if only we succeed in raising the spirits of the Archduke and of the army which, from the way it was sacrificed, has every reason to be disheartened." The Prime Minister's brother, Count Frederick Stadion, was sent to the headquarters for this purpose, and as a matter of fact the commander-in-chief soon adopted a more confident tone. Although he wrote a letter to Napoleon (which was never answered), offering to open negotiations, he was nevertheless hoping to effect a junction between Budweis and Linz, with two corps under Hiller which, falling back before Napoleon, had reached the Inn and were now marching down the Danube. With their help the Archduke meant to threaten the French in flank and rear and so compel them to retreat. But Hiller had destroyed the bridge at Linz and could not execute this plan, for the second bridge at Mauthausen had also been injured, and all he could do was to concentrate his troops behind the Traun and harass the enemy's advance as much as possible.[1] In this he was only partially successful, and after a heroic combat at Ebelsberg on May 4th, 1809, he had to abandon the line of the Traun. It was not till Krems

[1] The Archduke afterwards reproached him for not crossing at Linz, evidently unaware of the destruction of the Mauthausen Bridge. "This last blow," wrote the Prince on May 4th, "makes me inconsolable when I see that everything might have been made good again and that this has been made impossible through one man's fault" (Wertheimer, "Gesch. Oesterreichs," II. 313). The fault was not so great if the second bridge had been good. To burn the first and cross by the second was the more logical plan, and the Archduke had given him the choice between Linz and Mauthausen.

was reached that he was able to gain the other bank of the Danube. Here he awaited the Archduke, who was advancing through Zwettl and Meissau, and about the middle of May the two divisions of the army met on the eastern slopes of the Bisamberg overlooking Vienna.

In conversing afterwards with General Bubna of the Austrian Army, Napoleon declared that he had committed a strategic error in not pursuing the Archduke into Bohemia. He had hesitated long, he said, in Ratisbon, and had only decided to march on Vienna on account of the general situation of affairs in Europe, i.e. in order to prevent any co-operation between the malcontents of Germany and Austria. On May 13th, he was master of the capital, which surrendered after three days' resistance. Again, as in 1805, he and his suite took up their quarters at Schönbrunn. Much certainly had been gained, but not all. The occupation of the enemy's capital could not win its full significance till the enemy's army, encamped opposite the city on the other bank of the Danube, had been defeated. If Napoleon was to maintain the offensive, a battle must be risked, even though his army was weakened by the absence of several detachments. Lefebvre with his Bavarians was marching on the Tyrol, Bernadotte was at Linz, while Davoût had only begun his advance on Vienna.

In order to reach the enemy, the Emperor selected a crossing to the south-east of the city near Kaiser-Ebersdorf. Here, during the night of May 20th, he sent over his light horse, the corps of Masséna and Lannes, and behind them the Guards, to the large island of Lobau and from there during the following night they crossed on to the north bank of the river without being molested by the enemy. The Archduke Charles had originally intended to await the French in the position he had taken up, protected by the Bisamberg, for the French had already made an unsuccessful attempt to cross the river at Nussdorf, a manœuvre which they afterwards repeated as a decoy. But when Napoleon crossed below Vienna and occupied Aspern and Esslingen, the Archduke then decided to march out and attack him with superior forces. As a means of retaining this superiority in numbers he gave orders to send down

boats loaded with stones so as to destroy the bridge over the principal branch of the river at Ebersdorf and thereby prevent the enemy getting across further reinforcements. Captain Magdebourg, to whom this undertaking was entrusted, had rendered the Ebersdorf bridge impassable for several hours on the previous day, and now renewed his attempt with such success that, at three o'clock in the afternoon, when the Archduke Charles crossed to begin the attack, Napoleon had only 36,000 troops on the left bank. Nevertheless the manœuvre was too slow and partial in its execution to allow the Austrians the full effect of their threefold superiority in numbers, and the fighting round the aforesaid villages was fierce and bitter. On seeing fresh forces threatening his right wing, Napoleon ventured a cavalry charge against the Austrian centre but did not succeed in piercing it. Nevertheless the Austrians were driven out of the greater part of Aspern, and when night came down the French were still heroically holding their position.

During the night the Emperor brought reinforcements amounting to nearly 40,000 troops across the bridges which had meanwhile been repaired, and at three o'clock in the morning he renewed the attack on Aspern. There the Austrians were taken by surprise and the village captured. At seven o'clock, when word came that Davoût's troops were crossing the bridges, Napoleon ordered Lannes with three divisions and corresponding cavalry to break through the centre of the Austrian position. Advancing with tremendous impetus, Lannes bent back the Austrian lines so far that a catastrophe was only averted by Hiller's resolute stand at Aspern and by the Archduke exposing himself personally and calling up all his reserves, so as to check a retrograde movement. But suddenly the great bridge in the rear of the French gave way. Davoût's troops were left isolated on the far side of the river, and Lannes, unable any longer to receive reinforcements from Esslingen, was compelled to retreat. The Austrians now advanced with unflinching courage, and Napoleon was again forced on to the defensive, the character his action had had on the previous day. After some critical moments when

the Austrians charged the enemy's positions, the French were forced to surrender Aspern and Esslingen and withdraw to Lobau, Masséna's troops covering their movements. Both armies were completely exhausted and it was only next morning that the Austrians could measure the full extent of their victory.[1]

Napoleon had lost the day. His generals had covered themselves with glory, but the commander-in-chief was defeated. He crossed to Ebersdorf in a small boat and sat down alone at a table on which a hastily improvised supper had been spread. There he remained motionless, silent, his eyes transfixed in a rigid stare, till at last the tears welled up and suffused them. Was he weeping for Lannes who had received a mortal wound? So his flatterers say. Or was it another loss that drew those tears from him? He could no longer deceive himself, the aureole of his invincibility had vanished for ever. Who would believe him when he announced in his bulletin, "the enemy fell back on their position and we remained masters of the battlefield"? Nobody.

Shortly before this he had held a council with his marshals in Lobau, when he had been confident and sanguine as usual, and had refused to consent to their suggestion to evacuate the island. He insisted on remaining there and fortifying it. And he decided wisely; for on the night of May 23rd two

[1] As yet there is no entirely trustworthy account of the battle of Aspern. The new material promised in Zaski's "Campagne de 1809" is unimportant and his quotations defective. Menge's "Die Schlacht von Aspern," affects to doubt the Austrian victory which even unprejudiced Frenchmen do not dispute. It is altogether contrary to a well-founded custom to declare that a general who orders a retreat because he must, and who leaves the battlefield to his opponents, has suffered no defeat. The credit of deciding the action in Austria's favour lies with Prince John Liechtenstein, as the Archduke himself declared on the following day to the Emperor Francis in presence of the whole army. Stadion in a letter to his wife on May 23rd, describes the scene. It is possible that this public praise of Prince Liechtenstein was simply an acknowledgment of distinguished conduct in action, or perhaps it may even have been prompted by gratitude, for the Prince had restrained the Archduke at a critical moment from ordering the retreat, so Gentz pretends he was told by O'Donnel (*vide* Gentz, "Tagebucher," I. July 2nd).

brigades of Austrians tried to carry it and failed.[1] Whether the attempt might have succeeded had a larger body of troops been used, is another matter. Marmont relates that in the French Army, which had to bivouac on the island for three days until the great bridge had been repaired, confusion reigned supreme, and all the conditions would have favoured a sudden attack from the enemy. The Archduke, however, contented himself with taking up the strongest position possible on the Marchfeld and lying in readiness. In his opinion the victory would be more advantageously followed up by diplomacy than by further fighting, in other words, he wished to use it as a means of obtaining peace on the best terms. He did not feel confident of gaining a second success in open country. In the following week he wrote to his uncle, the Archduke Albert, "The battle of Aspern has made Napoleon relent somewhat. We ought therefore to take advantage of this fortunate circumstance which we can hardly expect to occur again."

The fluctuating fortunes of the contest had been followed by the other States of Europe with sympathetic emotions. Napoleon's enemies, particularly those in North Germany, were full of enthusiasm at the first victories of the Austrians in Italy, and especially with the success of the rising in the Tyrol. All King Frederick William's counsellors now urged him strongly to make common cause with Austria. But in vain. He defied his counsellors, and with narrow-minded obstinacy condemned the great national movement in favour of war as "pernicious restlessness". After Schill, acting on his own responsibility, had marched out of Berlin with his

[1] So the Archduke informed his Imperial brother on the 24th. But the Austrians do not seem to have been really in earnest about their pursuit of the enemy, for when Prince Liechtenstein offered to undertake it, he was put off with the remark that there had been enough blood shed. On the other hand Wimpffen, his chief of staff, wrote on the 29th, that "the victory could not be turned to account as the enemy's strong position made pursuit impossible; nor could the Danube be crossed so long as the enemy continued to maintain a considerable part of his army in Lobau, on this side of the main stream (*vide* also Mayerhoffer, "Österreichs Krieg mit Napoleon, 1809," p. 89).

battalion amidst the acclamations of the entire populace on his way to reinforce Dornberg, who was raising Westphalia, after news had come from St. Petersburg that the Czar did not intend to offer Austria any serious resistance, the King reluctantly consented to secret negotiations with Austria and to stop payment of the tribute to France.[1] This was a serious step, and one that required to be followed up, otherwise it lost all point. Nothing further was done, however. After the Austrian defeats in Bavaria and the rapid capture of Vienna, King Frederick William persistently maintained that the French Emperor would defeat even a combined Prussian and Austrian army, and that in any case it was better to be King of Prussia beyond the Oder than not to be King of Prussia at all. Even the battle of Aspern did not induce him to modify his views, and as it had not been turned to account it only furnished him with a fresh argument for opposing his Ministers. Just at this juncture the Austrian Government committed a grave error. Instead of accepting without cavil the conditions Prussia laid down for an alliance, they met her with vague assurances and directed her to apply to England for money and arms. In the end of May the Prince of Orange had arrived in the Austrian headquarters and had announced the decision of his brother-in-law, the King of Prussia, to side with Austria. But his action was disavowed, and in the middle of June, when the Austrian Colonel Steigentesch went to Königsberg (rather too ostentatiously) to conclude a military agreement, he completely overshot the mark and had to return without having accomplished anything. The King of Prussia was now resolved to await the issue of the next battle, all the more so as he hoped the Czar might then abandon his somewhat vacillating attitude and take a definite step in Prussia's favour. In spite of the lessons of 1806, Frederick William behaved exactly as he had done in 1805, but his people had

[1] His heart was not in this matter, as is seen from a marginal note in Goltz's draft of a treaty with Austria, declaring that Prussia would begin hostilities eight weeks after the conclusion of the treaty. King Frederick William's comment is, "It is not advisable to fix a definite time" (*vide* also Gaede, p. 102; Bailleu, "Histr. Zeitschrift," vol. 84, p. 452).

changed. An outburst of enthusiasm greeted the news that the Tyrol, which had been occupied by French and Bavarian troops when the Austrians withdrew, had again risen, and that at a battle on May 29th, at Isel, the peasants under the heroic leadership of Andreas Hofer had been victorious, that an Austrian detachment uniting with a volunteer corps raised by the Duke of Brunswick, had invaded Saxony and Franconia, and that Britain was about to land troops at the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser. It seemed as if now was the time to strike. So thought Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, who urged upon the King that such a step was necessary for the security and honour of the throne. Such too was the opinion of the Ministers who considered the country's continued existence in a state of dependence and "partial maintenance," ominous for the future, whereas co-operation with Austria would secure her the respect of enemies and the sympathy of friends; so too thought the Prussian generals, Blücher and Bülow, who were in command in Pomerania and who had straightway decided upon a military uprising against Napoleon. Just then, however, momentous tidings came to hand and blighted these high hopes.

After the battle of Aspern the two armies had lain inactive outside Vienna, confronting one another. The Austrian army avoided taking the offensive, so that their victory might have time to produce its effect at a distance, and also to avoid spoiling that effect by risking a new battle in which they might be worsted, so it was said in official circles. The Archduke cited the example of Fabius who conquered Hannibal. "Napoleon and I," he wrote to his uncle in June, "are watching one another to see who will make the first mistake which the other could turn to account, and meanwhile we are repairing our losses. I shall risk nothing; for the troops at my disposal are the last reserves of the country; but I shall seize with the utmost energy any opportunity of striking the final blow." [1] But Napoleon did not commit

[1] The quotations from the letters of the Archduke to his uncle Duke Albert of Saxe-Teschen are taken from a manuscript correspondence in

any other mistake during the campaign, and he did everything to blot out effectively all traces of the one he had made. He now concentrated all his available troops as a prelude to a decisive victory. Eugène, who had followed the Archduke John, advanced through Carinthia with over 40,000 men, and by the end of May he had already crossed the Semmering Pass. Marmont with 10,000 men, was summoned from Dalmatia, Lefebvre was recalled from the Tyrol and sent to Linz, there to relieve the divisions of Bernadotte and Vandamme which were advancing on Vienna. In order to protect these forces as far as possible, the island of Lobau, where Masséna's corps had been left, was fortified and the main bridge across the Danube strengthened by stockades and guarded by a flotilla of rowing boats. The Emperor carefully superintended all the preparations for his next victory even to the smallest details.[1]

Meanwhile on the other side of the river, the Archduke had also been strengthening his army. He had called up Kolowrat and his corps who were a long way off, while his brother, the Archduke John, was advancing through Hungary, where his ranks were reinforced by the provincial militia levied by the Diet in the previous year. But these movements were not carried out unopposed. In order to prevent a junction between the Archduke John and the main army, Napoleon sent out his stepson, the Viceroy, against him; and at Raab, on June 14th, Eugène avenged his defeat at Fontana Fredda. Prince John was compelled to retreat eastwards, and it was only after crossing the Danube, and with his forces reduced to some 20,000 men, that he succeeded in reaching Pressburg and restoring communications with the Archduke Charles. The latter naturally felt small inclination for further

French, added as a supplement in an extensive work by Kleyles, long an intimate friend of the Archduke Charles. Since the appearance of the first edition of this book, Wertheimer has confirmed the authority of these letters.

[1] In the Island of Lobau, on May 21st, he had followed the progress of the battle hanging on to a rope ladder; he now had one of the tall sliding-ladders on wheels used in the gardens at Schönbrunn brought on to the island so as to be able to watch operations with more comfort.

hostilities. "I tell the Emperor," he wrote his uncle on the 23rd, "that I shall attack Napoleon if he orders it, but I believe I shall be defeated, and he and his Ministers will pay dearly for their assurance and impatience." It will be the "throw of a gamester who risks his last coin on one card."

By the beginning of July, Napoleon had completed his preparations and could bring against the enemy encamped on the Marchfeld (who had only some 136,000 troops available) over 170,000 men and abundant artillery, especially if he struck before the Archduke John arrived from Pressburg. During the night of July 5th, he crossed with his entire army from Lobau to the north bank of the river, unmolested, with marvellous precision; and in the course of the following day, without encountering any serious opposition, he drew up his troops in battle order opposite the Archduke Charles. The latter had fallen back on a defensive position, the main body under his own direction being posted between Wagram and Markgraf-Neusiedl, behind the Russbach, which runs obliquely across the Marchfeld, while three corps under Kolowrat occupied the rising ground of Stammersdorf. In the event of the principal attack being directed against Stammersdorf the Prince intended to operate with his corps against the French right wing; but if Napoleon attacked him instead, Kolowrat was then to operate against the French left wing. The Emperor decided on the latter plan so as to pierce the Austrian formation at Wagram, where the two sections of their army met. All day long, undeterred by the fighting between the outposts, he kept drawing out all his corps in a wide bow extending from Leopoldsdorf to Kagran, with the exception of one corps which he placed opposite Kolowrat, and a detachment of light troops which were sent reconnoitring in the direction of March, to discover if there was any sign of the Archduke John. As the news proved reassuring, Napoleon determined to attack the Austrians that night; but the attempt, which was carried out by the corps of Davoût, Bernadotte, Oudinot, and Beauharnais, with the Guards artillery, did not succeed. The Austrians parried the attack and drove the French back on their positions.

Encouraged by this success, the Archduke decided to take the offensive. Detecting the weak point in the French position, he ordered his right wing to advance towards the Danube, while his centre at Wagram and his left wing under Rosenberg at Markgraf-Neusiedl were to advance simultaneously, and all the movements were to begin at four o'clock in the morning. He hoped by this means to take the French by surprise, and if possible interrupt their communications with Vienna, and by making the attack simultaneous, to prevent Napoleon massing his forces at any one point. But things turned out quite differently. The Austrian right wing, to whom fell the decisive share of the task, was late in being informed of this disposition of the troops, and did not join in the action until eight o'clock, whereas Rosenberg had begun his attack at four, as arranged. The consequence was that Napoleon was able to send such strong reinforcements to Davoût, who was fighting against Rosenberg, that the Austrians were not only driven back with heavy loss to Neusiedl, but even there they were hard pressed to maintain themselves on the defensive. Leaving Davoût, the Emperor then turned his attention to the Austrian centre, whose threatening advance he checked by a well-directed fire from a hundred cannon. On their left wing, however, the French had met with a serious reverse, for within a few hours it had been turned completely round and driven back beyond Essling. Napoleon at once sent forward Masséna who, after heavy losses and much arduous fighting on the march thither, succeeded in thrusting the Austrians back on Aspern. But the fortunes of the day were decided when Davoût drove Rosenberg from Markgraf-Neusiedl and compelled this ill-supported corps to retreat northwards. For as the Archduke John was not yet in sight, the troops destined to engage him were free to outflank Rosenberg. So confident was the Emperor of the success of his right wing and of victory, that in the thick of the battle he ordered his faithful Roustan to spread a bear-skin for him on the ground, and he allowed himself twenty minutes' sound sleep. Then followed a stupendous charge, led by Macdonald, of five French divisions and the Guards,

against which the immortal valour of the Austrian centre spent itself in vain. In view of what had happened to their left wing, the Austrian position was no longer tenable, and at two o'clock, when news was received at head-quarters that the Archduke John could not reach the battle-field for other three hours, too late to be of any avail, the Archduke Charles gave orders to abandon the fight. The Austrians had to withdraw beyond the Russbach as far as the slopes of the Bisamberg and the Brünner road, but they effected their retreat in good order and without being absolutely vanquished. Napoleon's losses were too severe for him to risk another attack. Besides he had gained his immediate object, he had defeated the main army of the enemy and had prevented its junction with that under the Archduke John. For when the latter reached Marchfeld the same afternoon there was nothing for his corps to do; the order to retreat had already been given. Attempts have been made to show that Prince John, who was in receipt of his brother's order early in the morning of July 5th, could not have marched out of Pressburg any faster, and that even had he arrived in time, French troops still intact would have prevented him taking part in the battle. This latter statement requires confirmation, as for the former, one involuntarily asks if a French general under similar circumstances would have taken as long to carry out an order from Napoleon? Any one who knows the military history of this period must answer in the negative. Another question which remains unsolved is why the Archduke John was not ordered to be a day earlier at Marchfeld, seeing that on July 2nd the Austrians already realized that an attack was imminent?

After all, the battle of Wagram did not bring the campaign to an end. Austria was by no means vanquished. The Archduke still possessed an efficient army which he now concentrated at Znaim, whither Napoleon could not follow him with his entire army, for he had to leave Eugène behind with the army of Italy (which had decided the fortunes of the day on the 6th), to watch Vienna and the Archduke John. So it came about that on July 11th, just as Masséna and Marmont were

again engaged with the Austrians and preparations were being made for another battle, an officer with a flag of truce arrived at Napoleon's head-quarters with a proposal for an armistice from the Archduke Charles. Napoleon's generals urged him to refuse, but he himself decided to accept, and that for several reasons. In the first place he saw that the new method of warfare in which artillery was taking the place of the bayonet, and which had played so conspicuous a part at Wagram, made battles more sanguinary without making them more decisive, so that he began to lose faith in the infallibility of battles as a means of success. Shortly after this, on August 21st, 1809, he wrote Clarke: "Battle should only be offered where there is no other turn of fortune to be hoped for, as from its nature the fate of a battle is always dubious".[1]

Then, too, he had had some unpleasant experiences with his troops. On the 6th, Bernadotte's corps had retreated without offering any resistance and had to be disbanded; and on the following night the news of the Archduke John's approach caused a panic in which thousands of troops deserted and fled towards the Danube. During the last battle many able generals had lost their lives by exposing themselves unduly in their efforts to inspirit their reluctant troops. Masséna had only narrowly escaped. On the other hand the Austrians had proved themselves valiant foemen who knew how to conquer and could only be defeated with danger and difficulty when numbers were against them. Finally, Napoleon had learned to reckon with national sentiment, for the Austrian militia had acquitted themselves admirably and the people had given abundant proof of their devotion to their reigning Princes. Witness what the Tyrolese peasantry had accomplished! Hungary, too, in spite of his agents and of his proclamation on May 15th, summoning them to declare for independence, had remained deaf to his enticements. There was no saying what dangerous resistance he might not rouse unless he desisted. The thought of war was certainly losing

[1] In conversation with the Austrian General Bubna, he acknowledged the excessive use he had made of cannon, but said: "What else could I do? My best infantry is in Spain."

its charms for him. Hence he accepted the truce, but granted it only on condition that he received 3775 square miles of territory, to be at his own disposal, and that the Tyrol and the Vorarlberg be evacuated, conditions to which the Emperor Francis only gave his consent after long refusal, and with the secret intention of continuing the war. As the Archduke Charles did not approve this decision, he withdrew from the army and the Emperor himself assumed the chief command.

The armistice of Znaim was thus very far from meaning peace. Austria was again counting on Prussia, whose King for once seemed resolute for war, and had sent a special messenger to the Austrian Court with full power to negotiate. Distrust lest Austria and France might come to a mutual agreement at her cost had led Prussia to make these overtures. Austria was also counting on Britain, who had landed a new army under Wellesley in Spain and was preparing to send a second expedition either to Holland or North Germany; on Russia, who had not proved a zealous ally of the great Corsican; and even on Turkey. Finally, Austria was relying on her own resources and hoping to bring her army up to a strength of 200,000 men and to place it under the command of Prince Liechtenstein. It was to conceal these purposes and preparations as much as possible that the Emperor Francis sued for peace.[1] Napoleon on his part was sincerely desirous of peace, for the very reasons which encouraged his opponent in his resistance, and he disguised his wishes as carefully as

[1] Metternich, writing on July 13th, 1809, gives the following account of these overtures. "Before leaving Vienna (i.e. previous to the battle of Wagram), I had several hints of peace from the French side. On the strength of this his Majesty thought of making an overture, or at least throwing out a feeler to find out Napoleon's intentions, and their value. Prince Liechtenstein offered to go to this monarch's head-quarters. He did so with the mission of finding out, Does Napoleon want peace? And what does he mean by peace? Either the Emperor of the French will not answer or, as is probable, he will in his answer give us the means of proving to the army and the nation that now it is a question of defending its existence. His Majesty will place himself in Hungary at the head of the army (W. St. A.).

Austria did her hostile intentions, so as to gain every advantage in the negotiations. At first he brusquely declined Liechtenstein's proposal for peace, talked of dismembering Austria and of compelling the Emperor to abdicate, and only consented to negotiate after repeated requests. The two plenipotentiaries, Champagny and Metternich, met at Altenburg, but their deliberations partook more of the character of a huge intrigue than of serious negotiations. Napoleon's demands were again excessive. He claimed, in addition to Galicia—by means of which he hoped to secure Russia's support, all the country presently occupied by his troops—nearly a third of the kingdom with 9,000,000 inhabitants—to which Austria replied by advancing counter-claims. Thus they manœuvred and gained time till a decisive turn in the general political situation forced both parties to proceed to treat in earnest.

In Spain the British troops had gained some hard-won victories which, however, had not proved of permanent effect. Wellington had compelled Marshal Soult to evacuate Portugal, and then, entering Spain, he had defeated Victor at Talavera on July 27th and 28th, 1809. At the same time an English army of 40,000 troops landed on the Island of Walcheren, occupied the fortress of Vliessingen, and encamped outside Antwerp, the harbour of the French war-fleet. The Prussian envoy, Baron Knesebeck, had with the greatest secrecy promised his Sovereign's assistance, and all these circumstances, coupled with Napoleon's excessive demands, whetted the desire for war at the head-quarters of the Emperor Francis in Hungary. Napoleon's proposal to extend the truce was declined; Stadion, who disapproved the negotiations and had left, returned on September 4th, and two days later General Bubna was sent to Schönbrunn with a letter from the Emperor Francis declining the French conditions categorically. Napoleon now relented, not that he was seriously concerned about the English expedition in Holland; fever and flood, as he wrote his Minister of War on August 9th, would soon put an end to it. In Spain, Wellington had been compelled by Soult's movements to fall back to Badajoz on

the Portuguese frontiers; and on August 11th, Sebastiani had defeated one of the Spanish armies scattered by Napoleon. But in France, whither Bernadotte had been sent to organize the defence of Holland, all sorts of machinations were afoot in which this discontented marshal was involved, and which found a congenial soil in the general consternation produced by the British expedition. Fouché too was again plotting. He had not only, as the Emperor ordered, called out the National Guards in the northern departments which were immediately affected by the Walcheren expedition, but he had also begun preparations in the disaffected provinces in the south, and had thus produced quite gratuitous friction. To Napoleon his presence in France might well seem urgently necessary. He therefore unreservedly expressed his wish for peace and moderated his demands. "I sincerely wish peace," said he in private to Count Bubna, the Austrian Ambassador, through whom the Emperor Francis dealt directly with Napoleon. "Till now I have had Russia's support, and the Czar Alexander maintains his alliance with me against the wishes of his people, for which I admire him; a Sovereign ought not to pay any attention to the opinions of his subjects." (No one could be more attentive on that score than Napoleon himself.) "But how can I be sure that it will remain so? Prussia, I know, has long been hesitating between you and me." He praised the Austrian army, saying that if he commanded it, it would be as good as the French army and superior to every other. He repudiated the Altenburg demands, attributing them to Champagny's private animosity, but demanded the surrender of 3,600,000 inhabitants, 1,600,000 in the west and the south, where he was anxious to connect Dalmatia with Italy and so open up a free route to Turkey, and 2,000,000 in Galicia, to be divided between Russia and Warsaw, a plan for which he had the Czar's consent. So Napoleon wrote to the Emperor of Austria when suggesting the prospect of an alliance,[1] and such were the

[1] "Corr.," XIX. 15,823, September 15th, 1809: "If peace is established between us, it will then depend on Your Majesty to make the bonds between our States even closer". A passage which deserves to be remembered.

conditions he gave to his Minister as the basis of the negotiations, with the hint to be as expeditious as possible.

But at Totis, where the Emperor Francis held his Court, these conditions were again found too hard. Napoleon, however, declared them to be his ultimatum and that he would only modify his terms if Francis I abdicated in favour of the Grand Duke of Würzburg, which was simply bluff, as in that case he would have needed to renounce his free route to the Balkans. The decision for peace or war now lay with Austria. But the martial mood in which her proclamations had been drawn up for the resumption of hostilities had been chilled by Napoleon's attitude and other causes. The English expedition in Holland, dictated by selfish motives, had proved a failure. Antwerp had resisted; the troops suffered severely from malarial fever, and on September 11th they re-embarked for home. In spite of the overtures he had previously made, and even of the news that Austria was again ready for war, Frederick William III could not decide to mobilize his troops against Napoleon. He had soon learned that there was no ground for his fear of France and Austria concluding an agreement detrimental to Prussia, and when the Czar declined his suggestion that they should combine in aiding Austria, he withdrew once more. Enticed by Napoleon's bait of Galicia, Alexander now warned the Emperor of Austria not to count on Russia and advised him to come to terms with France. Hence in the latter half of September circumstances were much less favourable for Austria than they had been only shortly before; and, worst of all, a fell disease which had broken out in the army had already swept off more than 50,000 troops. There was no really competent commander, for Liechtenstein, though an able and excellent soldier, was not that—and a military council was too cumbersome a medium. All these considerations received due weight in the Imperial camp at Totis. Stadion withdrew and Metternich, who had counselled negotiations, took his place. The negotiations at Altenburg were broken off and Prince Liechtenstein was sent by the Emperor Francis with full powers direct to Schönbrunn. Napoleon took advantage of these

altered circumstances at Vienna to increase his demands, and he now claimed a further sum of 100,000,000 francs for the costs of war. In her despair Austria thought for a moment of resistance, but so isolated and crippled was she, that on the night of October 13th, Liechtenstein signed these harsh conditions for his impoverished country, subject to the Emperor's consent. For this, however, Napoleon did not wait, and on the following morning a cannonade from the French guns announced to the Viennese that Peace was signed.

By the new treaty Austria forfeited over 2000 square miles of territory. Salzburg, Berchtesgaden, and the Inn quarter passed to the Confederation of the Rhine; Western or New Galicia to the Duchy of Warsaw, likewise the town and district of Cracow and the whole district of Zamosc in Eastern Galicia. A narrow strip of Eastern Galicia with 400,000 inhabitants fell to Russia. Napoleon received Gorz, Montfalcone, and the long-coveted Trieste, besides Carniola, the district of Villach in Carinthia, and all Croatian territory to the right of the Save. These territories he intended to combine under the name of "Illyria" and to give it a government of its own. The integrity of what remained of Austria was then guaranteed by the French Emperor, while Francis I gave his sanction to all the changes made or about to be made in Spain, Portugal, and Italy. Austria had again to break off her friendship with Britain and, as a matter of course, to join the continental blockade. By a secret article Francis I promised to reduce his army to 150,000 troops and to dismiss from his service all officers and officials born in France, Piedmont, or Venice, and to pay a war indemnity set by Napoleon at 75,000,000 francs, but which Champagny, with officious flattery, raised to 85,000,000 francs.[1]

On the night of October 15th, Napoleon left Schönbrunn, his departure having been hastened by an untoward incident. Three days previously, when reviewing the troops at Schönbrunn, a young man had tried to force his way into the

[1] De Clercq, VI. 293, *vide* also the complete text of the secret articles given in Demelitisch, "Metternich," I. 70.

Emperor's presence, and on being arrested was found to be armed with a long knife with which he unhesitatingly declared he meant to murder the Emperor. This youth—Frederick Staps by name—who was still little more than a boy, was the son of a Protestant clergyman at Naumberg, and of a gentle and tranquil disposition, but the sufferings of his native land had filled him with such unutterable hatred of its oppressor that he had determined to seek his life. Napoleon at first thought the youth was mad, and was only reluctantly convinced by Staps himself of the deep-rooted animosity against him in Germany, and of the extent to which the country was already arming. When he asked Staps, "Would you be grateful to me if I pardoned you?" he calmly replied, "I would try again to kill you". He was then shot in the greatest secrecy. The incident was hushed up, but if it happened to leak out, the police were to see to it that the would-be assassin was described as a madman.

Once more Napoleon returned in triumph to Paris. The public little knew how difficult he had found it to emerge victorious from the struggle; and even though they had, the treaty of peace was there with its humiliating conditions for Austria, to prove the contrary. For the great mass of the French nation, it was simply another victorious campaign in which the conquests made were not in France's interest, though they were bought with her children's blood. We have already seen the first symptoms of secret aversion for this Emperor for whom France was not sufficient. What was the use of all this striving to satisfy the national vanity, of all this fame and glory which he brought back from his wars, when it was so palpable that his own vanity could not be satisfied with the throne of France? In this incessant striving to extend his borders, Napoleon was running counter to the true instincts of the nation, and in the long run it cost him his people's favour. For there is one fault which no nation can pardon in its Sovereign—the lack of patriotism. As it was, there were certainly many things to challenge criticism. The promise made in the previous year that the war with England would soon be over had not been kept;

it continued unabated and rendered any business ventures on a large scale impossible. Seaport towns, once busy and prosperous, were now sinking into poverty and decay, and people began to question if the Emperor's plan of a continental blockade were after all the right way of forcing Britain to surrender, and whether well-managed negotiations with the English Cabinet might not lead sooner to peace. The war in Spain was not nearly at an end, and this interruption of the lucrative trade between the two States entailed exceptionally heavy losses in Southern France. Added to this the Emperor treated the middle classes with a contempt which they keenly resented. Only the sons of certain privileged classes were eligible as auditors to the Council of State, the one position leading up to the higher appointments and dignities. All other aspirants had to be content with the humbler branches of the service. Yet it was precisely this privileged class, whom the Emperor fancied he was thus binding securely to his own interests, who were least faithful to him. Like the European Powers, this class regarded the Emperor's regime as a temporary thing due to his personality, and they looked forward to the time when he would no longer be there. The adherents of his brothers who were hoping to retain their thrones after that critical event, were constantly increasing, and he soon realised that he had made a mistake in founding his European federation on the strength of family bonds, so long as he himself was without a direct heir. Something of this general discontent was visible even in the army. An observant contemporary relates that "the generals, by their rich emoluments, had interests quite different from the Emperor's," viz., to guard what they had gained, and for that reason rendered only with reluctance the incessant and arduous tasks demanded of them. The Emperor's partiality for surrounding himself with churchmen and returned emigrants, had only gained him lukewarm and doubtful supporters, and at the same time had produced the impression that he despised the foundation of his power—the Revolution, whose product he was. Those members of the old *noblesse* whom he chose by preference to wait upon him, accepted

the dignities offered them, it is true, but they betrayed his secrets every time they chanced to learn them. They flattered him shamelessly to his face and behind his back lamented the cruel fate which compelled them to dance attendance upon a parvenu. The clergy in their religious instructions carried their servility to foolish extremes, preaching the implicit obedience which every hierarchy favours, and at other times groaning over the Pope's fate. It certainly was hard enough. On May 17th, 1809, the Papal State was incorporated in the Empire by an ordinary decree, and shortly afterwards, while the battle of Wagram was raging, on an indirect order from the Emperor, the Pope was forced to leave Rome—a deed that roused millions of pious souls against Napoleon.

Such being the state of feeling, Napoleon had now to bethink himself how he could propitiate the nation and regain their good graces. For some years past there had been a general desire, even in the immediate entourage of the Emperor, that he might by a new marriage provide a direct heir to the throne. It was thought that the blessings of family life would deepen his appreciation of the State and divert his mind from its absorbing pursuit of power. This desire was all the more ardently cherished as the morality at the Imperial Court was far from pure. Josephine had long ceased to be the exclusive object of her husband's affection, and now, as her one means of retaining her own position, she rather fanned than checked his vagrant fancies.[1] There were scandalous rumours afloat too about the Emperor's brothers, and it was hoped that all this would disappear once there was a well-regulated family life within the Court. Besides, it was thought that his marriage into one of the reigning families of Europe would be a pledge of peace, and at the same time act as a barrier to his vast schemes of conquest.

To this general desire, Napoleon now responded. In March, 1808, he had already spoken frankly to Josephine about a divorce, but her piteous entreaties had diverted him from his purpose. This separation was no light matter for him either. Now, however, he meant to be firmer. On

[1] Broglie's "Souvenirs," I. p. 57.

November 30th he told his consort it was his irrevocable decision to seek a divorce. Josephine's anguish was such that she swooned, and the tears stood even in the Emperor's eyes. Some days later, when she was calmer, he sent his stepson Eugène to lay before his mother the State reasons which rendered the impending divorce a political necessity, and Josephine then submitted. On December 15th, a family council was held in the Tuileries at which the Emperor announced his intention of contracting a fresh union. "The policy of my monarchy," said he, "and the needs of my people, which have always guided my action, require that I should leave successors, heirs of my love for my people, to the throne on which Providence has placed me." As his marriage with his well-beloved consort Josephine did not permit him to entertain that hope, he must sacrifice the dearest affection of his heart for the welfare of the State, and break the bond which bound him to her. Being only forty years of age, he hoped to train up the children granted him in his spirit and his ideas. The Empress, whom he himself had crowned, was to retain her title. Josephine, sobbing, professed herself willing to make the sacrifice demanded of her by the State. On the following day a Senatus Consultum declared the Imperial marriage dissolved. The only difficulty lay in getting orthodox Catholics to accept the fact, for as we have already seen the religious marriage had been celebrated the day before the Coronation. Napoleon, however, boldly declared that he had given his consent then under moral pressure, which was used as an argument for pleading the nullity of the religious marriage, and in January, 1810, the Episcopal tribunal of Paris confirmed this view.[1] The fact that General Bona-

[1] One of these reasons certainly did not hold good, for Fesch, as Grand Almoner, was the accredited priest of the Imperial Court; the validity of the second reason, that of moral suasion was disputed. The Curia took up the position, and adhered to it even after the Emperor's fall, that the dissolution of royal marriages rested entirely with the Pope; ecclesiastical tribunals were not competent authorities. At the Vienna Congress, Consalvi was prepared to oppose Austria if necessary by disputing the validity of Napoleon's second marriage (*vide* Rinieri, "Consalvi e Pacca nel tempo del Congresso di Vienna," I, p. 111).

parte's civil marriage in 1796 was valid and recognized as such by the Church was ignored, intentionally or otherwise, by the ecclesiastical authorities.

Immediately after the divorce, Josephine withdrew to Malmaison. But where was the new bride? There could be no difficulty in finding her. Policy had cut the old bond and policy would tie the new one. No other object was taken into consideration, unless perhaps the parvenu's ambition to marry into one of the old reigning families of Europe. The greatest dynasties were those of Russia and Austria, and the Emperor's political leanings inclined him in favour of Russia. As has been seen, during the Erfurt days Napoleon had cherished the hope of an alliance with the Russian Imperial family, and had broached the subject to the Czar, who, however, had evaded a reply under the pretext that his mother's consent was necessary. The elder sister Katherine had soon afterwards been married to the Duke of Oldenburg, but Anna, the younger sister, was not yet betrothed. The question was, would this marriage now suit his policy?

Since Erfurt much had happened to ruffle the good understanding between the two countries. First came the war with Austria, which the Czar would fain have averted so as to pursue his expeditions in Sweden and Turkey with undiminished forces; then came the French victories, which had caused keen anxiety at St. Petersburg. The Czar had certainly succeeded in compassing the cession of Finland from Sweden by the peace of Friedrichshamm on September 19th, 1809, but he had not conquered in Turkey, and in the fall of the year the Russian troops had been obliged to recross the Danube. But what annoyed the Czar most of all was Napoleon's attitude towards Poland during the war. When the French Emperor saw the deliberate slowness with which Russia moved in the campaign against the Archduke Ferdinand, he turned to the national troops of the Duchy of Warsaw under Poniatowski, summoned the inhabitants of Western Galicia to assert their independence, and so gained from Poland the help Russia had withheld. The augmentation of the Duchy of Warsaw by 1,500,000 inhabitants, while

Russia only received 400,000, was Napoleon's reward for these services. He distrusted his Tilsit ally quite as profoundly as that ally distrusted him. This was not what the Czar had understood by the partitioning of Galicia, when he gave his consent to it. He had frankly told Caulaincourt that he expected to receive the larger portion, and Warsaw to be given the smaller part;[1] and now that the reverse had happened and that anti-Polish feeling was very strong in Russia, the treaty of peace affected him like a defeat. Nevertheless, it would have been no small inconvenience to Napoleon if Russia had taken up arms at this juncture while Prussia was ready to take the field, and so a few days after the Schönbrunn Treaty of Peace, on October 20th, 1809, a dispatch was sent to St. Petersburg announcing that the Emperor could not leave the West Galicians, who had voluntarily joined his ranks, to return under Austrian rule, but at the same time he was far from wishing to awaken hopes of the restoration of Poland; on the contrary, he would join with Russia in blotting out the names of Pole and Poland from the pages of history. (Little did he suspect Alexander was to learn that he had assured the Poles at the same time that he was not in earnest in making this statement!) The Russian Ambassador, Kurakin, was loaded with attentions, the wish to raise a Russian loan in Paris publicly supported, and even when Alexander requested from Caulaincourt a guarantee that Poland would never be restored, the Ambassador was instructed to gratify this request, as the Emperor wished "everything done to tranquillize Russia". Champagny was empowered to revive the project of marriage mooted at Erfurt, and to ask, in the event of Josephine being divorced, for the hand of the Grand Duchess Anna (November 22nd, 1809). Napoleon may have been in earnest, yet it almost seems as if, as at Erfurt, he was again merely wishing to make his ally re-assert his fidelity to the alliance; for

[1] He wrote at that time to Prince Galitzyn how strongly he was opposed to any increase of Warsaw through Galicia, and gave his reasons. His own views with regard to Poland were inevitably affected by such an arrangement (cp. Schiemann, "Nikolaus I," I. 105).

without awaiting a reply from Caulaincourt he began to make overtures, through various middle parties, in Austria, where Metternich was zealously advocating a good understanding with France as a means of securing rest for his exhausted country. Napoleon, moreover, had frankly admitted that he had been deeply impressed by the strenuous resistance of the Austrian army, and by the enthusiasm with which the people had greeted their Sovereign on his return, in spite of defeat and of the unfavourable terms of the peace. Possibly too he was considering that an alliance with the house of Hapsburg might prove the most effective means of disarming the hostility of Austria's adherents in Germany and Italy.

In November, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs had made inquiries through Floret, who accompanied the new Ambassador, Prince Schwarzenberg, to Paris, as to the Archduchess Marie Louise, then eighteen years of age, who came of a prolific family, and whose Catholic faith was more akin to French conditions than that of a Princess belonging to the Orthodox Greek Church of Russia. During the Altenburg negotiations rumour had mentioned her as a possible bride for Napoleon.[1] At the New Year, Napoleon received Countess Metternich, who had not yet left Paris, with marked attention, and shortly afterwards the members of the Beauharnais family called upon her, and, evidently at Napoleon's bidding, mentioned this matter. Hortense informed the Countess that her brother Eugène had advised the Emperor to marry the Archduchess Louise, and Josephine added that the Emperor had told her he had not yet decided, but that she was sure he would choose in Austria, if he were certain of being accepted there. Already on December 25th, Schwarzenberg had received instructions from Vienna that in the event of a marriage alliance being brought under his notice, he was to entertain it and not to discourage overtures. The train had thus been laid, and still no answer had come from St.

[1] "Rumour, Napoleon will give back the whole monarchy, marry the Archduchess Louise, and ask the hand of the Crown Prince (Ferdinand) for a French Princess" (Floret's "Journal" for October 8th, 1809.)

Petersburg. If, instead of a final decision, polite evasions were again sent, that would be regarded as tantamount to a refusal, and the Emperor would then press his suit in Vienna, confident of Austria's acceptance.[1] There were yet other considerations which made an alliance with the Austrian Princess more reliable than with the Grand Duchess Anna, who was only newly fifteen. Russia's conduct during the previous summer had made it clear to Napoleon that an end to that alliance was not far off, and that a desperate struggle must then ensue for the mastery of Europe. Hence the central German States, least of all Austria, must not be allowed to fall under Russia's influence. In order to make the Imperial family at Vienna more inclined to compliance, the utmost publicity was given to the proposed Russian marriage, in the hope that the dismay caused at Vienna by such a close intimacy between France and Russia might prepare the way for the other suit, and possibly induce them to make overtures. In her conversation with Countess Metternich, Josephine had not omitted to add: "You ought to represent to your Emperor that his ruin and that of his country is certain if he does not agree, and that his consent is also the only means of restraining the Emperor Napoleon from a schism with the Pope". Even to this day it is not absolutely certain which side made the first decisive move; whether Count Laborde, a confidential friend of Napoleon, who had taken an active part in the peace negotiations and had remained for some time in Vienna, broached the subject to Metternich, or whether it was the latter who first suggested it.[2]

[1] Napoleon can hardly have been ignorant of the feeling towards himself in the Russian Imperial family, and especially the aversion of the Dowager Empress (*vide* Caulaincourt's letter of February 4th, 1809, Vandal, II. 180).

[2] In a dispatch to Schwarzenberg (Vienna, December 25th, 1809), Metternich says that Laborde, who had formerly been in the service of Austria and had many acquaintances at Vienna, being specially intimate with Schwarzenberg, had sounded him before leaving as to an alliance between the Royal houses of France and Austria, suggesting the marriage of the Austrian Crown Prince Ferdinand to one of Lucien's daughters, or that

In any case the Emperor Francis and his Minister of Foreign Affairs looked upon a family alliance with Napoleon as a certain security for the State, a guarantee for its continued existence, and these considerations outweighed their antipathy to the suitor.

After the first secret preliminaries had been concluded between the Austrian and the French diplomatists, and the divorce had been pronounced by the Church—a stipulation on which the Austrian Court had insisted—Napoleon held a Council of his Ministers on January 28th, at which the question of his new marriage was discussed. Eugène Beauharnais, Maret, Fesch, and others advocated an Austrian alliance; Cambacérès, Murat, and others a Russian one. When Lacuée, the Minister of War, also advocated the latter, and zealously discountenanced any Austrian alliance, declaring that Austria was no longer a Great Power, the Emperor cut him short with the remark, "It is evident you were not at Wagram". No decision was arrived at, but the Emperor's inclinations were evident to all. On February 6th, when Caulaincourt's dispatch at last came in, requesting further delays, Napoleon then considered his obligations to the Czar at an end. "Postponing means refusing," said he, "and

of Napoleon and the Archduchess Louise. The first suggestion he at once put aside, but not so the second. Laborde, on the other hand, maintains in a memoir written for the Emperor after his return to Paris, about the middle of December, that Metternich had persuaded him to delay his departure from Vienna, and that in a conversation as to some means of bringing about better relations with Austria he had immediately mentioned as such Napoleon's marriage to an Austrian Archduchess, if the Emperor really meant to get a divorce. This idea, Metternich was careful to add, was entirely his own; he did not know his Sovereign's intentions, but was sure they would be favourable. Later on in a letter to Jacobi Klöst on September 11th, 1811, Metternich denoted himself as the one who had brought forward the marriage proposal, which agrees with a remark made by Napoleon in 1814 to the Austrian, Freiherr von Wessenberg, "Can Metternich forget that my marriage with an Austrian Archduchess is his work?" (Arneth, "Wessenberg," I. 189). Finally in his memoirs Metternich denies this and ascribes the initiative to Napoleon. In these conflicting accounts one fact at least is clear, both sides were willing.

besides I will have no foreign priest in my Palace coming between me and my wife." The Court of St. Petersburg was informed with the utmost courtesy that the project was abandoned. The official reply sent to Caulaincourt stated that the religious difference would have an unfavourable effect upon the populace, and that the recent communication requesting postponement had led the Emperor to a different decision. "Time is passing and the Emperor is impatient to fulfil the desire of France. He well remembers that the Archduchess Anna was spoken of to him at Erfurt, but the delay of a month before sending him a reply is sufficient to release the Emperor from any obligation, which indeed no longer exists, and also from all the claims of courtesy due to their friendship."[1] If the Czar felt annoyed, and we know that he did, that did not seriously affect Napoleon now that he was sure of Austria. He had played a double game and won. Only a few days after communicating his master's decision at St. Petersburg, Caulaincourt had a second task set him; he was to announce that the Emperor declined to accept in its original form the treaty relating to Poland, signed by him on January 4th, 1810, and already ratified by the Czar.

Meanwhile, on February 6th, Napoleon had sent Eugène Beauharnais to Schwarzenberg to arrange for the marriage contract being signed forthwith. The Ambassador was forced to disregard his instructions to send notification of this previously, and on the following day he signed the contract, after the Emperor had announced to his Ministers his decision to marry an Austrian Princess. Berthier then proceeded to Vienna as Grand Ambassador to make the formal offer on behalf of Napoleon, and there, on March 11th, in the Augustine Church, the marriage was celebrated, the Archduke Charles acting as proxy for his illustrious opponent. The Archduchess left immediately for France, and on the 27th the Emperor met his new bride at Compiègne. On April 1st, the civil contract took place at St. Cloud, the re-

[1] At Napoleon's bidding, on February 6th, the letter was to be worded so as to give the impression that Caulaincourt's dispatch had arrived while it was being written, and it was to be dated the 5th.

ligious marriage being celebrated on the following day in the Chapel of the Louvre. It was remarked that the ceremonial was exactly the same as that used at the marriage of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, and that the marriage contract was a reproduction of theirs, word for word.

Maria Louise did not greatly please the Parisians. She was a handsome girl of eighteen, fresh-coloured and healthy looking, with a frank look in her fine blue eyes. Yet in spite of her clear complexion and round rosy cheeks, she was considered plain-looking and dowdy. At Court every one was struck with her excessive shyness, but she soon gained composure and even a certain dignity, especially when treated encouragingly and shown marked deference by Napoleon, before whom she saw every one behave with abject submissiveness. Until recently she had hated him as her country's bitterest foe, in as far as a child of the least emotional of monarchs was capable of passionate feelings. Letters written by her to a girl friend at this time show the sacrifice she was making in the interests of policy. On January 23rd, she writes from Ofen: "Since Napoleon's divorce from his wife I open the 'Frankfurter Zeitung' always expecting to see the name of his new bride, and I confess the delay makes me anxious. I place my lot in the hands of Providence who alone knows what is best. But if it must happen I am willing to sacrifice my well-being for the good of the State, convinced that true happiness is only found in the fulfilment of one's duties." Then she adds: "Pray that it may not happen". And now it had happened.

Although in Paris the young Empress's personal appearance was freely criticized, nevertheless the marriage generally gave the liveliest satisfaction. The irreconcilables of the Faubourg St. Germain were indignant at an alliance between a legitimate Monarchy and the Revolution, and the Radical Republicans no less so at the way in which their oppressor had succeeded in strengthening his power. But the bulk of the nation was satisfied. Even the soldiers of the Old Guard thought that this marriage with a foreign Princess would bring about a general peace. Rentes went up on February 9th,

as soon as it was known that the marriage contract had been signed. Napoleon immediately took advantage of this mood to sing the old song once more, and he ordered Champagny to send out a circular letter to all the foreign ambassadors expressing his love of peace. "You will mention that one of the principal means used by the English to kindle war on the Continent consisted in spreading the belief that I aimed at destroying the old dynasties. As circumstances have now placed me in a position to choose a consort, I wish to deprive them of this wicked reproach, by means of which they stirred up the nations, provoked quarrels, and drenched Europe in blood." It is at least highly doubtful if the world believed these assurances. Metternich relates that at the Court of Vienna many conjectures were made as to Napoleon's calculations in contracting this marriage, whether he really meant to sheathe his sword and to found the future of France and of his family on the principles of order and peace, or whether he was merely wanting to gain Austria's forces to further his policy of conquest. That was the crucial point. They were not left in doubt for long. On March 20th, 1811, the booming of the cannon at the Invalides announced to the anxious citizens of Paris the birth of a Prince. Those who could read the signs of the times knew that the horizon of Europe had already clouded over once more, and they were in no doubt from whence the storm would burst. "King of Rome" was the proud title Napoleon bestowed on his infant son. Only the ancient Mistress of the World could furnish a name glorious enough for the inheritor of his power.

CHAPTER XV.

NAPOLEON IN HIS ZENITH.

It was a critical time in Napoleon's career as a ruler when, after having as he thought established his own plans securely, he found himself face to face with a new foe in the conquered subjects of those European Governments which he had laid prostrate. This opposition from the peoples of Europe he had plainly not foreseen when he declared war against their States, and consequently he repeated those very faults which his predecessors in the Revolutionary Governments had committed. The Convention and the Directory had not troubled themselves as to whether the nations of Europe actually wanted to be liberated by them from the yoke of their Princes and to be gathered under the wing of the French Republic. Napoleon in his turn cared just as little whether or not they wished to be subjected to his control and gifted with his laws. He considered he had secured his own ends when he granted the various countries new Constitutions and placed them under Governments which were useful to him, because subservient to his will. For national instincts he had so little perception that even in the French nation he neglected them, and was constantly hoping to weld French, Dutch, Germans, Italians, and Spanish into one Empire. After all it was a natural mistake.

What he had possessed in his youth and suffered for and lost so early, was merely a sort of tribal sentiment which pitted Italian against Italian, Corsican against Genoese, dialect against dialect. Of that deep-rooted patriotism which weaves its strong fibres round all the members of one mighty race of similar habits and speech he knew nothing. He had become too ardent a disciple of the cosmopolitan nationalism

of the eighteenth century which paid as little heed to difference of race as to difference of rank, and which sought its ideal in a citizenship of the world without distinction of race. Such had been his aspirations until he fell to dreaming only one dream in which he saw all this levelled humanity subject to his rule. Hence he thought of populations, not of nations; these he thought he had conquered when he had defeated their armies and humbled their Governments. But it so happened that when he ventured to attack Spain, where the instinct of nationality was exceptionally strong, the people, stung to fury, seized the weapons their rulers had dropped and determined to fight to the last. Soon the same spirit of national resistance to the aggressor manifested itself among the other continental States, and it is a characteristic of all Napoleon's ablest opponents that they rendered homage to this movement and recognized in the martial spirit of the nations the most powerful means for their deliverance. Thus in England many years previously, Pitt had raised an army of volunteers; in Austria, Stadion had laboured persistently for the establishment of a militia force, while Scharnhorst in Prussia was incessantly advocating compulsory military service. There was a deep significance in the Austrian Minister's remark to the Russian plenipotentiary before the last war: "We have constituted ourselves a nation".

What energy this element of nationality had infused into the struggle! In Spain, which Napoleon had expected to conquer by sending Murat on a "parade" to Madrid, the fires of insurrection could not be extinguished. Austria, though on the verge of ruin, had put such forces in the field in 1809 as gave the great war lord more trouble than all the armies ever sent against him by the Vienna Cabinet. Added to this there were risings in the Tyrol and Northern Germany, while in Russia public sentiment was so strong that the Czar had not dared to draw his sword against Austria.

It was ominous for Napoleon that precisely at the time when national hatred was impelling the peoples of Europe to take up arms against him, in France, too, there had arisen a patriotic agitation against his disloyal ambition. The Na-

tional State had entered into a secret but well-defined opposition to the International Empire. In 1808, just when the Spanish insurrection broke out, the Paris police discovered a Republican plot in which several senators, a discharged general (Malet) and some comrades of his way of thinking were implicated.[1]

Even the Pope lent his countenance to this hostile movement of the nations in 1809 against Napoleon's political schemes. He did not join in the struggle with the weapons of his temporal power, for these Napoleon had destroyed. His States were held by French troops, their Government conducted by foreign officials, and except that there was no formal deed to attest the fact, the inheritance of St. Peter was, and had been, since 1808, to all intents and purposes a province of the Empire. It was with all the strength of his spiritual authority, which rested on a broad and popular basis, that he was arming against the Imperator. Scarcely had the Spaniards begun their resistance, when, although surrounded by French troops, the Holy Father sent out a protest against the violence used towards himself, and forbade the Bishops of the Legations torn from the Holy See to take the oath to their new master. Napoleon replied to this from Vienna, after the victories in Bavaria in April, 1809, by issuing two decrees divesting the Pope of his temporal power and declaring the Papal States part of the territory of the French Empire. The Pope then hurled a Bull of Excommunication against his oppressor, which, though bearing the date of the battle of Aspern, had been prepared months before. The age-long conflict between the Imperial power and the Papacy had now been started afresh and it was for Napoleon to find a solution. He chose the one which offered the most advantages for his offensive policy and for the Revolutionary system which he represented.

Learning at Schönbrunn that the Bull excommunicating him had been affixed to the doors of all the churches in Rome,

[1] *Vide* Madelin, "Fouché," II. 47, 50, where mention is made of a second conspiracy originated by the Girondist Servan, who was Minister of War in 1792.

Napoleon immediately sent secret instructions to the King of Naples (who was in his confidence and had full charge of the proceedings in Rome), to arrest the Pope if he preached rebellion. Such a course, the Emperor maintained, was not unheard of; Philip le Bel and Charles V had both acted in similar fashion. Shortly afterwards he sent Murat a second note with regard to Pius, saying, "No more leniency! He is a dangerous fool and must be locked up." Murat treated the hint as was intended,—as a command—and on July 6th, just as the tide of battle was turning in the Emperor's favour at Wagram, Pius was arrested in the Quirinal and removed from Rome. He was taken first to Grenoble, and then, on special orders from the Emperor, to Savona on the Riviera and closely guarded throughout.[1]

Somewhat before the conclusion of the Peace of Vienna, Napoleon ordered the Cardinals, the Generals of the various Orders, the Papal Court and Archives to be transferred to Paris, whither he also purposed to summon the Holy Father in order to have him near at hand as an instrument of his absolute will. On Fouché's earnest dissuasion, however, the Pope was allowed to remain at Savona, and it was not till June, 1812, that he was transferred to Fontainebleau. After all, there was the chance that Pius might refuse his services. But even this had been foreseen. On his return from the campaign, when his marriage with an Austrian Princess had been arranged and the Pope thereby deprived of his last support from an orthodox Catholic Power, the Emperor issued a *Senatus Consultum* on February 17th, 1810, declaring the Papal States incorporated in France, proclaiming Rome the second city of the Empire, and promising the Holy Father a yearly income of 2,000,000 francs. Future Popes, on their election to the Holy See, were to be bound by the articles of the Gallican Church of 1682, which had established

[1] The Emperor afterwards, in a letter to Fouché, declared the arrest, which he himself had secretly ordered, a piece of folly. Pacca, the Secretary of State, should have been arrested and the Pope left undisturbed in Rome. At St. Helena he emphatically denied all complicity in the act. "Corresp.," XIX. 15,384, and 15,555.

the independence of the French Crown of any foreign Ecclesiastical Power, the fallibility of the Pope in matters of faith, and the superiority of the councils over the Papacy as affirmed by the Council of Constance. It was perfectly obvious that in pursuing this policy the Emperor meant to conquer resistance in the Curia by means of a complaisant council. As far back as 1807 he had written to Eugène that he would not hesitate to assemble a council of the Churches of France, Germany, Italy, and Poland, and dispense with the Pope.

Pius nevertheless protested by every means in his power. When the Archiepiscopal tribunal of Paris pronounced the divorce of Napoleon and Josephine, Pius refused his sanction, in consequence of which thirteen Cardinals (afterwards known as the "black" Cardinals) declined to take part in the impending marriage ceremony. Nor would he consent to the investiture of the Bishops appointed by the Emperor in accordance with the terms of the Concordat. The gentle old man was deprived of his advisers, so that, as his knowledge of canonical matters was not very thorough, he might be the more easily reduced to compliance. Austria's endeavours to allay the strife proved vain, and towards the end of the year Napoleon prescribed harsher measures for his captive and robbed him of his papers and of all means of communicating by letter; indeed he even deprived him of writing materials. Pius remained unshaken, and although now and then he might seem inclined to make concessions, to consent for instance to the coronation of Napoleon as "Emperor of the West," or to compromise in the matter of the temporal power, or to admit foreign prelates into the Sacred College; yet the remembrance of Napoleon's harsh treatment of himself, of the "black" Cardinals, who had been deprived of their incomes and banished to Eastern France, of those left behind in Rome, and of the Italian Monasteries, always caused him to retract. "The Emperor," said the Pope to the Austrian negotiator, "is a man who never wants what he pretends to want; his real intentions he never betrays. Where is the guarantee that he will not reject to-morrow all that he has

agreed to to-day?" And so Pius chose schism rather than to subordinate his office as Vice-regent of Christ to any temporal lord.[1]

Under such circumstances, ecclesiastical affairs both in France and Italy being in confusion, the Emperor was forced to take a decisive step if he meant to carry his point. The General Council, as originally planned, had been disapproved by his ecclesiastical advisers, who advocated rather a National Council. Yet at this "Conseil ecclesiastique," which had met once, on March 16th, 1811, under his presidency, he had heard Abbé Emery state that the French catechism declared the Pope to be the "visible head of the Church" whose authority they could not disown without imperilling themselves, and furthermore that Bossuet, whom Napoleon was fond of citing as an opponent of Ultramontanism, had affirmed that the Holy Father ought to be completely independent of any secular power in the exercise of his ecclesiastical functions. The Emperor immediately retorted somewhat rudely, that while that might be quite fit and proper in Bossuet's day—in the seventeenth century—when there were many recognized temporal rulers, none of whom would admit the other to be the Pope's temporal superior, now, however, when all Europe recognized him alone as sole master, this consideration no longer held good.[2] Paren-

[1] According to the statements of the Paris prelates, Pius's first refusal to confirm the Bishops appointed by Napoleon was due to the fact that the Emperor had not kept his promise to discard the "organic articles" of 1802, which in various ways exceeded the terms of the Concordat, and, contrary to the so-called "Italian Concordat" of 1803, had suppressed monasteries in Italy and had appointed Bishops in Venetia (Welschinger, "Le Pape et l'Empereur," p. 215).

[2] These haughty words were answered by Emery, who said that present conditions would not last and that Bossuet's opinion might again hold good. The other prelates, horrified at the boldness of their colleague, attempted to make excuses for him to the Emperor. "You are wrong, gentlemen," said the latter, "I am not at all indignant with him. He has spoken like one who knew his subject and how to handle it, and that is how I like to be spoken to." On leaving the Council, Talleyrand remarked: "That is the only man who knows how to tell the Emperor the truth without exasperating him".

thetically he insinuated that the successors of St. Peter "were constantly dividing Christianity into two camps, all for the sake of a paltry Roman State no bigger than a duchy". When the Prelates of France and Italy assembled in 1811 in the Church of Notre Dame to hold a National Council, again unexpected resistance manifested itself. The very first resolution passed by the council was one asserting their loyalty to the Pope, whose consent they requested before proceeding to deal with the conditions of investiture demanded by the Emperor. Napoleon, on the other hand, had hoped to use the decisions of the council as a means of exercising further pressure on the Pope. It was only after the sittings of the council had been suspended, the recalcitrant prelates arrested, and others threatened, that the council consented to promulgate as its own a decree dictated by Napoleon to the effect that if the Pope delayed beyond six months in investing a Bishop nominated by the Emperor, the Bishop might then be invested by the Metropolitan of the district (August 5th, 1811). Pius, who was at Savona, was ultimately persuaded to consent to this measure, in so far as the French Bishops were concerned; Italians he excepted, and again he demanded that his advisers be restored to him. And so the struggle went on.

Although Pius was not yet vanquished, his chances, on a general review of the situation, were not very bright. The evil treatment to which he had been subjected as Head of the Catholic Church, and his appeal as such to the faithful, had not made the impression it would have done in former centuries. The world had grown extraordinarily worldly. Even the Vienna Court had paid little heed to the Bull of Excommunication when it allowed the young Archduchess to set out for France. "Not one of the Catholic Thrones raised a protest," writes Cardinal Pacca in his Memoirs. Moreover a large number of the Emperor's opponents, British, Russian, and Prussian, belonged to other forms of the faith and did not come within the Pope's authority, while some nations, such as the Catholic Poles, hoped to secure their own interests by a close union with Napoleon. Indeed even the Holy Father's own subjects in the Papal States offered little

resistance to their new master, and were eventually well-pleased with the military but effective administration, the reform of the judicial system, the improvements in education, the regulation of rivers and roads, the draining of the marshes, and other salutary innovations of this godless Government.

With the possible exception of the Tyrolese peasantry, the Spaniards were the only nation upon whom the fate of Pius VII exercised an effect commensurate with its political significance. The Spanish priests were never weary of steeling their people's courage against one who "threatened Altar and Throne alike".[1] In the last days of 1808 the revolutionary central Junta, which carried on the Government in the name of the exiled King Ferdinand, summoned the nation to wage a guerrilla warfare, i.e. bands were to be formed under the direction of a monk or of an experienced officer for the purpose of attacking small French detachments, capturing couriers, and carrying off transports with arms and ammunition, etc. This exhortation was immediately acted upon. The guerrillas were everywhere and nowhere; they could be beaten off and pursued but not destroyed, and throughout the war they proved an intolerable scourge. Soon after the Junta's appeal, a manifesto was issued announcing to the peoples of Europe that the liberty of all the nations was involved in the Spanish war, and appealing for support. Nor did they ask in vain.

The British, who had hitherto appeared in the Peninsula only as foes of Napoleon, now entered openly into a friendly alliance with the Spanish insurgents and pledged themselves to help them to the utmost of their strength. And though they did not fully redeem this promise—there were seldom more than 30,000 British on the Spanish side—yet the command of their troops was in the hands of a man of genius, Arthur Wellesley, Lord Wellington, as he was styled after the battle of Talavera. "If the war in the Spanish Peninsula continues, Europe is saved," he used to say; and he acted

[1] In a Catechism drawn up by the Spanish Clergy for war purposes Napoleon was credited with the nature of a devil as well as of a human being, the killing of a Frenchman was accounted a praiseworthy deed, and desertion from the struggle infamy worthy of death.

accordingly. By wisely keeping his small force on the defensive rather than risking it in hazardous operations, he contrived to hold the vastly superior numbers of his opponents in check and to attain his end—the wound in the body of the Empire remained open. In spite of the 200,000 troops that Napoleon left behind in Spain, his marshals had not succeeded in pacifying the country. At variance among themselves, wearied of an exhausting war that held out no promise of gain, dispirited, and often uncertain whether to follow the orders from Paris or those from Madrid, what successes they gained were insignificant; and when the Emperor returned from Schönbrunn to Paris, the reports from the south were far from favourable.

Every one now expected Napoleon would immediately return to Spain, enforce obedience from his refractory generals, and by dint of his superior genius win a final and decisive victory. But he did not go to Spain. Of those who knew him intimately some declared he would not risk his life in a land seething with fanaticism; others, that his divorce and second marriage prevented him. It is not improbable, however, that the same motive which hastened his return to France in the beginning of the year now kept him there—his distrust of Talleyrand and Fouché, whom he had noticed during the Austrian campaign in secret consultation with Murat and Bernadotte. In any case he expressed himself very contemptuously about affairs in Spain, probably to avoid contradicting his own statement a few months previously, to the effect that he had practically brought matters there to a close. And so he contented himself with directing the movements of his generals from Paris.

At first it seemed as if this would prove sufficient. On November 19th, 1809, near Ocaña, the French defeated the last of the Spanish regulars, drove them back to Cadiz, and restored the province of Andalusia to King Joseph. There now remained only the guerrillas and the British auxiliaries. The Emperor had small respect for the guerrillas. He had no conception of their terrible significance, and he would not believe it when he was told that the warfare against them was far

more horrible than anything that had happened in La Vendée. He had more respect for the British troops—"The English are the only danger in Spain," he wrote Berthier in the end of January, 1810. Yet there seemed no reason why his troops should not quickly get the upper hand of a few thousand British, even without his presence, especially when he sent them large reinforcements as he now did, and when, by dint of flattery and alluring promises, he persuaded Masséna, the ablest of all his marshals, to undertake the task of driving Wellington out of Portugal. Ney and Junot were to hold their commands under Masséna; Soult, who was at the head of the army in Andalusia, was to come to his aid in Portugal. So sure was Napoleon of success that on February 8th, 1810, he issued a decree withdrawing the provinces north of the Ebro, Biscay, Navarre, Aragon, and Catalonia, from the National Government and transformed them into four French military departments under Generals Suchet, Augereau, Reille, and Thouvenot, who were entrusted with the highest civil and military powers. The troops under their command were to be supported out of the revenues of these provinces, for Joseph's Government was not in a position to exploit the country's resources with sufficient energy to defray the cost of maintaining the army. In future the generals were only to receive their orders from Paris, and in all these provinces the tricolour was to replace the Spanish flag. Accompanying this decree was a letter to Berthier, bearing the same date and stating in a more general way the Emperor's intention of placing in the hands of his generals all Spanish territory conquered by them; even the levying of the taxes was to be entrusted to them. There was the chance, too, that they might extend their conquests. If Suchet from Catalonia penetrated farther south and Masséna succeeded in wresting Portugal from the British, all Spain would then come under French administration. That was undoubtedly what Napoleon was aiming at, and possibly he deemed it better than squandering French troops and French money in establishing the independence of an ambitious brother who lacked the energy to

defend his throne for himself.[1] One thing certain is that the severance of these four provinces robbed Joseph of the credit his moderation had won him among the more liberal-minded Spaniards. When his Minister, Azanza, went to Paris to obtain the repeal of the February edict, he was informed after long delay that the Emperor had irrevocably decided on incorporating the whole of Spain in France, "of which it forms the natural continuation" and that its king was to abdicate as soon as the English had been driven from the peninsula.[2]

Everything now depended on Masséna and on the result of his expedition. It was a failure. The fortresses protecting the Portuguese frontiers only capitulated after a long and obstinate resistance which afforded Wellington a respite he turned to account by destroying all the means of subsist-

[1] Some have assumed that in the spring of 1810 Napoleon purposed sending back the Bourbon Prince Ferdinand VII, who had just then married his niece, Lucien's daughter, and, under compulsion, had sanctioned the cession of the annexed provinces. Masson and Sorel accept this hypothesis in their works, but so long as it rests solely on unreliable statements in Lucien's Memoirs it has no serious value. The presence in Paris of Lolotte, then 15 years of age, from January till June, 1810, was probably entirely due to the wish of the "family" for a reconciliation between the two brothers.

[2] The dismayed diplomatist actually received all the documents bearing on the subject—the decree in which Joseph renounced his Throne and a manifesto from Napoleon to the Spaniards—all properly drawn up and ready for use. The following passage occurs in the manifesto: "My brother has voluntarily returned to me the Crown which I abdicated to him and has begged me not to allow his subjects to be ruined. Knowing your circumstances, he appealed for my protection and insisted that I should take you into my Empire." It was an impudent perversion of facts; the very reverse was the truth. Azanza, at Paris, had described the quarrelling and plundering of the French generals and soldiers as the main cause of the widespread revolt, Joseph's moderation as the only means of tranquillizing the country, and he had begged that King Joseph might be effectively supported for one more year without any attack being made on the integrity of Spain. These documents, however, never reached Madrid. They fell into the hands of a guerrilla and were soon afterwards published, appearing in the Spanish insurgent newspapers and in the "London Courier".

ence on his methodical retreat, and by erecting a triple chain of forts to the north of Lisbon, from the sea to the Tagus. On this strong position at Torres-Vedras the strength of the French troops was ultimately broken. Already, in September 1810, they had suffered a severe defeat at Busaco and they had been sorely tried by the hardships of the march. Consequently in the spring of 1811, as the necessary support was neither forthcoming from the south nor from France, Masséna was forced to retreat to Spain. After a fresh reverse at Fuentes d'Onoro early in May, he was deprived of the chief command, which his indignant Emperor then bestowed on Marmont.

Portugal, therefore, had not been conquered; the British had not been driven from the Peninsula. Instead of that, by defeating the ablest of all Napoleon's generals, they had greatly enhanced their prestige. On the other hand the sufferings of the isolated French divisions and their compulsory allies baffle description. Countless numbers died of disease or hunger, or by the secret malice of the enemy. "This is a ghastly war," writes an officer belonging to the Rhenish troops, alluding to the incessant fighting with the guerrillas. "It is always victory or death, and in the long run —death." As an instance of this, the regiment of the Saxon principalities which had arrived in Spain early in 1810, 2300 strong, had lost 1000 men by September—and had over 1200 in the hospitals; by the month of October it had only twenty-seven men fit for service. Of the various corps which the Emperor sent across the frontiers, only a fragment, and that not a very large one, ever reached their destination. The depression among the soldiers was constantly deepening, but up till 1812 one hope had held them together, that their great War Lord would come in person and turn their misery into triumph. But even now, when things were going from bad to worse, he did not come. Again there was a perfectly clear reason. He did not come because he looked upon the war in the Peninsula merely as a minor episode in the gigantic struggle which he was now waging against Britain in all the corners of Europe—as quite a secondary item which would

lose its significance as soon as the great strife had been victoriously ended elsewhere. He evidently considered he ought not to involve himself personally in a subordinate matter such as the Peninsular campaign, which would keep him at too great a distance from the centre of his policy and from its immediate aims. All his energies were now absorbed by the commercial war which he considered the main issue and the essential feature of his policy. In 1810, about the time that he sent Masséna to Lisbon, he returned to the struggle with renewed zeal, convinced that Britain's finances were so crippled that in two more years her strength would be completely exhausted.

There were not lacking symptoms to support this view. The English Treasury had suffered severely by the constant drain of the subsidies to the continental Powers and the costly expeditions in Spain and Holland. Bank of England notes had already fallen 20 per cent, and on the Continent the English pound, which was usually exchanged at the rate of twenty-five francs, sank to seventeen. Since 1807 the woollen trade in Yorkshire and Wiltshire had suffered as severely as the cotton trade in Manchester and Glasgow, and the ironworks of Sheffield and Birmingham. The indirect taxes by which the State had sought to meet its needs pressed heavily upon the manufacturers and even more heavily upon the working classes.[1]

A commercial crisis was the natural result, and many of the banks failed. Already a considerable party in Parliament was agitating against the continuation of the war. As yet the continental blockade had never been carried out with

[1] The cost of living of a London middle class family had risen from £540 before the war with France to £900 during the war, and fell on the conclusion of peace to £750. Between 1792 and 1813 the expenses of an agricultural labourer's family rose from £27 to £48, and in 1823 amounted to £32 (*vide* Rose's abstract from Lowe's "Present State of England in Regard to Agriculture, Trades, and Finance"; also Lumbroso's "Napoleone e l'Inghilterra," p. 430). The competition of machinery affected even more severely those engaged in textile industries. Between 1795 and 1810 weavers' wages fell from 39s. to 15s. per piece (*vide* Gaskell, "Artisans and Machinery," 1836, quoted by Rose, "Napoleonic Studies," p. 195).

absolute strictness, and Napoleon felt confident that if he could only bring this about England would yield, sue for peace, and renounce her sovereignty of the seas. Then of course the struggle in Spain would also be at an end. Under these circumstances he reckoned it would be imprudent in him to cross the Pyrenees instead of remaining in Paris where he could supervise things personally and devote his attention to seeing that the blockade was rigorously enforced, which he could not have done in Spain owing to the difficulties of communication. Besides, Wellington was not to be defeated merely in the Peninsula. It was not the physical strength of one or other of the British expeditions that was his real foe, it was the material strength of the British Empire which could equip these expeditions, build up coalitions and instigate rebellions, it was this national wealth which must be destroyed. And the fate of Europe now hinged upon the possibility of Napoleon enforcing the continental blockade with such disastrous effect that Britain's prosperity would thereby be destroyed.

Reference has already been made to the fact that the idea of continuing the hundred years' war with England, so as to close the continental markets against her manufactures and her colonial goods, did not originate with Napoleon. The idea had been mooted in the councils of the Revolutionary Government at the time when young General Bonaparte was gathering his first laurels in Italy.[1]

[1] In a letter of July 22nd, 1796 Mallet du Pan writes Thugut: "The hatred against England has acquired fresh strength; the preparations for an invasion will be continued and a plan has been sketched and already partly carried out for closing the continental ports against England". A week later he writes: "As far as is possible the Continental Markets will be closed against England so as to attack her revenues, her manufactures, in short her most important resources, provoke the resistance of the British nation, and in this way compel their Government to sue for peace". ("Corresp. inédite," II. 118, 120). An article in the official organ, the "Redacteur," of October 29th of the same year, contains the sentence: "Our policy must confine itself to ruining the trade, and consequently the power of England by shutting her out of the Continent". Two days later the law of 10th Brumaire forbade the introduction of all English products, especially of such articles as velveteen, muslin, shawls, woven goods, crystal

The leaders of the Republic were convinced of the soundness of this policy, and the Emperor remained faithful to it, and in all his intercourse with the smaller States laboured unremittingly to further it. In November, 1806, when he had conquered Austria and Prussia, he launched his Blockade Decree, closing the continental ports against all vessels coming from England or English colonies. Owing to the English edicts of November 11th and 25th, and Napoleon's decrees of November 23rd and December 17th, 1807, the maritime trade of the neutral Powers was so beset with difficulties that the Government of the United States actually forbade her citizens to trade with Europe. Her commands were not obeyed, however. American shippers carried freights of English manufactures and colonial produce and traded with them under false certificates as to their port of shipment, in Holland, in the Hanseatic towns, and in Prussian and Russian ports. In the Mediterranean the neutral flag of Turkey on ships belonging to Greek merchants, concealed British cargoes which were smuggled into Trieste, Venice, and Genoa. This extensive indirect traffic dislocated Napoleon's great scheme in the most pernicious way, and he cast about for some means of crippling it as effectually as the direct trade with Britain. In March, 1810, he issued an edict aimed straight at the neutral Powers, subjecting Greek ships in the south to the most searching examination as to the origin of their cargoes, while American ships, on the other hand,—here the prohibition of the Washington Government stood him in good stead—were threatened with confiscation in all French ports, or ports within reach of French garrisons. It was only when the United States removed the embargo on French vessels that Napoleon declared himself ready to allow American vessels to discharge their cargoes in French ports; but only such as were brought direct across the ocean to France.

goods, sugar, etc. The accompanying report declared that one of the most effective ways of stimulating home manufactures was to prohibit the sale and consumption of English goods throughout the entire Continent. The Convention had also advocated this policy in its decrees of March 1st and October 9th, 1793.

Vessels which had touched at English ports or had traded in the Baltic were treated as enemies.[1] It was not merely this trading by neutrals which defeated Napoleon's policy. Right alongside of his territory on the North Sea and the Baltic, smuggling had reached enormous proportions, and in spite of decrees and regulations the Continent was furnished with a continuous supply of the prohibited British manufactures and colonial produce though at very high prices. Meanwhile in the London warehouses the home goods were constantly depreciating in value. The difference in price, i.e. the premium on smuggled goods, amounted in 1810 to nearly 50 per cent. To put a stop to this contraband trade the Emperor issued an edict at Trianon on August 5th, 1810, imposing a tax of 50 per cent on cotton, sugar, and other colonial products "which are all of English origin," and threatened with confiscation all depots of such goods within four miles of the French frontiers. In this way he spoiled the smugglers' trade and secured a large increase to his own treasury, the "*domaine extraordinaire*" into which this tax now flowed. By a Senatus Consultum of January 30th, 1810, the "*domaine extraordinaire*" had been declared independent of the State and placed under the Emperor's private control.[2]

[1] Thiers, XII. 32; "Corresp.," XX. 16,348; "Corresp.," XXI. 16,743. Even this measure had been thought of by the Directory. Early in January, 1798, it recommended the Legislative Body to confiscate all neutral ships carrying English goods, no matter who the owners were, and to close French ports against all foreign vessels which had touched at English ports. The reason alleged was to defend the liberty of the seas. (Mallet du Pan, II. 390).

[2] "If we give the treasury the profit that would otherwise go to the smugglers we shall thereby secure some abatement in the import of colonial goods and an increase of revenue," so wrote Collin, the Director of Taxes, to the Emperor (*vide* also Darmstädter, "Das Grozherzogtum Frankfurt," p. 308). The Senatus Consultum of January 30th, 1810, merely regulated the administration of the War Chest founded by Napoleon in 1805, on the spoils of the Austrian campaign, and since then increased by the fruits of further victories. The "*domaine extraordinaire*" helped largely in defraying the expenses of the army, in rewarding military and civilian officials, in the erection of monuments, public buildings and works, in the encouragement of the arts, and in adding to the splendour

A later decree, issued at Fontainebleau on October 18th, ordered that all articles of English manufacture found either in France or in allied countries be seized and burned. During the following weeks French soldiers were to be seen in all directions, crossing the frontiers, breaking into shops and, with the aid of the customs officers, dragging forth bundles of goods, the fruits of British industry, and burning them to ashes. Sugar and coffee were piled on ammunition wagons and sent to Antwerp, Mayence, Frankfort and Milan, and there sold by public auction. While a premium was put upon the zeal of customs officers, smugglers and shipowners were liable to extremely harsh penalties inflicted by a special tribunal instituted in November, 1810, for the purpose. Such were the severities to which the continental system had led. In France it was somewhat modified by the permission granted to certain shipowners on payment of large sums of money—which also went into Napoleon's private treasury—to import specific classes of English produce, such as indispensable provisions and dye-stuffs, and to export to England French wines and corn. In order that trade might not be too much hampered, attached to this permission was the stipulation that manufactured goods as well as agricultural products were to be exported. But as the English accepted only natural products, this stipulation was of comparatively little value. Nevertheless the traffic in licences proved very lucrative, and high prices were paid for them by many speculators.[1]

Yet after all, the system of licences was an infringement of the Emperor's great plan for a Continental Blockade. It afforded a valuable relief to the English, who in 1810 were threatened with serious calamities owing to the failure of the harvests and to the widespread want, but on the other hand

of the Empire. Up till 1810 the funds of the "*domaine*" amounted to two milliards (cp. Rupelle, Les finances de la guerre de 1796 à 1815, "Annales de l'École politique," 1892, p. 656).

[1] The Directory had previously sold such licences, as we see from Mallet du Pan's letters of January 28th, 1798 ("Correspondance inédite," II. 398).

it provoked bitter resentment in those countries outside France where Napoleon was rigidly enforcing the blockade. What led Napoleon to adopt an attitude so radically at variance with his whole policy can only be seen by a review of the internal condition of the Empire at this period.

The blockade system had undoubtedly given a powerful impetus to certain branches of French trade, while the extension of the Empire by means of victorious wars had opened a wider market for such commerce. This was specially true of cotton, woollen and silk fabrics, articles of luxury, and iron goods. Although the loss of the colonies had deprived the linen manufacturers among others of a valuable market, the increased exports to neighbouring continental countries had provided ample compensation. Hence, in spite of the ruin of the maritime trade, the industrial condition of France was thoroughly satisfactory during the first five years of the Empire.[1] It provided the farmer with solvent consumers, the State with willing taxpayers, and the Emperor with loyal and devoted supporters in the people themselves. This last had always been Napoleon's principal aim. Hence as early as 1806 he had made it impossible to import woven goods, soaps and other foreign products into the Empire, and he had used his victories to further his political influence in the conquered countries and to open up a path for exporting home industries far beyond the confines of France. That the continental nations should trade freely among themselves once Great Britain had been excluded, was an idea he never entertained. Like the Convention and the Directory before him he was a keen protectionist, and such a convinced opponent of free trade that he refused to allow the issue of a new edition of Léon Say's treatise on Political Economy published in 1803, advocating the abolition of duties. Not

[1] The improvement in French trade during Napoleon's time may be gauged by the fact that in the years after the Revolution and on till after the Empire the imports of raw materials and partially manufactured stuffs increased by one-third, while the import of manufactured goods diminished by one half (*vide*, Moreau de Jonnès, "Le commerce au 19 siècle," p. 186).

only was France closed against all imports, but also Italian territory and German territory as far as the Rhine, while the other countries were prevented as far as possible from trading among themselves. For instance, in October, 1810, an edict was issued throwing open Italy for the import and transmission of French goods exclusively, thereby depriving Austrian cloths and Swiss and Rhenish cotton goods of a valuable market. In the same year, by imposing prohibitive tariffs, Italian raw silk was kept out of Switzerland and the territories of the Confederation for the benefit of the Lyons silk manufacturers, who by their powerful competition ruined the Lombard industry.

Napoleon was thus constantly aiming at fostering French industries; and for this purpose he summoned a council of trades and manufactures in June, 1810, so that by making his system popular, the burdens he imposed might be willingly borne. In a letter of August 23rd, 1810, to the Viceroy Eugène, who protested against the aforesaid measures, he expressed himself frankly: "I cannot admit your observations. My principle is, 'France foremost'. You must not forget that if English trade controls the sea it is because the English are the most powerful on sea; it is therefore only the natural sequence of things that the trade of France, which is the most powerful State on land, should triumph on the Continent, otherwise all would be lost. It is better for Italy to come to France's rescue in an important case like this rather than be overrun with custom-house officials. If I were at any time to lose a great battle 2,000,000 men from old France would hasten to my standard, and all the exchanges would be ready to serve me while Italy would be thrust aside".[1] This spirit of sacrifice which strengthened his personal power in

[1] On August 26th he wrote again to his stepson: "The Italian customs offices must carry out their functions the same as the French, otherwise, I do not conceal it, I shall incorporate Italy in France. Italy, for instance, is flooded with Swiss goods; all printed materials and cotton goods come from Switzerland while France is glutted with such things. My intention is that printed stuffs from Germany and Switzerland be no longer allowed in Italy and that such be only imported from France" ("Corr.," xxi. 16,829).

Europe had to be rewarded. Hence protective tariffs were granted to French industries at the expense of the products of foreign States, and favoured treatment was given to French exports in the dependent countries which were obliged to exclude good English articles and to accept inferior and often dearer French goods, to the injury of their home products. It was an economic as well as a political tyranny, and contributed its share in stirring up the hostility of the continental nations.

But all this care was powerless to prevent French trade feeling the injurious effects of this political system which had been designed for its benefit. In 1810 and 1811 a crisis occurred which shook the credit of the financial world and even that of the Emperor. The advantages arising from the protective tariffs had led to the founding of new factories, and soon the production far exceeded the amount required for home consumption; hence the necessity of finding a field for exports became a pressing duty for the Government. When Napoleon captured the Throne of Spain for his family, he had intended to pursue the same conduct as had succeeded in Italy and Germany and to make Spain more accessible to French goods and inaccessible to British competitors than had hitherto been the case.[1] But the national rebellion of the Spaniards roused by the French expedition of 1808 had brought about the very opposite result. In one year the exports to the peninsula decreased by one half. And the decrease continued, for the war reduced the people's powers of consumption, while their English allies kept open a channel through Portugal for the import of British goods. Meanwhile, Holland, crippled by the loss of her trade, and the German territories impoverished by the war, also failed to realize the expectations of the French exporters.

[1] "While Spain was combating France and her trade through her customs, her ports, especially those in the Bay of Biscay, stood open to English commerce, and the Blockade Decrees in Spain as in France only favoured the smuggling of the English, whose goods were distributed from Spain through Europe," so runs Napoleon's report to his Foreign Minister on April 28th, 1808.

Hence the necessity for securing a sufficient market at home for French manufactures, and above all for maintaining the agricultural classes in a solvent condition. With a view to this, the English market, which was always ready to take corn and wine, was to be made accessible to them. And so licences were introduced. But their effect was infinitesimal compared to the injury that ultimately accrued to the industrial life of France from this foreign policy; and the Trianon Edict, by causing further increase in the price of raw materials, made matters worse. Moreover this Edict allowed the trade in Colonial produce to degenerate into barren speculation which reacted unfavourably on the money market. Meanwhile, owing to the diminished exports, many of the businesses started (often on borrowed capital) during the previous favourable conjunction of circumstances were unable to meet their claims, several of the large banking houses failed, involving many in their ruin, and all over the country manufacturers were refused credit. This in turn led to the collapse of a great number of manufacturing firms and to serious restrictions in the activity of others, with the result that thousands of operatives were thrown out of work. The earnings of the agricultural classes being consequently reduced, the crisis became general. Napoleon was really revolving in a vicious circle. For by the enormous sums which he drew from foreign countries for the maintenance of his armies and for his War Treasury, he crippled the purchasing power of the very market which he hoped to gain for French industries. Against that, what avail was it that he now gave 18,000,000 francs to help individual firms to keep their works going, that he carried out the erection of new public buildings so as to provide work for unemployed artisans, that he richly rewarded inventors like Jacquard, gave valuable prizes for the discovery of new processes, promoted cotton-growing in Southern France and Italy, and sought to stimulate the silk trade by ordering furnishings and draperies of Lyons silk for all his palaces? These were very fine evidences of the energy of his administration, but they were only relief measures, and as such, powerless to restore completely the

now shattered confidence in the blessings of his belauded government.[1]

This would certainly have been the time to conclude a permanent peace with England. But while the crisis was at its height the road to peace was barred. Early in 1810 the Emperor had sought to turn his military success to account in London, thinking that the failure of the Walcheren Expedition might have made the British authorities willing to conclude a peace such as he wished, and to secure this end he had pushed forward matters in Holland. This country had already fallen a victim to the blockade. The States General had won their prestige and their wealth by their ships, their colonies and their commerce. These were their sole resources. If Napoleon's laws, which made trade by sea impossible, were carried out, ruin was inevitable, and of that the Emperor was well aware. "Holland cannot escape ruin," he wrote Louis in March, 1808, when offering him the Spanish Throne, with a view to incorporating the Netherlands in France. He knew that the Dutch had eagerly welcomed American vessels with British cargoes, and that they forwarded these goods into the interior of the Continent so as to save at least a remnant of their once prosperous carrying trade. But as Louis had declined the Spanish Throne, Napoleon put aside his scheme of annexation for the time being. After the Austrian campaign, however, he immediately returned to it, alleging as his pretext that the Dutch had not possessed sufficient troops to cope with the English invasion of 1809. As a matter of fact it was malarial fever rather than King Louis's troops which had kept the British from Antwerp and had compelled them to beat a hasty retreat to the Island of Walcheren, where a detachment had held their ground for another couple of months. When Louis hastened to Paris to defend himself and his country from the

[1] The severity of the crisis in connexion with the diminished consumption of the foreign markets is seen, among other ways, in the exports of silk to Germany, which fell in 1810 and 1811 from 45,000,000 francs to 16,000,000 (*vide* S. Darmstädter's excellent "Studien zur Napoleonischen Wirtschaftspolitik," in the "Vierteljahrschrift für Social und Wirtschaftsgeschichte," II. 600).

charge of "betraying France," Napoleon informed him of his intention of annexing Holland to the Empire, and of providing him with a German principality. On the following day, December 3rd, 1809, the Emperor announced to the Legislature that "Holland, which lies between France and England, is the estuary of the most important arteries in my Empire. Changes are necessary; the security of my frontiers and the interests of both countries make them imperative." Ten days later Holland was alluded to in an official report as "part of France". One concession was granted to King Louis, that a Dutch confidential agent be first sent to England to request privately the repeal of the Order in Council of 1807, in return for which the French were to evacuate Holland and the Hanseatic towns, but to annex them if she refused. Napoleon was clearly aiming at putting upon England the blame of the annexation of Holland. Louis sent Labouchère, an Amsterdam banker and son-in-law of Baring of London, to Wellesley, the English Foreign Minister, to represent to him in urgent terms that the independence of Holland would be ruined if England did not repeal the edict. He was told in reply that his country was no longer of the same importance as before; that England was much more concerned with Spain where the war was still in progress, and that the edicts were simply defensive measures against Napoleon's blockade decrees, and could not be repealed so long as the latter remained in force. An agent sent by Fouché fared no better. Fouché's plan was to carry out Napoleon's intentions without his master's knowledge, though with the appearance of it. But at London his agent was informed that, although the Emperor's measures showed no desire for peace—on January 20th, 1810, Napoleon had issued orders for the military occupation of all Dutch territory between the Maas and the Scheldt,—they were willing to consider any *open* proposals.

These tentatives having failed to produce the desired effect in London, Napoleon varied his theme. As he had just then married a "daughter of the Cæsars," and all the world was consequently looking forward to a period of rest and

peace, the time was not suited for any violent action. So instead of claiming Holland outright for France, he compelled Louis to accept a treaty ceding to France all Dutch territory on the left bank of the Rhine, including Zeeland, Brabant and part of Gueldres, and entrusting the surveillance of the entire Dutch coast to a corps of 6000 French troops and French customs officers; and furthermore binding the King to equip fifteen large men-of-war, in return for which the Emperor promised to remove the restrictions so long imposed on Holland's trade with France (March 16th, 1810). Now that French vigilance had closed every egress, the Dutch negotiator again tried his luck in England. Again he was informed that the King and the majority of the Cabinet were opposed to the repeal of the edict, which had been of considerable benefit to British industries, and that Holland's independence was in itself no guarantee for peace, as Spain was the real obstacle. Napoleon then abandoned his attempt to use Holland as a means of forcing England to conclude peace. On being informed by Louis of Fouché's secret intrigues in London, the latter was deprived of his post as Minister of the Police, and the "Moniteur" officially repudiated all talk of negotiations with England as "foolish slanders" which had only embittered public opinion in London, where Fouché's overtures had been treated as authentic.[1] Any prospect of a good understanding was now out of the question, and so confident was Napoleon of humbling England by the blow Masséna was to deal her in Spain, that he rejected a proffered exchange of prisoners on terms favourable to himself, solely to avoid assisting his enemy in the peninsula. No further consideration was shown for Holland. The conditions of the treaty remained unfulfilled; the French army of occupation was increased to four times the stipulated number of troops, and in co-operation with the foreign customs officers, acted with insufferable violence. But complaints sent to Paris were answered with insults. Louis therefore

[1] A partitioning of the American colonies between France and England had been talked of, and also of granting Ferdinand VII Mexico as compensation (*vide* Coquelle, "Napoléon et l'Angleterre," p. 245).

considered it no longer compatible with his dignity to retain the Crown, and on July 1st, 1810, he abdicated in favour of his younger son—the elder had been made Duke of Berg in March, 1809—and withdrew secretly to Austria. Napoleon was taken by surprise and bitterly reproached his brother for his ingratitude.[1] As a matter of fact it was no small inconvenience to Napoleon to appear before the world at variance with his own nearest of kin. It made no alteration in the facts of the case, however. Even before the news of Louis's abdication reached Paris, a decree had been prepared, the first clause of which ran: "Holland has been incorporated in the Empire". This decree was now made public, and Lebrun, one of Napoleon's former colleagues, was sent to the new province as Stadtholder.

It is well to observe the methods underlying these usurpations. Both in Holland and in Spain Napoleon had been disappointed in his brothers. Neither Joseph nor Louis could now escape the strong national repulsion to the Empire within their Kingdoms. Instead of recognizing and respecting this sentiment, Napoleon blamed his brothers for being too feeble, vain, and obstinate to serve him. He watched them incessantly with the deepest distrust, and finally abandoned the family system in order to bring Europe, so to speak, under his personal rule.[2] In Holland and Spain he proceeded in similar ways. In Spain he annexed all the lands as far as the Ebro in February, 1810; in Holland, in March of the same year, all the land as far as the Waal; and documents were drawn up ready for use proclaiming the incorporation of both Kingdoms in the Empire. But in Spain one thing was still wanting—the British had not been driven into the sea. These annexations, however, were not destined to be permanent.

[1] Compare with this the Emperor's statement to the Swedish Ambassador that he had driven (!) his brother from the throne, although he loved him and had educated him, because he had failed to put down the Dutch smugglers (Lefebvre, v. 73).

[2] "There are cousins and relatives," said he to Metternich in September, 1810, "but that amounts to nothing. I ought never to have given thrones to my brothers, but time alone can make us wise. I ought to have appointed only Regents and Viceroys" (Metternich, "Nachgelassene Papiere," II. 398).

"The British Orders in Council of 1806 and 1807 have destroyed the public law of Europe. A new order of things guides the universe." Such were words in which Napoleon recommended the Senate to make the union of Holland with France constitutional. But the rescript demanded not merely the estuaries of the Scheldt, the Moselle, and the Rhine, as "new guarantees" against England, but also the Weser and the Elbe; and the docile senators, in a consultum of December 13th, 1810, actually declared as constituent parts of the Empire both Holland and the entire German coast of the North Sea, i.e. Oldenburg, Lauenburg, the three Hanseatic towns, Bremen, Hamburg and Lübeck, the principalities of Arenberg and Salm, parts of Hanover (which had only been allotted to Jerôme in January, 1810), of Westphalia and of Berg, amounting in all to over 600 square miles.[1] The new territories were to form three departments, with Osnabrück, Bremen and Lübeck as their chief towns. And for this there was not the faintest justification, not the shred of a lawful claim, not even a pretext; it was entirely an arbitrary proceeding! With equal arrogance the Swiss Republic of Valais was incorporated in November, 1810 "as the interests of France and Italy cannot be sacrificed to this impoverished population," and troops were sent to occupy the canton of Tessin for the avowed purpose of incorporating it in the Kingdom of Italy. "Circumstances have rendered these annexations necessary," said the Emperor's Minister in his report to the Senate. "Circumstances" had already enabled Napoleon to increase the number of French departments to 130, had made him ruler over an Empire that stretched as far east as the Save, had made him King of Italy, Mediator of Switzerland, Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, had raised his brothers and his brother-in-law to thrones,

[1] *Vide* Napoleon's letter to King Louis on May 20th, 1810 (Rocquain, "Napoléon et le Roi Louis," p. 273): "J'aurais considéré le trône de Hollande comme un piédestal sur lequel J'aurais étendu Hambourg, Osnabrück, et une partie du nord de l'Allemagne, puisque c'eût été un noyau de peuples qui eut dépaysé davantage l'esprit allemand, ce qui est le premier but de ma politique."

and kept them there, only so long as he willed. "Circumstances," in the same way, might have justified him in incorporating the whole of Europe, had he been able to compass his wish. His thoughts were undoubtedly tending in that direction.

The idea of annexing the German seaboard originated, like the blockade system, with the Directory, who twelve years previously had declared this district to be the "most important part of the globe for France"; for by possessing it England could then be excluded from all continental ports, from Gibraltar to Holstein, and even to the North Cape. This programme seemed now on the point of being realized. Denmark, which then included Norway, had instantly complied with Napoleon's demands to proscribe the cargoes of neutral ships. Hatred of England which, since the bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807, had got beyond all bounds, induced King Frederick VI to overlook the considerable disadvantages which would necessarily ensue to his country; and he was also actuated by the hope that he might some day, with France's help, obtain the throne of Sweden, which was bound to become vacant ere long. This expectation, however, was not realized, for a new turn of events had completely altered Sweden's political attitude. During the war against the Franco-Russian Alliance by which Finland was ceded to Russia, and Swedish Pomerania with Stralsund and Rugen to France, Gustavus IV, by his unwise hostility to Napoleon and his obstinate adherence to Britain—who had proved a sorry friend, had brought his country into a lamentable plight. In March, 1809, he had been removed from the throne and replaced by his uncle, Charles XIII. Sweden had then concluded a peace with Russia, and in January, 1810, also one with France, by which, in return for Pomerania, she pledged herself to carry out the continental blockade with the utmost rigour. Indeed in November, 1810, Charles XIII even consented to declare war against Britain. Shortly before this, being old and childless, he had chosen as his successor Bernadotte, whose social gifts had won him many friends in Swedish Pomerania. Little did he think that he

had called to his side a man who was no friend of the French Emperor, whose approval had previously been obtained. Napoleon would really have preferred Frederick, King of Denmark, so as to have a strong Scandinavian Power to counteract Russian aggressiveness. He had thought also of his stepson Eugène, who declined, however, as his wife, a niece of the exiled King of Sweden, was a strict Catholic and not willing to turn Protestant. Berthier also declined to leave France to fill the Swedish Throne, and as a small party was working zealously in Bernadotte's interest and had begged Napoleon's sanction for his candidature, Napoleon consented, on condition Sweden declared war against England, which actually happened.

While Napoleon was thus striving with his great rival for the mastery of Northern Europe, he was also seeking to secure his control in the extreme South. The British were firmly seated in Sicily where they kept the Bourbon royal family in a state of tutelage, subject to constant interference. A British expedition sent out from here against Naples in 1809, had ended as lamentably as the Antwerp expedition in the North. Napoleon now retaliated by ordering his brother-in-law, King Joachim of Naples, to drive the British out of Sicily or else to keep their troops shut up there, so that they might not be able to send reinforcements to Spain and Portugal. But in 1810 the French failed to effect a landing in Sicily. In the following summer, supported by the Toulon fleet, they were to renew their attempt, but as the ships were unable to leave Toulon the enterprise was postponed. In reality, like the conquest of Spain and Portugal, it was only looked upon as an item of secondary importance; and Messina, like Lisbon, was to be won by other ways.[1]

[1] Not without interest is the report sent by the English plenipotentiary, Lord Bentinck, to London, that Queen Caroline, after the marriage of her grand-daughter Marie Louise to Napoleon, sought to come to an understanding with the French party at her Court, against England, to whose yoke she submitted most reluctantly. The plan was that her troops were to attack the British on the island in 1811, whilst Murat stormed Messina. Sicily was then to be given either to Murat or to Napoleon in exchange for a suitable equivalent, while the Bourbon Prince Leopold was to marry

One fact stands out with absolute clearness amongst all Napoleon's multifarious activities at this time, namely, that those who hoped that his marriage into one of the oldest reigning families in Europe would reconcile him to the system of the old States, were very greatly mistaken, and that those others who, a year later, hailed the birth of his son as a pledge of peace, were no less so. In the spring of 1811 Napoleon spread his wings for his highest flight. Spain and Portugal were to fall to France sooner or later, either by conquest—Masséna was then at Lisbon—or by the march of greater events. From the southmost point of Italy to the ice-bound regions of the north all the Governments of Europe acknowledged his sway, and now the time had come to settle his account with the Russian Colossus. Why would he have compelled half the nations of Europe to serve in his armies if it were not that he meant to make himself ultimately master of them all?

The news from England was only calculated to confirm

one of Napoleon's nieces. But there is no satisfactory proof of these statements. In any case Napoleon did not fall in with those views which Caroline was constantly advocating. He merely announced his marriage with Marie Louise to the Queen, and talked of finding compensation for Naples outside Italy. Even here the evidence is not conclusive. Better attested is the story current in Vienna, that Queen Caroline, on hearing of her grand-daughter's marriage, exclaimed, "That was the only thing wanting among all my misfortunes, that I should be grandmother to the devil!" (Montet, "Souvenirs," p. 111). During 1811 there was a great deal of talk about annexing Naples to the Empire and of Murat's loss of favour. This last was probably not unmerited, for alarmed lest Napoleon's relationship to the Sicilian Court might prove disadvantageous to himself, Murat had arranged to be as independent as possible, and was probably even then thinking of a national rule over all Italy. In the summer of 1811 he issued decrees for naturalizing all French subjects engaged at Naples, and even before this, in order to strengthen his finances, he had imposed heavy duties on the export of cotton goods and on the import of French cloth, measures which he was forced to abandon in order to retain his throne. In September of 1810 Napoleon told Metternich that he already regretted having placed his brother-in-law on the throne of Naples, but any open breach with this fearless soldier would only have created great trouble, and moreover Caroline (Napoleon's sister) had considerable influence in Paris.

the Emperor in his self-appointed path. There the economic conditions arising from France's annexation of the northern seaboard provinces were constantly growing more serious. Britain had certainly conquered most of the over-sea Colonies belonging to European States, amongst them the Ile de France and Cayenne, but her expectations of thereby greatly increasing her export of manufactured articles had not been fulfilled; for colonial products had to be taken in exchange, and against these Napoleon had been closing the European markets more and more rigidly. Added to this, the introduction of machinery had led to over-production and loss of profits, so much so that Parliament was obliged to open a public loan for the hard-pressed manufacturers. French trade had also suffered, but the Emperor confidently assumed that the improvement there was only a matter of a short time. A few days after the birth of his son, on receiving congratulations from the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, he spoke with perfect confidence of his ultimate victory. The thought of peace he now frankly rejected. "You see," said he, "how far down England is to-day. Louis XIV and Louis XV were obliged to sign peace and I too would long ago have needed to seek it, had I, like them, ruled over old France. But I am not the successor of the French Kings but of Charlemagne, and my kingdom is the restoration of the Empire of the Franks. In four years I shall have a fleet. When my squadrons have been three or four years at sea we shall measure swords with England. I know I may lose three or four naval engagements (three or four fleets according to another authority). Well—I shall lose them; but we are brave, always booted and spurred, so we shall succeed. Before ten years are past, I shall have conquered England. No European State will any longer trade with her. It is my custom-house restrictions that do most harm to the English. But it is herself she has injured most with her blockade, for it has taught us how to dispense with her sugar and indigo and other products. In a few more years we shall have grown accustomed to it. Before long I shall have enough beetroot sugar to supply all Europe. There is a wide field for your

manufactures in France, Italy, Naples and Germany." The Emperor then referred to the home administration, saying, "I receive yearly, entirely from my own country, 900,000,000 francs, and I have 300,000,000 lying in the Tuileries; the Bank of France is full of silver money, whereas the Bank of England does not possess a farthing. Since 1806 I have brought in over 1,000,000,000 francs in war indemnities. I alone have money. Austria is already bankrupt, Russia soon will be, and so will Britain."[1] The Emperor's remarks on French finances call for some explanation. For although Metternich, who spent some time in Paris in 1810, formed the opinion that "France is unquestionably the wealthiest nation on the Continent, and in financial matters can bid defiance to any other," he qualifies this by the remark: "The Government coffers are empty; those of the Emperor full". This was pretty near the truth, for the 900,000,000 francs of revenue mentioned by Napoleon are entered in the budget of 1811 against 954,000,000 of expenditure; and although the annexation of Rome, Illyria, Holland, and the Hanseatic department, and the new tariff had contributed to raise the revenues, yet during the same time the expenses of the military system had rapidly increased. The estimates of the Minister of War for that year asked for 506,000,000 francs as against 389,000,000 in 1810; those of the Minister of Marine for 157,000,000 francs as against 120,000,000 in 1810; the receipts amounted to 1,056,000,000 francs, the expenditure to 1,103,000,000. To meet the situation, in December, 1810, Napoleon proposed in a Memorandum to avoid raising a loan, which he described as "immoral because burdening future generations," by increasing the indirect taxes (*droits réunis*) and adding a new impost by making a monopoly of tobacco which he expected would yield 80,000,000 francs. His forecast proved

[1] The speech is here given in its original form, as it appeared in the "Revue Critique," of 1880, from two independent sources. The version given by Thiers (XIII. 22-27) is evidently a later and revised edition, in which the Emperor's words are intended for the diplomatists and the German newspapers, etc. In Miot's Memoirs there is a third version given. (III. 189).

fallacious. The financial crisis still continued and was further accentuated by a bad harvest; 1811 was a good season for vines but not for corn. The drought which allowed the grapes to ripen to exceptional sweetness, parched the fields; the price of flour rose to nearly double, while its consumption diminished in corresponding ratio, and seriously affected the revenues. The year closed with a large deficit. Although Napoleon could enter a balance of 300,000,000 francs in his own treasury, which was perfectly correct, yet certainly not more than perhaps the half of that sum was in specie, the remainder consisted of debts due from States and private individuals. France's financial condition therefore was not quite so brilliant as Napoleon had described. We can conjecture how seriously concerned he was when—as we are soon to learn—Russia closed her territory against French exports, and how strenuously he sought to increase his sources of revenue by adding to the number of dutiable articles, and by conquering new markets in the East for French goods. Again, just as in 1809, the state of his finances made war seem to him indispensable.[1]

Any one who compares the Emperor's address to the representatives of Industry with his commands to his Minister of Marine in the same month—March, 1811—can there trace in the boldest outline his colossal scheme of domination. It was no longer the Empire of Charlemagne, nor even the Continent of Europe, but the whole round earth he meant to bring under his iron sceptre. Within the next three years he meant to equip two powerful fleets, one for the ocean, destined primarily for Ireland, and one for the Mediterranean intended for Sicily and Egypt. And counting on things turning out right in Spain and Portugal in 1812, expeditions were to be sent to the Cape of Good Hope, Surinam, Martinique, and elsewhere; and from 60,000 to 80,000 troops, "eluding the

[1] It is stated that Mollien tried to dissuade the Emperor from war with Russia because the finances of the State demanded rest, whereupon the latter replied: "On the contrary they are falling into confusion and therefore demand war" (Ségur, "Histoire et Mémoires," IV. 67; *vide* also Mollien, I. 410).

enemy's cruisers," were to be distributed over the two hemispheres. Meanwhile the Emperor was preparing for a last and decisive continental war against Russia, so as to force the Czar to enter the federative system and to comply with his designs on India.

His covetous glance embraced the wide world in its sweep. So completely was he dominated by the thought of his future supremacy that he no longer sought to keep it secret. "People will want to know where we are going," said he. "We are going to make an end of Europe and then to throw ourselves like robbers on other robbers less daring than ourselves, but who have become masters of India, and seize it."[1] When the Bavarian general, Wrede, who was in Paris in the summer of 1811, happened to make some remark in favour of peace, Napoleon sternly replied: "In three years I shall be master of the universe".

The more firmly Napoleon counted on the success of his continental system, the more trouble he took in depriving British goods of their last refuge—the Russian ports. It had become absolutely necessary to arrive at some understanding with the Czar in order to secure his co-operation in the measures against neutrals and to induce him to adopt the prohibitive tariffs Napoleon had introduced as a means of excluding colonial produce, as well as to enforce the decree requiring all English manufactured goods to be destroyed. If the Czar complied, success was assured; if he refused, Napoleon would then gain his ends by force. As things then stood, the latter course seemed the probable one.

The first beginnings of serious discord between the two allies date back to the war of 1809, when Russia showed little zeal in supporting France against Austria, and Napoleon retaliated by annexing Galician territory to the Duchy of Warsaw. The Emperor's marriage with an Austrian Archduchess was already regarded as a clever move on

[1] *Vide* Heilmann, "Wrede," p. 187. In November, 1811, he said to de Pradt: "Within five years I shall be master of the world. There is only Russia, and I shall crush her to pieces" (de Pradt, "Histoire de l'ambassade dans le grand-duché de Varsovie en 1812," p. 23).

the political chessboard against the Czar; and it is significant that on February 6th, 1810, the very day on which Napoleon requested Prince Schwarzenburg to sign the marriage contract in Paris, word was sent to the Ambassador at St. Petersburg that a treaty signed by the Emperor on January 4th, could not be ratified. This treaty referred to Poland. Alarmed lest the Duchy of Warsaw might some day extend under the protectorate of the French Emperor, till it included the whole territory of the ancient Kingdom, the Czar had desired assurances from France on this subject, and Caulaincourt, bearing in mind his master's instructions to soothe Russia's susceptibilities, had formally promised that the Kingdom of Poland would never be restored and that the name "Poland" would be carefully avoided in all public documents. To have signed this would not only have obliged Napoleon to lay down the valuable weapon he had welded so carefully in 1806 and 1809 for use against Russia, but also to guarantee by military force that no one else should venture to restore Poland. At one time it might have been necessary to make such a concession to the Czar, but now that the Austrian marriage had brought the Emperor Francis over to the side of France, that was no longer the case. Hence Napoleon did not ratify the treaty; but to avoid offending his ally, he brought forward a counter-proposal at St. Petersburg, merely promising not to support any attempt to restore the ancient Kingdom of Poland and to refrain from using the word "Poles". But Alexander was not satisfied with this. Instead of a secret agreement as suggested, he desired an open treaty by which the French Emperor would bind himself in the eyes of all Europe—and consequently alienate the Poles; he insisted on his original demands and claimed the consent he had received soon after the conclusion of the Schönbrunn peace. "The Emperor," said the Czar to the French Ambassador, "promised me the most positive security, and was then willing to give it; and why not now?" The answer, to have been true, should have been: because the French Emperor now considers himself the sole master of Europe; he has already antici-

pated a rupture with Russia and wishes to have some means at hand to bring it about whenever it suits himself.

Champagny's report of March 16th, 1810, declared that the internal condition of the Russian Empire, especially since the destruction of the trade with Holland, would inevitably force Russia into an alliance with Britain. Any honourable and permanent peace between France and the latter Power was out of the question, as Britain had never sanctioned the changes in Spain, Naples, Holland, and Westphalia, nor given back any colonies; everything else pointed to a brief truce merely, which would raise false hopes in the commercial world of France. "Without deprecating the means of still maintaining the dual alliance, the foundations of which are now crumbling, and without renouncing any prospect of obtaining some security by negotiating with the British Cabinet, we must from the outset regard Russia as the natural ally of England, and on the Continent combat the possible results of an understanding between those two Powers, so long as it is in our power to do so. . . . By delaying the peace between Russia and England on the one hand and between Russia and Turkey on the other, your Majesty secures the possibility of terminating the Spanish affair, driving the British out of Portugal and confirming your mastery in the West and the South." The best means of defence against Russia's change of policy was to make absolutely certain of Poland, either by depriving Prussia of Silesia and so connecting Warsaw with Saxony, or by uniting all the ancient Polish territories and granting Austria Silesia and Glatz, as compensation for Galicia. "The disadvantage of thus augmenting Austria's power in Germany would be outweighed by the numerous advantages of this plan which would indisputably place the fate of Europe in your Majesty's hands. Then, indeed, the Empire of Charlemagne would be actually restored, increased and strengthened by the experiences of 1000 years. Russia would then be divided from civilized Europe, and England from the Continent."[1] Napoleon was convinced of the truth of these

[1] For Champagny's exposé *vide* Schilder, "Alexander I," III. 471, also Nesselrode's letter to Speranski in his "Lettres et Papiers" III. 249.

statements and definitely declined any open treaty such as the Czar requested, alleging that "he could not under the circumstances bind himself to take up arms against a people who had rendered him only good services, as he would feel that to be a disgrace to France." When Prince Kurakin (brother of the Ambassador) brought him somewhat belated congratulations on his marriage, Napoleon then told him that although he did not wish war, he would declare it the moment Russia sought an understanding with England. The utmost concession he would grant was to warn the Poles to keep the peace and so avoid rousing the Czar's suspicion.

But Alexander had long known how matters stood. In March and again in April, 1810, he had spoken to Czartoryski about a national union of Poland under his sceptre, maintaining that the French Emperor was far less concerned about the welfare of Poland than about using "that country for his own convenience, when the opportunity came for him to make war on Russia". This was the time when the Czar was urging the suppression of the name "Poland" at Paris. When Czartoryski, who knew this, called the Czar's attention to the contradiction, Alexander untruthfully declared that it was not he but Champagny who had desired the name obliterated; and when Napoleon finally declined the Czar's proposal, the latter spread rumours secretly in Warsaw that the treaty confirming the annihilation of Poland had been accepted and that the French Emperor had thereby for ever rendered himself unworthy of their sympathies. In this way the whole negotiations on the Polish question, as conducted by the Czar, assumed the character of a huge intrigue with the object of driving French influence out of Warsaw. It was one of the means by which Alexander prepared for the impending breach. But whereas Napoleon stopped short at threats, in January, 1810, the Czar had already begun his military preparations, and by the beginning of the following year he talked to Czartoryski of an effective force of 300,000 troops (which was greatly exaggerated), exclusive of those

Napoleon, as is well known, often collaborated in documents of this kind; whether he did so in the above instance is not certain.

serving in the Danubian principalities. He also cherished the hope of winning over the Polish Army; and with its help, and supported by Prussia, of advancing immediately with 100,000 troops as far as the Oder. The Czar had also been seeking support at Vienna where, in spite of the marriage, there was still a strong anti-French party, whose influence, however, was quickly destroyed by Metternich on his return from Paris. Acting on the convictions formed there, the latter expressed himself thus in October, 1810, to the Emperor Francis: "In 1811 the material peace of Europe will not be disturbed by any new war enterprises of France. During the course of this year Napoleon will increase his own fighting forces, and will summon his allies to a decisive effort against Russia. This campaign Napoleon will begin in the spring of 1812."

The French Emperor could not fail to be aware of his ally's intrigues and preparations, for he heard through Warsaw of the military movements on the Russian frontiers, but he could not tell whether this activity was the result of his threats, or an indication of hostilities at an early date, before he had succeeded in terminating the "Spanish affair". In that case he was exposed to no slight danger, for his best troops were beyond the Pyrenees and those stationed in German territory were comparatively few. Hence the need for a large increase of his forces. Meanwhile be meant to obtain as much as he could by diplomacy.

The Polish question was only a single item in the long series of disputed points which cropped up during 1810 and 1811 between the Tilsit allies. Turkey was quite as great a source of friction. There, in secret, Napoleon was constantly and strenuously opposing the Czar. The Russians had crossed the Lower Danube in triumph, and peace with the Porte was imminent, a state of matters highly displeasing to Napoleon, who wished to keep the Czar's troops closely engaged in the south when he attacked Russia in the north. In order to accomplish this, seeing he himself could not make aggressions on his ally, he made Austria move out. He advised Metternich to occupy Servia (which Russia demanded for herself)

and promised to remain a neutral spectator should the Court of Vienna quarrel with the Czar over the Danube principalities. The Emperor Francis did not fall in with this plan, and Turkey, aware of the interest France and Austria took in her fate, persisted in refusing Russia's demands, and so the war continued its course. Nevertheless these matters were of minor importance compared with the main fact—Russia's attitude towards the Continental Blockade. This was the touchstone that revealed the real intentions of the St. Petersburg Government. Had the Czar complied with France's demands, Napoleon could then have hoped to finish the Spanish war before withdrawing his forces for the inevitable struggle for the mastery of the Continent. Should Alexander refuse, however, he would then be in the highly disadvantageous position of waging two wars simultaneously.

In the middle of October, 1810, Napoleon had requested the Czar to lay an embargo upon all ships in Russian waters flying neutral flags, as had been done since May in the ports of France and of the countries connected with her. "If Russia imposes the embargo," runs the dispatch on this subject to the Ambassador, "it will be the finishing stroke to England and will bring war to an end at once." To the Czar Napoleon wrote: "It depends on your Majesty whether the war continues or a general peace supervenes". An attempt was then made to get the Czar to use his influence with Sweden to have the large accumulations of English goods in the Gothenburg storehouses destroyed. As a means of inspiring confidence in Alexander, Napoleon took young Count Tschernischeff, the Czar's trusted adjutant, into his confidence and betrayed to him the fact that Metternich had secretly advised him to take back the Erfurt concessions. But all in vain; the Czar refused. He could not do otherwise. Even the interruption to direct intercourse with England in 1807 had entailed immense sacrifices on Russia, whose natural products thereby lost their most valuable market. The consequences were inevitable. Three years later the deficit equalled the country's revenues, and paper money sank to one-fourth of its nominal value. Indeed when Napoleon had

calmly predicted the bankruptcy of Russia in his address to the Paris merchants, he was well aware what had caused his ally's financial embarrassments, and he was secretly aiming at increasing these and hastening a catastrophe by goading the Court of St. Petersburg into repudiating neutrals. But to this the Czar dared not consent. In any future attack from Napoleon there was no other country in the world to which he could turn for effectual help if he now sought to ruin Britain. In reply to France's demand, he declared himself willing to adhere as before to the anti-British system of the Tilsit treaty and to capture every ship which could not give satisfactory proof of its origin; further than that he would not go. For Russia could not dispense with colonial produce, she was dependent upon the supplies of the neutrals, and, moreover, it was doubtful if the cargoes of the latter consisted exclusively of British goods. On the other hand he was prepared to exercise the pressure demanded on Sweden and sent orders to Tschernischeff, his adjutant, on leaving Paris to return through Stockholm,—on a very different errand, however, and one of which Napoleon was left in ignorance. Here the Czar's envoy was to assure Bernadotte that Russia would never consent to push measures against Sweden, whereupon the "Crown Prince" lavishly protested his devotion to the Czar and his aversion to Napoleon.[1]

The Czar's refusal touched the weakest point in Napoleon's policy, for so long as Russia allowed neutral flags in her ports, the Continent remained open to British exports and consequently gave England fresh strength for resistance. The Emperor was now firmly convinced that he must first defeat Russia if he was to ruin Britain and make himself master of the world. Just at this time, too, the Czar's policy showed a bias distinctly hostile to France, though it was really due to the internal condition of his Empire. In the end of December, 1810, a ukase was published, facilitating the entry

[1] Among other things he asserted that Napoleon had always assigned him a post in the field of battle where he might easily fall ("Revue historique," xxxvii. 74). It is well to remember that Bernadotte was a Gascon.

of neutral ships into Russian ports, so that colonial and manufactured goods could then be unloaded and sent south, via Brody, on any pretext, or forwarded by other routes to inland countries. On the other hand luxuries, such as silk and wines, which formed the staple articles of French export, were so heavily taxed that their price became prohibitive. Owing to the industrial crisis in France the export trade with Russia was more urgently needed than ever before, and the Czar's ukase therefore fell doubly heavy. Added to this, more armaments were afoot, fortifications were being built on the Dnieper and on the Dwina, and instead of news of victory from Spain, Masséna sent requests for reinforcements, as he had not been able to capture the British defences outside Lisbon. In 1811 the outlook at the New Year was far from cheerful.

Towards Russia, Napoleon had behaved in an arbitrary fashion that could not fail to provoke resentment. In December, 1810, the incorporation of the North German seaboard lands in the Empire had become law. Among these territories was the Duchy of Oldenburg whose Prince was closely related to the Czar.[1] At the outset Napoleon gave the Duke the choice of exchanging his territory for Erfurt, or admitting French troops and customs officers. After some delay, the harassed regent chose the latter alternative, whereupon he was told that it was too late; his land had already been annexed. On January 22nd, Napoleon signed the decree annexing Oldenburg and transferring the ducal family and their claims to Erfurt, which had once belonged to the electorate of Mainz, had then passed to Prussia, and since 1806 had been at the disposal of the French Government. The Czar was quite justified in telling the French Ambassador that he regarded such an act as a "slap on the face in the presence of all Europe". It was a flagrant violation of the Tilsit Treaty of Peace, in which Napoleon had solemnly guaranteed the integrity of Oldenburg. In a circular letter to the

[1] Duke Peter I, who governed for his cousin William, who was insane, belonged like the Czar to the house of Holstein-Gottorp, and his younger son George was the Czar's brother-in-law.

European Powers, the Czar protested against this violation of the rights of the house of Holstein-Gottorp to the duchy. "What is the value of alliances," said the letter, "if the parties to them do not keep the treaties on which they rest?" But the final break had not yet come. The protest concluded rather lamely, indicating that, in spite of all, the alliance still continued. So much for words. By her actions, however, Russia made any understanding extremely difficult. Napoleon's request that the Czar should repeal the ukase of December 31st was refused, owing, he was told in reply, to the critical condition of Russia's finances, which had rendered this step necessary. At the same time, in accordance with the plan previously communicated to Czartoryski and now also to the Russian Ambassador, the Czar's troops marched to the frontiers to invade the Duchy of Warsaw, where they were to join with the Poles, advance on the Oder, and so begin the war while Napoleon was deeply involved in Spain and while his forces in Germany were still insignificant. But these calculations were not reliable, for it was possible that the Poles might offer serious resistance, while of the central European Powers, Austria, at least, could not view with indifference any accession to Russia's strength. Moreover, as the Czar had not concealed his preparations for war, they entailed the inevitable disadvantage of having warned Napoleon, who was now strenuously endeavouring to be able to cope with any outbreak of hostilities in Germany. Already in October, 1810, he had made preparations with a view to raising his forces there to 180,000 troops and 400 cannon, and had begun the construction of new fortresses in Poland.[1] But it was only after receiving the news regarding the Czar's December ukase that he began to press forward his armaments. Masséna was told that he must manage without reinforcements. Davoût, who was on the Elbe with his army, was informed that his forces would be augmented to 80,000; and in March, 1811, he received orders that in the event of

[1] On October 6th, 1810, he wrote to Clarke, then Minister of War: "Bear in mind that the troops in Spain will be there a long time yet" ("Corresp.," xxi. 17,000).

operations against Russia he was to hasten to Danzig, where the 90,000 troops then at his disposal would be augmented by 50,000 Poles and Saxons.[1] The Poles' refusal of Russia's overtures robbed the Czar's plan of a vital element and added in corresponding degree to Napoleon's strength. The Czar then abandoned his plan and resolved to confine his operations to a defensive war within the boundaries of his own Empire.[2] Napoleon thus obtained the necessary time and opportunity for his military preparations. Both Emperors were now resolved on war and equally anxious to disguise that fact from one another and from the world. Every effort was made to gain allies and auxiliaries, and up to the last each protested his love of peace and his fidelity to the alliance. All this finessing was no small strain on the arts of diplomacy, and in April, 1811, thinking Champagny no longer suited for the post of Foreign Minister, Napoleon replaced him by Maret, who was more pliant and much more skilful in adapting his master's hints. Caulaincourt, who had trusted too much to the fine words in which Alexander concealed his intensions, was recalled from St. Petersburg and replaced by Lauriston, a man devoid of judgment. On June 5th, 1811, after his return to Paris, Caulaincourt had a seven hours' interview with Napoleon, during which he told him with great frankness that Russia's economic condition demanded consideration, and rendered trade with neutrals necessary for the country; and moreover the Emperor himself had broken the blockade decrees by his licences. Napoleon replied that he did not wish a peace like that of Amiens, which had ruined his trade (which was not the case); he wished an alliance that would be useful to him. Since neutrals had been per-

[1] In a second letter, on March 24th, 1811, the Emperor declared that so long as the Russians did not attack him, which he did not expect they would do while they were engaged with Turkey, he would make no hostile movements during 1811, but would continue the preparations till he had won sufficient time through negotiations to be able to assume the offensive ("Corr.," xxi. 17,516). In December, 1811, he told the Prussian Ambassador, Krusemarck, that he had been secretly preparing for war ever since the publication of the Russian ukase.

[2] *Vide* C. Schilder, "Alexander I," iii. 501.

mitted the alliance no longer served its purpose, nor had it ever been of any benefit to him. To this Caulaincourt had the courage to reply that Europe knew only too well that he sought to acquire territories for himself rather than for their own interests.[1]

On June 16th, the day before the opening of the National Council, the Emperor delivered an address from the throne to the Legislative Body, in which he indicated the wide scope of his policy and announced that he had united the Papal State with the Empire, and had allotted palaces for the Popes in Rome and in Paris. "They will, if they have the interests of religion at heart, often take up their residence in the centre of Christianity (i.e. Paris), just as of old St. Peter chose residence in Rome in preference to the Holy Land." He had incorporated Holland, as without it the Empire was incomplete; and he had annexed the German sea-board in order to have access to the Baltic and to augment his naval auxiliaries. The acquisition of Valais, as stipulated in the Act of Mediation, would prove beneficial to the interests of Switzerland, France, and Italy; the attitude of the Princes of the Confederation was satisfactory. In Spain, England has entered the field as a combatant. "Once she has exhausted her strength there and has herself suffered all the evil she has been inflicting on the Continent for the past twenty years, once half of her families are in mourning, the war in the peninsula will end like a thunderclap; Britain's armies will be annihilated and Europe and Asia avenged by the conclusion of this second Punic war."

India, the proud goal of his ambition, is never lost sight of! One way of reaching it was through Egypt, and, as we know, he had not relinquished his projected expedition thither, although it required a fleet such as he was far from possessing. There was yet another way—through Russia and by victories on land. But for such victories further armaments were indispensable. To gain the time requisite for these preparations was henceforth Napoleon's chief endeavour, especially since the ablest of his marshals had been com-

[1] "Vandal," III. 175, from unedited documents.

pelled to retreat from Portugal, and had thus made the prospect of the co-operation of the army in Spain more remote than ever. Hence he protracted the negotiations regarding Oldenburg; and when the Czar declined Erfurt he requested him to suggest another compensation. When part of the Duchy of Warsaw was proposed, Napoleon told the Russian envoy Kurakin in open audience, on August 15th, 1811, that they need not imagine that he would ever cede one inch of the territory of Warsaw, whose integrity he had guaranteed, not even though the Russian Army were encamped at Montmartre. He certainly would not choose to wage a war in the north; but if he were forced to do so, he would not yield. Russia would find no allies, and he would strip her of her Polish provinces. He had talked in similar fashion in 1803, before the war with England, and here again his object was to influence the Poles in his favour. Alexander then denied having harboured designs on Polish territory, but he brought forward no other plan of compensation, and he made the injustice done to Oldenburg a reason for further relaxing the laws against neutrals. And so the breach widened. "Once more," wrote Maret in November, 1811, to Lauriston, "I tell you and you alone, the Oldenburg affair is of little importance to us and to Russia; the Continental system is everything. Only you must not touch this question and do not depart from the line prescribed for you," i.e. nothing was to be done that might risk provoking a rupture before June, 1812, the time the Emperor had already appointed for beginning hostilities. By then he hoped to have completed his arrangements for the movements and maintenance of his troops, and during the interval he meant to keep urging the Czar to suggest some suitable compensation. If the Czar refrained from doing so, Napoleon would then denounce his silence to the world as hostile in spirit and represent him as the originator of the war, a conviction which, as a matter of fact, found credence in many circles.[1]

[1] The origin of the war of 1812 has been by many—Vandal especially—ascribed to Russia. It is true that in 1810 the Czar was already making military and diplomatic preparations, and in the following year he showed

Towards the end of 1811 Napoleon remarked to the Prussian Ambassador that in Russia they thought he was too much engrossed with Spain to be able to place a redoubtable force in the field anywhere else. That was a mistake. The English might remain in Spain, they could not drive out his armies; once he had ended up the war in the north he would turn again to the south. This agrees with the facts. By the end of the year, Davoût's army was increased to 100,000 troops; Danzig and Magdeburg were raised to fortresses of the first rank with garrisons of 25,000; the Confederation of the Rhine was prevailed upon to furnish 120,000 combatants; two new army corps numbering 90,000 troops were raised on the Lower and the Middle Rhine and placed under Oudinot and Ney; an Italian army of 80,000 troops was collected by Eugène, and all this exclusive of the Guards and the reserves, and completely independent of the forces engaged in Spain. These arrangements were accomplished with such secrecy that Russia would have had no adequate idea of them, had not the Czar's adjutant, who had remained in Paris, obtained by bribery some of the most important tables of figures. These certainly quenched all desire on the Czar's part to

for a time a disposition to assume the offensive. But after the refusal of the Poles, if he had not been driven to it by economic considerations, he would certainly have avoided war. With Napoleon the case was different. Early in 1810 he realized that a breach was necessary, as Russia would not voluntarily co-operate in the continental system; only he did not then contemplate war at such an early date as the Russian armaments indicated. These caused him to hasten his own preparations and to carry into effect, earlier than he originally planned, his long cherished intention of compelling Alexander by force to join the blockade against England. Also at the last moment he would have been not unwilling to abandon a war on the Russian steppes, provided the Czar would have submitted absolutely to his will and have rigidly excluded all British goods. This war therefore was only the consequence of his arbitrary edicts, against which the last of the independent Powers of the Continent was rebelling. In this sense he, and he alone, was the originator of the dispute with Russia. Metternich's news from Paris in October, 1810, confirms this, and his own words to Bubna in May, 1813: "We have left nothing undone to show that Russia disturbed the peace". Oncken, "Osterreich und Preuszen in Befreiungskrieg," II. 378.

cross the Niemen, but they did not rob him of the courage to face the impending struggle. Although many of those about him, his mother, his brother Constantine, and the Chancellor, Rumjantoff, for instance, all counselled peace, there were others, especially French and Prussian *émigrés*, who advised him to persist. The victory over the Turks on the Danube and the prospect of being able to recall the army stationed there, strengthened the Czar's confidence. Hence, because he possibly over-estimated his own forces, the great proportion of which only existed on paper, he sent no reply to Napoleon's further overtures for suitable compensation, rightly interpreting them as mere ruses to gain time, and he made no countermoves when Napoleon sent out fresh masses of troops and advanced on Germany.

It was a gigantic army which the Emperor proposed to bring into the field. Four hundred thousand, he told the Prussian Ambassador, half a million he said to the Austrian Ambassador; and even this number underrated the total. The Republic in her time had also sent forth great armies against her foes; but with this difference, that whereas then the whole nation was animated by the enthusiasm of a newborn Freedom, now the reluctant hosts were obeying the summons of a despot. And since the last campaign his rule had gradually been growing more burdensome to the nation. In the towns, the slightest symptoms of dissatisfaction immediately roused suspicion and led to prosecution and punishment. Since 1811 the number of political offenders imprisoned amounted to 2500. They were arrested simply on the Emperor's command, or on that of the Minister of Police, and detained in prison without a trial; one "because he hates Napoleon," another "because since 1811 he has been expressing hostile views of the Government in his letters to his brother," a third "on account of his religious views," and so on.

In February, 1810, a special censorship was established in Paris with a director-general, several auditors, and from fifteen to twenty censors, for the Emperor did not wish the police to have control of the censorship. The utmost servility was

shown in altering or condemning anything which might arouse even a trace of displeasure in the great potentate. For instance, an appreciative passage on the English Constitution was ordered to be suppressed in one book; another had to alter its title from "Life of Bonaparte," which was too tame, to "Celebrated Historical Actions in the Campaigns of Napoleon the Great". This prying activity of the censor extended to the farthest limits of the Empire. After the Hanseatic towns had passed under the control of France, Schiller's "Robbers," "Maria Stuart," and "William Tell," and Goethe's "Faust" were no longer allowed to be acted. Alas for the newspapers! Of the four independent Paris papers, two, the "Publiciste" and the "Mercure de France," had been suppressed; the other two had lost their capital and become wholly dependent on the Government. A single office, *le Bureau de l'Esprit Publique*, provided the people with news of victories in Spain, or with articles on Italian and French music, and so diverted the attention of the somewhat bored Parisians from the Emperor's foreign policy, while hundreds of thousands of their fellow-countrymen were being armed for bloody battlefields. Napoleon indeed sought to counteract the effect of his harsh measures towards the Press by the distinctions he conferred on savants and artists, on many of whom he bestowed the Cross of the Legion of Honour and provided them with pensions. He made Gros, Gérard, and Guérin, Barons; Lagrange, Monge, and Laplace, Counts; and lamented that Corneille was no longer alive that he might make him a Prince. On Madame de Récamier's intercession he came to the assistance of his opponent, Châteaubriand, and expressed his surprise that the latter's "Génie du Christianisme" had not been awarded one of the decennial prizes he had founded in 1804 for the purpose of enabling France to maintain her pre-eminence in the literary world. In 1811 Savary exerted himself to have the poet Chénier, who had perished during the troublous days of the Revolution, elected to the Académie, or, as it was then called, the second class of the Institute. The Emperor also watched over the University schools or lycées to prevent them being crushed out by the

strong competition of the Church schools. In 1811 he issued an edict limiting the latter to one for each department, and it was only to be in a town where already there was a State lycée, for whose prosperity the prefects were responsible.[1]

As in the towns, so, too, in the country districts. Government soon had to support its authority by harsh measures. Hitherto the French peasantry had been Napoleon's staunchest upholders, partly because they were slower to move than the inhabitants of the towns, and adhered longer to a cause once they had espoused it, and partly because the general who had restored order throughout the country had become "their man". Besides this the French peasantry had a decided inclination for military service, and had always supplied a goodly contingent of men who rose to places of honour. Napoleon dryly remarked, as well he might: "What do I care for gossip and drawing-room opinions? I pay no heed to them. I recognize only one opinion, that of the peasants. Other people's opinion is of no account." But even with the peasantry there was a limit to their liking, especially when news came to the villages more and more frequently, telling of countless victims swallowed up by the war beyond the Pyrenees; and now they learned that a new war was soon to begin in one of those distant countries about which the old soldiers of 1807 had told them such tales of horror. No wonder the conscription of 1811, which was to provide the Emperor with 120,000 new troops, roused little enthusiasm. The price of a substitute rose as high as 8000 francs and great numbers of the poor took to flight. For these desertions their families, the parish, and even the whole district were made answerable. This new "law of hostages" was rigorously carried out by means of flying columns ("*colonnes mobiles*"), but they only captured 30,000 out of the 60,000 deserters; the others lay concealed in forests and inaccessible mountain districts. In consequence of this the 120,000 troops of the levies of 1812 were treated with great severity. All the recruits were sent on to Germany, while

[1] *Vide* Charles Schmidt's admirable study, "La reforme de l'Université impériale en 1811" (Paris 1905), p. 33.

the garrisons of the Empire, as far as Lübeck, were supplied by upwards of 100,000 National Guards drawn from the years 1809 to 1812. Absence from their native land told unfavourably on the youthful troops, though the misery caused by the recent bad harvests made their lot otherwise seem more tolerable.

The iron hand of the "Protector" pressed even more heavily on the countries of the Rhine Confederation, whose Princes received orders in April, 1811, to get their contingents ready. Through Jerôme's extravagance, Westphalia had been plunged into such financial difficulties that even high taxation and forced loans could no longer stave off bankruptcy. Yet this little State now received orders to increase its army immediately to 30,000 men and to support 20,000 French troops and their horses. When Jerôme remonstrated, he was told he could abdicate if he liked. It was the same in Bavaria, which, after the war of 1809 had received as a reward the territory of the diocese of Dalberg. On the other hand, however, it had been forced to cede the South Tyrol to Italy; Illyria, Ulm, and other smaller territories to Württemberg; to assume a large debt for the Emperor's treasury, and to furnish 30,000 troops for the war. Württemberg ceded 40,000 souls to Baden, and received 140,000 from Bavaria; while Baden, in return for her own accessions, had to part with some of her territory to increase that of Hesse-Darmstadt. The Great Corsican scattered these German Governments and subjects about like chaff! The Prince Primate was compensated for the loss of Ratisbon by receiving Fulda and Hanau, and his territory was created the "Archduchy of Frankfort," with the arbitrary reservation that after Dalberg's death the sovereignty was to pass to the Viceroy Eugène, whose expectations of the crown of Italy had been destroyed by the Emperor's re-marriage. Fearing lest the impatient monarch might at any time overlook this proviso, Dalberg sought to commend himself by the most abject servility, though his subjects were groaning under oppressive taxes and his troops called up for the Spanish war far in excess of the numbers stipulated for in the treaty of the Confederation.

Saxony in particular was arming with feverish haste, especially in the Duchy of Warsaw, where Napoleon was laying in enormous stores of war materials. All those capable of bearing arms were called out, and a National Guard founded. The Governments of the Confederation with their troops were unreservedly at the Emperor's disposal. Woe to them if they were not! "If the confederate Princes," wrote Napoleon in April, 1811, to Frederick of Württemberg, "occasion me the slightest doubt of their willingness to arm for mutual defence, I frankly confess they are lost; for I prefer foes to unstable friends." [1]

Prussia and Austria, the two great central States vanquished at Jena and Wagram, had still to make good their allegiance. As for Prussia, Napoleon had not forgotten that he had already conquered it once and had only relaxed his grasp out of consideration for that same Russia against which he was now preparing to go to war. Nor did he forget that he had once camped as victor on the banks of the Niemen; and now he was debating if he might not regain this position perhaps by bringing Prussia directly under his control, as he had done with Holland. For a time he seriously considered this plan. One of Champagny's dispatches, dated November, 1810, advising the Emperor to partition Prussia in favour of Saxony and Westphalia, although forged by Esménard, is said to be based on reliable information. In the beginning of 1811 Queen Catherine of Westphalia has a note in her diary on the impending dismemberment of the Hohenzollern State. About this time too a rumour appeared in the Spanish papers to the effect that the rest of Prussia was to be given to Berthier. But this plan was soon abandoned. It was quite possible that the destruction of Prussia would meet with no less opposition from its people than had been the case in Spain, despite the great difference between the hot-blooded Southerners and the

[1] That this was no idle threat we see from the diary of the Queen of Westphalia, who wrote in her Journal on January 11th, 1811: "The Emperor is much displeased with the Grand Duke of Baden; he seems to be one of the Princes who will disappear".

Germans of the north, "sensible, calm, tolerant and temperate," as Napoleon described them. About the secret doings of the "Tugendbund" as the anti-French party in Germany was now called, the most exaggerated reports were rife in Paris. A *coup d'état* in Prussia was therefore out of the question, but after Russia had been defeated, the Emperor hoped that Spain and Prussia would drop into his lap like ripe fruits. Hence it was wiser in the meantime to make King Frederick William's troops serve his purposes by peaceful means, and so strengthen his position on the Niemen. Such was the plan Napoleon finally adopted and it succeeded, partly owing to the distracted state of Prussia, whose territories were constantly threatened by the Rhenish Confederation on one side, by Warsaw on another, and by the French garrisons in Stettin, Küstrin, Glogau, and Danzig; partly, also, because as in 1805 and 1809, Napoleon found a helper, though a reluctant one, in King Frederick William, who combined a lack of confidence in his people with an unshakable conviction of the invincibility of the great Corsican.

In order to secure the existence of his imperilled country, in May, 1811, Hardenberg (now Chancellor of State) had forwarded to Paris proposals for an alliance. These proposals were still unanswered, for Napoleon did not wish war just then with Russia, nor did he wish to compromise his outwardly friendly relations with that Power by a rash diplomatic move; furthermore, he wanted to have a sufficient body of troops in Germany before answering Prussia's proposals. But his silence increased the anxiety at Berlin, so much so that Hardenberg allied himself with Scharnhorst, the leader of the patriotic party, and urged the King to arm, and during the following summer the military forces were increased in the utmost secrecy to nearly 100,000 men. Although the Czar's reply to his previous letter had not been satisfactory, King Frederick William again appealed to Alexander, and sent Scharnhorst on a private mission to St. Petersburg, there to negotiate a military convention. A request was also sent to England for subsidies. Both appeals were so far successful. The Czar had already abandoned his idea of an offensive plan

in favour of remaining on the defensive within his own Empire. Now, however, he professed himself ready—"on the whole"—to mobilize his army, in the event of war, "as rapidly as possible," and to advance to the Vistula and even farther should circumstances prove favourable. Prussia meantime was to prevent the enemy advancing on the Vistula. So ran the convention signed by Scharnhorst at St. Petersburg on October 17th. England gave the subsidies as desired and sent war materials to Kolberg. But before these happenings became known in Berlin, King Frederick William had changed his mind once more. Alarmed by Napoleon's armaments, he made overtures at Paris in August, thinking it safer to secure his State by a timely compromise rather than risk it in a doubtful venture. Nor did Hardenberg oppose him. Now at last Napoleon replied, for his reinforcements in the fortresses on the Oder, in Westphalia, and in Poland had made such progress that he could again adopt his usual browbeating attitude towards the Berlin Court. He insisted, before any further negotiations took place, that Prussia should stop her armaments. Not only was that done, but Blücher, who was highly obnoxious to the Emperor, was deprived of his command. Napoleon then ordered Prussia either to join the Confederation of the Rhine or to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with France and furnish 20,000 troops, three men-of-war in the event of a conflict with Russia, privateers for service against England, and to carry out the blockade rigorously. These were hard conditions and made compliance seem doubtful without some attempt at resistance. By the end of October the Convention with Russia had been signed, and the English subsidies promised; and so once more Hardenberg braced himself to persuade the King to throw in his lot with Russia and England, and to make common cause with them. But the King refused; he sided with the opponents of these patriots who in 1809 had wrongly predicted that the country would be ruined if it did not oppose Napoleon. The King considered that the circumstances again were very similar. He viewed Scharnhorst's convention with distrust, and of the various clauses it contained he endorsed

only the one stating "that a high degree of activity was not to be expected from the Russian armies, which would fall back on their first plan of campaign which had only been abandoned with reluctance in order to make sure of us". Hard as Napoleon's terms were, they spared the life of the State, whereas to fight against France so long as the Emperor's genius directed the struggle, betokened "inevitable, or at least extremely probable ruin". One point only he conceded to Hardenberg before rejecting the St. Petersburg convention—that Austria should be sounded. Should that Power unite with Russia and Prussia in energetic action there would then be some prospect of success and of the maintenance of the peace; but in any case the negotiations with France were not to be broken off.

Scharnhorst's secret mission to Vienna proved futile, and so on February 24th, 1812, the offensive and defensive alliance with France took effect. The terms were even harder than before. For Napoleon had prolonged the negotiations till the last moment, so as to have Prussia securely enmeshed. In the previous year when Hardenberg had offered to form an alliance with the Emperor, and to give him the help of Prussian troops, he had done so under reservations which guaranteed the integrity of the country, increased the military forces of Prussia, obtained the restoration of the fortress of Glogau, and secured certain acquisitions of territory. But now there was no word of all this. The treaty of February 24th was an unparalleled humiliation for Prussia. According to its terms Prussia was to furnish a contingent for service in any part of Europe except Spain, Italy, or Turkey; she was to provide Napoleon with 20,000 men and sixty guns for the campaign in Russia—nearly one half of her entire armament; the other half was to garrison the fortresses of Silesia, Potsdam, Colberg, and Graudenz, where the commanding officers were to receive their orders from the French general staff. French troops were to march unopposed all through Prussia, except part of Silesia. Their generals were to requisition goods, obtain supplies for the army, and maintain order and security. The vast amount of provisions required of Prussia was to be re-

garded as part payment of the old war indemnities. Against England, King Frederick William promised to carry out the blockade decrees with the utmost rigour and to provide three warships.[1] So the patriotic fervour of 1811 ended in subjection, and the King won nothing in return but vague promises of an increase of territory in the event of victory, though Napoleon had been lamenting ever since 1807, "How could I leave that man so much land!"[2]

Austria's attitude had contributed in no small degree in inducing the King of Prussia to join with France in the impending struggle. Scharnhorst came to the conclusion at Vienna, in December, 1811, that the Emperor was not in a position at that moment to render assistance. The plain truth was, Austria was on the French side. From the documents of this date containing Metternich's advice to his master, it is evident that Austria's policy was shaping decisively against the Czar. As it was, Russia's action against Turkey in the Danube Principalities had caused friction between the two Powers. Then, too, Alexander's plan of restoring Poland and constituting it a separate Kingdom under Russian suzerainty was another source of annoyance at Vienna, for it meant that Austria would require to surrender Galicia, in exchange for which Russia certainly offered Servia and the Danube Principalities, but these would need to be re-conquered, and in a war with Napoleon that was out of the question. The chances were that even though Austria ranged herself on the Emperor's side, she would still lose Galicia, as Napoleon would probably at once play off a united Poland against Russia, an idea which he had discussed with Metternich at Paris during the summer of 1810. However, Napoleon offered Austria, who had been absolutely impoverished

[1] Cp. De Clercq, II. 354. It is interesting to note the confidence with which Napoleon predicted to Maret in August, 1811, the termination of the alliance between Prussia and Austria "after six months".

[2] At that time Frederick William's attitude was justifiable. Any revolt then might have proved a doubtful venture, considering the great masses of troops, apart from those engaged in Spain, which Napoleon was able to bring into the field against Russia, and how quickly when these forces perished he raised yet another army.

since the last war, the important province of Illyria with its sea-board as an equivalent for the Polish territory; furthermore, as a reward for her co-operation in the war, he agreed to extend Austria's Bavarian frontier to the Inn and to grant her Prussian Silesia, "a province almost indispensable for us in the event of the Kingdom of Poland being restored". The dismemberment of Prussia, no matter which side she espoused, Metternich regarded as much a settled fact as the victory of the French in the impending war with Russia.[1] Austria's policy was, therefore, inevitably dependent upon that of Napoleon. But even in this dependent position Metternich resolved to make the most of circumstances, and seeing free action was not possible, to strengthen his country while in subjection. Napoleon did not oppose his father-in-law's wishes. "The first mistake Prussia makes settles the Silesian question," he declared to the Austrian envoy in December, 1811. Indeed he reckoned that even if Prussia did not depart from her prescribed path, he might be able to dispose of Silesia in Austria's favour by means of a successful war. In that case there would be no lack of territory for compensation and any other province would do for King Frederick William—whereas Silesia was the only one which could round off Austria.[2]

In Vienna, they had thus ended by entering into a close and active alliance with France which offered them distinct advantages. This decision had already been made and

[1] "Prussia is no longer to be reckoned among the Powers," he assured the Emperor Francis early in 1811, and again in November of the same year he stated, "Prussia is in the hopeless condition of dreading dismemberment from whichever party she espouses".

In the same document the remark occurs: "To argue from previous experiences, especially from probabilities supported by recent facts, every indication points unmistakably to a French victory". At that time Metternich reckoned the French army at from 200,000 to 300,000 troops. How he must have felt confirmed in his policy when he learned that the total was double that number!

[2] Maret, who had succeeded Champagny as Foreign Minister, proposed to give Prussia Russia's Baltic provinces as compensation for the loss of Silesia.

notice of it sent to Paris when Scharnhorst came to Vienna. It is easy now to see that his mission would fail; we can even understand, though not exculpate, Metternich advising the envoy of a State he already considered lost to join with Russia—i.e. to commit precisely that "first fault" which was to settle the Silesian question at once in Austria's favour.[1] And as the mere name of Silesia recalled the time of the great Empress who had waged three wars to recover the lost province, the Franco-Austrian Treaty of Alliance of 1756 was sought out in order that the new offensive and defensive alliance might be drawn up according to its terms and even its phraseology.[2] On March 14th, Schwarzenberg signed the treaty in Paris. Austria was to support France in the war against Russia with 30,000 troops, which, unlike the Prussian auxiliaries, were not to be divided, and were to be commanded by Austrian officers who were not to receive orders from French generals and were only to obey instruc-

[1] On December 17th, Schwarzenberg had the decisive interview at Paris. Metternich cannot have received the report of it before the 25th. Until then Scharnhorst was left in uncertainty. On the 26th, Metternich informed him that Austria was unable to help, and hinted that Prussia would be less unfortunate with Russia than with any other party (*vide* Metternich, "Nachgelassene Papiere," II. 422, and Lehmann's "Scharnhorst," II. 434). Metternich, in the presence of the Ambassador, is represented as saying that Austria would not take France's part, but would remain neutral. Scharnhorst's reports contain no mention of this (Duncker, "Aus der Zeit Friedrich der Grossen und Friedrich Wilhelm III," p. 422).

[2] On June 8th, 1812, Metternich wrote Count Goetz, Governor of Galicia that "the only principles on which the Emperor could entertain the idea of a closer connexion with France were to be found in the French alliance of 1756, and that the new treaty would be drawn up on this basis, in so far as it was applicable to the general condition of affairs in Europe. A comparison of the two treaties shows this truth to be indisputable, even the words being almost the same, a circumstance which was not without considerable influence." (W. St. A.) Certainly the words were almost the same, but the political conditions differed immeasurably. Then, it was the voluntary decision of a great Power; now, merely the compulsory compliance of a bankrupt State whose Minister thought it profound wisdom to form an alliance with a Sovereign of whom he admitted that his "monstrous aim was, and is, to be sole ruler of Europe".

tions from Napoleon. On the restoration of Poland, Austria was to retain Galicia, and if she voluntarily surrendered part of it, to receive Illyria as compensation. The integrity of Turkey was guaranteed, i.e. Russia was not to gain any of it. The treaty concluded as follows: "In the event of a successful termination to the war, the French Emperor promises to procure war indemnities for the Emperor of Austria and accessions of territory which will not only outweigh the sacrifices entailed by war but also form a memorial of the close and lasting ties between the two Sovereigns". As Illyria had already been mentioned, these words could only refer to Silesia, "the one province that could round off Austria".[1]

Napoleon had thus made sure of the German central States, and from the headlands of Calabria in the south to the Memel in the north, from Cape Finisterre to Bukovina, the Continent obeyed his behest. He would certainly have liked to include also Sweden and Turkey—Russia's ancient foes—in his system, or rather to have retained them as such, so that they might have attacked his opponent in the north and in the south while he dealt a fatal blow at his heart. But here he missed his game. For while the French and the Russian Ambassadors at Stockholm were each seeking to overreach the other, Bernadotte seized the favourable opportunity to recommend himself to his future compatriots by obtaining a large increase of territory. He offered to conclude an alliance with whichever Power would aid him to obtain Norway, and heedless of the protestations he had lavished on the Czar's envoy in December, 1810, he now made overtures to Napoleon, to whom public opinion in Sweden still clung. Meanwhile the Crown Princess—the Desirée whom Napoleon had wooed in 1795—worked zealously in Paris for an alliance. But to this Napoleon would not listen, for Denmark was loyal

[1] *Vide* De Clercq, II. 369. To a man who advised him to exchange Illyria for Galicia, Napoleon replied, "I see you have no idea of the value of these provinces. You do not see that as soon as I select them as a basis I have one foot in Rome, and the other in Constantinople" (Pasquier, "Mémoires," II. 76).

to him and ready to place a corps at his disposal for the surveillance of the shores of the North Sea and the Baltic. On the other hand he himself proposed to restore Finland to Sweden after the defeat of Russia, if Sweden would send 40,000 men against the Czar, and at once prosecute the war energetically against Britain. But to the Swedish Government these simultaneous enterprises against Russia and Britain seemed impracticable. The Swedish Ministry in a subsequent report to Charles XIII, dated January 8th, 1813, stated: "We cannot ignore the fact that a war with Russia, necessarily entailing hostilities also with Britain, is beyond Sweden's strength; that a British fleet in the Baltic during the summer could frustrate all Sweden's exertions against Russia; that meanwhile the coast of Sweden would be at the mercy of Britain, that commerce and the coasting trade would completely cease, and thereby occasion widespread misery, and that Sweden's great need of grain required the continuance of peaceful relations with these two Powers—England and Russia." It so happened that just at this juncture French troops were sent to occupy Pomerania to check smuggling, a most inopportune proceeding in view of the political situation, for Napoleon thereby alienated the sympathies of the Swedes, and Bernadotte could at last venture to gratify his long-cherished personal enmity to Napoleon. First of all Sweden declared herself neutral, and so avoided war with England; then she declined the French proposal and made overtures to Russia, promising that if the Czar sent an auxiliary corps to help her in the conquest of Norway, Sweden would then make common cause with Russia in North Germany and threaten Napoleon's left flank. Denmark was to receive compensation in Germany for the loss of Norway. To this the Czar consented, and on April 5th, 1812, an agreement was signed between Sweden and Russia which was ratified in August when Alexander and Bernadotte met at Abo.

In Turkey the Sultan Mahmud would willingly have accepted Napoleon's proffered friendship in the early months of 1812, but now circumstances were such that even the Sultan could not follow his own wishes. In the previous

autumn the Russians had massed their forces for a decisive blow, and they had then offered peace under conditions relatively favourable, solely to end the war on the Danube before beginning the great struggle with France. Russia no longer demanded the two principalities; she was even prepared to restore Bessarabia and the Sereth boundaries. This occurred at a time when the Turkish treasury was empty, the army in a lamentable plight, and the desire for peace and rest universal. The turbulent janissaries alone clamoured for war. Napoleon's promises to restore the Crimea, Tartary, and all the land the Porte had lost within the last forty years, were of no avail unless she would furnish him with the 100,000 troops he demanded as auxiliaries. Moreover the Emperor had allowed his designs on Candia and Morea to become too transparent.[1] On the other hand, Britain threatened to force the Dardanelles and burn Stamboul if Turkey entered the French system. The Divan, which Mahmud consulted, declared in favour of peace with the Czar, which was concluded in the end of May, 1812, on condition that the Pruth should thenceforth be the boundary. These diplomatic reverses at Stockholm and on the Bosphorus were deeply mortifying to Napoleon, who had come to regard Turkey as one of the most important factors in his future plans. Nevertheless a victory over Russia still seemed to him possible, even without a diversion by the Turks, and this success in the north he reckoned would close the south against the great adversary whose will he meant to curb north, south, east, and west.[2]

[1] *Vide* Champagny's Treaty of March, 1810: "The second condition . . . would be that the Porte should without fail agree to cede to your Majesty Morea and Candia in return for the support granted to enable her to obtain Little Tartary and the Crimea, territories which must be much more important to her for the defence of Constantinople. This is not the place to dilate upon this old project, which in the event of a breach with Russia would need to be thoroughly discussed" (Schilder, "Alexander I," III. 475).

[2] The Russian Countess Edling declared that she was told by Eugène Beauharnais at the Vienna Congress that Napoleon intended, after conquering Russia, to march on Constantinople ("Mémoires," p. 196).

It was about this time, March, 1812, that Napoleon talked to Narbonne, his adjutant-general, of marching through the conquered Russian Empire on India and there overthrowing the British rule. He certainly had an overwhelming force at his disposal when he prepared to take this final step towards the mastery of the Continent. But resolute as Napoleon was, Alexander was no less so in resisting a dictatorship which interfered so wantonly with Russia's interests. The rupture was unavoidable. Any delay was entirely due to military causes.

On April 30th, 1812, the Russian Ambassador in Paris delivered the Czar's ultimatum, viz., that he would only consent to negotiate with France when the French troops were withdrawn from Prussia and Swedish Pomerania, and that he could not renounce trade with the neutrals. To gain time, instead of answering immediately, Napoleon sent Narbonne to Alexander with instructions which were post-dated April 25th, although despatched on May 3rd, in order to give the impression that the Russian ultimatum was then unknown. Napoleon therein stated that he had made a final effort to induce England to make peace and thus banish all discord from the world. What had happened was that, on April 17th, Maret wrote to Lord Castlereagh, then Foreign Minister, that France was prepared to restore Portugal to the House

This agrees with the fact that before the campaign he had dealings with the rebel Servians in order to drive Russia's influence there out of the field and at the same time gain help against the Porte. "After your overthrow," said the Grand Vizier to the Russian negotiator, "our turn will come next" (Boppe, "La France et les principautés danubiennes," "Annales de l'école politique," 1896, p. 346). Compare also Bernadotte's remark to the Russian Ambassador, "I am told Napoleon means to be done with Russia in two months, in order to go on then to Constantinople" (Sbornik, xxi. 445). This belief was also current in the army. An officer writes that after conquering Moscow, Napoleon would have preferred St. Petersburg, but that it was too great a distance from the Turkish provinces, "for after a good alliance with Alexander, who, whether he is willing or not, will have to march in our train like the others, we must go in the following year to Constantinople and from thence to India" (Quoted by Sorel, vii. 588).

of Braganza, provided that England would recognize Murat and Joseph, and evacute the Pyrenean Peninsula and Sicily, in which case France would also withdraw her troops from Spain. It was the old game which Talleyrand had played with such skill twelve years previously. There was no need to wait for an answer to know that England would not recognize Joseph. However, should the unexpected happen, the troops then set free in Spain would give Napoleon other 200,000 veteran combatants, an invaluable asset, not only in the field but also for the inevitable negotiations. Narbonne's mission to the Czar was merely a device for obtaining as much information as possible about Russia's military dispositions.

While his envoy was hastening to Vilna and Maret beguiling Prince Kurakin in Paris with diplomatic blandishments, Napoleon left his capital on May 9th, accompanied by the greater part of his Court, and travelled to Dresden, there to make an imposing display of his power, and, as he hoped, intimidate his foe.

At Dresden the Princes of the Confederation had assembled to pay homage to the great Corsican, who ruled them more despotically than ever a Roman Emperor his German vassals in the days of yore. There too was Francis of Austria, the last of the Cæsars. Like the King of Prussia, with docile submissiveness he had joined the ranks of the lesser "Sovereigns" who formed the background to this powerful parvenu. Now that the boundaries between the Latin and the Teuton elements had been blotted out, the forces of both had been summoned that the conqueror might strike a final blow for the mastery of the world. Personal ambition and an unbounded love of power were certainly the mainspring which set these great masses in motion; an almost intolerable compulsion held them together. Yet, from the lofty vantage-ground of genius, where details sink out of sight in the wide horizon, this mighty host, armed for war, was full of vast possibilities, destined under the leadership of the greatest general of all time, to extend to the East, by means of conquests, the civilization of the West, and to put an end to international strife by

uniting the nations under one sceptre. To such a one Goethe's lines might fitly apply:—

Woruber trüb Jahrhunderte gesonnen,
Er übersieht's in hellstem Geisteslicht,
Das Kleinliche is alles weggeronnen,
Nur Meer und Erde haben hier Gewicht.
Ist jenem erst das Ufer abegewonnem,
Dasz sich daran die stolze Woge bricht,
So tritt durch weisen Schlusz, durch Machtgefechte,
Das feste Land in alle seine Rechte.[1]

In these lines, which were addressed to Marie Louise, the great humanist of the century was not merely offering conventional homage to the Emperor now that he had reached the highest rung of his power. For Goethe, Napoleon's greatness was beyond doubt. He accurately divined his significance in history, all he had achieved unconsciously in the service of the Ideal. "Napoleon," he says in one place, "without being conscious of it, lived entirely for his imagination. He utterly denies the Ideal, refuses it any reality, and all the while he is zealously endeavouring to translate it into facts." The great poet ignored the Emperor's lavish waste of energy in contemptible occupations, and the vulgarity of his selfish aims. Others might talk of the horrors of war and the bitterness of oppression; he looked beyond that to the ultimate goal, the unification of the peoples of Europe by means of a higher civilization. From this standpoint Goethe was right in counting Napoleon among the great men of history. For all of them were great because they acted under the spell of great ideas which were their personal aims. Alexander the Macedonian went forth from the narrow confines of his little State to conquer the

[1] "Wherever centuries have darkened thought,
He sees the meaning in his clear soul's light,
And all the petty part sinks out of sight.
Earth and Great Ocean have their moment got.
Let once from Ocean safe our shore be won
Then may the proud sea-breakers spend their might
For through his wise resolve, and by his force of fight,
Our Continent secure to its own heritage of right shall come."

world, and by matchless deeds engraved his name on the memory of the ages. But what impelled him on his course was simply the expansive energy of Hellenic culture, in the service of which he undertook his expedition to the East. Charlemagne truly conquered his wide empire by his sword; yet he was but the chosen vessel appointed to carry the moral ideas of Christianity to the young nations of the North. And when we find Napoleon pursuing a similar course, intent on placing his own person too high, and in subduing the whole world to his will, let us remember that this will, to a great extent, was not his own, but was merely the instrument of that civilization of humanity at which the intellectual forces had been labouring for centuries before it became the common heritage of the world. Through rivers of blood, it is true. But the laws of the world are written in blood, whether the individual shed his on a Cross or the millions bear witness in death. Wherever Napoleon conquered it proved the introduction to a higher social order, whether on the Manzanares or on the Tiber; on the Rhine or on the Elbe; in Naples or in Poland; in Prussia or in Austria. Sometimes the new order manifested itself directly under the stress of conquest, sometimes indirectly, because resistance to the conqueror seemed possible only when he could be met with his own weapons. To cite a single instance, the defeat at Jena alone altered the whole inner life of Prussia.[1] The advance of Napoleon's host in 1812 on the extreme confines of European civilization was fraught with change and progress of vast importance, beside which the fact that the leader went sword in hand, coveting only the sovereignty of the world, dwindles into insignificance.

But the nations of Europe could not view the field of

[1] Compare Meier, "Die Reform der Verwaltungsorganization unter Stein und Hardenberg," p. 133, and Gneisenau's letter of 1807 with the passage, "If the other States want to restore the balance of power, they must open up the same sources of help and make use of them" (Pertz, "Gneisenau," I. p. 302; quoted by Koser, "Hist. Zeitschrift," 73, 199). Koser also demonstrates the fact that the reorganization of the State of Prussia, though it did not follow the French model, was due to the impact of circumstances produced by the war.

history from this height. They did not seek for an ideal mission which Napoleon was fulfilling unknown to himself, and consequently they could not console themselves with that knowledge. He threatened their independence, oppressed them shamelessly to serve his own ends, compelled their sons to fight his battles, injured their trade and reduced their incomes, attacked the keepers of their faith—and bitterly they hated him. Bitterest of all were those two nations, the Spaniards and the Russians, who were farthest removed from the humanitarian culture of the Revolution, and in whom the primordial instincts of racial feeling and religious faith had remained the purest. Spain he had not yet conquered. It remained to be seen if he would succeed in Russia.

CHAPTER XVI.

MOSCOW.

While Napoleon was at Dresden, flaunting his imperial power in the eyes of Europe, his columns were marching on the Vistula. Never had the world beheld such an army. Upwards of half a million troops stood ready to invade Russia, and the reserves, which were sent East later on, brought up the total to fully 600,000. Long and zealously the Emperor had carried on his preparations, keeping his adversary in suspense till the very last by protracting the negotiations, and meanwhile spurring on the smaller States to unparalleled exertions, until at length he reckoned that his vast superiority of numbers had assured him the victory.

Yet he was not altogether free from doubt. Ségur, in his "Reminiscences," relates that at Paris, while the preparations were in progress, the Emperor sometimes appeared lost in thought; then suddenly he would start up, exclaiming in wild excitement that he was not ready for such a distant war, that he would require three more years. Mounier, the Emperor's new private secretary, (so Barante relates) declared that this uncertainty seriously affected the Emperor's health. "The greater part of the night he was sleepless; he would lie on a sofa for hours brooding over his difficulties, till finally he sank into a troubled slumber. Although not actually ill, he was far from being in good health. Matters which would once have roused his anger now wearied and disheartened him. He no longer read the reports from Spain, which were invariably bad; he handed that over to Count d'Albe, his head military secretary. Nevertheless he was quite inaccessible to the warnings and arguments of the few members of his entourage who ventured to protest, and he hotly refuted what-

ever they said. Foremost among those who sought to dissuade him was Caulaincourt, who knew Russia and the national pride of its people. He warned Napoleon that the Russians would never think of peace so long as an enemy stood on the soil of their fatherland; he reminded him of the untrustworthiness of compulsory allies, of the hatred of him that had sprung up in the German States under the French system of plunder, of the inhospitable theatre of the war, of whose horrors they had had bitter experience in the campaign of 1807, and he quoted Alexander's own words, that he would rather withdraw to Kamtschatka than cede a province or sign even a truce, so long as his capital was in the hands of the enemy. "We shall not risk our forces," said the Czar. "We have plenty of room behind us, let us keep our army together and well organized and leave our climate and our winter to wage war for us. The French are brave, but they have not our staying power; they are more easily discouraged. They only work wonders when their Emperor is there, and he cannot be everywhere. He will probably defeat us if we accept battle. Yet even that does not always secure peace. The Spaniards have often been defeated, but they are far from being conquered or subdued."[1]

Just then Poniatowski arrived in Paris from Warsaw and described the barren pathless wastes of Lithuania, the Lithuanian nobility, already half Russian, the people cold and unemotional, and assured him that he need not look for great results from liberating them. Ségur, an older man, recalled the Emperor's attention to France, which, after the campaign was over and it had extended its boundaries to the confines of Europe, must cease to be France. In the long run it would be a case of replacing the Monarchs of the various countries by the generals of the Empire as Stadtholders, and they, like the officers of Alexander the Great, would perhaps not trouble to wait for the death of their master in order to reign alone. Duroc spoke in a similar strain. But arguments were useless. Napoleon replied that he had nothing to fear from his allies. Prussia was debarred from all

[1] Vandal, III. 183 (from an unpublished report).

agitation; with the Courts of South Germany and of Austria he was connected by marriage, besides the Germans were a slow and methodical race, and there would be time enough to deal with them. He was well aware of the ambition of his generals, and war was precisely the safest way of diverting their energies. War had its dangers, but so had peace. If he withdrew his army to France and kept it there in rest and idleness, far more ambitious interests and more dangerous passions would then spring up than he could ever control. There spoke the Bonaparte of the old Convention and Directory days. And withal he was still a dreamer, bringing forward "destiny" as a final argument. "I feel impelled," he said "toward a goal which I cannot see. When I have reached it, an atom will be sufficient to overthrow me. Till then no human efforts will prevail against me."

Having thus silenced the remonstrances of his suite, he turned with redoubled energy to provide for the thousandfold wants of his giant army, arranging for even the smallest details, so that nothing might be found lacking. Besides the artillery parks of the various corps, reserve depots were established at Modlin, Thorn, Pillau, Dantzig, and Magdeburg, where several millions of cartridges were stored. To transport some 1300 cannon to Russia, 18,000 horses had been procured; siege trains were ordered to be sent on from Dantzig and Magdeburg to Düneburg and Riga. As the district to be traversed abounded in rivers, two train loads of bridges were taken, besides which each army corps had its own pontoons and tools. Prussia was to provide depots of horses at the Vistula and the Oder. But the heaviest task of all was to provision such great masses of troops. It demanded the utmost care, because, as Napoleon never wearied of reminding his generals, such vast numbers of troops, all following hard on one another, could not live on the country. Thousands of wagons laden with flour and rice and drawn partly by oxen, which were afterwards slaughtered for food, followed the various corps. In the middle of January the Emperor made arrangements for storing provisions for 400,000 men for fifty days at Dantzig and in the towns on the Oder and the Vis-

tula. In addition to this Prussia had to furnish provisions for twenty days. Two large transports were to carry flour and biscuits by water from Elbing to Vilna. Dantzig, Elbing, Warsaw, Thorn, Marienburg, Bromberg and Modlin contained enormous stores of provisions, Dantzig alone having 300,000 hundredweight of flour, and 2,000,000 biscuits. In order to avoid being further burdened with fodder for 150,000 horses, the campaign was delayed till a time of year when the plains and meadows would supply them with green food. In this way the administration of the army affected the sphere of politics, for it retarded the opening of the war until the summer.[1] All this had been accomplished without the Russians assuming the offensive and crossing the frontiers, as Napoleon might well have feared. The "last act," as he reassuringly termed the Russian campaign, was now about to begin.

Early on the morning of May 29th, the Emperor left Dresden and drove to Posen, arriving there on the 31st, and then proceeded by Thorn and Dantzig to Königsberg. In the previous January he had had ample preparations made for his accommodation during the campaign. For his conveyance to the various scenes of war a comfortable carriage had been built in which he could work by day and sleep at night. His suite accompanied him, some on horseback, some in carriages. On arriving at a place where head-quarters were to be established, a couple of rooms in the best house in the neighbourhood were instantly set apart for the Emperor. The larger room served as his study, small tables being placed in the corners for his secretaries and a large one in the centre on which Colonel d'Albe immediately unrolled the map of the district, for the Emperor took with him a whole cabinet of archives and a well-chosen collection of maps which were closely guarded by a mounted picquet such as accompanied

[1] Ségur (IV. 94) relates that Napoleon was delayed in France two months longer by a scarcity of provisions due to the bad harvest in the previous year. This is not altogether accurate, as Maret in his Memoir of August 16th, 1811, dealing with the entire Russian policy, gave June of the following year as the time for the beginning of the war.

the Emperor's carriage. When in bivouac a rectangle of from 200 to 400 yards was pegged off and surrounded by sentries, and within it, in addition to the Emperor's tent, there were seven others; one for the high dignitaries, Duroc and Caulaincourt, one for the adjutants, one for the orderlies, one for the secretaries, etc. Napoleon's tent consisted of two apartments; a study and a bedroom; one of the two adjutants in attendance slept in the bedroom and half of the orderlies in the study. The adjutant in charge of the large portfolio with the maps had a compass, coloured pins, and writing materials always ready for use. When the Emperor was on horseback a page was in attendance with a telescope in readiness and also writing materials; Caulaincourt, who was again Master of the Horse, took care that the map in use was so folded that Napoleon's eye could immediately find the exact spot. Three majors-domo and an outrider carried baskets of provisions in front of their saddles, and two mounted valets had charge of the medicines and surgical instruments. The moment the Emperor dismounted four of his escort did likewise, surrounding him at a respectful distance, and remaining near while he was reconnoitring. Even the smallest details had been taken into account—the slightest irregularity was forbidden, strict order reigned supreme and everything waited on the Emperor's behest.

Narbonne had returned from Vilna with the same reply that Caulaincourt had received a year before, viz., the Czar was resolved to withdraw, if need be, to the remotest part of his Empire, and not to think of peace till the French had quitted the country;[1] and he repeated his demand for the evacuation of Prussia. Napoleon now accepted the challenge without further cavil. He had disposed his "Grand Army"

[1] Alexander declared that if the Emperor in person went to St. Petersburg or Moscow he would defend himself, or rather wear out his enemy, by leading him on and ruining him by marches, as Napoleon could not continue for long to occupy the country so far away from his auxiliary forces ("Castellane Journal," 26 Mai, 1812, I. 96; cp. Vandal, III. 430, unedited reports). The Czar pointed to a spot in the map in Eastern Asia remarking: "If Napoleon is resolved on war, and Fortune does not favour the right cause, he will need to go as far as this to sign peace".

in three groups; the first under his own command, the second under that of Eugène, the third under Jerôme. The main body comprised the flower of the French Army—the Guards with a strong corps under Davoût, another under Oudinot, a third under Ney, who also commanded two Württemberg divisions, a fourth under Macdonald (which included the Prussians under Gräwert), and finally the cavalry reserves (two corps under Murat), making a total of 250,000 men.[1]

In the second army under Eugène, Viceroy of Italy, there were the Italian and the Bavarian army corps, as well as a French mounted corps, making a total of 80,000 troops. The third army under Jerôme included the Poles under Poniatowski, the Saxons under Regnier, the Westphalians under Vandamne (who was to advise the King), and a mixed cavalry corps of Poles, Saxons, and Westphalians. It also numbered 80,000 combatants. The troops, almost without exception, were in good spirits, proud of their leader, who rewarded brave deeds with such generosity and in whose genius they believed more firmly than ever. If some of the generals shook their heads over the large percentage of immature youths in the ranks, unequal to the hardships of such a campaign; if some, like Rapp, bluntly declared they would rather have remained in Paris; there were plenty of others who had not yet received an estate nor the title of duke, and who were eager for the opportunity of winning both. Although in Holland and in Illyria there had been riots over the conscriptions, although thousands of French fugitives had been captured and compelled to serve, although even within the first few days a fierce and sanguinary dispute had broken out between

[1] The different accounts of the strength of the various Army Corps do not tally. The tables in Fézensac's souvenirs put the Guards, for instance, at 35,800 men, whereas authentic sources give their numbers at 47,000. It was composed of the division of the Old Guard, two divisions of the Young Guard, a division of Polish Guards, and a division of cavalry. As to the strength of Davoût's corps even official sources are at variance. The Minister of War's list gives 69,553; Thiers, who says he had used the Imperial tables, from 97,000 to 99,000; Napoleon, in conversation with Queen Catherine of Westphalia, mentioned about 100,000.

French and Prussian soldiers over a train of stores, yet, after all, these were only minor matters.

By the end of May the army extended from Königsberg and Elbing along the Vistula as far as Novo Alexandria, while the Austrians under Schwarzenberg were concentrating near Lemberg. This wide extension of the allied forces left the Russians in doubt whether to expect Napoleon's attack in the north, near Kovno or Grodno, or to the south of Warsaw. Hence, in order to avoid being taken by surprise, and to be ready in both places, they divided all their available troops into two armies, one of which, under Barclay de Tolly, took up its position to the north of Vilna, the other, under Bagration, to the south of the Pripet. Both of these generals had distinguished themselves during the campaign of 1807. A third division under Tormassoff, destined to act against the Austrians, was still in process of formation in Volhynia. Barclay's army numbered 111,000; Bagration's 66,000, and of these, on marching north to rejoin the main body, he was to leave nearly 30,000 behind with Tormassoff, to hold the Austrians in check, an unnecessarily large number in view of the fact that Austria had given assurances that she would prosecute the war as an independent Power—i.e. not too zealously—and that she would certainly not increase the stipulated number of troops for Napoleon's service. At the outset, therefore, the 400,000 French troops had only some 150,000 Russians opposed to them, and even these were broken up. Debarred by public opinion from withdrawing into the interior of the country without offering resistance, the Czar had adopted the plan of campaign drawn up by General Phull (formerly in the Prussian service), according to which a strong army was to fall back before the enemy on an entrenched position held by the reserves near Drissa, and there offer battle. Meanwhile a second army was to attack the enemy in flank and rear, the idea being to repeat at Drissa the success Wellington had won at Torres Vedras. There was yet another Russian Army in Wallachia and a weaker one in Finland, but these two were not yet free when the campaign opened. Napoleon had greatly overestimated

the strength of the Russian armies and had no suspicion he was numerically so much superior to them.[1]

Perhaps it was this error more than any other which affected him and his army so disastrously. For it led him to form a plan which most probably on closer acquaintance with his foe he would not have made, and the zealous prosecution of which exposed his troops to all sorts of hardships that a more methodical campaign would have spared them. This plan was to march upon Vilna by way of Kovno with the first army, whose left wing under Macdonald was to cross the Niemen at Tilsit and operate to the north with the Prussians, and thus break through between Barclay and Bagration. The second and third armies were to follow the first *en échelon* to the right, via Grodno, so as to form a powerful wedge and widen the breach between the two Russian armies, which were then to be attacked separately and defeated. By a strange fatality the very size of the enormous masses at the Emperor's disposal was now to prove a disadvantage. The general who in 1796 with only 40,000 troops, had won such marvellous triumphs over an enemy far superior to him numerically, was now with ten times his former number of troops to fail in overcoming an enemy far inferior to him. Paradoxical as it may seem, it was perfectly natural. The numerical superiority of the French prevented Barclay giving battle and led him to keep on retreating in the hope of rejoining Bagration, who fell back at the same time and for the same purpose. But as the intervening columns of the French constantly widened the distance between the Russian armies, their junction, provided Bagration escaped being surrounded by the French, could only be effected after a long retreat. So it came about that the Russian generals in their constant endeavour to join

[1] In the Memoirs of two officers at head-quarters there are evidences of such overestimates. Ségur mentions the Russian total as 300,000 and Fézénsac, 330,000. The latter computes the two armies of Barclay and Bagration alone at 230,000. Bagration's division was always maintained at its original figure, 66,000. Napoleon himself reckoned Barclay's troops at 150,000 and Bagration's at 100,000.

their forces, retreated persistently before the French, refusing the battle for which Napoleon was longing with feverish impatience, and keeping their enemy following them in hot pursuit across a barren country, along devastated routes, until finally, their supplies being unable to reach them, that once proud host became so shrunk and enfeebled that the victory it ultimately won was no longer of decisive moment. Such is virtually the gist of the following events, and the prelude to a catastrophe, than which there is none more terrible in all the annals of history.

Although Napoleon had set out with the idea of making Moscow the ultimate goal of his expedition, yet owing to the campaign beginning so late he scarcely expected to reach it. In Paris, he had told those whom he admitted to his confidence that he was only aiming at reducing Russia's power by depriving her of Poland and driving her back across the Dnieper. At Dresden he told Metternich that the campaign would terminate at Minsk and Smolensk, where he would halt and fortify both places; he himself would go into winter quarters at Vilna, organize Lithuania, which he intended to conquer, and feed his army at Russia's expense. If this did not lead to peace, he would advance to the very heart of Russia in the following year and wait as patiently as in the first campaign until the Czar surrendered. This plan, on which the entire system of supplies was based, still held good when Napoleon led his army across the Russian frontiers. In the Manifesto which he issued to his soldiers he called the war then on the eve of beginning "the second Polish War". At Vilna he assured General Sebastiani he would not cross the Dwina, as to proceed farther that year would be certain ruin. He intended to wrest Poland from Russia, i.e. Poland as it had been in its palmy days in the seventeenth century when Smolensk had belonged to it, in which town he intended to stay,—so he told Jomini, whose duty it was to forward the supplies.[1] Evidently, therefore, he had not originally planned

[1] In Jomini's "Précis politique et militaire des campagnes de 1812 à 1814," I. p. 75, a conversation at Vilna is narrated in which the Emperor expressed himself precisely as he did at Dresden to Metternich: "If M. de

this rash advance into the heart of Russia, as some military writers maintain, and he was certainly running counter to his long and carefully matured plan in reaching Moscow so early. Yet this ruinous haste was forced upon him by the enemy. But now for the facts themselves.

Early on the morning of June 23rd, wearing the black cap and uniform of a Polish lancer, the Emperor rode out along the Niemen, accompanied only by Caulaincourt, Berthier and Ney. To the south-east of Kovno they discovered a favourable point for crossing the Niemen, and at midnight the troops began to cross the river by three bridges. Napoleon had reckoned on resistance, but with the exception of a few Cossacks, there was not an enemy to be seen. He then directed his army on Vilna, the leading town of Lithuania, hoping there to fall in with the Russian Army. The Czar indeed had waited in Vilna for some time. He had already on repeated occasions testified his sympathy with the Poles, and now he meant at least to spoil Napoleon's game, apparently with success, for the oncoming hosts of the French saw little enthusiasm on the part of the Lithuanians for the "Liberator of Poland". Eventually, however, the Czar was obliged to evacuate Vilna, where Napoleon and his troops made their entry on June 28th, only to find their hopes of a battle frustrated once more. The feeble Russian outposts were driven back with the utmost ease. And in the town itself there was no enthusiasm such as they had looked for, no spirit of sacrifice such as they had found at Warsaw, no thousands of troops as they had been led to expect, no money, no support of any kind. Napoleon was sorely displeased to have his calculations thus upset. For he had counted on reviving the national enthusiasm in the Duchy of Warsaw and on raising up fresh enemies against

Barclay thinks I would chase him all the way to the Volga, he is greatly mistaken. We shall follow him as far as Smolensk and the Dwina, where a victorious battle will give us cantonments. I shall return to Vilna with the head-quarters staff and spend the winter there and send for a company from the Opera and one from the Theatre Français. By the May following the whole matter will be settled, if peace is not arranged during the winter." (*Vide* Metternich, "Nachgelassene Papiere," I. 125: Ségur, "Histoire et Mémoires," IV. 281.)

the Czar by winning over the Russian Poles and inciting them to fight for their ancient independence. At Paris, and again at Dresden, he had spread the belief that the Kingdom of Poland was to be restored; and he had sent the Abbé de Pradt, titular Bishop of Mechlin, as Ambassador Extraordinary to Warsaw to urge the Ministry to strenuous exertions in military matters and to announce the Emperor's protection for a Parliament which was shortly to be summoned. It was to be a "Confederation" such as had existed in ancient Poland; its agents and resolutions were to be sent throughout Russian Poland, and it was to organize a system of harassing the Russian army, "similar to what the French troops had been subjected in Spain". The nation was to be wrought up to a sort of frenzy, with the exception of the Austrian Provinces, "so as not to offend an ally".[1]

It was a matter which required skilful handling, for de Pradt was to avoid pushing matters to extremes, as the Emperor had no intention of actually restoring ancient Poland, although he wished to inspire the people with that hope so as to lead them to regard the struggle with Russia as a war of independence and to help with all their might. The decisive passage in de Pradt's instructions stated that the Emperor would receive representatives from the "Confederation" and would inform them in reply that the restoration of their country depended entirely on their own zeal, efforts, and

[1] Napoleon had first thought of Talleyrand, but whereas in the later years of the Russian alliance Napoleon had gradually grown more alienated from his ally, Talleyrand had become the Czar's secret accomplice and confidant and was not ashamed to ask the Czar for large sums to meet urgent expenses. (*Vide* Schilder, "Alexander," II. 397.) It is possible Napoleon was aware of these dealings and sought to render Talleyrand powerless by sending him on a mission to Poland which would compromise him with the Czar. In any case he judged it wise to remove this dangerous schemer from Paris while he was waging war in the East. But Talleyrand had little inclination for exposing himself to danger and is said to have declined. His greed of gain led him to take advantage of a confidential post entrusted to him, and to speculate on the Vienna Exchange, and once more he forfeited his master's favour. At Duroc's suggestion the mission was offered to de Pradt. (Ernouf, "Maret," 378.) The whole matter has not yet been cleared up.

patriotism. This was the argument the envoy was to use. But de Pradt managed his business badly and the Emperor's hopes were frustrated. The fact that the citizens of Warsaw had paid barely half the expenses of the 70,000 troops they furnished, and had thereby involved France in additional expenditure, led the Emperor to regard the restoration of the old Polish Republic from another point of view from that in which the National Patriots regarded it. "I cannot understand," he once wrote to Davoût during December, "how this country can claim to become a nation." He had also frequently spoken to the Czar in contemptuous terms of this desire of the Poles. "Do you really think that these Polish Jacobins are of any account to me?" he said to Balascheff, the Russian Minister of Police, who called upon him at Vilna, more for information than for diplomatic negotiations. His real attitude towards the Poles is seen in a remark he made to Narbonne, "I shall only tolerate the Poles as a disciplined force on the battlefield. We shall have a little bit of a Parliament in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw but nothing further." When this "bit of a Parliament" sent a deputation to Vilna, begging him just to say the word, that the kingdom of Poland now existed, he answered evasively and reminded them of Austria, whose integrity he had guaranteed. Such, in fact, was the agreement he had come to with Francis I in Dresden.[1] Under such circumstances it was small wonder that the Lithuanians showed no desire for heroic sacrifices.

[1] That this was so was shown in a letter from the Emperor of Austria to Count Joess, the Governor of Galicia, dated June 7th, 1812, wherein he says: "the restoration of Poland will probably be one of the first results of the outbreak of war between France and Russia. The French Emperor will only play an indirect part in these events and will leave it to the assembled Polish Diet and the fully authorized Warsaw Ministry to organize the provinces formerly constituting the Kingdom of Poland, but now under Russian sway. To the deputation from the Diet, begging him to restore the ancient kingdom, the Emperor will reply that this was a matter for Poland herself; but he will also make it perfectly clear that the Galician Provinces now in Austria's possession, can never be included in Poland as he himself had expressly guaranteed for ever the integrity of Austria in the treaty of March, 1812.

There was a special reason for this. The "Liberators," "the bearers of civilization" had swept through their country like the bitterest of foes. Thousands of starving marauders had flocked into the villages, robbed the houses of the nobility and committed the wildest excesses. Even at Vilna, the suburbs of the town were plundered by the advance guard, a circumstance which quenched the enthusiasm of the more ardent Poles and accounted for the unexpectedly cool reception extended to the Emperor. For this deplorable collapse of discipline both among the French troops and their allies there was a twofold reason.

In order to overtake the enemy the troops had advanced on the Niemen by forced marches along roads sodden by several days continuous and heavy rain which made progress extremely difficult and exhausting, and many, especially of the young recruits, proving unequal to the strain, were left behind. Then, too, the supplies were unable to get forward. The wagons stuck fast in the mud, and the oxen, being badly tended, contracted disease and had to be destroyed. It was the same with the horses, more than 10,000 of which died within the first few days from eating the rank grass. The Guards alone had to leave behind 100 guns. The transport service by road broke down completely. The ships with their enormous cargoes of flour went aground in the shallow waters of the Vilia, and by the time the freight had been unloaded and carted to Vilna, the army had left. Cruel sufferings then began; for the Russians as they retreated had destroyed all the mills, granaries, and storehouses. Even in the Young Guard soldiers died of starvation, so their leader, Mortier, told Napoleon; others in despair blew out their brains. The Emperor then had recourse to the Jews, but even they failed him at this crisis, and the counterfeit paper roubles, millions of which had been printed at Paris, found few to accept them. Thus on the road between Kovno and Vilna, disorders had crept in which were never again got rid of and which proved but the shadows of worse to come.

Nor had things gone smoothly with the Russians either. Their head-quarters staff showed no grasp of a definite plan,

and although, in March, Alexander sent word secretly to Berlin that he would retreat to Kasan rather than sign a peace that impaired his independence, it was only by accident that during the following weeks they stumbled on the right way of destroying their enemy.[1] After concentrating the six corps of his army a few days' march behind Vilna without the French being able to prevent him, Barclay fell back hastily on Drissa, following Wellington's plan of destroying all provisions and magazines and laying waste the country behind him. At Drissa a fortified camp had been established (in imitation of Torres Vedras), and here Barclay meant to await Bagration, who was to come up with Platoff's Cossacks by way of Novogrudok and Vilika. But Bagration did not arrive. He found the road already occupied by Davoût, whom Napoleon had sent on instantly with a few divisions as far as Minsk, there to intercept the second Russian army which Jerôme was driving in from the west. Thinking he had the main body of the enemy in front of him, the Russian general did not venture to cut his way through, but turned instead to the south to join Barclay by way of Bobrinsk and Mohilev. Jerôme moved too slowly to prevent him, while Davoût, thinking the enemy was still 70,000 strong, delayed his advance and waited at Minsk for the King of Westphalia to begin the attack. And so Bagration escaped. Exasperated at his brother's dilatoriness, Napoleon transferred the chief command of the third army to Davoût, and Jerôme, in high dudgeon, returned to Westphalia.

The Emperor then sent on Murat, Oudinot, and Ney to follow the Russian main body to Drissa. It was the middle of July, much too late for such a step, but the lack of supplies at Vilna had caused the delay. At Drissa they were to engage Barclay in front, while Napoleon with the Guards, three

[1] Duncker, "Aus der Zeit Friedrichs des Grossen und Friedrich Wilhelms III," p. 573. Knesebeck, who was then in St. Petersburg, was commissioned by his master to urge the Czar to keep the peace, but if it came to war, to recommend a constant retreat, an advice which was not without effect on the Czar.

divisions of Davoût's army and the troops of the Viceroy Eugène were to turn his flank and to cut his communications with St. Petersburg and Moscow. But this plan also failed; for on learning that Bagration could not advance, after some skirmishing with the French vanguard, the Russians abandoned their ill-chosen position, and proceeded east. Their right wing under Wittgenstein remained behind to cover the road to St. Petersburg, and was kept under observation by Oudinot and St. Cyr. A second time Napoleon's plan of forcing the enemy to accept battle had been frustrated. They retreated persistently. What a price he was paying for his ill-starred manœuvres! The faster he advanced the greater the sacrifices, especially along the roads previously traversed by the enemy. During the advance on the Dwina in July, when the sun's rays beat down with merciless heat and the troops were stifled with the incessant dust, marauding assumed enormous proportions. General St. Cyr, who commanded the Bavarians, relates that his corps lost on average a battalion a day, from 800 to 900 men. It was the same over all the army. Those who remained in the ranks had to battle hard with hunger and privations. For weeks past there had been no regular supplies. There was no bread nor vegetable food of any kind, and the exclusive meat diet seriously affected the health of the troops. Dysentery broke out and they perished in thousands. Worst of all was the plight of the cavalry regiments. For the horses having now nothing to eat but the old straw off the thatched roofs, died under their riders and their carcasses lay by the wayside polluting the air. Nor did Napoleon escape these terrible hardships. He, too, suffered. He was no longer the same man who had enjoyed such excellent health during the rigours of the first Polish war. An abdominal complaint (dysuria), which had developed during the last few years, made riding extremely irksome to him, while the daily reports of the shrinkage in his army, and his ceaseless pursuit of a decisive battle which constantly eluded him, proved an intolerable strain on his nerves. He seemed to have lost that calm control of himself and of others which had hitherto distinguished

him in the field. He longed for a battle to end this misery. "After we crossed the Niemen," writes Albrecht Adam, the painter, who followed the campaign attached to Eugène's staff, and who seems to have been well-informed, "one thought, one hope, one wish, animated the Emperor and the whole army—the thought of a great battle! They spoke of a battle as if it were a splendid festival, and looked forward to it with delight and were downcast every time their expectations were disappointed."

Hope lured them on once more. Barclay crossed to the right bank of the Dwina on his way to Vitebsk. He had sent word to Bagration to join him there by proceeding through Mohilev and Orcha. Two things were now possible for Napoleon. Either he might succeed, by marching along the left bank, in getting such a start of the enemy as to permit of him crossing the river near Bjeschenkowitski and attacking the Russian flank while on the march; or, Barclay might make a stand at Vitebsk where he was awaiting Bagration. The first course was frustrated by the enemy's rapid advance, but the second seemed likely to be realized. On July 25th, Murat's cavalry had their first serious engagement. On the following day the French drove the Russian rearguard back on Vitebsk, and there, on the 27th, Barclay's entire army stood ready for the fight. Eye-witnesses describe the joy of the French, and their leader's satisfaction. The Russian general was really determined to fight, although he had only 75,000 troops at his disposal, for he knew Bagration was advancing from the south and he could not let him fall into Napoleon's hands without an effort to succour him. Yet things happened otherwise. Davoût had marched from Minsk eastwards to Mohilev and had reached that town before Bagration, who had then, on July 23rd, sought to force his way through, but after some heavy fighting had been driven off. Once more Bagration turned south so as to reach Smolensk by a wide detour and at last effect his junction with the first army. These tidings reached Barclay on the night of July 26th, when he had already drawn up his troops in battle order. Now, he considered there was nothing to be gained by a battle. The

French troops far outnumbered his, and it was not improbable that, while he fought at Vitebsk, Davoût might advance on Smolensk and enter there before him. On the other hand if Napoleon attacked, he would be obliged to deliver battle. But the Emperor spent the 27th in unimportant skirmishes, partly with a view to allowing time to get forward as many of his troops as possible and winning a second "Austerlitz," as he said; partly to avoid exposing his wearied troops to battle in the overpowering glare of the noon-day sun. Perhaps, too, as some have conjectured, the severe strain on both his physical and his nervous energy had rendered him unfit to form a decision rapidly. In any case the delay was disastrous. On the morning of the 28th, not a Russian was to be seen. During the night they had all withdrawn, and a heavy morning mist which did not clear off till late in the day screened their retreat so completely that not a trace remained to show in which direction they had gone.

It was a bitter disillusion! Almost a third of the Grand Army had already perished; over 130,000 names had been struck off the army lists, and nothing had been accomplished! The cavalry were so exhausted that General Belliard told the Emperor plainly that six more days of forced marches and he would have no cavalry left. Besides, the main body was too far from the wings. Macdonald had sent the Prussians against Riga and was marching with his French troops on Jakobstadt; Regnier had been unavoidably left behind at the Pripet to watch the Russian reserves under Tormassoff, while Schwazenberg, who had already begun his advance on Minsk in order to rejoin the main army, had turned aside to succour Regnier. For on July 27th, while Napoleon was preparing for battle at Vitebsk, Tormassoff had captured a Saxon division of 3500 troops, and it was evident he required closer attention than had hitherto been bestowed on him. Napoleon now placed Regnier under the command of Schwarzenberg and charged the latter to fight the Russians and "be done with it". Oudinot had received similar instructions in reference to Wittgenstein, whom he was told to drive out of Drissa and hurl northwards into Macdonald's hands. But Wittgenstein

did not let himself be driven at all, not even when Saint Cyr came up with reinforcements, and in the middle of August he was still at Drissa.

Such was the situation when Napoleon decided to give his troops the rest they sorely needed, to bring up ammunition, and to restore order in the disorganized commissariat. Fortunately, near Vitebsk the country became more fruitful and populous, the people more cleanly and well-to-do than the brutalized Polish peasantry of Lithuania, and the spirits of the troops revived somewhat; although with the overpowering heat and the bad water it was precisely during these days of rest that dysentery claimed the most victims. At Vitebsk Davoût received orders to rejoin the main body; and there, it is said, the Emperor flung his sword on the table in a fit of passion, declaring he would stay there, give up the pursuit of his evasive foe, collect his forces and organize Poland; the campaign of 1812 was at an end; what was still left undone would be overtaken in the campaign following. He had expressed similar views to Murat, who was in favour of advancing; 1813, he said, would see him in Moscow, and 1814 in St. Petersburg; the Russian war would require three years, which indeed was about the time he had counted on in his original programme. But there was one item lacking—victory—or, as he said to Jomini, "a good battle". The French Army occupied a position between the Dnieper and Dwina in a sort of natural gateway forming the entrance to the Muscovite Empire, the goal which Napoleon had chosen for the first stage of his operations. But so far all he had obtained from Russia had been bought with his own losses, not with the enemy's, and such possessions were neither safe nor enjoyable. There was no getting over that fact. He chafed under the tormenting thought that his prestige was discredited. Suddenly he resolved to leave Vitebsk after a short rest and advance upon Moscow. The Russians were at Smolensk and would be unwilling to abandon without a struggle—as they had done the barren territory of Poland—this first really Russian town; all the more so as their two armies were now united. A victory at Smolensk would give

Napoleon the key to Moscow or St. Petersburg, whichever he chose; or, he could remain there in winter-quarters in a strong position, covered by the Dnieper—but the battle for preference. "No blood has been shed yet," said Napoleon to the generals of his suite, Berthier, Duroc, Mouton, and to Caulaincourt, who sought to dissuade him from continuing the advance. "Russia is too great to yield without a fight. The Czar cannot open negotiations till after a battle; and this battle I shall seek and gain, though it should be in the Holy City itself."[1]

The Czar indeed had no thought of negotiating and certainly not now. For on July 18th he had come to an agreement with England by which he secured definite advantages during the war; and as the Sultan had ratified the Treaty of Peace, the army in Moldavia could now be recalled to the north. Napoleon had also learned of this fact, and most unwelcome news it was, yet it only confirmed him in his determination to seek a speedy and decisive engagement. After spending two weeks in Vitebsk and the neighbourhood, he broke up his cantonments. He now intended to concentrate the entire army encamped near Vitebsk—including Davoût's troops, 199,000 men—to the south of that town, send them across the Dnieper and advance eastward along the right bank, protected by the river. On learning that the enemy, after uniting their two armies, had assumed the offensive and were marching out from Smolensk towards Vitebsk, he judged it not impossible that he might reach Smolensk unnoticed, turn the enemy's left wing, and bar their retreat on Moscow. This operation, similar to one carried out against Mack in 1805, was begun on August 10th, with the greatest precision. The troops passed over the Dnieper at Rasasna and Chomino, and at Krasnoi on the 14th they crossed the old Russian frontiers. The information about the Russian movements proved correct. The Czar had been forced to yield to the patriotic feeling in the army and among the people, de-

[1] Ségur, IV. 205. The Emperor's letters during these last days to Berthier and Maret say nothing of discontinuing the march, but only speak of a short rest.

manding that the soil of Ancient Muscovy be defended; and Barclay was compelled to give battle. To avoid losing his communications entirely with Wittgenstein and being outflanked on the right, where he believed the French were in greatest strength, Barclay chose a north-westerly direction for his attack; Bagration formed the centre, and, in order to be ready for any emergency, a division was detached to the left and posted on the other side of the river. This division Napoleon's vanguard fell in with on August 14th, and drove back with heavy loss on Smolensk. Meanwhile a messenger had brought the tidings to Bagration who, recognizing the danger, sent a corps galloping back to the town at full speed to ward off the first onset of the French, while he himself and Barclay, whom he informed at once, followed as quickly as they could.

On the morning of the 16th the French advance-guard reached Smolensk and at once began an assault on its walls. It failed, however, and Napoleon's plan was thereby doomed at the start. For while he waited for the Guards and the Poles to come up and reinforce his inadequate numbers, the two Russian Armies arrived and resumed possession of that important strategic point and also of the road to Moscow. No less an authority than Clausewitz has blamed the Emperor for marching along the right bank of the Dnieper instead of attacking the advancing enemy in front, defeating them, and so gaining Smolensk. But that would only have been what Napoleon called an ordinary battle. The defeated enemy would then have retreated through Smolensk and fallen back on their own line of operations, which was precisely what Napoleon wanted to prevent. Now, however, no other course was open, provided the Russians consented to fight at all. They did, but in the form of a retreat. Barclay would not let himself be lured out of the city, but sent forward Bagration, who was eager for battle, along the road to Moscow, whilst he himself defended Smolensk with a single army corps, about 30,000 troops. When Napoleon found that the enemy would not be drawn into a decisive engagement, he then attempted to force his position, to hold him in

check with superior numbers and compel him to offer battle. But shell after shell burst against the ancient walls of the city in vain, reminding the older officers of the siege of Acre; and bombardment, although it laid the larger half of the town in ruins, proved equally fruitless. For a whole day the French fought against the rearguard of their retreating foe, losing no fewer than 10,000 troops, but yet without success. Finally the Russians drew off voluntarily, having first set fire to the magazines and to the northern suburb, built, like most Russian towns, mainly of wood. Everywhere smoking ruins met the conqueror's eye; but victory had once more eluded him. If only he had advanced at once along the road to Moscow! For in order to escape the French batteries across the Dnieper, Barclay had made a wide detour, and Napoleon by a direct march could easily have overtaken him and have forced him to give battle. But the Emperor, who was not aware of the real situation, merely sent forward Ney and Murat, and when they encountered Barclay's troops at Valutina-Gora on the 19th, he regarded it simply as an engagement with the enemy's rearguard and of little importance. He had already sent Junot with his corps (some 13,000 strong) along the left bank of the Dnieper in order to cross the river further east, but although informed by Murat of the true state of affairs, he omitted to operate against the enemy's flank, and so Barclay with the main body of his troops was able to continue his march unimpeded.

The problem was now what to do next? At Dresden Napoleon had said to Metternich that his enterprise was one in which success depended on patience; whoever could exercise it best would reap the victory. But grievously he sinned against his own conviction. Before commencing the assault on Smolensk even Murat had counselled him to halt, since it was evident that the enemy would not accept battle and would continue to retreat. But all in vain. Afterwards when he was master of the ruined town, his suite again remonstrated. Rapp, who had come up from the Niemen, described the hardships of the long march, the countless victims of typhus and dysentery, the thousands of marauders drag-

ging themselves half-dead from exhaustion into the shelter of a bush to die unseen, the hosts of deserters who, forming into bands, had pillaged castle and hamlet, and committed such excesses that the peasantry in despair rose up and slew them. Napoleon replied that he knew all that, and admitted the horror of the situation, which he contended was the very reason for losing no more time. The first victorious battle would put everything right. Schwarzenberg had defeated Tormassoff at Gorodetschna, and on August 18th Saint Cyr, who had succeeded the wounded Oudinot in the command, defeated Wittgenstein near Polozk and drove him back across the Dwina, thereby facilitating the action and advance of the main army. Napoleon reckoned confidently on further successes. His immediate aim was to defeat the main body of the enemy, and that could only be done by marching east along the road to Moscow. Any further stay in the half-burned town was no longer to be thought of.

It may seem surprising that the Emperor should still be so sure of his troops, but it was only of those whose robust constitution and strict sense of discipline kept them loyal to their flag. They murmured, as they had done in 1807, but they obeyed—in spite of the blazing heat by day, in spite of the loss of rest by night, for the halts at night were spent in foraging for food in the nearest villages; in spite, too, of the gloomy prospect that next day, perhaps, the burden would no longer be endurable. They were chosen troops, these 161,000 men with whom the Emperor marched out of Smolensk, sound of body, strong of soul, especially Davoût's men. They were glad to advance, for behind them lay the horrors of the Polish desert, before them battle, victory, glory, honour, and at the end of all, the far-famed Moscow. Had Napoleon examined matters more minutely he would probably have remained on the Dnieper or have fallen back on Lithuania. But in Russia he was as short-sighted as he had been in Spain. He only took into consideration the army in front of him which he meant to defeat, and the Russian Cabinet to which he meant to dictate terms. He did not recognize the new foe he encountered the moment he left

Poland behind him at Krasnoi and trespassed on Russian soil—the strong patriotic sentiment of the Russian nation which their religious creed and their barbarous instincts had welded into an invincible resistance. Everywhere this spirit made itself felt; in the army where fanaticism steeled the courage and endurance of the troops; in the Court where the Czar could not escape its influence; in the populace who were arming in thousands, and, congregating in front of the Kremlin at Moscow, cried aloud to their ruler, "Let us conquer or die!" The signs were plain past all mistaking, but Napoleon's eyes were holden. Was it not sufficiently significant that at Smolensk, a single army corps had held its own for two days against a large army and had withdrawn without leaving a solitary prisoner in their hands? Was it not remarkable that they had committed to the flames the holy city on the Dnieper with its sacred shrine, rather than suffer it to fall into the hands of the invaders?

Already the Chauvinistic spirit in the Russian camp had claimed a victim—Barclay, the commander-in-chief. A Livonian, and of Scottish descent, he was regarded in the army as a foreigner, and in the Court his bitterest foes were among the leaders of the old Russian party. He had quarrelled with Bagration, and the operations of the army suffered from the discord between its commanders. The Czar had hitherto upheld Barclay, but now he was no longer able to do so. The fact that he had not defended the City of the Holy Virgin with greater energy was counted an unpardonable crime, and the Czar was persuaded into believing that the battle of Smolensk, which had begun with much vigour, ought to have ended in Russia's favour.[1]

Barclay who, after all, had only done what the Czar at

[1] So the Czar wrote subsequently to Admiral Tchitchagoff, who was leading the Moldavian army to the north. The letter is published in his Memoirs. Barclay justified his mode of procedure on the ground that he was reserving his army for a decisive action at a convenient time, and he also recalled the fact that Napoleon only needed to cross the Dnieper lower down to compel him to abandon Smolensk, as his position there could never have been tenable. *Vide* also Barclay's defence in Fabry.

Polozk had adjured him to do, to spare the army for afterwards, was deprived of the chief command and relegated to one of the lesser posts he had previously filled. He was succeeded by Kutusoff an "Old Russian," beloved by the troops, but disliked by the Czar, partly because he had been opposed to the war and had therefore prolonged the negotiations with Turkey, and partly on account of his unreliable character.[1] He had served in the campaign of 1805, and although not more than 67 was a frail old man who could only mount on horseback with great difficulty and had carefully to avoid all danger. Nevertheless the troops had unbounded confidence in him, and his prestige now allowed him to withdraw farther and not risk battle till he had reached the broken ground near Borodino where the Kalotza flows into the Moskwa. The place was known as the Sacred Heath, and the popular belief was that no enemy had ever been able to cross it. There the battle was to be fought. Moscow was not to be allowed to fall into the enemy's hands without swords being drawn. Only recently the Czar had explicitly promised the inhabitants military protection.

On September 1st Napoleon reached Gshazk, where he learned that his vanguard had met with serious resistance from the enemy. Soon all doubt was set at rest; the Russians unmistakably meant to fight. The Emperor assembled his army, about 135,000 men, whereas the Russians could only muster 127,000 and of these 7,000 Cossacks and 10,000 Militia were without any military training, and could only be used in the sanitary and ambulance services.[2] Kutusoff, however, occupied a chosen position. He had disposed his troops across the road to Moscow, behind the Kolotza, and had thrown up earthworks. The most westerly of these

[1] "The people insisted on his appointment," said Alexander to a confidential friend. "I have appointed him, but for my part I wash my hands of him." Subsequently he thought of removing Kutusoff and re-appointing Barclay (*vide* Schumann, "Nikolaus I," I. 84).

[2] This use was not without its advantages, for they undertook willingly the labour of seeking out the wounded from among the combatants and removing them to the places where they could be attended to (*vide* Löwenstern, I. 273).

redoubts was captured by the French on September 5th after desperate fighting, and the Russian left wing was then driven back from the Kolotza on to the other entrenchments in such a way that the Russian position now resembled an elbow with the village of Borodino at the bend. Napoleon formed his plan. He decided not to turn the enemy's left flank, as Davoût sagely counselled, lest such a threatening movement might again cause the enemy to withdraw. He intended to attack their left wing and their centre successively with large masses of troops and bend it round still farther, till their front faced south instead of west, then hurl them across the road and chase them to the Moskwa. Everything depended on Kutusoff standing firm! Napoleon's anxiety on this point was so keen that he scarcely slept all night. At one o'clock in the morning he mounted on horseback and rode out to convince himself that the Russians were still there and to ascertain their position from their camp fires. To add to his anxieties, that evening news arrived that Wellington had defeated Marmont at Salamanca on July 22nd,—another reverse to be retrieved. Nor had the troops much sleep, for they had to wander far afield to obtain food for themselves and their horses. But they all returned and decked themselves in their bravest, for now, at last, the long-desired "festival" was at hand, and even the sick, Germans as well as French, were eager to rejoin the ranks.

At five o'clock in the following morning, the firing began on the right wing and by six the battle was in full progress. The left wing under Eugène, advanced against Barclay's army and captured the village of Borodino; Davoût, supported by Ney on the left and Murat on the right, proceeded against the Russian centre, held by Bagration, whose left wing was engaged by Junot, while Pontatowski and his Poles attempted to turn it. The conflict throughout raged with the utmost bitterness, both attackers and defenders fighting with desperate heroism. The Russian redoubts were taken and retaken time and again, the French regiments, foot and horse and the German cavalry in particular, performing prodigies of valour. In the end they remained masters of the enemy's position,

though only after Bagration's army, which had been severely exposed and inadequately supported at the outset, had been almost exterminated and the commanding general mortally wounded. The Russians drew off for a few hundred yards or so—only to form up again and renew the battle. But the divisions under Ney and Murat had been so fearfully decimated that they were unable to return to the charge. Now was the moment for a strong reserve to step in and annihilate the enemy before they had time to recover themselves. The Guards were standing there ready, 20,000 strong, and Murat and Ney urgently besought the Emperor to give the order to advance; but he would not. "If a second battle takes place to-morrow," said he, "what am I to fight with?" He nearly omitted the order to turn the guns on the retreating Russian centre. He was strangely unlike himself. But this was attributed to the feverishness accompanying a severe chill, to the constant pain he had been suffering all day, especially, however, to the long strain on his nerves, already exhausted by much harassing excitement and now unequal to a new task.[1] At Borodino on September 7th, Napoleon only won a battlefield, not a battle. In spite of their enormous losses, 44,000 in killed and wounded, the Russians remained in their positions all night, and early on the following morning they withdrew along the road to Moscow. Their commander even persuaded the Czar they had won, and at St. Petersburg the battle was announced as a victory for the Russian arms.

During the course of the battle Napoleon had remained continuously at his distant standpoint which prevented him grasping the demoralization of the enemy at critical moments.

[1] Napoleon is condemned by almost all military writers for not having launched his Guards. Jomini alone finds some excuse for the Emperor, and considers it a much more serious error that he did not press home vigorously the attack on the Russian left while it was still weak. The idea that the battle might be resumed next day was not unfounded. Barclay, who had sent strong reinforcements to Bagration, and had thereby been prevented opposing Eugène with his full strength, maintained that the renewal of the fight was indispensable, and even Kutusoff had thought so until he learned the enormous losses his army had sustained, of which Napoleon was not aware.

For the first time he had not been present on the battlefield, which was contrary to his oft-expressed convictions. He was certainly not well. But what were his sufferings compared to the anguish of the stricken thousands around him? In scenes of horror, Borodino far exceeded Eylau. In one day over 70,000 troops had been killed or wounded—and here "wounded" ended only too surely in death.[1] Napoleon declared it was the most sanguinary battle he ever experienced and the most obstinately contested. One thing at least had been gained, the road to Moscow was free. The day after the battle he is said to have exclaimed frequently in great agitation, "Moscow! Moscow!" Yet, behind Moscow there would still be that army whose strength of resistance he had now proven. By then, too, it would have received reinforcements, for another army was advancing from the south, fresh from victories over the Turks, while Napoleon's wings, and with them his line of retreat, would be threatened by superior forces of Russians. So after all it had been no victory, although the enemy had been forced to withdraw. New battles were sure to follow, and he doubted if his troops would be equal to the occasion, for after the butchery at Borodino he had only about 100,000 left. Three days before the battle a reserve corps under Marshal Victor, numbering about 30,000, had crossed the Niemen. The Emperor now ordered it to join the reserves at Smolensk and march on Moscow to reinforce the main army. For the present that was all he could do. On September 14th, from the top of a slight rising-ground he caught his first glimpse of the mighty city of the Muscovites, and his eyes flashed as he looked down and beheld his goal within reach at last.

Early on September 14th, Kutusoff entered Moscow and left it again the same afternoon by the opposite gate. The excitement amongst the inhabitants remaining in the city—the nobles and the wealthy had already gone—was intense, for they had heard of a victory at Borodino, yet the victorious general was already withdrawing, and abandoning

[1] The French lost 28,000, according to some authorities 30,000 troops, including forty-nine generals.

the town to the foreigners. So great were the crowds of people hurrying from the city that the army had difficulty in getting through. Close behind the Russians came the French. Napoleon himself did not arrive till the following day. It is said that he had expected to be received by a deputation of magistrates, instead of which there was not a soul to be seen. Such was the first disillusion, and others were to follow. The town was deserted, the streets empty, the few inhabitants who remained peeped cautiously from behind the shutters. "We felt," says Adam, describing the entry of the French troops, "as good actors would do if compelled to play to an empty house." The Emperor rode into the Kremlin and took up his residence there. The Guards remained in the city, but the other corps had to find shelter for themselves in the neighbourhood. It was some comfort that there was at least abundance of food, in spite of the fact that the Russian rear-guard had plundered busily. Soon the troops began to settle down in the deserted houses, eager, after the unutterable sufferings of the campaign, to enjoy some rest at last.

But that they were not to find at Moscow. Even before their entry, they had noticed in the distance thick clouds of smoke curling upwards here and there. But they had paid no further heed to it, for in every town the Russians had burnt all the provisions on their approach. Soon, however, their suspicions were aroused. At the Kremlin, loud reports following hard on one another told of fire breaking out at different places; and soon they could no longer refuse the testimony of their eyes—they were living in a doomed city. Driven by a furious gale from the north-east the flames kept on spreading, and by noon on the 16th the whole town was on fire, the sparks falling even into the court-yard of the Kremlin. Napoleon, who was just then enjoying his first amazed inspection of that marvellous home of the Czars, had to leave in haste, and fighting his way with difficulty through the smoke and confusion in the streets, he escaped with his suite to the castle of Petrovskoje. From there he beheld the city whose possession he had coveted as his crowning triumph, bathed in a sea of fire! What engraved the awful sight even

deeper on his spirit, was the conviction which immediately flashed upon him, that neither Chance nor Folly had lit those flames. The enemy themselves had sacrificed their capital to save their food and their wealth from the hands of the stranger, and to prevent him making his dwelling-place there.[1]

Napoleon appointed a commission to inquire into the origin of the fire, and a number of incendiaries caught red-handed were shot. Still the fire raged on, utterly beyond control, and unwilling that the troops should be disappointed of all their hopes he allowed them to plunder. The havoc done was enormous; the gain, trivial. Provisions had nearly all been destroyed, but the cellars had escaped and there were wine and brandy in abundance. As a result the disorder among the troops became so great that the few peasants who ventured into the town with provisions were robbed and the

[1] The fact that Count Rostopchin ordered the conflagration before leaving the town is now regarded as a proven fact even by Russian historians. That many causes may have contributed, owing to the release of all sorts of doubtful characters and to the excesses of the soldiery, certainly cannot be denied. The feeling of the inhabitants also favoured it. They preferred to burn their homes rather than leave them to the French. Already on September 11th Count Rostopchin had all the fire brigade apparatus removed from the town, and two days later he informed the generals with the army that as soon as Moscow was abandoned defenceless to the enemy, it would be destroyed by fire. On the 14th the prisoners were released, and he ordered the municipal supplies of brandy to be taken out to the streets and destroyed; he then left the town, and from a neighbouring rising ground he said to his son: "Greet Moscow for the last time, in half an hour it will be in flames". He himself set fire to his own castle. This he frankly stated in the following years, though a decade later he denied it. When the French were seeking for the original incendiaries they discovered a number of police officials among those incriminated, and in repeated instances they found that the steps of the houses had been soaked with oil and connected with the street by a slow fuse. On October 6th, the Czarina wrote to her mother: "Our people have begun to burn all their possessions dear to them so that they may not fall into the enemy's hands". Schmidt, in his "Die Urheber des Brandes von Moscow, 1812" (Greisswald, 1904), makes a valuable contribution towards solving this question. It is a significant trait of Russian character that all the churches were spared from the fire.

soldiers, fraternizing with some thousands of Russian marauders, scoured the country-side unmolested, as if the war was over.

That indeed was the earnest wish of all, not excepting the Emperor. At last, on September 18th, the fire died down, leaving three-quarters of the town in ashes. The inhabitants, about 10,000 in number, who had remained in the town, wandered starving through the streets. A battalion of the Guards had saved the Kremlin, to which Napoleon now returned, and full of the idea that the Czar would leave nothing undone to be master once more of his own country, he daily expected him to make overtures of peace. But these never came. He then tried to hasten matters, and on the 20th he wrote to the Czar that Moscow was burned, that the governor had ordered it to be set on fire, that 400 incendiaries had been caught in the act and shot, that this calamity might have been avoided had the Czar written to him either before or after Borodino, and that he hoped his letter would be accepted in a friendly spirit. Again he waited expectantly. But September wore away and winter drew perilously near. The army could only be fed by sending foraging parties farther and farther afield each day, thereby incurring much danger and often meeting with scant success. A single Russian corps is said to have captured 3,000 Frenchmen within three weeks. Then too the peasantry formed themselves into train-bands, hid their property and defended their villages. "You are the nation of the Russian Faith," their leaders exhorted them. "Die for the Faith and the Czar. Why are you Christians if you are not willing to suffer for the Faith? Are you true believers, if you are not prepared to serve the Czar?" The fact that Rostopchin denounced Napoleon as "unbaptized" rendered the latter's appeal to the inhabitants of Moscow futile. In the town of Vereia the French garrison was surprised and captured by partisans. Soon the high road to Smolensk became unsafe, the convoys of supplies were captured and the regular service of couriers interrupted. Napoleon's generals advocated a retreat to Poland, but the Emperor could not bring himself as yet

to confess defeat before the world and to abandon Moscow, where he had hoped to reign as master.

"Imagine Moscow taken," he had said to Narbonne before the beginning of the campaign, "the Czar reconciled or replaced by a dependent Government, and tell me if an army of Frenchmen and Allies could not advance from Tiflis to the Ganges, and there, by contact merely, overthrow the whole fabric of India's mercantile greatness? France might conquer at one blow the independence of the West and the liberty of the seas. Alexander the Great was as far from the Ganges as I am from it at Moscow."[1] Later on, when he was leaving Vilna, he told Maret he would soon summon him to Moscow to negotiate for peace.[2] Moscow was never absent from his thoughts. Just as in the Middle Ages the image of Jerusalem haunted the mind of the Crusader, so the Holy City of the Russians haunted his. It was afterwards related in the circles of his relatives and his intimate associates that he had taken with him to Russia the imperial insignia, robes, sceptre and crown. He had intended to dictate peace and then, within the Kremlin at Moscow, to have himself proclaimed by the army "Emperor of the West, Head of the European Confederation, and Defender of the Christian religion". So Bernadotte told the Russian Ambassador in confidence in April, 1812. The insignia was said to have fallen into the hands of the Cossacks during the retreat.[3]

[1] Villemain, "Souvenirs," p. 127.

[2] Ernouf, "Maret," p. 469.

[3] *Vide* the Russian Ambassador's statement in the Sbornik, XXI. and the "Spectateur Militaire," 1887, vol. 38, p. 478, where Tracy affirms it was entrusted to a member of the Imperial family. According to Russian sources (Langeron's "Memoirs," p. 98) the imperial van with the Emperor's mantle, insignia, orders and valuable papers was burned by the Cossacks on the road between Vilna and Kovno (cp. also Paymaster Peyrusse's "Memorial," p. 136; and Coignet's "Diary," p. 342). Vandal, (III. 588) contends there is not sufficient basis for this narrative because the Emperor's coronation mantle is still to be seen in the Treasury of Notre Dame, and because there is no evidence in the imperial accounts of expenditure for a new insignia. But these objections do not destroy the other evidence, as it would scarcely be the insignia of 1804 but some other in which the Emperor intended to attire himself when he advanced beyond

All that was now a thing of the past. Peace had not been secured and the Grand Army which was to have cleared his path to the highest power in the world, had dwindled till its very existence was in jeopardy.

For Kutusoff, who had first marched south-west, had then, unnoticed by the French whose advancing cavalry had lost touch with the enemy, turned to the west, and at Tarutino, to the south of Moscow, had taken up an excellent position where he could threaten the French line of retreat and could meanwhile strengthen himself. He increased his regular troops to 80,000 and 600 guns, in addition to which he had militia and 20,000 Cossacks, all well clothed and in good condition; but at the same time he lost an invaluable general in Barclay, whose opinions were not acceptable to him and who now quitted the army, indignant at the treatment he had received. The state of affairs in both wings was wholly favourable to the Russians. On the Dwina, Wittgenstein had been reinforced by troops from a Finnish corps, by recruits and militia, bringing up his strength to 40,000 as against 27,000 under St. Cyr, who had not been able to follow up vigorously his victory at Polozk. In the south the Russian army from Moldavia under Tchitchagoff had effected a junction, on September 20th, with Tormassoff's army, giving a total of 64,000 troops against Schwarzenberg's corps of 41,000 Austrians, Saxons and Poles. And still no answer came from St. Petersburg. Napoleon was beside himself with annoyance. For a moment he even thought of fetching an answer in person, but this wild scheme was quickly abandoned, and finally he had to reconcile himself to make overtures. On October 5th he sent General Lauriston to Kutusoff, who replied that he had no authority and that the most he could do would be to forward a letter from Napoleon to the Czar. Then ensued another period of suspense, till silence at last convinced the Emperor that this effort too had failed.

being Emperor of France. There is evidence that he both thought and expressed himself to this effect. But there is no further proof as to whether he really intended, while on his expedition to the East, to have such a ceremony in the event of some epoch-making victory.

At St. Petersburg there was no thought of compromise. The taking of Moscow, it is true, had caused profound anxiety, and Rumjantzoff again advocated peace, as did also the Dowager Czarina and the Grand Duke Constantine, who was responsible for Barclay's dismissal. Nevertheless the Czar remained unshaken, in spite of the bitter disappointment caused by the loss of his capital following so closely on Kutusoff's news of a victory at Borodino. Nor was it that his fickle nature had suddenly gained strength under the stress of adversity. Many causes contributed to his decision. For one thing the influential circles in St. Petersburg held him immediately responsible for the catastrophe to the ancient and wealthy metropolis, and they were unwilling to risk any lasting injury to their country by a humiliating peace, all the more so as the loss of Moscow had greatly intensified the warlike mood of the nation.[1] For Moscow had been surrendered without a second battle having been fought, and their army, which had claimed the victory, was therefore in a position of commanding strength, whereas the severe losses the French had suffered were too palpable not to be known also in St. Petersburg. Furthermore, during the last days of August, at Abo in Finland, the Czar had met Bernadotte, who had counselled him to exercise patience, and had given him back the Russian corps which, according to the treaty, was to have helped to conquer Norway. Wittgenstein was thus reinforced by 20,000 troops. Probably, too, amongst those surrounding the Czar, there were men of strong and energetic wills (one thinks involuntarily of Stein, whom the Czar had sent for in May) who advised him to continue the struggle and confirmed him in this purpose by their own staunch support.[2] Finally, the pressure of the Moscow disaster quickened the Czar's natural piety, which was further deepened when the war ultimately ended in

[1] *Vide* the Memoirs of Countess Edling, p. 75, and Pertz's "Stein," vi. 2, p. 179.

[2] Stein's letters to the Czar later on, in December, show the influence he had acquired over him ("Hist. Zeitschrift," vol. 63, p. 273).

Russia's favour.[1] When the tidings came of the burning of Moscow and also the rumour that the enemy had set fire to the city, Alexander exclaimed: "No more peace with Napoleon! He or I; I or he. We two cannot rule together." To Bernadotte he wrote: "After this wound anything else seems but trivial scratches. At least this affords me the opportunity of giving Europe the strongest proof of my perseverance by continuing the struggle against its oppressor."[2] So the war went on. By a new plan of operations, drawn up under the influence of Kutusoff's success, Wittgenstein, co-operating with the Finnish corps, was to drive back the French army opposed to him; then, while the Finnish corps, reinforced by the garrison from Riga, held the French in check, he was to work his way south and effect a junction with Tchitchagoff in Napoleon's rear. Schwarzenberg was previously to have been thrust westward by Tchitchagoff and Tormassoff and kept under surveillance by the latter. This plan was based on the assumption that Napoleon would leave Moscow and begin a retreat, and the refusal to entertain any overtures was intended to confirm this assumption.

Meanwhile Napoleon had wasted five precious weeks in the hope of peace, and now he saw himself confronted by the remorseless truth that he must leave Moscow. Who can depict the thoughts that surged through his mind when he viewed that proud host by whose valour he had reared his empire, breaking up plank by plank, like a doomed vessel. His far-seeing glance discerned not merely the horrible perils both inevitable and near, the death-dealing winter—even summer had reduced his army to half its original size—but also the remote consequences, the revolt of compulsory allies and the endless succession of new battles to regain what he had possessed only a few short weeks before! Vainly he

[1] "The conflagration of Moscow has illuminated my soul, and the judgment of the Lord on the snow-clad plains has filled my heart with a glow of faith such as I have never before felt" (Schiemann, "Nikolaus I," 87).

[2] "Miscellanea Napoleonica," IV. 692.

tried to thrust back the thought of his lost prestige, he even shunned being left alone. It is said that he protracted mess to an unusual length, attended the performances of a French theatrical company, and took a lively interest in the plans for the re-organization of the *Théatre Français* and such like matters. But a decision could no longer be avoided. The Emperor must again become a general, for all these misfortunes had been brought about through there being too much Emperor and too little general.[1] As a military measure the first thing to be done was to order the retreat. While he was making his preparations for that and was in the act of holding one of his daily reviews, news came that the Russians had assumed the offensive. On the 18th they had surprised Murat, who had been sent southwards to observe Kutusoff, and had driven him back in the direction of Moscow with heavy loss. The last faint hope of peace was now extinguished; fighting was inevitable.

Since the beginning of October, Napoleon had been considering by which route they should leave Moscow, which was no longer tenable. There were three roads open. The one by which they had come, the one through Kaluga to Smolensk, and finally the one to the north-west through Bjeloi to Welikie-Luki, which would allow him to threaten St. Petersburg. At first he had favoured the third route, because it did not betray the fact that he was retreating so palpably as the others, but he soon abandoned it. The road to the south did not meet with much approval. "Any movement on Kaluga," so run the notes which he dictated, "is only advisable in the event of retreating on Smolensk. But is it wise, if we are returning in any case to Smolensk, to seek out the enemy and then, after losing a few thousand troops, to set out on a march which can only seem like retreating before an army which knows its country well, has many secret agents and numerous light cavalry"? He goes on to explain how in an engagement with the enemy they might easily have

[1] "Moscow is not a military but a political position," said he to Daru. "People insist on regarding me here only as a general, whereas I am here as an Emperor" (Ségur, v. 85).

from 3000 to 4000 wounded whom they would need to carry with them in their retreat for hundreds of miles; this would look like a defeat, and would certainly be reckoned as such in popular opinion. Rather than that, he would return by the road they had come. Here the enemy would not be a constant thorn in their sides; they knew the road thoroughly and it was five days' march shorter. The army would take flour for two weeks with them and reach Smolensk without losing any stragglers. At Viasma they would stop and find provisions and fodder.[1] These notes belong to the early days of October. Soon afterwards, however, he definitely decided to march by the route through Kaluga as the advance of the Russians made it necessary to support Murat. The force of these considerations soon became evident.

On October 19th the "Grand Army" left Moscow. Including Junot's corps, then stationed at Moshaisk, it numbered in all 108,000 troops. They marched out in a south-westerly direction, the soldiers laden with booty, the weight of which soon wearied them, while the endless succession of wagons filled with the spoils of the Holy City and with sick and wounded, and the long train of camp followers which included many foreign families fleeing from the hatred of the Russians, gave to the whole cavalcade the appearance of some tribe migrating. In Moscow, where Mortier remained with 8,000 troops, the Emperor spread the report that he would return after defeating Kutusoff, with such success that Kutusoff actually believed he was coming expressly to fight him. Such was not the Emperor's intention. He was really thinking how he could elude the enemy's left wing, avoid an "*affaire*" and some "thousands of wounded," and reach the new west road to Kaluga before his adversary; or else gain Juchnow and arrive at Smolensk via Jelnia. But Kutusoff's deception, on which Napoleon had confidently reckoned, did not last long; and when Napoleon, covered by two corps, marched off with the main body of his army westwards towards Borovsk, news of this movement shortly afterwards reached the Russian head-quarters. Immedi-

[1] "Corr.," xxiv. 19,237.

ately Kutusoff started for Malojaroslavetz on the Luscha, in order to obstruct his advance on Kaluga. The Emperor might perhaps have carried through his plan successfully had his army been able to move more rapidly. But the heavy loads which the infantry had to carry, the bad condition of the cavalry horses, the insufficient teams for the 600 guns, none of which he would consent to leave behind, the immense length of the train which he took with him instead of sending by a different route, and to crown all, the heavy rains which had softened the roads, made a quicker pace impossible. So it came about that the French vanguard under Eugène reached Malojaroslavetz little in advance of the Russians, who took up a position on a rising ground on the other side of the river. Desperate fighting at once began. The Russian position was taken and re-taken repeatedly, and finally, after frightful carnage, it remained in the hands of Eugène and his Italians. But that was all, for Kutusoff, who had meanwhile come up with the whole army, held the road to the south; and it remained to be seen if Napoleon was prepared to fight his way through.

So after all the "*affaire*" had come to pass. The fighting on the 24th had cost the French over 5000 killed and wounded, and if the battle were renewed next day on a larger scale, with such stubborn foes as the Russians, the losses would certainly be very serious. In the Council of War summoned by Napoleon, Murat was almost the only one in favour of fighting; the majority were strongly averse to it. Even the intrepid Mouton, who had saved the situation on the Island of Lobau in 1809, advised a retreat on the Niemen as rapidly as possible, along the high road by which they had come and were therefore familiar with. This counsel fell in with the Emperor's own conviction. Possibly, too, he was influenced by the fact that on the 25th, while on a reconnaissance, he had narrowly escaped being taken prisoner by a band of Cossacks. But he hesitated about choosing the route to the north, which exposed him to the constant anxiety of being harassed by the enemy, who had hitherto been in front of them. Kutusoff, however, solved the dilemma for him next

day by breaking up cantonments and going farther south, although this step was counter to the wishes of Toll, his excellent adviser, and was manifestly dictated by a dread of Napoleon which he had never shaken off since Austerlitz. Napoleon immediately seized the opportunity his opponent had left him to turn north and reach the high road at Moshaisk. On the 21st, Mortier received orders to quit Moscow. Before leaving he was to blow up the Kremlin, a despicable deed, only partially successful. On the 27th his corps rejoined the army, which now proceeded west by forced marches. A week had already been lost and Napoleon could not now venture to halt at Viasma—if Kutusoff understood his business.[1]

The retreat which now followed makes the march through the desert after the fruitless siege of Acre seem mere child's play by comparison. The troops who set out on this terrible journey were those whose strength had withstood the pitiless haste of the march to Moscow, the sultry heat of the Russian summer, hunger and privations past reckoning up. And now they were no longer pursuers but pursued. At least they had a definite goal in view; they must march bravely, they were told, only as far as Smolensk, where they would find Victor's

[1] There is a lack of information as to Napoleon's attitude during these days. There is nothing surprising in the fact that he did not pursue the retreating Russians who might later oppose him again in battle. But it is surprising that he did not choose the quicker route from Malojaroslavetz through Medyni and Vuchnow to Viasma. In a letter to Berthier for Junot, on October 26th, he refers to this fact, and says the cold and the necessity of disposing of the wounded, who numbered from 3000 to 4000, had decided him to go to Moshaisk. ("Corr.," xxiv. 19,307.) But the winter cold had not then set in. On the 27th there was some frost at night, but the weather was still fine. The winter of 1812 was later than usual in Russia. Hence the other reason must have been the decisive one, the care of the wounded, for whom, since the beginning of October, Napoleon had shown marked consideration in all his plans. The wretched vehicles at his disposal and his ignorance of the condition of the road may also be partly responsible for his decision. Possibly, too, he imagined he could only reach Medyni via Kaluga, which Kutusoff with his superiority in cavalry and artillery would not have surrendered without another "*affaire*".

corps and abundant rations, orders having been given to that effect. There, between the Dwina and the Dnieper, they were to spend the winter. And so this disorganized and demoralized host toiled along the same *via dolorosa* which they had trodden only two months before, past the battle-field of Borodino where the dead still lay unburied, past the hospitals, —abodes of horror,—from which those who were alive were brought out, past burned towns and villages, through a country devastated on all sides. When November came round the frost grew keener at night and the majority of the soldiers, who were insufficiently clad, suffered bitterly from cold and hunger, for the provisions they had carried with them from Moscow were soon used up, and foraging along their route as they had done before was now rendered impossible owing to the bands of armed peasantry who murdered with savage cruelty all who fell into their hands. And besides the enemy was again in sight.

Kutusoff, who was excellently served by his light horse, having received timely intelligence of Napoleon's retreat, turned back and followed him with the main army through Silenki towards Viasma, while Platoff's Cossacks harassed the rear-guard under Davoût. Napoleon now gave orders to march as they did in Egypt, with the baggage in the centre, so that in case of attack they could make front and fire in any direction. Again the pace quickened. "The enemy is fleeing," Platoff reported, "as never army fled." There was ample cause for haste. For by taking the shorter road which Napoleon had rejected, Kutusoff and his vanguard reached the high road beyond Viasma on November 3rd, and cut off the French rear-guard, and it was only Eugène's timely action in sending back two divisions from Viasma that saved Davoût, for Napoleon and his Guards were already far beyond that town. Had Kutusoff attacked the French that day with his whole army, as his generals advised him to do, he might have dealt the invaders a crushing defeat. But Kutusoff, though energetic and indefatigable in resistance, lacked enterprise in attack, and did not trouble sufficiently to press home an advantage. Moreover he was firmly convinced that the

rigours of a Russian winter would completely annihilate the French without his assistance.

The fighting at Viasma had cost the French 4000 in killed and wounded, 3000 had been taken prisoners, while Davoût's corps was so completely shattered that Ney had now to form the rearguard. On November 6th, the cold registered from 8 to 12 degrees, and a biting north wind brought with it dense snow.[1] The roads became slippery and the horses stumbled and died in heaps, their flesh being the only animal food there was for the starving soldiers. Many guns had to be abandoned, large trains of ammunition wagons were blown up; the cavalry as they lost their horses had to proceed on foot. Discipline ceased entirely. Each thought only of himself. Those wounded in the recent fight were abandoned to their fate, and perished by the roadside, as did also thousands who, from cold or exhaustion, had thrown away their arms and left the ranks; for at night, when the camp-fires were lit, they were not allowed to come near, and sinking exhausted in the inhospitable snow they froze to death. Round a single bivouac, upwards of 300 were found dead in one night. Many a one awaited the advance of the Russians, thinking to beg from them and gain a brief respite; but when the enemy passed their last hope was quenched, if a Cossack lance had not previously put a term to their misery. Worst of all were the sufferings of the rear-guard. One of Ney's colonels writes thus of these days: "Our small stock of provisions was consumed, the horses dropped dead with hunger and exhaustion and were greedily devoured by the men. Whoever wandered aside in quest of food fell into the enemy's hands. Our men would rush upon any solitary fugitive and take his provisions from

[1] According to the accounts given by Bausset, Guretzky-Cornitz, and Berthezène, the severe cold and the snow began on November 4th; almost all the others—Fézensac, Castellane, Gourgaud, Peyrusse, Coignet, and Napoleon in bulletin 29, give the 6th. Castellane ("Journal," I. 180) writes on the 3rd: "The days are warm like summer, the nights are cold". Fézensac ("Souvenirs," p. 288) writes on the 5th, "the weather was beautiful and mild for the time of year . . . but during the march next day the weather suddenly changed and became very cold". Castellane writes on the 6th: "The snow is now falling steadily".

him by force; lucky for him if they left him his clothing. Thus, after laying waste the country, we fell to destroying one another." At last, like some welcome beacon of deliverance, the towers of Smolensk rose in sight. When the roll was called barely 50,000 out of the 100,000 who had marched out of Moscow answered to their names. Among them were 5000 cavalry in miserable condition, for which Murat, nicknamed the "Cavalry Butcher," was largely to blame; even in the outskirts of Moscow he had goaded on the poor fellows quite unnecessarily to fight the Cossacks, which cost them their horses. Of the other leaders the Viceroy Eugène and the dauntless Ney were held in the highest regard. In all the records of this campaign Ney stands out conspicuous for his courage, sagacity, and splendid self-control in the most desperate situations. On the other hand Napoleon greatly embittered the good feeling of the troops by the favouritism of the Guards which he had repeatedly displayed even during the summer. On arriving at Smolensk, on November 9th, although the arrangements made by the Commissariat came far short of his expectations, he first of all provided for the Guards, who received two weeks' rations while the other corps had only one week's rations, a proceeding which led to riots.[1] As the town had been burned, only a very few houses afforded any shelter from the piercing cold, and consequently the bulk of the troops had to sleep in the open. The dead bodies were still lying in heaps in the narrow streets, and this was the place where they were to make their winter quarters!

[1] Paymaster Péyrusse in his diary under date of November 10th, makes the following remarks in regard to the army's arrival in Smolensk—"The Magazines were immediately broken open and any regular distribution made impossible; everything was plundered. The power and authority of those in command ceased now that the army had been reduced to despair by hunger and hardships of every kind. The soldiers remained masters of the magazines. Wine, brandy, rice, biscuits, and vegetables were all mixed up together and trodden under foot. The enormous stores of provisions, squandered in this way, barely sufficed for two divisions." Although subsequently Napoleon charged his stewards with remissness in their duties, and with corruption, it is more than probable he did so purely to conceal the fact that the would-be ruler of the world was sometimes not even master of his own army.

But even that was not to be, for the line between the Dwina and the Dnieper had already become untenable. While on the march, Napoleon had received tidings from Victor which filled him with apprehension. Instead of remaining at Smolensk to make the needful preparations for the retreating army, Victor had been obliged to hasten to succour Saint-Cyr against Wittgenstein, and in the end of October the two marshals were defeated at Tchatchniki by superior numbers. The retreating army was thereby exposed to serious danger from the north; hence Napoleon's grave anxiety. With touching urgency he bade Victor advance again to the attack and drive the enemy across the Dwina. Just then a messenger arrived announcing that Tchitchagoff, having posted part of his army on the Bug to observe Schwarzenburg and Reynier, was advancing on Minsk and had already reached Slonim on the 6th, so that there was now the possibility of him effecting a junction with Wittgenstein. To remain in Smolensk was therefore out of the question. The Emperor only waited till the troops had rested somewhat and for the arrival of Eugène, who was coming up by a toilsome detour through Duchovchina; he did not wait for the rear-guard. On the 14th he left Smolensk, giving orders that the various corps should march at a distance of a day's journey between each. Seeing that Kutusoff, during the four days' halt at Smolensk, had overtaken the French via Jelnia and might at any moment attack the army on the line of march, the reason for this arrangement is not apparent. Possibly Napoleon was unaware of the enemy being so near, or he may have expected them to try and effect a junction with Wittgenstein via Smolensk;[1] then too, by leaving longer intervals between the various corps he probably hoped to secure a more regular distribution of rations at Orcha than had happened at Smolensk. From the 12th to the 17th, the army marched out of the town. Of the 30,000 camp-followers who had entered Smolensk with the army, only

[1] Writing to Victor on November 7th, the remark occurs: "In a few days your rear-guard may be overwhelmed by Cossacks" ("Corr.," xxiv. 19,326).

the fourth part now joined the rear-guard under Ney. Of the others some had died from cold and hunger, some remained behind intent on plunder. All such were slain by the returning inhabitants, or thrown into the flames, or drowned. The sick and wounded were left behind in the hospitals and many of them perished when the towers on the city wall were blown up, which was done on Napoleon's command. The horrors were unutterable.

Almost immediately on leaving Smolensk the intense cold began to claim its victims and the demoralization in the ranks asserted itself afresh. Again the enemy had appeared and that too where they were not expected. When Napoleon and the Guards reached Krasnoi, the Russian vanguard seized the road behind him, and now there was the danger lest the oncoming corps, marching singly, might be defeated successively by this Russian detachment 17,000 strong, while Kutusoff, by continuing his advance, might oppose the Emperor in front at Krasnoi. In order to prevent this, the Emperor called a halt, so as to allow Eugène's corps (the next in order) time to come up. Napoleon had only 15,000 men with him, so greatly shrunken were even the Guards. Kutusoff, on the other hand, who was only a day's march distant from Krasnoi, had thrice that number at his disposal, although in his hasty march through the deep snow he had been obliged to leave behind nearly half of his infantry, sick and unfit for service.[1] Here again, as at Viasma, the Russian commander, though well informed as to his opponent's desperate plight, avoided bringing up his main body, separating Napoleon from the rest of his army and then overpowering him as he might have done. He vainly attempted to disguise

[1] The Russian regular troops during this war did not display the power of endurance that one would naturally have expected from them. Of the 100,000 troops with which Kutusoff started his parallel pursuit of Napoleon, by the beginning of December 48,000 were in hospital, although they were clad in furs, well fed, and had not moved with such rapidity as their enemy. By the middle of December, of the 200,000 troops in the Russian army, only 40,000 were still under arms. Of the various nationalities the Poles and the Germans seem to have borne the cold best (Bernhardi, "Toll's Memoirs," II. 352, 469).

his hesitation, which was generally ascribed to his fear of Napoleon's genius, believing him invincible even in such straits. Emboldened by this respite, early on the following morning (the 17th), in bitter cold, Napoleon actually assumed the offensive and thereby screened Davoût and Ney from the Russian vanguard. He also reckoned on the chance that Kutusoff, seeing the likelihood of a more extensive engagement, would recall his vanguard and so leave the road free. In this daring move he was entirely successful, and so Davoût also was able to reach Krasnoi. Now, however, as he was in danger of being outflanked, the Emperor continued the march to Orcha, leaving Ney to his fate. The latter, after some desperate and bootless fighting, stole across the frozen Dnieper by night with 3000 troops, but on the farther side he fell into the hands of Platoff's Cossacks. At length, after almost incredible hardships, he regained the high road behind Orcha, with barely 900 troops.

The extreme cold now began to abate and in its place thaw set in and several days' rain made the march even more toilsome; for most of the soldiers had nothing but rags on their feet. There were now barely 25,000 survivors in the shrunken ranks, and of these thousands threw away their arms; even the Guards began to waver. During the cold days Napoleon had frequently marched in front of his troops, clad in a Polish fur cloak and leaning on a birch staff; he now stepped in among his old grenadiers and addressed them thus: "You see the disorganization of my army. By some unfortunate infatuation most of the soldiers have thrown away their arms. If you follow their dangerous example, there is no hope left. Upon you depends the salvation of the army." Through the instrumentality of the Jews, at Orcha where the main body arrived some 18,000 strong, and almost without cavalry and artillery, the troops obtained the rations they so sorely needed, as well as a few batteries drawn by the horses belonging to the pontoon parks. The boats were left behind, as it was thought all need for them was past. The bridge at Borissov over the Beresina was held by the French, and once they were across it they counted there was no further

obstacle on the road from Minsk to Vilna. But their trials were not nearly over. On November 22nd, Napoleon received word that Admiral Tchitchagoff had advanced through Minsk on Borissov where he had driven back the French and now held the passage of the river. What made this news doubly distressing was the fact that Victor and Oudinot had failed completely in their operations against Wittgenstein and were now marching southwards straight for the high road. To all appearance the fate of the army was sealed. Kutusoff was in its rear; Tchitchagoff to the south and in front; Wittgenstein on its right. If the two latter effected a junction and opposed the French at the Beresina, escape would be impossible, for thaw and rain had melted the firm ice, the river was in flood, its banks under water, and the pontoons had been left behind at Orcha!

It was a situation to daunt the bravest heart. But Napoleon, whom we saw, on his way to Moscow, nervous, ailing, and uncertain of success, now under the certainty of disaster was himself again, resourceful, circumspect, self-reliant, a general in heart and soul. Even his bodily ailments seem to have disappeared, and since the winter campaign of 1807 he had never felt so well; a small fact, but not to be overlooked. During these days of dire distress and wearing anxiety, his mind and energy asserted themselves as of yore. "He looked pale," says one of his companions, "but his countenance was tranquil and nothing in his appearance betrayed his mental sufferings." He gauged the whole extent of the danger and saw the remedy required, if such were still possible. The paramount necessity was to bring up the troops who had been fighting against Wittgenstein and who had not suffered nearly so much as the Grand Army. Oudinot with his 8000 troops was to repel the division which Tchitchagoff had sent to Borissov and if possible to regain possession of the bridge; while Victor, with his 11,000 troops, was to march south-west from Tchereja to the Beresina and hold Wittgenstein in check as long as possible. Meantime, Napoleon got rid of a large number of the camp-followers who still hung on to the army, and at Bobr

he destroyed half of his wagons in order to procure horses for what little artillery he still possessed. Here he learned from Oudinot that Borissov had been recaptured, but that the Russians had burned the bridge. Only the day before he had written: "Should the enemy gain control of the head of the bridge and burn the bridge so that we were prevented crossing, it would be a great misfortune". And now this had happened. Moreover, in front of them were two armies both superior in numbers to their own; they were fleeing from a third, and right across their path was a river 100 yards wide with marshes on either side.

Had Napoleon been opposed by an enemy of even half his military capacity, neither he nor his army would ever have escaped. He would never have reached the frontiers as he did, though only with a handful of officers, nor have raised new armies, nor have involved Europe in new wars as actually happened. But Kutusoff was mainly concerned "not to appear on the frontiers with emaciated troops," and so he pursued with extraordinary slowness, while Wittgenstein failed to inform himself adequately of his opponents' desperate plight. Although no longer held in check by Victor who, contrary to the Emperor's orders, had rejoined the high road at Loschinza instead of marching rapidly to the Upper Beresina, Wittgenstein had advanced cautiously, also from fear of the Emperor, only as far as Borissov. Both these generals and the incompetent Tchitchagoff were quite unequal to their opportunities for destroying the greatest general of the age. Tchitchagoff, whose task it was to prevent the Emperor slipping through, walked headlong into a snare laid for him by Oudinot. The latter had received orders to find a suitable spot for bridging the river, which he did at Studjanka slightly to the north of Borissov. He was then by a feint to create the impression that they were going to cross to the south of the city. The ruse was kept up with such success, and harmonized so completely with Wittgenstein's expectations, which he had communicated to Tchitchagoff, that the latter only sent a feeble detachment to the north, and on November 25th drew off with his whole forces a

day's march to the south of Borissov, so as to be ready for the French army when it came up and attempted to join hands with Schwarzenberg, as he expected it to do. On the same day, the 25th, Oudinot led his corps north from Borissov to Studjanka and there began to build two bridges which were not ready till the following afternoon.[1] Frost had suddenly set in again and hardened the marshy banks, but in the river where the sappers were working up to their shoulders in water, the blocks of ice drifting down the stream greatly hindered them in their work, at a time too when every moment was precious. At last the crossing began. A number of guns posted on the high ground of Studjanka commanded the opposite bank of the stream and held in check a Russian detachment stationed there. The cavalry swam across, dislodged the enemy, and so opened the road, which remained clear also the following day. Oudinot's troops, 8,000 strong, were the first to cross. They took up a position facing south; behind them in the dusk came 4000 cavalry which had been reorganized and placed under the dauntless Ney, who had lost all his troops. On the following day, the 27th, Napoleon superintended the crossing of the river in person, and even allowed a number of fugitives to pass over. At midday he himself crossed with the Guards, now reduced to 7000. In the afternoon, while a large crowd of these fugitives were on the bridge, it gave way and many of them perished in the river. When it had been set up again—it was the third time it had broken down—the remainder of Eugène's and Davoût's troops, 2400 in all, passed over, and only Victor's corps, 11,000 strong, remained behind. The latter's rear-guard had reached Borissov, where it was to hold Wittgenstein in check, cover the army's retreat, and save as many as possible of those who had thrown away their arms. For now when he saw his Grand Army crumbling to

[1] Hartmann's statement ("Militärwochenblatt," Beihefte von 1894) that three bridges were built is contrary to all the other authorities. It is probably due to a misunderstanding, Wjesselovo having been taken for Studjanka, which was not marked on the French maps. The intention was to build three bridges, but there was not sufficient material.

pieces, Napoleon was busily planning how to create it anew, and he counted on utilizing the services of these stragglers, among whom were many excellent officers. Hence during the night of the 28th he sent across a division to support Victor, who was to hold the bridges for that day also. The whole army now numbered from 30,000 to 35,000 under arms.[1] The number of stragglers must have been equally great. A large proportion of these poor creatures remained in the village across the river, helpless with cold and hunger. Many of the refugees from Moscow stayed there too, unwilling, in spite of all warnings, to part from the carts which contained their little all, and their last bite of food. The sorrow of such scenes no pen can tell. However, Napoleon was not destined to escape without any interruption from the enemy. On the evening of the 27th, Wittgenstein, supported by Platoff, fell upon Victor's rear-guard, surrounded it and compelled it to surrender. He then proceeded unopposed to Studjanka, where he held Victor and the larger half of his forces firmly in check. Meanwhile Tchitchagoff, who had been informed of the real state of affairs, had sent strong reinforcements northwards along the right bank of the river and was himself following very cautiously. The army had thus to fight its way through once more, except the corps of Eugène, Davoût, and Junot, which had crossed the bridges over the marshy Gaina before the Russians destroyed them and had proceeded to Sembin. At Borissov the two Russian leaders had agreed upon concerted action, and on the 28th the fighting began on both banks of the river, in desperate cold. On the one bank, Victor with 7000 men had to withstand a force far in excess of his own, while on the other bank, the onset of 26,000 Russians had to be met by 10,000 French at most. But

[1] Accounts vary greatly, the numbers ranging from 22,000 (Ségur) to 50,000 (Fézensac). The latter figure is certainly wrong. Napoleon had no further lists prepared. Clausewitz, in a letter of November 30th to Stein, mentions about 40,000. The most accurate estimate is probably Chambray's, who, on the morning of the 26th, estimated the total at 26,700 infantry and 4000 cavalry. Cp. Osten-Sacken, "Der Feldzug von 1812," p. 339.

these sorely tried troops were equal to their task. On the right bank of the river the advance columns gave way at first before the onset of the Russian Chasseurs; even the Young Guard retired towards the river, but Ney, stepping into the place of the wounded Oudinot, roused his men to fresh efforts, and by a splendid cavalry charge routed the enemy and captured over a thousand prisoners. The fighting continued till far on in the night without the Russians gaining any substantial advantage and without the Old Guard—now barely 4000 strong—being engaged.[1] Meanwhile, supported by the artillery on the opposite bank, Victor held his own against Wittgenstein's spiritless attack till the evening, when, under cover of darkness, he crossed the river with the remainder of his troops, having previously sent over a large number of non-combatants. But he was no longer able to cover the passage of all the stragglers and fugitives. On the very morning of the battle, when the Russian cannon began to boom, thousands of these hapless creatures rushed panic-stricken on to the bridges and immediately there arose a scene of terrible and inextricable confusion. Carts and ammunition wagons blocked the way; horses, taking fright,

[1] Whether Tchitchagoff, who had already issued a warrant of arrest against Napoleon, should be taxed with deliberate negligence is still a disputed point. The Russian generals were no heroes, and certainly the French troops with their stragglers looked in the distance like an army of from 60,000 to 70,000 men. Tchitchagoff did not possess more than half that number. Depressed by the defeat of his vanguard at Borissov, aware that Wittgenstein was not yet near and that Kutusoff was at a distance, it is quite conceivable, though not very creditable, that instead of hastening to the place where the French had forded the river, Tchitchagoff halted at Borissov, as Jomini relates, in order to let reinforcements come up and cross by a quickly built bridge of boats. For similar prudential reasons, Wittgenstein advanced much more slowly than was compatible with complete success. He afterwards sought to justify his conduct by declaring the direct route impassable. But this is contradicted by the reports of his lieutenant-generals (*vide* Krahmer, "Beiheft zum Militärwochenblatt," 1894, p. 241). One of the latter, Count Berg, who had been refused permission for a bayonet charge on the 28th, declares Tchitchagoff's dilatoriness was due to his dread of Napoleon "whom he feared like the lion which other animals dread to approach" ("Histor. Zeitchrift," 62, 192).

grew unmanageable and trampled the sick and wounded under their hoofs; desperate human beings fought with the energy of despair for a brief respite from death; and over all dropped the cannon balls of the enemy. Many, in the hand-to-hand fight on the bridge, fell into the river; many more voluntarily plunged into its icy waters or trusted themselves to the drifting floes; others again were forced into the river by the surging crowd behind them. Few escaped. If such horrors could be surpassed, it was on the following morning when the last of the regular troops hewed their way at the bayonet's point across the bridge and then set fire to it. With a yell of horror the men, women, and children left behind rushed on to the burning bridge till its beams gave way under the load and all were engulfed. Even then, 5000 of these stragglers fell into the hands of the Russians. Tchitchagoff himself relates that after Napoleon's retreat he found the peasants' cottages at Studjanka crowded with corpses, and the place where the river had been crossed covered with the dead, stiffened by frost into every variety of attitude, while visible above the surface of the river were ghastly groups of drowned soldiers, women and children, with here and there, like some statue, a mounted dragoon, rigid in death, man and horse ice-bound in the frozen river. Upwards of 24,000 dead bodies found on the river banks and on the battle-field were collected and burned by order of the Governor of Minsk; and ten years afterwards, along the Beresina, there could still be seen the islets and mounds formed of the victims of that awful day, overgrown with sweet forget-me-nots, as if in solemn remembrance of the most ghastly tragedy of the century.

After that costly but magnificent passage-at-arms on November 28th, by which he completely foiled the enemy's plans, like the last flutter of a dying organism, Napoleon's military force collapsed utterly. His army was gone; he had only a few followers left, and, under stress of the merciless cold, even they had disarmed. Maddened by hunger and ill with typhus, they struggled along past Sembin and Molodetchno and on towards Vilna. On December 3rd, when the thermometer stood at 16 degrees below zero, only 9000

men still kept their weapons, and even they gave in when on the 6th the cold increased to 24 degrees, and on the 8th actually marked 30 degrees. Each night hundreds perished. The day after the battle on the Beresina, Napoleon saw clearly that nothing more could be done with these troops. "In such a state of matters," he wrote to Maret at Vilna, "it is possible I may consider my presence in Paris necessary for the Empire and even for the army," which meant that he had made up his mind to go; and with good reason. Even before he reached Smolensk news had arrived from Paris that caused him no little anxiety. The Republican general Malet, who had been involved in a conspiracy against the Emperor in 1808, and had since then been kept under surveillance in a Paris *Maison de santé*, had formed a plot with a couple of Royalist confederates to announce that Napoleon was dead and to forge a Senatus Consultum conferring upon himself the command of the town. A provisional Government of moderate Republicans and Constitutionalists was to be appointed under the leadership of Moreau and Carnot. With this as their basis, the conspirators hoped to win over the Municipal Guard, those of the National Guards who were in garrison at Paris, seize the Municipal authorities, and overthrow the Empire. For two weeks past there had been no news from the Emperor. At the outset the people had viewed the Russian expedition with approval as a final and decisive step to secure a permanent peace; but the persistent advance into the heart of the enemy's country had alarmed and disappointed them, and the burning of Moscow had finally dispelled all their illusions. Henceforth they saw that they must be prepared for new and endless wars. Malet was reckoning on all this when he set to work early on the morning of October 23rd. A regiment of the National Guards, the veteran Municipal Guards, and two generals whom he fetched from prison (one of whom had formerly been chief of Moreau's staff) accepted his statements as *bona fide* and obeyed him. They helped him to apprehend Savary, the Minister of Police. The Prefect of the Seine was so convinced of the genuineness of the matter that he actually had

one of the halls in the Hotel de Ville made ready for the sittings of the Provisional Government. At the Commandant's house, however, thanks to the presence of mind of two officers, Malet was arrested, put under confinement, and the troops stationed outside were informed that the Emperor was alive. "*Vive l'Empereur!*" rang forth at once, and the bubble burst. Malet and his deluded confederates were soon afterwards shot in accordance with the laws of war.

Such was the news that greeted Napoleon on the march. What struck him most—and what is significant for history—was the fact that all were so easily persuaded of his death, that no one thought of the dynasty, that every one seemed to look upon a change of government as a matter of course. "Dear me," he exclaimed, surprised and chagrined, "my wife, my son, the institutions of the Empire, were never thought of!" If such a plot could meet with such a measure of success when the army was known to be far away, what might not happen when once people knew it no longer existed? Nor could its fate be concealed. Moreover, since Smolensk no couriers had reached him, another disquieting fact. At all costs he was resolved to be in Paris when the news arrived of the failure of the expedition, and of the loss of the hundreds of thousands of lives entrusted to him, so as to counteract the impression by the overpowering force of his own personality. At the Beresina he had done his duty as a general, and now that the army was breaking up, the one thing left for a leader to do was to procure help; and that could only be done from a distance. The attitude of the Germans was a further source of anxiety, and so, as soon as the column had reached the Vilna road at Molodetchno, he meant to leave it and hasten home.

On December 5th the army reached Smorgoni, the rearguard having been constantly engaged with the pursuing Russians who took prisoner thousands of unarmed soldiers. On the same day the Emperor assembled his marshals and communicated his decision to them; Murat was to lead the army beyond the Niemen; at Vilna they would find fresh troops and a Bavarian division under Wrede; for the rest of

the army and for France, his presence in Paris was indispensable. Only from there could he keep a tight rein on Prussia and on Austria; they would think twice before declaring war against him, once they found him at the head of the French nation and of a new army. He had previously made Eugène read aloud his last bulletin, dated December 3rd, from Molodetchno, in which he gave certain indications of the destruction which had overtaken the Grand Army. It was not a straightforward narrative of the facts, however; the whole truth was not to be read there. It almost sounds like an impious trifling with misfortune to say, as he therein does, "Men not sufficiently hardened by nature to rise superior to the vicissitudes of fate, lost their cheerfulness and good humour and thought of nothing but misfortune and defeat; those again whom nature made superior to such things, retained their cheerfulness and their fortitude and saw new glory in the difficulties they had to overcome". He did not explain in his bulletin how it was that hundreds of thousands had perished. The terrible Russian winter was blamed for everything. Before December 6th his army was proud, magnificent, and victorious; after that the dreadful climate of the North wasted and consumed it. That he, and he alone, had been the sole cause of this calamity the Imperial Author never betrayed by a word. No mention was made of the ruinous haste of the advance on Moscow during the very height of the Russian summer which had cost the army more lives than the winter. No explanation was given as to why he had obstinately remained in the burnt-out capital. But there was one thing of supreme importance for people to know—that he was alive and well. "His Majesty's health has never been better," ran the concluding words of the bulletin. He then said good-bye to his generals and drove off that night with Duroc, Mouton, Lefebvre and Caulaincourt, passing himself off as the latter's secretary, Rayneval.[1] On

[1] Napoleon at this crisis has been blamed for deserting his army, an accusation even more unjust than when he left the Egyptian expedition. He was Emperor and could command his army or not as he thought good, and consequently could resign his command when he wanted. He was

the 6th, he met Maret at Vilna, on the 10th, the French plenipotentiary de Pradt in a suburb of Warsaw, on the 14th, the King of Saxony at Dresden, where, seven months before, in the full tide of his glory, he had received the homage of half the world. He reached the French frontiers without being recognized, and at midnight on December 18th, he arrived in Paris. His bulletin had preceded him by one day.

The journey home was not free from danger. The daring partisan leader Sesslavin and his Cossacks had already overtaken the French army, and the little group of travellers only succeeded in escaping him by passing his camp-fires by night regardless of the intense cold. In one night alone, half of the hundred Polish Hussars forming the escort lost their horses and perished. Twice, in spite of his disguise, attempts were made on the Emperor's life. The first time at Osmiani, on Russian soil, where he met Loison's composite division, one of the officers in which, a French major, had suggested to some German brothers-in-arms that they should make Napoleon share the fate of Wallenstein. The second attempt was at Glogau. But in neither case did the plot prosper; and so Napoleon escaped. His star was already on the wane, but it was destined once more to plunge Europe into war and bloodshed before it sank for ever in the vast solitudes of the Atlantic.

better able to succour his shattered army by hurrying on before it to Paris than by remaining behind. The closing passage of the bulletin (No. 29) has sometimes been condemned as cynical, but it was called forth by some remarks in the letters of his confidential correspondent, the State Councillor Fiéveé who, at the time of the Malet fiasco, complained that the bulletins never said whether the Emperor was alive, "which after all is the first thing we want to know". In a previous letter, on October 23rd, he had said: "The Emperor's presence in Paris, provided he could leave without endangering the army, would do a great deal of good". Napoleon placed exceptional confidence in this adviser.

CHAPTER XVII.

LEIPZIG.

What a bitter awakening for Napoleon from the dream of unlimited power which had lured him on to Moscow! His prestige, won in a long series of astounding achievements, had been shattered beyond repair, for although he had not been defeated in the last campaign, yet—no matter what the cause, starvation, cold, or certain destruction—he had been forced to flee; and the impression produced by that unprecedented event was ineffaceable. A mere remnant was all that was left of the Grand Army, the finest elements of which were the veterans who had conquered at Austerlitz and Friedland. And we know what the army meant to Napoleon—"his nation"—as he once strikingly remarked to Jaucourt (Talleyrand's friend). Nevertheless he still had an army, but in size it was not to be compared to the one he had lost, and moreover it was in the field against the British and the Spaniards. He had allies, too, but they were allies made during his days of prosperity and power, and it was very doubtful if they would remain staunch now that he was shorn of his strength.

It is perhaps well here to recapitulate the aims which the Emperor had in view in his Russian expedition. He was not merely seeking to extend his continental power over Russia, but to close the entire Continent of Europe against Britain, so that, struck in her vital interests, the latter Power would be compelled to sue for peace, to withdraw her troops from Spain, and open the seas to the world-wide policy of the conqueror. And Napoleon might possibly have succeeded, had he adhered to his original plan of halting at Smolensk and liberating Lithuania. This would have enabled him to

concentrate his army, bring up reinforcements, and establish a well-organized commissariat; then, with an imposing show of strength, he could have taken up a position threatening both Russian capitals, a circumstance which would not have been without effect on international politics. For in June, 1812, just as Napoleon crossed the Niemen, the United States declared war against Britain, no small help to Napoleon in his struggle with that Power. For two years past he had been labouring to bring this about. He had offered to exempt the United States from the Berlin and the Milan decrees, provided they would renounce their intercourse with Britain and her colonies, and obtain in London the repeal of the Orders in Council of 1807. He was well aware that Britain would not consent to this, at least not in its essential conditions. She not only refused but showed a thoroughly hostile spirit, searched all American ships for British sailors to press them into her Navy, and stirred up ill-feeling in North America against the Washington Government. This led in 1812 to open war, and for the first time, Britain suffered defeat at sea. This fresh complication, added to the continual increase in the National Debt and to Napoleon's threatening attitude in Russia, might well have induced Britain to favour the idea of a general peace, especially as the year had not brought any great success to the British troops in Spain. For although a victory at Salamanca had secured for Wellington the chief command of the combined anti-French forces and had freed Cadiz from the siege, the blunders and egotism of the Spaniards finally compelled Wellington to retreat on the Portuguese frontier. But when news after news reached London from Russia, telling of the rapidly diminishing hosts of the Grand Army, of the fruitless butchery at Borodino, of the burning of Moscow and the unspeakable horrors of the retreat, all thoughts of peace or of compromise with Napoleon were definitely abandoned. The war party in Parliament reigned supreme. During the summer Britain had formed a peaceful compact with Russia, and through her influence a treaty was signed between the Czar and the Spanish Regency (July 18th and 20th, 1812).

Thus while the fate of the Russian campaign was still undecided, a coalition already existed, directed not so much against France, as against the preponderance for which Napoleon was fighting and which was represented in his ambitious personality. Things in Europe had now reached a crucial stage, and much depended on whether the nations within the charmed circle of Napoleon's power should decide, in view of the great losses they had suffered, to join in the general movement against the oppressor, either with or without the approval of their Governments.

Napoleon does not seem to have at once realized the full significance of the events in Russia. After leaving the army, he still expected it would rally and find rest and rations at Vilna, that the division advancing to meet it would provide the needful support, and that Murat, with Macdonald and the Prussians on one side, and Schwarzenberg and Reynier on the other, would be able to maintain his position behind the Niemen. When he passed through Warsaw, he assured the local Diet that he had still 120,000 troops. To renounce his predominant position in Europe never entered his mind, not even when at last he learned that the remnants of the Grand Army had been unable to maintain their position at Vilna, and that, after involving the fresh troops sent them in the common confusion, they had all to be brought back across the Niemen to Königsberg with sufferings untold and hourly losses. The Old Guard now numbered barely 500, the Guards cavalry 600, most of them without horses, the rest of the army was a chaotic mass of some 40,000 troops, among them several thousand officers and subalterns, less than half of whom proved subsequently fit for service. Five hundred thousand men had been lost; of these, nearly 100,000 had been taken prisoner, several thousands were in hospital, all the others had died.[1] But the greatness of the

[1] In March the Russian generals told the Austrian Ambassador that in the Governments of Minsk, Smolensk, and Moscow the dead bodies of 142,000 French troops had been burned, and in the neighbourhood of Vilna 46,570 had been burned (Lebzeltern's report of March 10th, Luckwaldt's "Osterreich und die Anfänge des Befreiungskrieges," p. 146).

misfortune was far from causing Napoleon to lose heart. He had still the two wings, numbering 66,000, reinforcements about 20,000 strong, which had not yet reached the Russian frontiers, also the garrisons of the Eastern fortresses, and finally, in the survivors of the Grand Army he had invaluable material for constructing a new force. Early in spring he intended to take the field against the Russians. On his arrival in Paris, preparations on a vast scale were immediately begun for new armaments, the plans for which he had probably thought out carefully during the retreat. A few weeks later he bluntly reminded one of the German diplomatists that "the lion was not so nearly dead that they might venture to kick him".

The important thing was that his rule in France was still secure and that the nation did not refuse him dutiful obedience. The public authorities and the various corporations (who had received private hints) came forward again with assurances of devoted homage and unshakable fidelity. In his replies to these addresses the Emperor took note of the Malet conspiracy and of the attitude of the Government. "Timid and cowardly soldiers," said he to the deputation from the Senate, "may cost their country its independence, but faint-hearted officials destroy the majesty of the laws, the rights of the throne, and the social order. To die like a soldier on the field of honour is a glorious death; but that of a magistrate falling in defence of monarch, throne, and laws, is more glorious still." In his reply to the address of the Council of State he inveighed against those who championed the doctrines of the "Rights of man," and accused them of being the cause of the lack of stability in the institutions of the State. "Who," he asked, "proclaimed the principle of

On December 21st, Lefebvre wrote Berthier that "of the 500 left of the Old Guard not one could shoot owing to the terrible cold. All the others (about 800) are frost-bitten and their limbs so ulcerated in consequence that they will all perish if help is not forthcoming at once. To-day 200 of the worst cases have been taken on stretchers to Danzig to have their toes and fingers amputated without delay" (Rousset, "La Grande Armée de 1813," p. 60).

revolt as a duty? Who flattered the people by ascribing to them a sovereignty they were incapable of exercising? Who disturbed the respect and the sanctity of the laws and made them dependent, not upon the sacred principles of justice, on the nature of things and on civil rights, but only on the will of an assemblage of men utterly destitute of any knowledge of civil and penal law, of administrative functions, of military and political law? If a State has to be regenerated it is by following principles diametrically opposed to these. It is in history which portrays the heart of man, that we must study the merits and defects of the various forms of legislation." In these diatribes Napoleon was aiming at producing a clear impression in the people's minds that he was the man who in former days had rescued the State from the anarchy into which it had been thrown by such doctrines, and that this spirit having again manifested itself, the country was in danger of relapsing into confusion if she now left her Emperor in the lurch instead of supporting him with all her might, as also the heir to his throne and the principles on which it was founded. It was essential for him that this view of the case should meet with general acceptance, if he were to succeed in reconquering his old position by means of a new army.

On his return from Russia, all the recruiting material available was the conscription of 1813, about 140,000 men, the majority of whom had already entered the depots in December. Within a few months they would have received sufficient drill for active service. Of trained soldiers there were only four regiments of marine artillery, 3000 mounted gensdarmes and two battalions of the Paris Municipal Guards. But the Emperor was intent on new struggles and new conquests, and for such purposes these forces were utterly inadequate. There were also the cohorts of the National Guard, 80,000 strong, but they were not available for service abroad, and they were commanded by officers who were mostly invalided, pensioned or discharged, a state of affairs the Emperor intended to remedy. The first thing to be done was to get the Senate to pass a decree that the co-

horts, like the line regiments, were liable for service abroad; the next, to have all the available generals, staff-officers, colonels and subalterns sent on from the Grand Army. In both points the Emperor succeeded. Individual applications (all pre-arranged) were sent in from the National Guards themselves, requesting the privilege of being allowed to serve against the enemy, with the result that on January 11th, 1813, the Senate passed the desired decree. This opened up the prospect of an additional 250,000 troops, i.e. 100,000 troops from the last four classes of those hitherto not available owing to the age limit (now reduced to 18), and 150,000 from the conscription of 1814, which the Emperor did not intend to call up until spring. Such was the material for the new army, and, if a few fairly large detachments were withdrawn from the corps in Spain, a formidable host could once more take the field. Yet Napoleon was not satisfied, and in April he asked the Senate for another 180,000 men, so that—making allowance for desertion, inefficiency, and sickness—he would have nearly 600,000 troops ready for the campaign of 1813. The scarcity of horses he hoped to make good by purchases in France, Hanover, Brunswick, Holstein, and even Mecklenburg. Furthermore, corporations and wealthy individuals received hints privately that they would greatly commend themselves to the Emperor by voluntarily placing at his disposal a fully equipped mounted soldier. The prefects were enjoined to select young members of the gentry and of wealthy families for this "voluntary" service. Napoleon aimed in this wise at taxing the moneyed classes and at the same time attaching them to his interests by entrusting him with the fortunes of their sons. These *gardes d'honneur*, numbering about 10,000, were to receive the rank of lieutenant after one year's service, and to be available as a *garde du corps*, an idea Napoleon had long cherished, but hitherto, out of consideration for the Imperial Guard, had not ventured to carry out.[1]

[1] Mollien ("Mémoires," III. 246) relates that the Emperor's idea was not carried out by the prefects in the sense he intended, and that the compulsory nature of the proceeding made him numerous and embittered enemies. Pasquier ("Mémoires," II. 59, and 89) states: "No measure

In January, 1813, Napoleon displayed the some tireless energy as of yore, the same wide and accurate knowledge of the materials suited to his purpose, supplemented and directed by his marvellous memory. For he had no longer carefully prepared lists of troops to aid him. Now, single-handed, under circumstances that would have clouded the mind and disturbed the peace of any other man, surrounded by servants who could only help him in a very subordinate capacity, he toiled with indefatigable zeal to reconstruct the fabric of his power. Alas, that such a great administrative genius which aforetime had restored order and strength to the State, should now be wholly engrossed in exhausting its energies!

For this new sacrifice Napoleon was not satisfied to have merely the Senate's sanction; he wished to have the people's approval, or at least to conquer their reluctance, which was not an easy task. There was no lack of rebels and deserters. Public opinion, both in the capital and in the departments, was hostile. The Emperor was greeted with insulting epithets as he rode through the suburb of St. Antoine. Word came from Provence of fresh disturbances and from the western departments of Royalist agitations, while in Belgium the conscriptions met with open resistance. But in the long run French patriotism came to his aid. It was not only the Emperor, but France too, whose commanding position in foreign affairs and decisive pre-eminence among the nations of Europe had been forfeited by the disaster of the previous year. However much the nation might lament this incessant warfare and all it entailed, they did not want a weak France, and already the consequences of their loss of power were making themselves plainly felt.

First of all in Prussia, who had only been constrained by the menace of superior numbers to range herself on the side of the oppressor. There the people looked upon the ruin of the Grand Army, in which their own soldiers had served, as

created such irreconcilable enemies to Napoleon as this did, nor raised such an ardent desire for his fall".

a sort of divine judgment and an encouragement to throw off the yoke of a humiliating alliance. As sang one of their poets,

"Mit Man und Ross und Wagen,
So hat sie Gott geschlagen."[1]

The excesses committed by the troops of the Grand Army on their passage through the country had roused the people's indignation and revealed an unquenchable hatred which clamoured for satisfaction. Such, too, were the sentiments animating the Prussian corps which had been compelled to serve the national enemy. They had certainly behaved well at Riga. But later on Palucci, the Russian commander of the fortress, authorized by the Czar, sought to win over General von Yorck (then in command as Grawert was ill) and showed him a letter in which Alexander solemnly promised not to lay down arms till Prussia had been restored to the position she held in 1806. Then came the certain news of the destruction of the Grand Army, and so on December 20th, 1812, during Macdonald's march south, when the Prussian detachment found itself confronted by a Russian division under Diebitsch who confirmed the Czar's promise, Yorck signed an agreement at Tauroggen declaring his corps a neutral force and binding it not to fight against Russia for two months, even although the King should repudiate the treaty and order the troops to rejoin the French army. It was a momentous fact that a man of such staunch fidelity and conservative opinions as Yorck, who cordially detested reformers like Scharnhorst and Stein, should be compelled to yield to the pressure of public opinion. "With the King or without him," Blücher and Bülow had wanted to act in concert with Austria in 1809; and now, Yorck's troops refused to fight against the Russians, whether the King gave his sanction or not. It seemed as if national sentiment would prevail even against the monarchy. On the rest of Germany the deed of Tauroggen exercised a wonderfully exhilarating influence. "Those whose memory carries them

[1] God hath smitten them,
Man and horse and chariot.

back to that time," writes Ranke, "will remember how the news of it came like a flash of lightning out of the far distance, illuminating the horizon and transforming it. While still under the French yoke, the throbbing pulse of a national consciousness could everywhere be felt."[1]

Upon Napoleon the impression which this news produced was deep and lasting. The lesson of the vital power of nationality, which Russia had taught him and which Spain was hourly teaching him, had at length opened his eyes, so that he no longer deceived himself as to the moral significance of this incident. But it had also a strategic significance and it was this aspect of it which proved immediately disastrous to him. For now, after the defection of the allies' corps, it was impossible for his shattered troops and their reinforcements to remain longer at Königsberg, where the inhabitants were openly showing their hostility; and, moreover, the Russians were approaching.[2] Murat, like Napoleon, had not expected the Russians to continue their offensive movements beyond the Niemen. Now, however, when Wittgenstein, Tchitchagoff, and Platoff with his Cossacks advanced westwards, when Macdonald's troops began to fall into confusion, and the Prussians under Bülow withdrew their co-operation, Murat decided to throw the whole of Macdonald's corps into Danzig and to withdraw with the remainder of the army to Posen where, on January 17th, on his own responsibility, he handed over the supreme command to Eugène and left for home. Before news of this had reached him Napoleon had already made use of the Tauroggen Convention in Paris. On January 9th he wrote Berthier: "As soon as I learned of Yorck's treason I resolved to make a statement to the nation, to be issued to-morrow, and to organize extraordinary levies". The reply to this was the Senatus Consultum of January 11th, which did not meet with any serious opposition. Maret could therefore assure the Ambassadors at all the foreign Courts that it was the intention of the French nation to arm,

[1] "Sämtliche Werke," 48, 256.

[2] *Vide* the account of the revolt of the Prussian recruits on January 3rd in Max Schulze's "Königsberg und Ostpreuszen, Anfang 1813," p. 39.

not merely in proportion to its losses, but so as to secure its prestige, its glory, and its peace, against all contingencies. The Emperor assured Krusemarck, the Prussian Ambassador in Paris, that Frenchmen would follow him unreservedly, and that if need be, he would arm the women too. But even though the people were willing to pay this new blood-tax without resistance, it was still necessary that the prestige and renown of the leader should not be dimmed. For this purpose, therefore, whenever possible, statements were made to the effect that the Emperor had everywhere defeated the Russians, and that it was only the cruel cold that had destroyed the army, which had not been ruined until it passed under Murat's leadership. In a conversation in February, 1813, with one of his higher officials, Count Molé, the Emperor clearly shows how he wished to be judged. On this occasion he said: "The King of Naples is incapable of acting as commander-in-chief; he has lost the army which I handed over to him. When I left for France I had one and now I have none. After my departure the King lost his head; he did not know how to enforce obedience; insubordination got beyond all control; in Vilna the troops plundered to the value of 12,000,000 francs and the soldiers were no longer of any use."[1]

Yet another means of conquering the nation's dislike of these new armaments was the settlement of the dispute with the Pope. Napoleon hoped by this means to win back the millions of devout Catholics who had been alienated by his harsh treatment of the aged Pontiff, and many of whom

[1] Napoleon continued: "I myself required long practice in self-control in order not to be dismayed by such a spectacle. The evening before, I was the Conqueror of the world, Commander of the finest army of modern times; the next day it no longer existed." Molé remarks that "when he uttered these words the Emperor's face and eyes betrayed the only sign of emotion I ever witnessed in him" ("Révue de la Révolution Française," x. 131, 1887). *Vide* also Mollien ("Mémoires," III. 169) who related that whereas when he returned victorious, the Emperor was gloomy and taciturn, he was now cheerful and placid, inquired particularly for Madame Mollien who was ill, and then talked of affairs in a calm and matter-of-fact way.

regarded the destruction of the army as a judgment, believing that Providence withheld his favour from a leader who was under the ban. At Savona in 1811, as we have already seen, the Pope had accepted the decree passed by the National Council regarding the investiture of newly appointed Bishops; but he had done so only under certain reservations. He had not recognized the Council and he had granted the privilege of confirmation to the Metropolitans, in the event of the Papal sanction not being forthcoming, solely on condition that they performed the rite in the name of the Head of the Church, whereas Napoleon desired that the new Bishops should be invested in the name of the Imperator. To this Pius, who was already repenting his action, refused his consent, whereupon Napoleon ordered him to be removed from Savona and brought to Fontainebleau. Here the Emperor conducted the negotiations in person, with the assistance of a few submissive prelates, deploying the whole range of his diplomatic arts and graces to captivate his prisoner. Sometimes he advanced claims without serious intent, solely for the purpose of withdrawing them in favour of others much more important. Among his demands were that two-thirds of the Cardinals be appointed by Catholic Princes and that every Pope, before assuming his Holy Office, should solemnly promise to do nothing contrary to the four Gallican Articles. The Coronation of the Empress and of the King of Rome was also discussed. On one occasion the Emperor taunted the Holy Father with his ignorance of ecclesiastical affairs, and catching hold of a button of his soutane, in the heat of the argument, he shook him, which gossip afterwards distorted into maltreating the Pope. On another occasion he sought to dazzle his prisoner by a glowing picture of the extension of power which the Church might acquire through his aid; the restoration of Germany to the Catholic fold was one of the inducements held out—provided, of course, Pius would comply with his wishes, renounce his temporal supremacy, accept without cavil the decree of the Council, and take up his residence in Paris. On this last point the Pope was immovable. He chose Avignon—which was certainly not

named in the agreement signed, where it merely stated that, "His Holiness will exercise his Papal power in France and in the Kingdom of Italy in the same manner and form as his predecessors". Napoleon yielded this point and did not even insist upon an explicit statement as to the renunciation of the inheritance of St. Peter, for that followed as a matter of course from the contents of the Treaty. On January 25th, 1813, the new Concordat was signed. It was really only a preliminary agreement intended to serve as the basis of a final settlement. In Article IV the decree of the Council regarding the investiture of Bishops was included word for word, and the Pope was granted the right of appointing ten French or Italian Bishops and the six Roman Bishops. As compensation for his lost territories, the Pope was to receive an annual revenue of 10,000,000 francs; the Emperor pardoned the refractory prelates.[1] Napoleon had certainly not gained all he wished; he had coveted a position as head of the Church somewhat similar to that held by the Czar in Russia, but greater, universal in its extent and unlimited in its scope, as the name of the Church implied. But the immediate advantage he aimed at, he had gained. He had made peace with the Pope, and that fact the world could not learn too soon. Newspaper articles and church bells proclaimed it far and wide and Te Deum Laudamus was sung everywhere. Two months later, tormented by misgivings and remorse, and enlightened by his old advisers, who were again allowed access to him, as to Napoleon's political situation, Pius retracted his consent. Nevertheless the reconciliation at Fontainebleau had done its work and the armaments were nearly finished.

Besides the faithful, the Emperor had also to conciliate those who set more value on temporal things than on spiritual, and that was now very difficult. For as we have seen, he had undertaken the Russian campaign in the expectation that like the wars of 1805, 1807, and 1809, it would bring him in substantial gains and restore order to his

[1] For the text *vide* "Corresp.," xxiv. 19,511, also Champeaux, "Le droit civil ecclésiastique français," p. 454.

finances; and the disappointment had been correspondingly severe.[1] To make matters worse during the retreat the war-chest with 10,000,000 francs in gold fell into the hands of the enemy. The new armaments involved exceptional and heavy expenditure. In 1813, a deficit of nearly 150,000,000 francs was expected, and the deficit on the two previous years, amounting to over 80,000,000, had not yet been met. Mollien, the Minister of the Treasury, a very upright man, who had followed the Emperor's policy with unconcealed anxiety, advised him to increase the direct taxes. But Napoleon again put aside this suggestion. He disliked the idea of touching the private property of the individual and thereby provoking dissatisfaction. A war tax and a one-fifth reduction of all official salaries proved of small help. The sources of credit, for palpable reasons, were not available to a defeated Conqueror; the greater part of the Church lands in Italy and the Rhine territories were already sold, but he had thought of something else. He intended to turn the Communal property to account. Several thousand parishes possessed land and properties valued at 370,000,000 francs, which were not used for any public purpose but were leased. The revenue from these leases was small, only about 9,000,000 francs. Nine million francs represented, however, the interest on 135,000,000 of 5 per cent *rentes*, then selling at seventy-five. If the parishes were guaranteed their 9,000,000 of yearly income by entering them for 140,000,000 in the Great Book of the Public Debt, then, by selling the lands on behalf of the State, the 230,000,000 required would be obtained and the deficit covered. The "Caisse d'amortissement" (sinking fund) was to effect the sale and also, in the interim, to issue redeemable bonds at 5 per cent with which the Minister was to pay the Government creditors, contractors and others,

[1] At Vitebsk he told his Minister of Finances, who was pointing out a deficit of 40,000,000 francs on the first six months, that he had demanded a contribution of 2,000,000 roubles from Courland, had confiscated 1,000,000 in the Treasury, and had seized as booty salted provisions worth from 15,000,000 to 20,000,000 francs which could be disposed of in Courland ("Corr.," xxiv. 19,082; Mollien, iii. 154).

which was quite feasible owing to the security of the interest. Napoleon himself bought 71,000,000 francs worth of these bonds out of his Tuileries Treasury, in order to raise their value. Mollien long stood out against this arbitrary measure, which not only robbed the parishes of their property but also for all future time limited their revenues to the above trivial sum, whereas by natural processes their expenses would go on increasing and could not be met save by increased assessments which would fall directly on the individual. Hence, it was only in appearance that the individual and his property seemed for the moment to be spared by the State in its new exertions. But for Napoleon the moment was all-important. The erstwhile restorer of the national order and prosperity is scarcely recognizable in this daring opportunist. Again, as in the past summer, he was straining forward relentlessly to grasp the decisive victory which was to lay all Europe at his feet. Then, but not until then, he would restore order and prosperity.

When the new financial law had been discussed in Council, it was then passed on, in accordance with the Constitution, to the Legislative Body. Before the Russian campaign this concession had ceased to be observed; the financial law for 1812 had been passed without the deputies of the legislature being consulted. Indeed Napoleon seems to have been firmly resolved on dispensing with the Legislative Body after his Russian victories. He told Metternich at Dresden that he had muzzled and discredited it, and all he needed to do now was to lock the Legislative Chamber and put the key in his pocket. He had a new programme in view. "France," he said, "is less suited for popular representation than many other countries. In the Tribunate the Revolution was still active. I established order by abolishing that body. I do not wish absolute power, however, but I want more than mere empty forms. I want what will effectively serve the interests of order and the public weal. I shall re-organize the Senate and the Council of State. The former will become the Upper House, while the latter will replace the Chamber of Deputies. I shall continue to appoint all the Senators;

one-third of the State Councillors will still be appointed by election and by the triple lists; the remaining two-thirds I shall nominate myself. These will then prepare the budget and discuss the bills. Thus I shall have a real representation of the people, for it will consist entirely of experienced men of affairs; no babbling '*idéologues*,' no more tinsel. France will then be well governed even under an incompetent ruler—and such are bound to come—and the usual way of educating Princes will be quite sufficient." This speech was purposely intended to tell Metternich clearly, and the rest of the world as well, that the Empire which he had founded did not depend upon a single life, and that he would take very good care that it remained unshaken, even under those Emperors of his dynasty whose intellect and activity were inferior to his own. So far so good. The fact that he expected to secure the welfare of the nation solely by means of the bureaucrats shows the limitations of his own mind; for he failed to grasp the great truth that it is only by the co-operation of theory with practice, by thought correcting action, and vice versa, that a healthy political life can develop. By relying exclusively on the practical factors of Government he fell into an extreme quite as profitless as that of the radical doctrinaires who preceded him in the Government of France. Yet what he looked upon as the basis of a modern State and spread abroad in the world by means of his armies, his officials, and his Civil Codes, was nothing else than the dream of those "*idéologues*" whom he so bitterly hated; and no matter how contemptuously he judged them, but for them and the fruits of their thinking, his name might never have reached posterity.

But these plans, formed when the Emperor was at the zenith of his glory, were rendered impracticable by the march of events. Now he was no longer contemplating any alteration in the Constitution. He did not lock up the Council hall of the Legislative Body; instead of that, on February 14th, 1813, he opened their sittings with a speech which he wished to be regarded and to be circulated as a statement to the nation. This last remnant of popular representation,

he now found quite a welcome means of mutual understanding. He referred his hearers to the Minister of the Interior for evidence that French trade and commerce had never been in such a flourishing condition as at the present time. The Minister of Finance would submit measures for coping with their heavy liabilities without imposing fresh burdens on "his peoples". He then proceeded to depict the course of the Russian war in the familiar colours, and here for the first time mention is made of the "severe winter setting in *prematurely*" which for long years continued to form an integral part of the Napoleonic legend. He also alluded to his peace with the Pope, and to the English who had again been obliged to evacuate Spain, where "the French dynasty" reigned, and would continue to reign. He expressed himself as satisfied with the conduct of his allies; he would abandon none of them and would maintain the integrity of their Governments—which was tantamount to declaring that he meant to hold fast to Poland, the Confederation of the Rhine, Italy, and in short, the whole sphere of power that was his in the previous year. Again he protested he never would consent to anything but an honourable peace; to do otherwise would be "to imperil everything, even the prosperity of our children."[1] His policy, therefore, was to remain unchanged, just as if there had been no disastrous war to diminish his resources and deprive him of over 400,000 tried troops. But the world had grown accustomed to expect the

[1] These exposés were one of the means by which the Emperor sought to popularize the Imperial Government. They were always highly coloured statements, and never more so than now when he had returned a fugitive, and without an army. In this exposé he declared the area of soil under cultivation throughout the Empire had increased by one tenth, that its value amounted to five milliard francs, that the increase in value arising from the working of raw materials amounted to 1,300,000,000, that the balance of trade showed assets of 166,000,000 against 75,000,000 in 1789, and that the new beetroot sugar industry amounted to 90,000,000. It is difficult now to verify these statements. This exposé was reproduced by Montalivet on February 25th, and if his statement—that France had at this time over 1,000,000 soldiers and 100,000 sailors at her disposal—is any criterion of his accuracy, the above figures are greatly exaggerated.

extraordinary from him, and he, on the other hand, had found it quite a sufficient sacrifice to have had to postpone his plans for the mastery of the world. For now that the Continental Blockade could no longer be enforced, Britain was pursuing her maritime commerce unhindered, from the Baltic to the Levant; and the projected invasion of India again receded into the distant and uncertain future. Once more he must fight and conquer—and no ordinary victories would now suffice—to enable him to join the threads where they had been broken off.

Even if Napoleon obtained from France another armament for a new expedition, it remained to be seen if he would still have at his disposal the military forces of all his allies as in the last campaign. On January 18th, 1813, he had written to the Princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, summoning them to raise new contingents. To stimulate their courage he declared that the Russians had fought badly and that only the Cossacks had proved effective fighters, though after a fashion of their own. He further stated that the Grand Army in Germany, including Schwarzenberg's corps, still numbered 200,000 troops (!) and these he would bring up before March, by means of the National Guards, and the new levies in Italy, to such a strength as might have enabled him to dispense with any farther help "from his peoples," but for the defection of Yorck with 20,000 Prussians. The army had been thereby compelled—an army of 200,000 troops—to fall back before the Russians (who had fought so badly) behind the Vistula, and in this way the war had been brought close to Germany. He was ready to defend the frontiers of the Rhine with all his forces, but the Confederate States must also realize the necessity of contributing in corresponding degree.

The answer to this appeal was thoroughly satisfactory, although the interest taken in the armaments diminished in proportion to the distance from France. The Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin was the only one of the Princes of the Rhine who openly deserted Napoleon; the others re-

mained loyal. The most compliant of them all, more so even than the Emperor's brother Jerôme, was the Grand Duke of Frankfort, who immediately began to equip two battalions with the greatest zeal, in order to afford Napoleon "the opportunity of winning fresh fame". Oppressive excise duties supplied the necessary money. The King of Württemberg, whose army corps of 14,000 had dwindled to 173 officers and 143 men, did not hesitate to show his displeasure to the French Ambassador and declared that the charter of the Rhine Confederation was only binding on its members so long as Napoleon was actually in the position of "Protector". But when the military preparations in France cut the ground from under this argument, he hastened to assure the Emperor that as soon as he became acquainted with the twenty-ninth bulletin he instantly set about replacing his contingent. Jerôme, King of Westphalia, again complained to his brother of the financial embarrassments of his State (though he himself had invested 19,000,000 francs in France) but nevertheless on Napoleon's rebuke he complied with his categorical demands to furnish 20,000 troops and to send provisions for 15,000 to Magdeburg. As there was no money on hand requisitions were levied. Bavaria, which had lost no fewer than 28,000 troops, was to provide a complete new army, and this was only possible by levying repeated conscriptions during 1813. At Munich the sacrifices appeared too great, and for a moment the authorities there debated whether they would not remain neutral, but finally, intimidated by Napoleon's gigantic preparations, they promptly granted one division. The remainder of the contingent assembled in a camp near Munich under Wrede, who, smarting from the sorry treatment he had received at Paris from Napoleon and more recently from his marshals, had joined the anti-French party of the Crown Prince Louis. Saxony was even more doubtful than Bavaria what course to pursue, for now that Poland had fallen into the hands of the Czar she saw her own territory threatened by a Russian invasion, and hence she intended to shape her policy in

accordance with the attitude of her own German neighbours, Austria and Prussia.[1] This raised anew the burning questions as to whether the two chief German Powers would maintain the alliance with France or not. In the immediate future everything depended on that.

Before applying to the States in the Confederation of the Rhine, Napoleon had turned to the Courts of Berlin and Vienna to get them to reinforce their contingents. Then came Yorck's defection. Suspicious as ever, Napoleon surmised this might be King Frederick William's answer, but he nevertheless accepted the assurances of the Prussian Ambassador and of Prince Hatzfeld, who was sent to Paris for the special purpose of clearing the King from suspicion. These assurances, however, were not strictly in accordance with facts. At the Prussian Court they had certainly looked upon French victories as alone possible; the idea of the expedition being a failure was never entertained. Yet at Berlin the dislike of the "Russian preponderance" was quite as great as the desire to be rid of the French yoke. The probability was that Russia would now claim the portion of Poland lost by Prussia in 1807. Latterly Hardenberg had been thinking much of Poland; he had even hoped that Napoleon might grant this Kingdom to Frederick William so as to form a strong bulwark against Russia. But all this was based on the supposition of France being victorious and Russia defeated. And now the opposite had come about. Adjutant Ludwig von Wrangel performed a historic service when he convinced his Sovereign of the necessity of providing against this contingency—considered by all so highly improbable—and when, deputed by

[1] For the attitude of the Princes of the Rhine Confederation, especially in South Germany, towards France and Russia, *vide* Luckwaldt, "Osterreich und die Anfänge des Befreiungskrieges von 1813," p. 207. The dread of a Russian supremacy in Europe was quite as intense as the hatred of the French oppression. St. Aignan, the French representative in Saxony, writes of Charles Duke of Weimar that he does not love the Russians, and of the Duchess that she had said though she did not wish to see all Europe lying under foot of Napoleon and he conqueror of Russia, neither did she wish the Russians to become masters of Germany (Fischer, "Goethe und Napoleon," p. 197).

King Frederick William, he went secretly in August, without Hardenberg's knowledge, and delivered a verbal message to the leaders of the Prussian auxiliary corps. In the event of the French being forced to recross the Russian frontiers and being pursued by the Russians, the Prussian corps was to cut itself adrift from the French, withdraw to Graudenz and prevent the entry of both combatants into this fortress.[1] But Macdonald's advance and the risk of sacrificing his artillery prevented Yorck from withdrawing to Graudenz; nevertheless he fulfilled the essential condition; he had maintained the Prussian force in an efficient state for independent action. Russia advocated its remaining neutral, but although this harmonized with the political views of King Frederick William, he was so much under the influence of the French party that it was difficult to secure his co-operation. He was inclined to favour an understanding with Austria, and sent a confidential agent, Knesebeck, to Vienna. However, in the middle of January the Czar sent a proposal that if Prussia separated from France and allied herself with him, he would procure her suitable compensation, probably in Saxony. On the other hand, should King Frederick William adhere to his alliance with Napoleon, the Czar would then feel justified in co-operating in any future dismemberment of Prussia.[2]

This was no mere empty threat. In Alexander's compact with Bernadotte at Abo the annexation of Prussia as far as the Vistula was discussed, the Crown Prince of Sweden agreeing to accept it in lieu of Norway, which had been prom-

[1] *Vide* Thimme, "Konig Friedrick Wilhelm III," his share in the Tauroggen Convention and in the reforms from 1807 to 1812 where the corresponding passage in Wrangel's diary is quoted and its accuracy confirmed by a careful criticism. The statements in the diary receive further corroboration from the fact that in 1838 Wrangel sent in a petition to the Crown Prince recalling the service he had rendered twenty-six years previously, which he could easily verify by referring to the King who was still alive (*vide* Thimme, Band XIII der "Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preuzischen Geschichte," p. 251).

[2] Boyen, who had spoken in this strain to the Czar, had his words reported indirectly to the King (*vide* Meinecke, "Boyen," I, 251, also Bailleu, "Briefwechsel," p. 240).

ised him. Even now there was a strong party at the Czar's Court who advocated making the Vistula frontier a condition of peace with Napoleon. But this party, which included Kutusoff, Rumjantzoff, and most of the generals, did not carry their point. Alexander inclined to a new proposal brought forward by a younger diplomatist, Nesselrode, who maintained that Russia required a long and secure peace and that such could only be gained by decisive victories over France so as to destroy her preponderance and restore the old balance of the Powers. For such an undertaking Russia was not able single-handed; she required the support of the central Powers. Then indeed it might be possible to withdraw territories from Napoleon's supremacy until France had been forced back within her natural frontiers. This view agreed with what Stein had advocated in a memorial to the Czar on November 17th, that Russia should not confine herself to defence merely, but that reinforced by Prussia and Austria, she should prosecute the war during the winter in Germany. By so doing Alexander might become the benefactor and peacemaker of Europe, as he had already been the saviour of his own Empire.[1]

As a result of these considerations, Kutusoff received orders in December to cross the frontiers, and overtures were made to Prussia and Austria. The Court of Berlin was assured that the Czar renounced his claims to East Prussian territory, but not to the Duchy of Warsaw which he had just then invaded. He was again, as in 1811, seriously considering a project for a united Poland under his own suzerainty. Public opinion in Russia, however, was against the Poles, and the fear of complications with Austria and Prussia deterred the Czar from taking action just then, so he wrote Czartoryski on January 13th, 1813. But these considerations necessarily increased the difficulty of coming to an understanding with King Frederick William. Much now depended upon the latter's envoy, Knesebeck, finding what he was seeking at Vienna and securing Austria's consent to

[1] *Vide*, Pertz Stein's "Leben," III. 212; Lehmann, "Stein," III. 198.

armed mediation so as to profit by France's weakness on the one hand, and, on the other, to prevent the threatened preponderance of Russia.

Nowhere had the issue of the Russian campaign caused more profound surprise than at the Court of Francis I. In October, after the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian Alliance, Metternich had judged it prudent to be on closer terms with Hardenberg and had written to him confidentially that from the way in which the Russians were conducting their operations, their existence as a European State was virtually doomed; and as England was also feeling the need of peace, he intended to agitate for a general pacification. In this way he hoped to avert the danger of a separate peace between Russia and France. After the news of the retreat of the Grand Army, and of the failure of Napoleon's expedition, Austria abandoned her subservient attitude, and, assuming a more worthy and independent spirit, she seized the opportunity to come forward as peacemaker. In order to play his rôle of mediator with dignity, Metternich sought to spare as far as possible what little army his impoverished country still possessed, as indeed he had consistently done throughout the campaign. Already in April, 1812, he had told Stackelberg, the Russian envoy at Vienna, the ostensible conditions of the alliance with France, and had assured him that Austria would not increase her auxiliary corps above 30,000 troops; beyond that she would only arm for her own defence. Russia, anxious for the security of her Austrian frontier as Austria was for that of her Russian frontier, expressed her willingness, in the event of her being victorious, to refrain from opposing the interests of the Vienna Court. Thus there had arisen a sort of unwritten agreement between the two avowed enemies, and their diplomatic relations were only outwardly interrupted. But any mutual understanding to combine against Napoleon was out of the question. For at Vienna they preferred the prospect of the French supremacy—which would not last beyond Napoleon's lifetime,—to a permanent Russian supremacy, as that would deprive them of Galicia, which had been expressly guaran-

teed by Napoleon. Austria was therefore able to strengthen herself and to place a reserve corps of from 30,000 to 40,000 troops in the East without having anything to fear from Russia. Austria has been unfairly accused of limiting her share in the Russian campaign to mere manœuvres and demonstrations, but it must be borne in mind that her forces were very limited and that stern necessity compelled her to husband them carefully. After the campaign, however, Napoleon summoned his father-in-law to double his contingent (which had gone back to Warsaw with the Saxons and a French division under Reynier) so that it might keep the Russians engaged while the Emperor was raising new armies. But this request was so diametrically opposed to the views held at Vienna that compliance was out of the question; yet they dared not send a definite and immediate refusal, as that would have aroused suspicion.

Hitherto Metternich had turned a deaf ear to the proposals of Russia's secret agents, and now, confident that Napoleon would soon be master of a new army, he sought a solution of the difficulty by prosecuting vigorously his plan for a pacification. He sent General Bubna to Paris on a special embassy to assure Napoleon that only a universal peace on a wide basis could heal the wounds of the last campaign and strengthen the new French dynasty. Napoleon did not reject Austria's unarmed intervention, but his utterances to Bubna held out little prospect of success. Spain, he said, would remain in the possession of his family, and his troops would only leave the country when the British evacuated Sicily. Murat would retain Naples; he himself would not relinquish one of the countries annexed to France by Senatus Consultum (i.e. Piedmont, Rome, Tuscany, Holland, Valois, the Hanseatic territory, Oldenburg, Parma, Elba, and Lauenberg), nor cede one village in the duchy of Warsaw. On the other hand, compensation would be found for territories such as Illyria and Corfu, which were not constituent parts of the empire. Austria was to inform Russia that the Emperor was prepared to guarantee the integrity of Russian Poland, and to withdraw the clauses of the Tilsit Treaty dealing with

the exclusion of Britain; but as Austria's intervention with the latter Power would in all likelihood prove fruitless, it was extremely desirable that Francis I should double his contingent, in which case the Emperor would provide the subsidies. Napoleon was intent on renewing the struggle, hence his eagerness to secure Austria's co-operation. From Vienna he learned that on the collapse of the Grand Army, Metternich had remarked to Otto, the French Ambassador, that if only Austria would change her policy she could reckon on a following of 50,000,000 souls in Germany and Italy. This Napoleon was determined to prevent. He even thought for a moment of exploiting the dynastic ties between the two States. Early in January he had a memoir drawn up discussing the advisability of crowning Marie Louise and her son; or, under certain circumstances, of establishing a regency. Maret wrote to Otto at Vienna that the coronation of the Empress would probably take place in February, provided Francis I solemnly guaranteed to his daughter the maintenance of the alliance. But in Vienna small heed was paid to such things. As soon as they felt certain that Napoleon's chief anxiety was to regain his lost prestige, Metternich concentrated all his energies on keeping the clash of arms far from Austria and on maintaining the country in a state of readiness for any emergency. He declined Napoleon's request to double the contingent, but on the other hand he did not join the enemy's camp. Shielding himself behind his rôle of peacemaker, Metternich carefully avoided bringing forward definite proposals of peace such as he might have needed to defend, which Austria was neither in a financial nor in a military position to do. He encouraged Hardenberg to declare himself openly the partisan of Russia, so as to ensure the war remaining definitely in the north and to compel both the Czar and Napoleon to greater moderation. But he would not exert himself to obtain from Russia the reversion of the Duchy of Warsaw to Prussia. Knesebeck's mission was therefore a failure. All it had obtained was the Emperor's promise that the troops massing in Moravia and Silesia would never be used against Prussia. Both then and later Austria was

handicapped in making any sudden alteration in her political system with its alluring prospects, by the fact that little reliance could be placed on the Czar's policy. A letter from Alexander, dated December 29th, 1812, summoning the Emperor Francis to occupy the old Hapsburg provinces, i.e. the Tyrol and Italy, and promising to aid him to the utmost, received a reply in the negative; for Metternich saw clearly that his neighbour's aim was to remove the Austrian troops from their threatening flank position to some more distant locality, and by a rash act to compromise the Vienna Court with Napoleon. Soon, too, irrefutable proofs came to hand of Alexander's renewed designs on Poland. To avoid all chance of collision, the Emperor Francis refused to allow the auxiliary corps to march, as the Viceroy Eugéne requested, from Warsaw to Kalisch where they would inevitably have come into conflict with the pursuing Russians. Instead of that, he ordered Schwarzenberg to conclude a truce (January 30th, 1813), terminable on two weeks' notice, and to withdraw the troops to Cracow, "so as to save them for the coming campaign," according to the assurances sent to Paris. This was not actually defection, but it was as Napoleon himself declared, "the first step towards it". The Emperor immediately recognized all the disadvantages of this arrangement, which would compel Eugène, by depriving him of his support on the right, to fall back from the Vistula to the Oder. The Russians were then able to advance unhindered, and on February 13th, at Kalisch, they defeated Reynier's isolated corps, which fled in a woeful plight to Glogau.

The Russian advance reacted upon the negotiations with Prussia and forced the latter to come to a settlement. King Frederick William, who was seriously disturbed by the exclusively Austrian policy pursued by Metternich, behaved exactly as he had done in the crises of 1809 and 1811. He still clung to the belief, not altogether unfounded, that Napoleon could only be conquered by combined action on the part of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and it was therefore with extreme reluctance that he consented to separate negotiations

with the Czar. He had repudiated Yorck's defection, yet the messenger by whom he informed that general of his dismissal was commissioned to suggest secretly to the Czar the possibility of an alliance, provided the Russian troops advanced rapidly on the Vistula so as to protect King Frederick William from Napoleon, and that the Czar circumscribed his Polish plans (i.e. restored Danzig and the former Prussian territory in the Duchy of Warsaw to King Frederick William). Alexander sent a reassuring reply, though he had only recently written the letter previously quoted to Czartoryski! The King then consented to leave Potsdam for Breslau so as to get away from the French, who still occupied Berlin (January 22nd, 1813). Hatzfeld had taken the precaution to inform the Emperor of the intended transfer of the Court to Silesia in order to be out of the way of the pursuing Russians or, as Hardenberg honestly says in his diary, "To avoid being compromised between the Russians and the French". Hatzfeld had also to bear in mind that in negotiating with Russia it was hoped to secure the neutrality of that part of Silesia which had been closed against the passage of foreign troops by the terms of the French Alliance, "entirely in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor Napoleon.[1] This, of course, was diametrically opposed to these wishes, but before the unwelcome reply reached Napoleon, the Prussian Court had already begun diplomatic negotiations with Russia. This still left the way open for Napoleon to secure Prussia's alliance, either by paying her debt of 90,000,000 francs incurred by the immense army supplies for the recent campaign, or by definite promises of territory. He did neither. He talked to the Prussian envoy in a casual fashion about parts of the Duchy of Warsaw and of the Kingdom of Westphalia, without committing himself in the slightest; he referred the claim for a reduction of the debt to his Minister, and declared that he had forbidden requisitions in Prussia, although at that time Eugène and the command-

[1] *Vide* the King's Letter to Hatzfeld on January 8th, 1813, in Oncken's "Die Sendung des Fürsten Hatzfeld nach Paris," "Deutsche Revue," 1899, II. 49.

ants of the fortresses on the Oder had received orders to levy such. The Czar's task was thus rendered much easier. On the day on which the Prussian Ambassador's report reached Breslau, Hardenberg (who was in favour of Russia) induced the King to appoint an armaments commission of which Scharnhorst was made a member (January 28th). On February 12th, the troops of the line in Silesia and Pomerania were mobilized as a precaution against a possible surprise from the French, who could easily move out from Berlin, where a division under Grenier was then stationed; and Knesebeck, who had been recalled from Vienna, was sent to the Czar to negotiate for a treaty of alliance. King Frederick William's immediate intention was merely to assure himself of Russia's support, and to propose to Napoleon an armistice relegating the French troops to the left of the Elbe, and the Russians to the right of the Vistula, which would form the preliminary to a peace somewhat on the basis of the treaties of Lunéville and Amiens. To wage a war of extermination against Napoleon was certainly far from his thoughts.

But it was what his people wanted. In 1809 they had not been strong enough to carry the King with them, but now they were to succeed. In memorials, petitions, addresses and appeals from devoted generals, the monarch was reminded that every Prussian looked upon war against France, whose yoke was so bitter and so heavy, as a sacred war. How deeply in earnest the people were in this matter is seen from the fact that, on February 3rd, the armaments commission appealed to the wealthy and the intelligent to enter the army as volunteer chasseurs, and a few days later it removed all restrictions upon military service between the ages of seventeen and twenty-four, and advocated universal service as long as the war lasted. Candidates came forward in crowds, fired with enthusiasm and martial ardour, and eagerly seized the weapons handed to them; others who could not join the ranks sacrificed all they had to help in the struggle against the French—for that purpose, and no other,—the King might decide as he liked. Again a revolutionary movement was making itself felt throughout Prussia, such as had made

Frederick William hesitate four years before; but this time it was stronger.[1] Now, too, the people felt not merely as Prussians but as Germans. Like the Austrians in 1809 they had "constituted themselves a nation," while the King and his immediate advisers were still stumbling on the ground of territorial particularism. This national movement among the German peoples stood the Czar in good stead, for it attached much less importance to the possession of Polish territory than did the Berlin Cabinet, and Alexander only needed to support it effectively in order to get a free hand for his secret designs on Warsaw. He therefore sent Stein to Königsberg with full powers to convoke the provincial diets and authorize them to give grants of money and to order armaments. Stein, who was regarded as the head of the national party, looked beyond the limitations of the German States and hoped for a United Germany. "I have only one Fatherland," he wrote in December, 1812, "and it is Germany; in this moment of great developments, I am utterly indifferent to dynasties." In Königsberg, Stein was completely successful. The Diet willingly granted Yorck's request to have his corps brought up to its full strength; it passed a law, drafted by Clausewitz, calling out about 40,000 militia, and threw open the East Prussian ports, all quite independent of the Court, just as if the King had already thrown in his lot definitely with Russia.

But this was far from being the case. The negotiations between Knesebeck and Alexander at Kalisch had come to a standstill because the former had insisted, much more obstinately than his instructions warranted, upon the restoration of all Prussia's former possessions in Poland, and to this the

[1] Cp. the remarks of the English agent Ompteda in his letter of February 20th, 1813. "The King, who unfortunately does not believe in the strength of the patriotic zeal, is no longer in a position to master this enthusiasm which has captured all minds and reveals itself in truly noble forms. If the King refuses to use the means proffered by his subjects on behalf of the nation, or if he even delays in co-operating with Russia's efforts in order to restore the Prussian monarchy, a revolution will be inevitable and the army will give the signal" (Ompteda, "Nachlasz," III. 25).

Czar would not listen. At last, on February 27th, setting aside this unskilful negotiator, Alexander (on Stein's suggestion) sent a treaty direct to Breslau. Owing to the pressure from the increasing excitement in the army and the nation, it was accepted, and on the following day it was signed at Kalisch. According to its terms Russia and Prussia bound themselves to act in concert for offensive and defensive purposes in order to liberate Europe, and to restore Prussia to the rank she held in 1806. The Czar was to provide 150,000 troops, the King 80,000 troops and more if possible. Russia guaranteed her ally the possession of old Prussia, while Frederick William surrendered his former Polish province and contented himself with a strip of land joining East Prussia with Silesia. Both Powers were to try and win over Austria to their cause, and Russia was to second Prussia's endeavours to obtain English subsidies. In order to restore the ancient power of the Hohenzollerns, conquests in North Germany were agreed upon, Hanover alone being excepted, on England's account. In Article III the King undertook to increase his forces by calling out the Landwehr, and on March 17th, the necessary decree appeared, accompanied by a rousing appeal "To my People," summoning them to a war of deliverance from the long-borne yoke of foreign tyranny. On the same day Hardenberg informed Saint-Marsan, the French Ambassador, of the alliance, and at Paris, on the 27th, Krusemarck handed to Maret Prussia's declaration of war.

Thus, at Breslau, the German national party had won the day over the territorial party, and the national trend of the Russo-Prussian alliance found expression in a new treaty on March 19th, 1813. In a proclamation addressed to all the Germans of the Rhine Confederation, the liberation of Germany from the dominant influence of France was held up as an object for which all ought to co-operate. Any Prince who had not answered the summons within a given period, was to be threatened with the loss of his territory. A few days later a Proclamation was published from Kutusoff, the commander-in-chief of the Allies, addressed "To the Germans," in which the threat against those Princes "who are, and mean to re-

main faithless to the German Cause," was even more clearly expressed; they were declared to be "ripe for destruction by the force of public opinion and the might of arms in a just cause". A central administrative committee of four plenipotentiaries, appointed by Prussia and Russia, with Stein at their head, was to administer affairs, enforce requisitions, call out militia, etc. In this they were specially aiming at Saxony, whither the Viceroy Eugène had gone on his way from the Oder to Berlin; but in March, on express orders from Napoleon, Eugène withdrew before the oncoming Russians and took up a strong position at Magdeburg. In order to divert their thoughts from Warsaw, Alexander had mentioned to Knesebeck and other trusted agents, that Saxony was better situated than Poland for increasing Prussia's territory, and this may have made an impression at Breslau. Meanwhile King Frederick Augustus of Saxony, accompanied by two cavalry regiments, had gone to Ratisbon, and his Minister Senfft, hoping to extricate his country by withholding the Saxon troops at Torgau both from the French and from the allies, had secretly concluded an agreement with Austria, guaranteeing the integrity of Saxony's hereditary possessions and providing compensation in the event of her being compelled to surrender Warsaw. Saxony in return undertook to furnish 30,000 troops to support the Emperor Francis in his endeavours to bring about a peace (April 20th, 1813). But the rising of the Saxon people—or at least of their army—and their union with the Prussians, for which the allies had hoped, did not take place, and although at Dresden Davoût's destruction of the stone bridges was still bitterly resented, the two Sovereigns were loudly welcomed when they made their entry into the town on April 23rd.

If the appeal to national sentiment was not successful in Saxony, in other places it led to risings which, however, owing to the proximity of the French, were without permanent effect. In Hamburg, for instance, about the middle of March a Cossack patrol appeared and was received with enthusiasm; but in Oldenburg and other places on the coast rash acts of violence towards the French customs officers led

to bitter reprisals when the Russians had to retire and a flying column of French troops took their place. Had the King of Prussia changed his policy two months earlier, when the impression created by the disaster to the Grand Army was still fresh and Napoleon had not yet raised a second army to take its place, had he then thrown in his lot with the national party, he would have been warmly supported by the peoples of Western Germany and his appeal would everywhere have awakened an echo.[1] But time had been wasted in fruitless negotiations with Austria and in other ways, and now, when a new army had sprung from the earth at Napoleon's bidding and he had forged new fetters for his vassals beyond the Rhine, this effect could no longer be obtained. If the allies were to conquer, they must rely entirely upon themselves and on help from foreign Powers.

The Breslau Treaty of February 27th, was to be communicated by Austria to Sweden and Britain. These two States were now brought into closer touch through the good offices of Russia, who had been in league with them for a year past. Britain guaranteed to the Crown Prince John the future acquisition of Norway, and promised him the Island of Guadeloupe and satisfactory subsidies, provided he undertook to furnish 30,000 troops for a continental war against France. Possibly foreseeing some such negotiation, Napoleon had sent a secret agent, towards the close of February 1813, to conciliate Bernadotte, but as he again did not offer Norway, but only Pomerania and unspecified territories between the Elbe and the Oder—the well-known partition of Prussia—the negotiations failed. On March 3rd, the treaty between Sweden and Britain was concluded, and on the 23rd, the Crown Prince sent an insulting letter to his former Sovereign, renouncing his allegiance. Denmark, however, remained loyal, and that of necessity. Frederick VI would have thrown in

[1] On January 29th, Prince Hatzfeld said to Napoleon in Paris : "Everything is prepared and organized ; Germany appears to me like some piece of fire-works which only requires a single match to set it aglow ; if Prussia rouses herself, if she treads the path of a popular rising, the whole nation will follow." The Emperor agreed with him (Oncken, 347).

his lot with Russia and England but for the certainty that negotiations with these Powers would entail upon him the loss of Norway, without any compensation. Prussia, hitherto at war with England, now naturally entered into a treaty with her and so obtained the necessary subsidies and the prospect of Hildesheim, Ostfriesland, and part of Münster as compensation for renouncing Hanover. In order to bind King Frederick William the more securely to the war, and to keep Russia on the offensive, the London Cabinet abandoned their projected "Kingdom of Austrasia" (between the Scheldt and the Elbe), under a British Prince, and reverted instead to Pitt's plan for combating the preponderance of France, so as to restore the balance of power and thereby reconquer the continental markets for British exports. The old map of Europe, which Pitt had ordered to be rolled up, was again unfurled, for it was to hold good once more.

This was not the mood Metternich had expected to find at London when he offered his good services there to promote a general peace. His proposal that Britain should offer Napoleon certain colonial territories, as a means of inducing him to restrict his sphere of influence on the Continent and to keep the peace, the Cabinet refused to entertain, declaring that the passage in Napoleon's speech from the throne referring to the future of Spain was sufficient proof of the utter futility of such a step. So Metternich's diplomacy failed entirely in this instance. Public opinion in Britain was moreover greatly incensed at the Vienna Cabinet for having suppressed an insurrection in the Tyrol and other mountainous districts formerly belonging to Austria which were to have been grouped together and placed under the Archduke John as "King of Rhaetia". Considerable sums had already been spent by the British agent, King, in furthering this project. So outspoken was the dislike of Metternich's hesitating policy that the Prince Regent did not dare to receive the latter's envoy publicly. But although England had declined Austria's overtures of peace, the Vienna Cabinet did not yield to Russia's pressure nor grant her consent to the truce proposed in January. For this aloofness there was

good reason. At the time the truce was under negotiation, the Russian envoy had assured Schwarzenberg that his master had no thought of restoring Poland. Now, however, they had learned at Vienna of the exchange of letters between Alexander and Czartoryski, proposing to restore the ancient kingdom of Poland at the first favourable opportunity, and as any fresh extension of Russia's power would have endangered Galicia, Austria was naturally reluctant to further Russia's schemes.[1] Now, too, it turned out that in the end of March Czartoryski had been in Kalisch and from there had proceeded to Warsaw. So Alexander's exhortations to join the war met with evasive answers, and no alliance was formed.

These circumstances reacted upon the attitude of the various Powers towards Napoleon. If Austria was to uphold her rôle of peacemaker—which was desirable both for her own independence and for shaking off the French alliance,—she would now be forced to lay the suggested restrictions before the French Emperor without being able to offer any immediate compensation, and consequently with small likelihood of success. But Metternich realized that while Napoleon would not be moved by the warlike attitude of Russia and Prussia, it was possible he might prove accessible if his ally came forward more boldly. In short they recognized at Vienna that the time had come for Austria, if her proposals were to carry due weight, to exchange her rôle of unarmed mediation for that of armed intervention. To strengthen her for this purpose, Metternich made the compact with Saxony and sought to win over Murat and Bavaria to his party for neutral mediation.[2] This change of policy took effect in March, 1813, after Napoleon had sent a new ambassador, Count Narbonne (in place of Otto), to Vienna to revive the project for the dismemberment of Prussia and for the acquisition of Silesia, provided his father-in-law would

[1] After 1813 Metternich once wrote Hardenberg, saying his chief anxiety was lest he might not succeed in preventing an enormous increase in Russia's power, the inevitable result of which would be to destroy the French colossus (Bailleu, Art. "Metternich," in der Allg. d. Biographie).

[2] The report that he attempted to gain Jerôme also is false.

support him in the struggle with 100,000 troops. But Metternich declined to do so and called the Emperor's attention to a passage in the note brought by his ambassador, requiring Austria to assume a more definite attitude, and in the event of Britain not entertaining her proposals for negotiations, to enter the struggle as the "*partie principale*". This, Metternich declared, imposed upon Austria a different rôle to that of a mere auxiliary as assigned to her in the treaty of 1812, and called for armed mediation, which she had hitherto avoided. Austria thereby felt herself as it were authorized to assert her independence, for, as the Emperor Francis wrote to his son-in-law, it was impossible to "stand at the same time in the first and second line".[1] Accordingly on April 11th, she came forward as armed mediator, and as such in sympathy with the most influential circles in Vienna, where the feeling was growing in favour of Prussia's warlike decision and becoming hostile to Metternich. When Narbonne requested that at least the auxiliary corps should terminate the truce concluded in January, Metternich replied that the Russians had already given notice to that effect. But he prudently refrained from stating that this had been done at Austria's request, and after the secret convention of March 29th, in order that the corps might retire before superior forces to Galicia and from there to Bohemia, where a new army was being equipped to support the policy of mediation. Whether it ever saw active service or not depended on Napoleon being "reasonable," as the Emperor Francis remarked to Narbonne, i.e. renouncing his oppressive preponderance in Europe. Talleyrand aptly described the situation in his remark to Prince Schwarzenberg, who had been sent to Paris to sound the Emperor. "Now is the time when the Emperor Napoleon must become King of France." That keen-sighted diplomatist well knew these conflicting interests could never be reconciled.

[1] This of course was merely one of the diplomatic subterfuges such as Metternich handled with great skill. Only in January he had said to Humboldt, the Prussian representative, that a State could quite well remain neutral and yet give an auxiliary corps to one of the Powers engaged in war (Gebhardt, "Humboldt als Staatsmann," I. 412).

Napoleon had originally intended not to assume the offensive until May. In the middle of March he wrote Eugène to that effect, proposing to cross the Elbe, north of Magdeburg, taking with him not only the Viceroy's army, but also a second one to be collected in Mainz and Würzburg; he then intended to advance by forced marches through Stettin to Danzig, where Rapp with 30,000 troops was waiting to be relieved. He expected to have some 300,000 troops available for this manœuvre, enough to secure the control of the Lower Vistula. The Russians would then be forced to draw back and Prussia would fall into his hands; and we have already seen, by the territories proffered to other Governments, how he meant to dismember the State of the Hohenzollerns. Though far from being a plan of operations, it was certainly a great conception, and yet within a couple of weeks it was abandoned. The alliance of the northern Powers as well as their insurrectionary tendencies, the threatened loss of Saxony, and more especially of Austria, whose attitude indicated unmistakably that no reliance was to be placed on her, led Napoleon to modify his plan. He felt convinced that the sooner he rent this woof of diplomacy with his sword, rallied his doubtful allies, and despoiled his vanquished foes, the better for him. He therefore decided to begin the war earlier than he had intended. On April 15th he left St. Cloud, and two days later he entered Mainz.

The preparations he saw there and shortly afterwards at Erfurt, where he established his head-quarters, and the troops he reviewed, were not calculated to inspire him with much confidence. His new army was to include twelve corps—exclusive of the Guards—but at present he had only seven corps at his disposal, and of these the first, under Davoût, consisted of Hanoverians who were to hold the Lower Elbe districts, and were not available for offensive purposes. Two others with a cavalry corps, a detachment of the Guards, and two separate divisions (60,000 troops) were placed under command of Eugène on the Lower Saale. Of these 48,000 were to be sent on to Merseberg to Napoleon, who was advancing with the main army (numbering about 105,000) from Erfurt

to Weiszenfels; while an Italian corps with the Württemberg division (27,000 strong) under Bertrand was marching from Nürnberg and Coburg on Jena and Kamberg.[1] There were thus barely 200,000 troops instead of the 300,000 on which he had reckoned a month before, and as the campaign was beginning earlier than was originally intended their equipment was still far from complete. The most serious defect was the lack of cavalry. The whole army—exclusive of Davoût's corps—had only 10,000 mounted troops. Some of the infantry were so late in getting their arms that they were drilled after they were on the march. The best of the artillery had been lost in Russia or was beyond the Pyrenees, and had to be replaced by old cumbersome cannon. There were not sufficient teams, and the various corps had only half of their artillery reserve. There were many other defects. First and foremost the lack of officers, for in spite of the numbers recalled from Spain there were still not enough. The general staff was particularly weak, while the corps of Marmont and Oudinot had none at all. The sanitary corps was short of men and the army administration wretched. Taking it all in all it was an army of ill-equipped recruits which was now about to renew the gigantic struggle for the mastery of the world. What a contrast to the previous year! But Napoleon was well aware that if he meant to win he must throw the whole weight of his personal genius into the fight. "I shall wage this war," said he, "as General Bonaparte and not as the Emperor."[2]

[1] Exhaustive investigations on the French Army of 1813 were published by Osten-Sacken in the "Jahrbücher für die Deutsche Armee und Marine," 1888, and recently some corrections have been made from new sources in his work "Militärisch-politische Geschichte des Befreiungskrieges von 1813" (1904), II. p. 206. Cp. also Lanrezac, "La Manœuvre de Lützen (1904), p. 116, for the numbers on April 25th, according to the lists in the Paris war archives, which certainly show too high an estimate.

The figures given by Thiers are too high, those of Camille Rousset too low. The figures given in the older German sources, Clausewitz, Odeleben, Müffling, and others are all inaccurate.

[2] Lanrezac (p. 24) disputes the statement that the troops of 1813 were mostly immature lads without any training, and declares that the 105,000

One advantage at least Napoleon had on his side. He was far superior to his opponents in numbers. The early outbreak of hostilities caught his allies in the very middle of their preparations. Scharnhorst wrote on April 2nd, that the Prussian army would not be ready for active service before the end of May; till then they would need to trust to luck. Owing to the losses in the late campaign and to the blockade of the fortresses on the Vistula and the Oder which were still held by the French, few Russian troops were available for actual warfare, scarcely more than 50,000, and these advanced with the Prussians, their combined force numbering only about 96,000, in three armies under Wittgenstein, Blücher, and Tormassoff. (The latter had replaced Kutusoff, who was then ill and died in the end of April.) The allies possessed more than double the number of cavalry of their opponent, an advantage which was not without its effect on the fortunes of the war. When Napoleon advanced from Erfurt upon Leipzig these armies concentrated between the Elster and the Pleisse, and on May 2nd, Wittgenstein, who had been made commander-in-chief, decided to attack the French while they were on the march and fall upon their right flank near Pegau, in the direction of Lützen.

Napoleon had not expected his opponents to assume the offensive so rapidly, even although he knew they were concentrating and taking up a position at Pegau. He had moved out Ney's corps with five divisions from Lützen southwards in the direction of Kaja and Gross-Görschen and had ordered Marmont to advance with the sixth corps direct on Rippach. Having thus secured his flank he thought there was still time to seize Leipzig and from there fall upon the enemy's right wing. But the allies forestalled him. On the morning of May 2nd, riding out from Lützen in the direction of Leipzig

men taken from the levies of previous years were over twenty and had all served at least one year. This last statement requires proof. However, it is true that the young recruits of 1813 joined the army in December, 1812, and were certainly not left until April without some training. The impression made on eye-witnesses by the extreme youth of the majority of the troops is well attested.

where a division under Kleist had engaged the French vanguard, the Emperor suddenly heard a heavy cannonading in his rear, warning him that Ney's divisions were being attacked by superior numbers. The army having thus been surprised on the march, Napoleon immediately decided to call a halt, to make Eugène advance southwards from Markranstadt against the enemy's right wing, and Marmont to operate on Ney's right, while the Guards, who were posted at Lützen, were to act as a reserve. Meanwhile Bertrand was to threaten the enemy's left wing and a corps of Eugène's army under Lauriston, was to capture Leipzig, and be ready to support the others. All this was planned and ordered in a flash. Everything now depended upon Ney's recruits being able to withstand the enemy's attacks until the other divisions had time to come upon the scene. And what one scarcely dared hope for, happened. The young, raw, ill-equipped troops, who had responded to the Emperor's summons sullenly and reluctantly, now fought with the greatest obstinacy against the flower of the Prussian army, and not till late in the day, and after long and murderous fighting, were they driven from the villages they had occupied—Gross, and Klein-Görschen, Rhana and Kaja—and thrown into confusion. Meanwhile Marmont and his troops had come upon the scene, Bertrand had assumed a threatening attitude, and when Napoleon in the centre launched the Guards to recapture Kaja and the other villages, and one of Eugène's corps, under Macdonald, attacked the Prussian right wing, the enemy at last fell back before superior numbers and the battle of Lützen added another to the long list of the Emperor's victories. On this day Napoleon exposed himself more than ever before in order to fire the courage of his youthful troops, and for this he received his reward when the youngest of his recruits, even those who were wounded and maimed, greeted him with enthusiastic cries of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" just as his old veterans were wont to do.

He had certainly not won a complete victory such as he had aimed at in planning to surround Leipzig, and there was no immediate necessity for the allies crossing the Elster as they did that same night, and continuing their retreat to the

Elbe. In spite of their inferiority of numbers, 70,000 against Napoleon's 120,000, the allies might have carried the day had their generalship been better, had the battle begun at seven o'clock as arranged instead of at eleven, and had not the Czar, who with the King of Prussia was present during the action, spared his Guards and left idle 9000 troops belonging to Miloradowitsch's corps purely for reasons of etiquette. As a matter of fact Napoleon's losses were heavier than those of his opponents. He had upwards of 20,000 killed and wounded, among them a great many officers whom he could ill spare; and neither prisoners nor guns had been captured. His want of cavalry and the lack of staying power in his youthful infantry prevented him from following up his victory effectively. Moreover, under cover of night, Blücher, who had been wounded, brought up nine squadrons to Rahna where the French were lying, and rousing them from their rest made them unfit for the pursuit in the morning. The fighting at the outposts on the following day was indecisive. Nevertheless the victory at Lützen was not without its influence on the political situation, for it rallied Saxony to the Emperor's side. On May 8th, Napoleon entered the old town of Dresden and summoned the King of Saxony, who was staying at Prague, to declare whether he was a friend or a foe. Whereupon Frederick Augustus, in spite of his agreement with Austria, reasserted his friendship and placed his Guards cavalry and the whole garrison of Torgau at Napoleon's service. Ney then marched his corps into the fortress, took over the Saxon troops, and, reinforced by other two corps, crossed the Elbe and forced the allies near Dresden to abandon this river. On May 11th, the Russo-Prussian army evacuated the new town (which is on the north bank of the Elbe) nor did they halt until they had crossed the Spree.

But after all the incomplete victory at Lützen had not settled the momentous question of Austria's attitude as Napoleon had hoped it would. Austria showed no signs of returning to him, and although for a moment she had hesitated and had even swerved considerably, she still adhered to the path which would eventually lead her to the allies. Toward the

end of April she had been on close terms with them, but on May 7th, while the news that the battle on the 2nd had been a victory for the Prussians and Russians was still uncorrected, Stadion (who had been Minister of War in 1809) was sent to the allies' head-quarters to offer Austria's services as "Armed Mediator," and to state the conditions which the Vienna Court was prepared to enforce with all its might. The minimum suggested was, that the Duchy of Warsaw should be surrendered, that Napoleon should renounce the trans-Rhine provinces (Holland, Oldenburg, and the Hanseatic towns)—that he should also renounce his protectorate over the Confederation of the Rhine, that Prussia should be restored, and that he should cede Illyria and Dalmatia to Austria, which Power was to receive a new Bavarian frontier. Any new French successes in the field would inevitably lead to these demands being modified, but would not alter Austria's political attitude. In a dispatch of April 29th, to the allied monarchs, Metternich declared that by May 24th at latest Austria would have 125,000 troops ready for service, 60,000 of whom were to checkmate French aggressions in Bohemia. But when more accurate news of the battle at Lützen came in, and when the French army advanced almost to the Austrian frontiers, the Emperor Francis abandoned all thought of such concessions from his son-in-law, and Schwarzenberg, who was in command of the army in Bohemia, had even difficulty in preventing him from stopping the armaments. The instructions given to Bubna, who was sent to act as intermediary with Napoleon, just as Stadion had been sent to the allies, were far below the minimum which Russia and Prussia were prepared to uphold. The dissolution of the Duchy of Warsaw, the cession of Illyria to Austria and the restoration of the territories on the right bank of the Rhine were the only conditions on which Bubna was to insist. But Napoleon who had been apprised by Narbonne of the full extent of Austria's recent trafficking with the allies, received Bubna with profound distrust, especially when he began to expound Austria's programme so as to show that a general peace was only possible if concessions were made

by the French Empire, for which England would have to make compensation; that, as the latter country in the meantime refused to do so, the first advances would need to come from the Emperor; but that once peace had been concluded on the Continent, Britain would then be isolated and forced to yield. What idle words these must have seemed to Napoleon, who for years back had been striving with all his might to isolate her and yet had failed! He concluded that Austria was already on closer terms with his opponents than with him, and he immediately acted on this supposition. He wrote to the Emperor Francis that he was more anxious for peace than anyone, that he was ready to send delegates to a congress at which even representatives from the Spanish insurgents would find a place, also that he favoured the idea of an armistice pending negotiations (such as Bubna suggested), but that he would not be made a laughing-stock in the eyes of England; rather than that he would die at the head of all brave-hearted Frenchmen. At the same time he ordered Eugène, who had left for Italy, to have a new army in readiness by the end of June at latest, sufficiently strong to hold from 60,000 to 80,000 Austrians in check in the south. News of this was to be diligently spread at Vienna, so as to intimidate the Government there. Marie Louise, who had been appointed Regent in the Emperor's absence, was instructed to write to her father that if he deserted France, her husband, who had 1,000,000 combatants under arms, would turn all his forces against Austria. But to Bubna the Emperor threatened that he would come to terms with Alexander and cede Warsaw to him. Nor was this an idle threat. As he had always several strings to his bow, he actually attempted to come to an understanding with the Czar without Austria's officious mediation and the sacrifices it entailed. Caulaincourt was to go to the enemy's outposts with a proposal for a congress and a truce. He was to request an interview with the Czar and hold out to him the inducement (so ran his instructions), of obtaining a "brilliant revenge on Austria for her foolish diversion in Russia". Caulaincourt was to begin by offering Poland. But the Grand

Duchy of Warsaw and the Republic of Danzig were not to go to Russia but to Prussia, with the exception of a narrow strip which was to be reserved as indemnity for the Duke of Oldenburg. In return, Frederick William was to cede his territory west of the Oder, i.e. Brandenburg with Berlin and the portion of Silesia lying between Glogau and the Bohemian frontier. Prussia, whose capital would thereafter be Warsaw, Königsberg, or Danzig, would thus come absolutely under the influence of Russia. (Brandenburg was destined for the King of Westphalia and the Krossen district evidently for Saxony.) Napoleon did not desire to return to the Tilsit agreement against England, as his aim was to pave the way for a general peace; and for the future the Czar must find some way for himself of enforcing respect for his flag.[1] Napoleon hoped by these concessions to break up the coalition, and by surrendering Poland and abandoning the Continental blockade to satisfy the Czar, for these had been the real causes of discord in 1812. Six years before, by his brilliant victory at Friedland, he had gained what he was now aiming at, and he hoped by means of a second Friedland to reach his ends this time also. But while his ambassador was still vainly waiting for an audience from the Czar, the war had begun afresh.

Napoleon had sent on Ney and his corps towards Berlin in order to separate the Prussians, who were alarmed for their capital, from the Russians. But this manœuvre had failed, for the allies remained together and Wittgenstein had even decided to venture a second battle at Bautzen. Learning of this on May 18th—the day on which Caulaincourt left to negotiate officially for a truce—Napoleon sent word to Ney, whom he knew to be at Luckau with three corps, to advance on Drehsa, east of Bautzen, as rapidly as possible

[1] Only a part of these instructions have found a place in the correspondence of Napoleon. The actual preliminary proposals have been given by Lefebvre in his "Histoire des Cabinets de l'Europe," v. 331, while the abandoning of the Continental blockade is only mentioned by Jomini, who quotes the passage verbatim in his "Précis politique et militaire des Campagnes de 1812 à 1814," I. 261.

and fall upon Wittgenstein from the rear. On the following day Napoleon himself left Dresden and hurried on through Hartha towards Bautzen. Meanwhile Wittgenstein had been reinforced by fresh troops under Barclay and the Prussian general Kleist, and, entrenched in a strong position made memorable during the Seven Years War, he was ready to receive Napoleon if he advanced from the west. At the allies' head-quarters, however, when they found that the French were also approaching from the north, the Czar, instead of immediately attacking Napoleon with superior numbers, sent Barclay and Yorck against Ney. On May 19th, some skirmishing took place at Weissig and Königswartha in which the French losses were as heavy as those of the allies. As a result of this Napoleon himself opened the attack on the 20th, so as to draw off the allies from Ney and leave him free to resume his advance. About noon the Emperor marched out from the west with four corps and the Guards, and crossing the Spree at several points, he drove the enemy's advance-guard out of Bautzen and by the evening he had gained a firm foothold on the other side of the river. Meantime Ney with two of his corps had reached the Spree at Klix, while two other corps and the cavalry reserve were only at Hoyerswerda. The oncoming darkness, on which Napoleon had reckoned when he began the battle at noonday, prevented Wittgenstein making his counter-attack. Next day would decide the victory, and to all appearance not in favour of the allies, who were now numerically inferior.

The Emperor's plan was to send Ney against Barclay who commanded the allies' right wing, adjoining which was the centre under Blücher, and so gain control of the enemy's line of retreat, while he himself meanwhile attacked the Russians in front and deceived them as to his real object by his personal presence there and by deploying strong forces against their left wing. He worked incessantly until early morning, when he ordered the right wing under Oudinot to begin the action as a sign for Ney to advance; then only he lay down on the battlefield and snatched a few hours' rest. Had the Czar seen his great antagonist sleeping so quietly

he would scarcely have disregarded Wittgenstein's remonstrances and persisted in seeking the decisive action at this spot and so leaving Barclay's weak division to oppose Ney. As no reinforcements were sent him, within a few hours Barclay was driven back far beyond Gleina, and Blücher's flank thereby seriously exposed. Instead, however, of pushing forward boldly right into Blücher's rear, as Jomini says he advised him to do, Ney turned cautious. Certainly he could hardly have expected that the enemy would leave their right wing so culpably weak, and so he waited for Reynier and the seventh corps to come up. As soon as they reached Klix he again advanced to the attack, no longer, however, on Hochkirch for the golden opportunity had passed, but to the right, against Blücher, who was already turning his artillery upon him. For the Czar, realizing at last the true state of affairs, had sent his Guards to reinforce Blücher. Ney might still have sent one of his corps to the left to continue the enveloping movement, but even that risk he avoided and instead he drew in all his available forces. By so doing he left the road to Görlitz free, and thus the great mass of the allied troops, now vigorously attacked by Napoleon, were enabled to effect their escape. Just in time! They had lost the battle as they deserved to do, but they had saved their army, which was doomed to destruction had not the most daring of all the marshals of the Empire belied his reputation on that day. Napoleon pressed hard after the enemy, but all in vain. Here, as at Lützen, he was foiled by his lack of cavalry, and his troops were exhausted by the fighting. On the day following, May 22nd, he rode forward to the advance-guard to animate them by his presence and to urge them to close at once with the Russian rear-guard and end their obstinate resistance. But, alas! this action cost him no fewer than three excellent generals of his suite, among them the brave and trusted Duroc whom he sincerely mourned.

But this was not the kind of battle Napoleon had reckoned on as a means of forcing the Czar to accept his proposals. Of the 170,000 troops at his disposal both days he had not been able to bring more than 90,000 into action; for the enemy's frontal position was so strong that he could only operate on the

two wings. His losses—amounting to nearly 25,000 men—far exceeded those of the allies, and again he had captured neither prisoners, flags, nor guns. The political results were as disappointing as the military ones. Caulaincourt was refused the desired interview with the Czar, and was merely notified that Austria's mediation had been accepted and that proposals would only be received through that Power. The allies, however, were prepared to entertain the idea of a truce, and Stadion was deputed to write to Berthier that they were willing to have negotiations on the subject at the outposts. It now remained to be seen if Napoleon was in earnest.

He, meanwhile, had been following the enemy in close pursuit, fighting all the way. Oudinot's corps alone had remained at Bautzen and was to proceed through Hoyerswerda in the direction of Berlin. At Liegnitz and Jauer the allies had at length turned off to the right towards Schweidnitz, thus abandoning Breslau. They were not unanimous about continuing the war. Barclay, who had replaced Wittgenstein as commander-in-chief, was in favour of retiring into Poland so as to restore order among the Russian troops, reorganize them, and obtain fresh supplies of ammunition, which was already running short; if he were to remain in Silesia, he would require six weeks' rest. This circumstance—in view of the fact that Austria's armaments were to be ready by the middle of June—was decisive; for Frederick William viewed any separation of the allied armies with the utmost anxiety. Had Napoleon been aware of the critical state of matters in the enemy's camp he would not have committed what he afterwards considered the greatest mistake of his life. But he did not know, and so he consented to suspend hostilities. For this he also had special reasons, two of which he stated in a letter of June 2nd to Clarke, his Minister of War,—the lack of cavalry, which prevented him dealing a decisive blow, and Austria's attitude. There were other reasons as well. In his own army there was only too much confusion, and the heavy loss of officers in both battles made itself keenly felt. His young troops were unequal to the exhausting marches; most of the corps had a third of their men, Ney's more than

half, in hospital. As a result of the sufferings caused by the bad administration, thousands deserted, while others scattered over the country, providing for themselves by unrestrained marauding. Ere long, in spite of reinforcements, the army had shrunk to 120,000 men.[1] Added to this, hostile bands of guerrillas did much damage in the rear, cutting off convoys, capturing two trains of artillery, and so forth. Under these circumstances Napoleon judged it foolhardy to build any hopes on a third victory which he would still be incapable of following up, while further losses would only strengthen Austria's hesitation. Then, too, all the reports from Paris told the same tale, that the people were ardently longing for peace. Even the "Marets" and the "Savarys," those members of the Emperor's entourage whose long-proven servility seldom allowed them to tell their master unpleasant truths, strongly advised a cessation of hostilities, and for the time being Napoleon was forced to take public opinion in France into account. So on June 4th, when the army had reached Breslau and Oudinot was posted opposite Bülow on the Elster while Davoût occupied Hamburg, a truce was signed at Plöswitz near Streigau. According to its terms the French were to withdraw beyond the Katzbach, the allies beyond a line running from the Bohemian frontier through Landeshut, Streigau, and Canth (east of Breslau), to the Oder. The territory to be occupied by the French was bounded by the Oder from the mouth of the Katzbach northwards, the Saxon frontier, and then the Elbe to the North Sea. Hostilities were to cease until June 20th.

If it was Napoleon's intention to break up the game of diplomacy by a daring and rapid attack, and more especially to rend in pieces the fine woof of Metternich's intrigues, then his spring campaign was a failure. He had neither succeeded in separating Russia and Prussia nor in rallying Austria to his side, while by his separate negotiation with Russia he had merely furnished the Czar with a lever which he was not slow to use in putting pressure on Austria. At Vienna

[1] Lefebvre, v. 348, who consulted the documents in the Paris War Archives, gives this number before the conclusion of the truce.

great consternation was caused by the news of a second defeat and by the repeated appearance of Caulaincourt at the allies' outposts. They dreaded lest Russia might withdraw, as she had done in 1805 and 1807, and hence they judged it needful to approach the allies in some tangible form, so as to prevent any slackening of their efforts. Early in June, therefore, Francis I and his Minister repaired to Gitschin Castle in Bohemia where they were visited by Count Nesselrode, who was sent by the Czar to ask Austria to join the alliance formally. Although the Emperor Francis was greatly disinclined to take part in the war with his ill-equipped troops so long as there was any chance of securing peace by means of negotiations, Nesselrode succeeded in obtaining from Metternich a statement of six indispensable conditions of the peace, the first four of which Austria was prepared to enforce by a resort to arms in the event of Napoleon refusing. These conditions were—(1) The dissolution of the Duchy of Warsaw. (2) The enlargement of Prussia by restoring Danzig to her. (Owing to altered circumstances, Metternich now considered a strong Prussia necessary, so as to co-operate with Austria in preventing aggressions either from France or from Russia.) (3) The reversion of the Illyrian provinces to Austria (who was to be strengthened for similar reasons). (4) The independence of the Hanseatic towns. (5) The dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine. (6) The restoration of Prussia as far as possible to the position she had held in 1806. These first four conditions were certainly not what Austria had previously proposed as the minimum, yet they went farther than what Bubna had submitted to Napoleon. Indeed as early as May 16th, the allies had agreed at Wurschen upon a much more extensive programme, including, in addition to the above-mentioned points, the separation of Holland from France, the restoration of the Bourbons in Spain, the restoration of Austria to her status previous to 1805, the withdrawal of all the French troops across the Rhine and the liberation of Italy. But the certainty of Austria's co-operation, which Metternich declared he personally guaranteed to the Czar

Alexander in the Bohemian Castle of Opocno, made the allies willing to negotiate for peace with France even on Austria's conditions. Nor did they inform Napoleon of the articles of the Wurschen Treaty, as he would infallibly have turned the circumstances to account in France by obtaining more armaments. That Napoleon, if victorious, would not consent to these terms they considered a foregone conclusion. The peace was only to be a preliminary arrangement to be followed by negotiations for a definite pacification which could not be carried out without Britain's co-operation and assent. To this Russia and Prussia had to pledge themselves in June when they concluded an agreement with the London Cabinet to supply them with the subsidies necessary for enabling them to continue the war. And so on June 27th, 1813, at the allies' head-quarters at Reichenbach, Austria, Russia, and Prussia signed a treaty embodying not only the provisions already formulated at Opocno, but also the four conditions declared indispensable by the Cabinet of Vienna together with Austria's solemn promise to declare war on France immediately, if Napoleon had not accepted these conditions by the 20th of July. In the latter event the three Powers were no longer to wage war for these moderate demands but for the whole comprehensive programme of May 16th, i.e. France was to be forced back within her old boundaries. The Powers furthermore pledged themselves not to countenance any attempt on Napoleon's part to open separate negotiations.[1]

Rendered uneasy by Metternich's visit to the Czar, and Bubna's overtures having proved unsatisfactory, Napoleon now invited the Austrian Minister to meet him in Dresden.

[1] Article 1 announced that "after H.M. the Emperor of Austria has invited the Courts of Russia and Prussia through his mediation to enter upon negotiations with France for a preliminary peace to serve as basis for a general pacification, and after he has established the conditions which he considers necessary for the restoration of the balance of the Powers and for a permanent peace in Europe, he pledges himself to declare war against France and to join forces with Russia and Prussia if France has not accepted these conditions by the 20th of July of this year". One of the essential demands binding Austria to war, was the evacuation by the French of the fortresses along the Vistula and the Oder.

After discussing the situation with Nesselrode, Metternich accepted the summons, and on August 26th, he presented himself before the Emperor in the Marcolini Palace. The interview lasted for nine hours, during which Napoleon gave way repeatedly to violent outbursts of temper, at one time even going so far as to describe his second marriage as a piece of folly and to accuse Metternich of venality. He sought to fix Austria down to a state of armed neutrality, but Metternich was equally resolute in insisting upon armed intervention. This persistency so exasperated the Emperor, that in a fit of temper he flung his hat to the end of the room. He had done so in the previous year, and on that occasion Metternich had hastened to pick it up and hand it back; now, however, he let it lie. This interview long enjoyed an historic celebrity, because it was believed to be the turning-point in Austria's policy and in Napoleon's fate. But this was not so. For some time past the Viennese Cabinet had been following its own desire for independence, and any alteration of its course was no longer admissible. Napoleon was wrong when he remarked of Metternich at this time, "He fancies he is guiding everybody, whereas everybody is guiding him," and his final remark at the close of the above interview, "You will certainly not make war on me," was destined to remain unfulfilled.

The interview in Dresden resulted in the Emperor meeting Austria half-way. He not only declared the alliance of 1812 cancelled, but even accepted the armed mediation of the Emperor Francis. Such a decision on Napoleon's part might well cause surprise, were it not explained by a convention signed on June 30th between Maret and the Austrian Minister in which it was agreed, in the interests of the Peace Congress to be held at Prague, to prolong the armistice till August 10th, and Austria was to induce the allies to accept this proposal. During the long interview on the 26th, Metternich had already offered to do so as the price of Napoleon's acceptance of Austria's mediation.[1]

[1] It has long been a disputed point whether Napoleon or Metternich was the first to propose the extension of the truce. In Metternich's

Napoleon himself, however, was not at all in favour of war at any cost, and would have been quite willing to conclude a peace, preferably a general one, which would have put an end to all hostilities and tranquillized the nation. But a purely continental peace which allowed the war with England to continue and left the French colonies in the hands of

report on this matter, drawn up by him in 1820 for the Emperor Francis, he describes himself as replying to Napoleon's demand for Austria's neutrality in the following words: "The Emperor Francis has offered the Powers his mediation, not his neutrality. Russia and Prussia have accepted it; and now it is for you to decide. Either you accept, in which case we shall fix a period for the duration of the negotiations; or you refuse, whereupon my master shall consider himself free as to his actions and conduct." This was tantamount to saying that if Napoleon accepted her mediation, Austria proposed to prolong the armistice beyond the period stipulated for in the Treaty. Compare Luckwaldt, p. 325. Also Sorel, VIII. p. 148, who even declares it was not easy to bring Napoleon to consent to the extension of the armistice. That is scarcely so, for Sorel at the same time quotes Metternich's letter to his father in September, 1813, "I have managed by a daring stroke, by prolonging the truce for twenty days, to reach my goal," thereby proving that this extension which he knew suited Napoleon also, secured his other object, viz., the dissolution of the alliance and the acceptance of mediation. The extension of the armistice was advantageous for Austria's preparations, but far more so for France. If therefore Metternich offered Austria's mediation on such terms as made it worth Napoleon's while to accept, it was because he was anxiously desirous of peace as the means of averting a foreign invasion. Early in July he told Hardenberg the Emperor Francis was convinced the whole burden of the war would fall upon Austria, and would entail heavy losses on the monarchy, and therefore, to avoid that, he was willing to renounce all increase of territory. Oncken, "Osterreich and Preuszen in Befreiungskriege," II. 399, cp. also Luckwaldt, p. 336, and Wertheimer, "Der Herzog von Reichstadt," p. 62, where an attempt has been made to show, by quoting some letters to Stadion, that Metternich was always in favour of war, and that the Emperor Francis alone was till the last, sincerely desirous of peace. Stadion was the eloquent champion of the war party, Bubna the advocate of the peace party, and to both of these men Metternich wrote favouring various views according to the circumstances and the times. Even to Stadion he once wrote: "Try to bring them (Russians and Prussians) to reason and to persuade them they have more to gain by peace than by war, which they do not understand how to wage" ("Die Konvention vom 30 Juni," given Neumann, II. p. 365).

Britain he was prepared to accept only on two conditions—either after inflicting crushing defeats in battle, and thereby securing the supremacy of the Empire for a long period, or by coming to a separate agreement with Russia similar to that of Tilsit. But to inflict crushing defeats, extensive preparations were necessary and these again required time. In his instructions to Caulaincourt on May 26th, Napoleon had reckoned on three months, which was far in excess of the period allowed by the armistice of June 4th. Now, however, a valuable extension of time had been won and the Emperor immediately seized his chance. He still hoped to find an opportunity at the congress of coming to an understanding with Russia. Hence be intended to send to Prague not only Narbonne, the accredited Ambassador to the Austrian Court, but also Caulaincourt—though not just at once. The latter he detained till July 26th, when, after much friction, between the allied Sovereigns and bitter upbraiding of Metternich, who had not observed the terms of the Reichenbach Treaty, the various negotiating parties at Neumarkt signed the extension of the armistice. It is probable that the Emperor was unwilling to appear at Prague while the impression created by the news from Spain was still fresh. For at Vittoria, far to the north of the Ebro, Wellington had totally defeated the French on June 21st and had put them to flight. Only a few fortresses beyond the Pyrenees remained in the hands of the French, and when these fell, France herself would be in immediate danger. The Emperor was now sincerely anxious to get his hands free in Eastern Europe without loss of prestige, and so he sent instructions to Caulaincourt "to conclude a peace with Russia which would be glorious for that Power".[1]

[1] Ernouf, "Maret," p. 574. The fact that Napoleon at this time was not disinclined to a general peace is confirmed by Metternich's letter from Dresden on June 28th to the Emperor Francis, where he speaks of being "convinced that the question of a general peace could be much more easily fought to an issue than that of a merely continental peace" (Oncken, II. 395). Maret even gave him a plan of the scheme. Napoleon's statement at St. Helena that he had wished for a general peace at Dresden was made known through Montholon's "Narratives of St. Helena,"

In the Bohemian capital Caulaincourt soon realized that there was small chance of fulfilling his Sovereign's wishes. Anstett, the Russian representative, was a confirmed Napoleon-hater, and he and Metternich had agreed to conduct negotiations after the manner of the Teschen Congress of 1779, i.e. not to discuss matters in conferences, but to commit everything to writing, each party communicating separately through the intermediary Power. Metternich had chosen this plan as a means of precluding all possibility of secret agreements behind his back, and the allies had accepted it in order that Austria might compromise herself the more surely with France. Under such conditions, Caulaincourt was powerless, and Napoleon was forced to abandon his idea of a separate peace with the Czar. Henceforth he set his mind on compelling by force of arms what he could not otherwise obtain. If Austria did not remain neutral, though he still hoped she would, he was resolved to make his preparations on such a scale that he alone would be numerically superior to all three opponents. The news that Alexander and Frederick William had met Bernadotte at Trachenberg Castle in Silesia, and had there discussed a plan of campaign, completely excluded any further thoughts of peace. In the end of July the Emperor left Dresden and met the Empress-Regent and his Ministers at Mainz. Here he received their reports, gave instructions for their guidance during the coming campaign, and inspected two new corps. On August 5th he returned to Saxony. The Congress at Prague lasted other five days, and even then they had not got beyond mere formalities, as was natural, seeing no one any longer wanted peace. The allies had never expected it as a result of Austria's mediation, and had merely accepted her services as a means of enabling her to change sides. Even Metternich, under the impression of the news from Spain, had become quite bellicose. Moreover, at Trachenberg Castle, Bernadotte

p. 107. A few weeks later, however, he changed his mind and objected to an Austrian envoy being sent to London. He wanted a continental peace, but after a pattern of his own, i.e. with Russia alone, at Prussia's expense, and without any consideration for Austria.

(in whom they had great faith at Vienna) had declared himself ready to take command of an Army of the North, composed of Swedes, Prussians, and Russians, and the plan of campaign previously agreed upon at Reichenbach had been modified in accordance with Austria's proposals.[1] For the present Metternich's one desire was to convince his faint-hearted Master of the impossibility of any reconciliation with Napoleon. The Emperor Francis had now a formidable army at his disposal, and he no longer rejected the idea of using it. He wavered, however, as to the advisability of making great sacrifices to restore a situation that had become intolerable four years previously, or to conclude a peace that might not prove of long duration. But Stadion, since the beginning of his mission to the allies, had been indefatigable in tightening the bonds between them and Austria, and regardless of the hesitation at the Viennese Court had even exceeded his instructions. Now in his letters he urgently appealed to his Master not to be satisfied with the minimum demands, but to use the opportunity when they had 400,000 combatants in flank and front of the enemy, to attack him in the rear as soon as hostilities began. Now was the time to strike a blow for complete independence and for the security of the frontiers. The Reichenbach Treaty, he declared, did not restrict the *casus belli* to the four points constituting the minimum. These appeals did not fail of their effect upon the Emperor Francis, whose hopes of peace had already been destroyed by Napoleon's "unreasonable" attitude at the congress. Fouché, the newly appointed Governor of Illyria, passed through Prague during these days and told the allies a great deal about the precarious situation of the Emperor and the troublesome mood of the nation. Except in Vienna, where they dreaded the risk of new defeats and of a third occupation of their city, the people of Austria were in a state of fer-

[1] On July 19th Colonel Latour took the Austrian proposals to Reichenbach where they were approved, and on the 22nd, Metternich, who advised his Master to face the risks, sent a sharp note to Maret, complaining of the delays at the congress. Caulaincourt was then sent without further delay (Luckwaldt, p. 348, 359).

ment which both Minister and Monarch had to take into account. Broglie, Narbonne's secretary, says in his Memoirs, "We could not cross the street in Prague without being insulted".

After all, the essential thing was that Napoleon should be convinced at last that he had been mistaken with regard to Austria's future attitude when he expressed himself so confidently to Metternich at Dresden. Caulaincourt's reports, but especially the Austrian Army lists which the French agents at Prague had managed to procure, led the Emperor to regard a declaration of war from Austria much more seriously than he had hitherto done. He found himself suddenly face to face with a more powerful coalition than he had ever before encountered, a coalition of States whose interests he had till then thought irreconcilable. He made a last effort to overthrow it. Scarcely had he returned to Dresden when he instructed Caulaincourt to sound Metternich privately, "as to how Austria felt with regard to peace, and whether, if Napoleon accepted her terms, she would make common cause with him or remain neutral". But he was too late. Metternich replied by stating not only the four indispensable articles for which Austria had pledged herself to fight, but all six points which she had previously been willing to settle by diplomacy. As that implied the dissolution of the Rhine Confederation and the restoration of Prussia to her former status, etc., there was small prospect of Napoleon yielding. His answer, accepting or declining, was to reach Prague not later than midnight on August 10th. Metternich must have passed some anxious moments after sending off this ultimatum, for had Napoleon within that time declared his acceptance of these conditions, Austria's position would have been embarrassing in the extreme. She would then have needed to make good her escape through some back exit, a contingency which had been foreseen in the preface to the ultimatum, where Metternich informed Caulaincourt that Austria was aware from "previous declarations," of the conditions under which the allies *seemed* to favour a peaceful settlement, and which the Emperor Francis regarded as the only way which could

really lead to a general peace.[1] Hence the ultimatum showed quite plainly that if Napoleon did not accept the conditions Austria would go over to the allies, and that she would not force Russia and Prussia to peace even if he consented. But Metternich's calculations were justified; he wrote straightway to Stadion that the form in which the question was put allowed no possibility of Napoleon answering in the affirmative. The victor of Lützen and Bautzen could not accept a programme which disputed his right to control his German troops, and which forced him to evacuate the fortresses of the Vistula and the Oder. "Do they want me to dishonour myself?" said he to Metternich at Dresden. "Never! your hereditary Sovereigns can suffer defeat twenty times and yet each time return to their capital, but I am only a child of Fortune. I shall have ceased to reign on the day when I have ceased to command respect." He was now indignant at Austria's demands, which he exaggerated in his letters to Jerôme and Cambácerès as including even the restitution of Venice. However, merely for the sake of appearing to do something, he offered, in return for compensation for the King of Saxony, to relinquish the Duchy of Warsaw, Danzig, as a free State, and Illyria and Dalmatia without Trieste. On the evening of August 9th, Bubna received this reply at Dresden and punctually forwarded it to Prague. But Napoleon's official answer did not arrive till the 11th, when the French delegates had already received their passports and the congress was over. On the 12th the Austrian Emperor issued his declaration of war against France and a new and desperate struggle began.[2]

[1] Thiers, XVI. 217; Oncken, "Österreich und Preuszen," II. 450. Luckwaldt, p. 368; Sorel, VIII. 171.

[2] Napoleon did not at once give up the diplomatic game as lost. Hostilities could not be resumed without a week's notice on either side and he utilized this time in complying with Austria's ultimatum purely with a view of throwing on to other people's shoulders the odium of being the aggressor. But that was all the success he obtained. On August 16th (the Czar had meanwhile arrived in Prague and had been secretly informed of the decision by Metternich) his plenipotentiary was dismissed with a reply in the negative. In 1814 the dethroned Emperor remarked to the Austrian General Koller: "As for the Prague Congress, I confess I was mistaken in

No attempt will be made here to give a detailed narrative of the struggles in which the peoples and States of Europe, sinking their mutual animosities, made common cause in order to free themselves from the oppressive yoke of Imperial France. Only the leading events will be reviewed.

Napoleon had made the very most of the truce. He had brought his army up to a strength of 440,000 troops ready to take the field. Of cavalry, the lack of which he had so bitterly deplored a few weeks previously, he now had a superfluity and of artillery likewise. And although his troops were the youngest of the French nation and of the peoples of the Rhine Confederation capable of bearing arms, yet, mere lads as they were, they had fought at Lützen and Bautzen like seasoned troops. They were to prove their mettle once more, and they would have done so cheerfully and eagerly had the war-chest not been empty, and had the commissariat contractors been more honourable. But there was no money for the soldiers' pay and the corruption was indescribable. So great were the sufferings from hunger that thousands of the youthful troops were in hospital, and this proved one of the chief causes in bringing about Napoleon's defeat in the great struggle.[1] There was still a great scarcity of officers and subalterns, but the dearth of the latter was largely due to the fact that the Emperor had drafted the best material into the Guards, who now mustered 58,000, and who were cared for and privileged in the same manner as before. It almost seemed as if this Imperator, who had no close national ties, was aiming at creating a personal army within the army proper. Besides the Guards there were fourteen army corps,

my estimate of you. I took you to be what I had found you on previous occasions; but meanwhile you had changed, to your advantage" (Helfert, "Napoleon's Fahrt von Fontainebleau nach Elba," p. 18).

[1] The lists show no less than 90,000 sick, out of the 440,000 troops at which the army in Germany was reckoned. Most of them died from lack of attention and of nourishment. The corruption extended even into the Emperor's immediate circle. An eye-witness relates that Paymaster Peyrusse pocketed 1000 francs out of the 4000 set aside by the Emperor for a monument to Duroc at Reichenbach, remarking that it was the usual thing to do (Odeleben, "Napoleon's Feldzug in Sachsen").

two of which, the Bavarians under Wrede on the Inn and the garrison of Danzig, do not come under consideration and are not included in the 440,000 troops. A corps under Vandamme had been detached from the division on the Lower Elbe under Davoût and sent to Dresden; a second corps was withdrawn from Franconia and placed under St. Cyr; Poniatowski had brought up 8000 Poles (unarmed) through Austria, and in addition to these there was a reserve of five cavalry corps, the command of which the Emperor bestowed on Murat, hoping thereby to strengthen his wavering allegiance and rivet him once more to the imperial interests. This great mass of troops was stationed mostly between Dresden and Liegnitz. Four corps under Ney, Lauriston, Marmont and Macdonald and a cavalry corps, 130,000 troops in all, known as the "Bober Army," were placed under command of Ney on the Katzbach and the Bober with their front to the east. Fronting south, near Dresden, stood St. Cyr with a cavalry corps; Vandamme's corps was at Bautzen; the Guards, Victor's corps, and a cavalry corps at Gorlitz; Poniatowski at Zittau; these troops constituted the main body, 180,000 strong, and were under the Emperor's own command. In addition, three corps, those of Oudinot, Bertrand, and Reynier, and a cavalry corps 67,000 in all, known as the "Berlin Army," were detached to the north. They were under the command of Oudinot and were posted at Luckau, Kalau, and Kottbus, while Davoût's corps, numbering 38,000, was stationed at Hamburg; Girard united an intermediary corps of two divisions in Magdeburg and Wittenberg.

The allies had also been making great strides in their preparations during the last two months. Alexander had organized a system of recruiting which enabled him to bring troops from all parts of the Russian Empire, until by the middle of August the Russian regulars numbered 180,000, exclusive of the great reserves in Poland. Prussia, thanks to the warlike enthusiasm of her people, had done wonders. "We now have an army," wrote Gneisenau on July 11th to Stein, "such as Prussia never had before even in her palmiest

days." Austria too had exerted herself to the utmost, and had 127,000 troops in Bohemia, exclusive of those in the garrisons, ready to take the field. In addition to this there were 37,000 troops in Central Austria to hold in check 30,000 troops under Eugène in the valley of the Danube. England provided the subsidies. On August 18th, on the breaking up of the congress, a treaty was signed with Britain by which Austria immediately received half a million sterling. As to the plans for utilizing effectively this enormous force, which, including 23,000 Swedes under Bernadotte and 9,000 Anglo-German troops, amounted to over 500,000 men, a provisional agreement had been made in June at Gitschin when the Emperor Francis first indicated the possibility of his cooperation. These plans were further discussed at Trachenberg with the Crown Prince of Sweden, and they were finally settled in July, when the supplementary proposals brought forward by Austria at Reichenbach were accepted. According to the Trachenberg plan of campaign, there were to be three armies in the field. The main army was to occupy Bohemia, out of consideration for Austria, who dreaded a new invasion from the north and the occupation of Vienna by the enemy. It was raised to the requisite standard by strong reinforcements of allied troops from Silesia, and at the conclusion of the armistice it numbered over 250,000 troops. It was placed under the command of Prince Schwarzenberg with Radetzky as chief of the general staff, but was hampered by the presence of the three Monarchs with their private military advisers, a combination of circumstances demanding great diplomatic tact.[1] Then there was the Army of the North under Bernadotte, composed of Prussians, Russians, and Swedes, numbering in all 127,000, from which a corps was detached to observe Davoût; and finally, the Army of Silesia. It consisted of a Prussian corps under Yorck, and three Russian corps under the command of Blücher with Gnei-

[1] The difficulty of commanding this composite force of 127,000 Austrians, 82,000 Russians, 45,000 Prussians, consisted chiefly in the fact that Schwarzenberg had to obtain the consent of the Sovereign concerned in the disposition of all troops other than Austrian.

senau as his adviser; even after 125,000 troops had been sent into Bohemia, it still numbered slightly over 100,000. The fundamental principle of the allies' strategy, as laid down by Radetzky, was that if their dread adversary threw himself with his main body on one of their three armies, it should fall back while the other two advanced to the attack. In this way they calculated to delay the Emperor's opportunity of striking a decisive blow with the main body under his own command until the three allied armies, strengthened by the reserves then being collected in Poland, were able to meet him with such superiority of numbers and such co-operation in their movements as would ensure success.

Of this plan Napoleon was entirely in ignorance, and he was late in learning of the advance of the Russian and Prussian troops on Bohemia. The idea of marching on Vienna, which the allies ascribed to him, he never entertained. He even thought of abandoning Dresden, and in this his generals agreed with him, and taking up a strong position behind the Saale and from there defeating the allies' armies separately as they came up; but a remark of Maret's that Frederick II in a similarly advanced position had successfully defied the combined Russian and Austrian forces, led him to abandon this wise project and remain on the far side of the Elbe. He now planned an offensive movement against Berlin in which Davoût was to co-operate from Hamburg and Oudinot from the south. This manœuvre he expected to be successful, as he greatly underestimated the Army of the North and considered it the weak point in the enemy's lines. A division under Girard was to move out eastwards from Magdeburg and form a connecting link between Davoût and Oudinot. After the capture of Berlin, Küstrin and Stettin were immediately to be relieved, so that the left wing of the entire French position would then be able to move farther east. Meantime the Emperor intended to cover this operation by an effective diversion against the other two armies, leaving the allies to take the offensive. From what point the attack might be expected was not clear even to himself. To be ready for any emergency he took up a temporary position at

Gorlitz with the Guards and a few corps, under the impression that the Austrian and Russian allied army might march out from Bohemia through Zittau. He sought to fortify Dresden against a surprise attack by erecting pallisades and earthworks, and entrusted its defence to St. Cyr, he himself being in a position to co-operate within a few days.

But the enemy did not assume the offensive from Zittau. Instead of that, before August 16th, Blücher had already begun hostilities and had defeated the four French corps under Ney, who had opposed him near Liegnitz, and had driven them back behind the Bober. Napoleon now meant to retrieve this defeat and to crush Blücher by one fell blow. Warned, however, by the altered demeanour of the French troops, perhaps even by the ringing cries of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" that the great War Lord was there in person, and therefore seeking a decisive action, Blücher fell back, in accordance with the principle laid down by the allies, and withdrew behind the Katzbach, fighting all the way. Not realizing at the outset that this retreat was intentional, the Emperor pursued eagerly, until the 22nd, when at length he saw that Blücher had no intention of accepting battle. He then returned to his position at Gorlitz-Zittau, where a messenger from St. Cyr overtook him with an unexpected summons for help. For a hostile army was now advancing from the Erzgebirge, and Dresden was in danger. There was thus a likelihood of the decisive action taking place not where Napoleon had expected but nevertheless in a favourable quarter for him. In a letter to Maret, written during these days, he remarked: "As there can be no settlement without a battle, nothing could be more fortunate than that the enemy should march upon Dresden, because then a battle must ensue". Leaving Macdonald with three corps to oppose Blücher, and taking Ney and the sixth corps with him, the Emperor set out for the west. The Guards and the corps of Vandamme and Victor, who had been posted to the north of Zittau, ready to meet the enemy, were also to advance in that direction. After three days of unrivalled forced marches the troops reached the neighbourhood of Dresden, where the Emperor

conceived the daring plan of crossing the Elbe below the enemy, who were already near the city, so as to place them between himself and St. Cyr and cut off their line of retreat. But this brilliant plan he had to abandon almost immediately, for St. Cyr was too weak to maintain his resistance until the great flanking movement had been completed. Nothing therefore remained but to choose the safer way and advance upon the enemy from Dresden. Vandamme was sent to Pirna and Königstein with 40,000 troops, and on the morning of August 26th, Napoleon entered Dresden with the Guards, who in three days had marched over sixty miles in torrents of rain and across fields, for the roads were reserved for the artillery and the convoys. The corps of Marmont and Victor were still on the way.

Meanwhile the allies had actually reached the neighbourhood of Dresden. At a council of war held at Melnik they decided to send the "Bohemian Army" towards Leipzig to attack Napoleon's communications as soon as he advanced upon Bernadotte. But during their march over the Erzgebirge they abandoned this dangerous project, and on finding that the Emperor had taken the field in Silesia against Blücher they directed the entire army on Dresden. The temptation to capture this powerful city with its large depots and reserves was too great to be resisted, and on August 25th a reconnaissance was made from the hills to the south of the city to see if it might be carried by a *coup-de-main*. But this idea was abandoned, as at head-quarters it was considered advisable to manœuvre "until the enemy's plans became more clearly defined". Such was the view of Alexander, who herein followed the counsel of his military advisers (among them Moreau, Napoleon's old rival), although the chances were in favour of a daring blow if struck that day. It was certainly more in harmony with the strategic principles of the allies to lure on the main body of the enemy by means of their smaller armies, so as to unable their united forces to advance victoriously—in other words to bring their main body within reach of the decisive battle. Hence in his order for the following day Schwarzenberg laid stress upon the

"demonstrative" character of the further advance. The right wing (the Russians under Wittgenstein) was to push on as far as the suburb of Pirna, Kleist's Prussian corps to the Gross Garten, while an Austrian corps in the centre and on the left was to advance, "without undue loss of life," on the villages and suburbs to the south and the west of Dresden, which was now being heavily bombarded. The assault and attack by the left wing was ordered for the afternoon of the 26th. Meanwhile the battle against St. Cyr was already in progress, for the allies were now intent on capturing Dresden with one portion of their army.[1] On that same day, however, they became aware of the approach of strong masses of the enemy's troops from the east and finally of Napoleon's presence in the town, a state of affairs which compelled them to change their offensive movement into a defensive one, and even into a retreat. They resolved to desist from any further attack on Dresden and to take up a strong position on the hilly ground until the retreat commenced. No adequate explanation has yet been given as to why they discontinued the battle, and why they did not prosecute the attack on the left wing with redoubled ardour instead of abandoning it. By four o'clock in the afternoon, fighting was going on all round the city, which was swept by an incessant hail of bullets.

Meanwhile the Guards, spurred on by unstinted encouragement from their Emperor, had crossed the Elbe and advanced on the threatened positions. They averted the onset of the allied troops, who, being unsupported and without the requisite means for an assault, failed of success and sacrificed themselves to no purpose on the outskirts of the city. At five o'clock Napoleon advanced to the attack and drove the

[1] On August 26th Metternich wrote from Brüx to Hudelist in Vienna: "I arrived to-day from the head-quarters at Reichstatt in Dippoldiswalde, four leagues from Dresden. As I was leaving the latter place 30,000 troops set out to make a reconnaissance. During to-day Dresden is to be attacked and carried by storm. Sixty thousand troops, including 20,000 Austrians, are destined for this enterprise, all the chances being favourable to it."

Russians on the left beyond Striesen, the Austrians on the right to Löbtau and Cotta, and the Austrians and Prussians in the centre back on the heights of Räcknitz. The day ended in favour of the French, and that too without the aid of the corps of Marmont and Victor, which only arrived during the night and added greatly to the strength of the French army.

Next morning, seeing the allied army was still there, having merely withdrawn to higher ground, the Emperor immediately assumed the offensive. Schwarzenberg had advised an instant retreat, for as Dresden could no longer be captured easily, the object of the demonstration was accomplished, also the troops were short of food, they had suffered heavily during the incessant rain, and Prince Wurttemberg was unable to maintain his ground at Pirna against Vandamme. The three Monarchs, however, especially King Frederick William, advocated maintaining the defensive in favourable positions in the event of the Emperor renewing the battle—which he did. Napoleon engaged the enemy's right wing and centre while Victor with his column advanced against the left wing and pierced it between Rosstal and Döltzschen, thus enabling Murat to overthrow the extreme left with the utmost ease. Attacking it in front with his cavalry corps while two divisions surrounded it from the west, he succeeded in capturing an Austrian division 9000 strong and in driving the remainder far back along the Freiberg road. The allies' mistake in leaving their cavalry inactive in the centre and not risking a charge, and the failure of the Austrian detachment under Klenau to arrive in time, greatly facilitated the victory of the French. So, threatened in their rear, where Barclay had failed to carry out the Czar's orders to drive the French from the Pirna road, and decisively defeated in their left wing, the allies began their retreat that night.[1] Within two days their losses amounted to over 10,000

[1] On August 31st, Metternich wrote Hudelist: "After incredible fatigues and an excellently conceived demonstration, which was foiled by the equally incredible ineptitude of General Barclay de Tolly and might have proved highly compromising for us, the allied army began its retreat

dead and wounded and 15,000 prisoners whilst their opponents, from their sheltered position, had not suffered nearly so heavily and had a notable victory to their credit. Had Napoleon followed up his success with equal skill, the main army of the allies would have been overwhelmed by a catastrophe such as no victory of their other armies could have retrieved. But this he did not do, because on the 27th he was uncertain whether the enemy, whose centre and right wing had been but little engaged, might not renew the battle and bring all their troops into action. His commands, issued that evening, show that he expected a third day's battle. As a matter of fact the plan of withdrawing with the entire army to the heights of Dippoldiswalde, and there renewing the fight was discussed at the allies' headquarters until far on in the night. Finally however, Schwarzenberg, pleading the defective equipment of the Austrian troops and especially the lack of artillery, ordered the retreat, and next morning, as Napoleon was riding over the scene of the previous day's battle, he saw the enemy's columns defiling towards Maxen and Dippoldiswalde, and disappearing in the valleys. As Vandamme held the Pirna road leading from Peterswalde to Teplitz, the Emperor came to the conclusion that the allies would try to gain the latter town by the shorter but less convenient road through Altenberg. He therefore sent St. Cyr and Marmont after Victor along the road to Sagda, whilst Murat was to march against Freiberg and Frauenstein and threaten the allies in flank and rear. On the 28th he wrote to Vandamme (who had relieved Mortier at Pirna), that the enemy seemed to be following the road to Altenberg, and ordered him to prevent them establishing communications with Teplitz and to harass their baggage train.[1] Napoleon

from Saxony on the evening of the 27th". At the head-quarters of the Monarchs, Barclay's conduct was regarded as one of the principal causes of the day's failure.

[1] This letter of Berthier to Vandamme, given by Pelet in the "Spectateur Militaire" of 1823, is quoted by all historians—even military ones, except Aster, with the senseless clerical error of "Annaberg" instead of "Altenberg," which alone is possible. Neither the wording of this letter nor Napoleon's note to Murat on the following day leaves any doubt on the

himself was far from considering he had vanquished the enemy whom he had expected to renew the battle, but he

point, for he says " toute l'armée se retire par Altenberg sur Teplitz ". Recently attempts have been made to justify Napoleon's conduct during these days by asserting that on August 28th he thought the enemy was actually retreating in the direction of " Annaberg," and consequently he did not succour Vandamme as he considered him no longer in danger, and it was only at noon on the 29th that he learned " to his surprise " from Marmont's dispatch that the allies were retreating " through Altenberg on Teplitz ". (*Vide* " Jahrbücher für die Deutsche Armee und Marine," 1902, where Osten-Sacken upholds the view that the only possible explanation was that Napoleon thought the enemy retreating via Freiberg, and did not suspect the success that was within his reach nor the danger to which his general was exposed.) But the arguments here adduced are insufficient to explain adequately how the allied army came to be at Annaberg and why it was not retreating on Bohemia, where the depots and reserves were. If the former direction was his goal, why did not Napoleon choose the nearer and more convenient route through Marienberg into Bohemia, mention of which repeatedly occurs in his correspondence ? It was illogical to think of the enemy retreating to the west where their left wing had been surrounded and defeated on the 27th, while their centre and right wing remained intact. Moreover, on the 28th, the Emperor wrote to Vandamme : " I think you should forestall the enemy by way of Tetschen (!), Aussig (!), and Teplitz and cut off their baggage, etc., in short all the impedimenta that accompanies an army ". How could Vandamme do this by such a route if the army were marching from Dresden to Annaberg ? How could the Emperor write Murat on the morning of the 29th, " Vandamme announces that terror reigns in the whole Russian army," if the Russians were marching on Annaberg and Vandamme on Aussig ? In the same dispatch he ordered Murat to turn aside from Freiberg and march to the south-east on Frauenstein, " so as to come upon the enemy in flank and rear," consequently he must have thought Murat was advancing via Hermsdorf, which would actually have led him to the flank and rear of the enemy who were marching via Altenberg. If Marmont's news on the 29th " that the enemy were marching via Altenberg," really " surprised " Napoleon, would this surprise not have been immediately mentioned in the new order to Vandamme ? No mention is made of it. On the 30th he writes Mortier to support Vandamme " if need be " with three divisions of the Guards. Marmont's news on the 29th was only a confirmation of what Napoleon had supposed on the 28th—viz. that the enemy was advancing on Altenberg. The passage in the postscript of the letter to Murat on the 29th confirms the previous day's supposition : " Marmont announces that yesterday a column from Dippoldiswalde followed the road to Frauenstein, but at Hermsdoff they will regain the Altenberg Road ".

frankly regarded it as a great success to have victoriously repulsed the onset of their main army. Had he had the faintest suspicion of the dejection in the allies' camp, of the bad spirit shown by the Austrians, of the disorder of the retreat, of the inextricable confusion in the marching of the columns,[1] of the danger of their being annihilated between Vandamme and a pursuing French corps, he would not have lost a moment in completing his victory by a sudden and crushing blow.[2]

There were other considerations. During these last days he had learned of a disaster to Oudinot's army, which had been defeated by Bülow at Gross-Beeren on August 23rd, and compelled to retreat on Wittenberg. As if that was not enough, just as he was about to join the pursuing corps news came that Blücher had won a brilliant victory on the 26th, at Wahlstatt on the Katzbach, over Macdonald, who had been thrown back into the Lausitz with a loss of some 20,000 troops. Napoleon was now hesitating whether, under these circumstances, he would venture into Bohemia. He gave the question the most careful consideration, and wrote a series of notes answering it in the negative. In his original plan of operations he had intended to remain on the de-

From these reasons and others drawn from Napoleon's letters ("Corr.," xxvi.), I therefore adhere to my opinion that in Berthier's letter to Vandamme on August 28th, it should not be "Annaberg" but "Altenberg," just as in the note of the 30th it should be ("Corr.," xxvi. 20,492) "Rumburg" instead of "Naumburg".

[1] So great was it that 36,000 Prussians under Kleist, unable to advance at all, wheeled off to the east from Furstenwalde and made their way across the hills.

[2] An attack of illness which came on while he was breakfasting on the Pirna road is alleged to have interrupted his advance and occasioned his return to Dresden, so runs the tale. But though the illness may have had some basis of fact it must have been of brief duration, for he looked very well and cheerful on his return to Dresden, where a messenger from Katzbach met him and found him in "the best of health". He himself two days later, when he learned of Vandamme's mishap, told Daru that his indisposition had caused him to retreat from Pirna as he thought himself poisoned (*vide* Pasquier, "Mémoires," II. 86). In 1815, in speaking to some generals, he again sought to excuse himself by this trivial circumstance for not following up his victory at Dresden.

fensive in the south and to assume the offensive only in the north. Hence he had conceived the battle of Dresden entirely on the defensive,[1] regarding the capture of Berlin and the fortresses of the Oder, which he calculated could not hold out longer than October, as the real object of attack. He was now thinking of conducting this attack in person with greatly increased forces while Dresden was merely to be put into a better state of defence. But at this crisis he erred, for instead of acting like a strategist he argued like a politician. "I can thus succeed," said he, "in separating the Russians from the Austrians and can give Austria proof of my special consideration for her by not having carried the war into Bohemia." As a matter of fact he sent a messenger secretly to Metternich.[2] Within the next two weeks—provided Macdonald were able to hold his own against Blücher—he expected to take Berlin, provision Stettin, destroy the Prussian defence and disorganize their militia, whose strength he greatly underestimated. The pursuit into Bohemia was therefore abandoned.

The criticism of the stragetic aspect of this plan must be left to military experts, and they hitherto have generally condemned it. Not altogether justly; for in his quest of a decisive battle Napoleon was forced to choose between two alternatives, either to enter Bohemia and march on Prague, or to carry out his original project in the north; and the latter, for reasons which he himself explains, was distinctly preferable.[3] But after all neither of these plans was carried

[1] *Vide* his letter to Fouché on August 30th, 1813, given by Brotonne, "Lettres Inédites," p. 498.

[2] In a letter on August 29th, to Berthier, who afterwards sent it to Murat, Napoleon wrote: "I do not see why you had to let the King of Naples know of my communication to Austria" (Lecestre, II. 1084).

[3] "I am no longer in a position to reach Prague before the enemy," runs a note of August 30th, "it is a fortified town; I should not be able to capture it; Bohemia might revolt. I would be in an unfavourable situation at Prague whilst the Silesian Army might perhaps attack my Bober Army; also Oudinot and Davoût's armies would then only be able to maintain the defensive and I would lose 9000 troops in Stettin in the middle of October. I would indeed hold the line of the Elbe from Prague

out. Vandamme, who had secured possession of the Pirna-Teplitz road on the 27th, had not succeeded in entering Bohemia before the allies and defeating their columns singly when they descended into the valley, as Napoleon had hoped he would. On the 28th, the young Duke of Württemberg with a Russian corps and the Russian Guards, fought his way through by this road and on the following day, after valiant rear-guard fights, he continued his advance. Hence on the 29th, when Vandamme marched down from the hills near Priesten, he met with stubborn resistance from these troops, which were constantly being reinforced by the regiments arriving along the Altenberg road. Expecting that St. Cyr and Marmont would soon come to his rescue, Vandamme made a stand at Kulm, where a battle began on the 30th. But Marmont and St. Cyr did not come; they had been sent away from the Peterswald road in the direction of Altenberg and were a long distance off. On the other hand, Kleist, marching unopposed through the Peterswald, overtook Vandamme from behind and all-but annihilated his corps. Upwards of 10,000 troops were compelled to surrender; the remainder fled to the mountains, while Vandamme himself, who had acted with courage and prudence against overwhelming numbers, was taken prisoner.[1]

to the sea, but it is much too long. If it were broken at any point the territory of the 32nd Division (on the Lower Elbe) would then be exposed, which would necessarily recall me to the weakest part of my States. The Russians, who could not ignore the presence of my army of 60,000 troops at Stettin, have nothing to fear for themselves and for Poland. . . . As I am at the end of my lines, I could not reach the threatened point. I would lose my fortresses on the Oder and not be on the road to Danzig. On the other hand, by marching to Berlin I would secure a great victory, I would be in the centre of things, and within five days be able to reach the remotest points of my lines, relieve Stettin and Küstrin, possibly divide the Russians and the Austrians, be relieved of the difficulties of feeding the troops, for the potatoes, and the resources of Berlin, the canals, etc., would provide for them" ("Corr.," xxvi. 20,492).

[1] No sooner had Napoleon learned of Vandamme's disaster than he laid all the blame on the latter. He even went so far as to declare falsely that Vandamme had entered Bohemia contrary to his orders.

On September 1st, Napoleon wrote to St. Cyr: "I have explicitly

Early on the morning of the 31st, news of this disaster reached Napoleon. Only the day before a gloomy report had come in from Macdonald. Without a doubt the impression produced by the victory at Dresden had been affaced by the failures at Gross-Beeren, Katzbach, and Kulm. The hope of being able to separate the allies had to be given up, for their successes held them the more securely together. Even Napoleon was daunted. "Such is war," said he to Maret. "Victor in the morning, vanquished in the evening. Often it is only a step from triumph to failure." One thing was clear, a fresh success was imperative. He reverted to his plan for advancing on Berlin. After convincing himself that the allies did not immediately intend to march on Saxony, he sent forward Ney to take over the command from Oudinot and to begin the offensive by marching from Wittenberg to Baruth. To guard Dresden he left behind the corps of St. Cyr, Victor, and Mouton (who had collected the remnants of Vandamme's corps) and formed a reserve force out of the Guards, Marmont's troops, and a cavalry corps which he intended to take north with him if Macdonald succeeded in holding his own at Görlitz. But that Macdonald was unable to do. He was forced back on Bautzen, whence he sent an urgent message to his master telling him that of the troops still remaining (from 60,000 to 70,000) the majority were without weapons and ammunition, and that in the event of any fresh disaster they would inevitably desert. To pre-

ordered him to entrench himself on the heights, for his corps to camp there and only to send out skirmishing parties to Bohemia in order to alarm the enemy and to gather news" (Lecestre, II. 1058). Yet in his orders to Vandamme on the 28th, the latter was told that the Emperor expected him to arrive before the enemy via Tetschen-Aussig-Teplitz, and in the letter to Murat on the 29th there occurs the statement: "General Vandamme, who was in Nollindorf yesterday, ought to enter Bohemia to-day from the Peterswald direction" ("Corr.," XXVI. 20,491). On the following day the King of Württemberg received word that "Vandamme is advancing on Teplitz and four army corps are following the enemy who was in Altenberg yesterday" ("Corr.," XXVI. 20,491). Just as in 1798, after Abukir, and in 1805, after Trafalgar, they all fail when the Emperor fails, and by sacrificing them he sought to maintain the popular belief in his own invincibility.

vent such a contingency the Emperor hastened with his reserves to succour his hard-pressed general, and thus reinforced to defeat Blücher on his rapid advance, and then march "in hot haste," on Berlin. A good plan, provided the enemy gave battle. But there was the chance that Blücher, whose impetuous energy was checked and guided by the strategic genius of Gneisenau, his chief-of-the-staff, on learning of Napoleon's presence, might withdraw as he had done in August and entice him into pursuit through an exhausted country. That is what happened. Blücher fell back from Hochkirch to Görlitz, fighting all the way. This time, however, Napoleon fathomed his design and left off the pursuit, but he was now forced to advance against Bernadotte without having defeated the Silesian Army as he had hoped. He had already given orders to that effect when he was recalled to Dresden by the tidings that the Bohemian Army had resumed the offensive. In any case he would have been too late in reaching the north, for, thanks to Bülow's indomitable energy and to the timely co-operation of the Swedish and Russian artillery, Bernadotte had won such a decisive victory over Ney at Dennewitz on September 6th, that the French troops, pursued by Swedes and Russians, were driven far beyond Torgau. Next day the defeated marshal wrote to the Emperor: "Your left flank is exposed. Be careful, I think it is time to abandon the Elbe and fall back on the Saale."[1]

On September 6th, before this letter had reached him, Napoleon had arrived in Dresden and had discovered during a reconnaissance that the heights of the mountain passes into Bohemia were held by the enemy. For elated by their victory at Kulm and by the successes of their other two armies, the allies, on learning of Napoleon's advance against

[1] Of the remaining troops which were to operate against the allies' North Army, Girard's division, on hearing of the defeat at Gross-Beeren, turned back, and on their retreat to Magdeburg were annihilated on August 27th at Hagelberg. Davoût's troops, half of whom were Dutch and Low German, consequently unreliable elements, had only ventured on a feeble demonstration, which, in consequence of Oudinot's defeat, had to be abandoned.

Blücher, had immediately begun a diversion in favour of the latter. A division of 60,000 Austrians was to cross to the right bank of the Elbe and fall upon the flank of the advancing French at Rumburg, while the rest of the main body was to hold the troops at Dresden in check. Napoleon could scarcely have learned of this when he hurried south in order to drive the enemy back over the Erzgebirge and venture a sortie into Bohemia. The first of these plans succeeded, but the second was abandoned, owing to the difficulty of getting the artillery down from the Geiersberg heights into the valley, and also because Ney's defeat involved the likelihood of the Elbe line being broken, and consequently the Emperor wished to be at hand. Moreover, as soon as Napoleon's presence in Dresden became known, the allies immediately recalled all the troops detached to the east (with the exception of one division), and these now stood ready to meet him. Owing to these circumstances and to the impossibility of securing brilliant successes with such steep passes in his rear, Napoleon abandoned the idea of invading Bohemia.[1] By September 12th he was back again in Dresden, from whence he sent on all the stores and the entire clerical staff to Torgau, but unfortunately for him, he still continued to hold the town as a military base. Shortly afterwards, in order to mask Schwarzenberg's movements, the allied army advanced over the mountains in a north-westerly direction on Leipzig; but in this they were foiled by Napoleon making a sortie as far as Kulm. Again, however, he found the enemy too strongly posted for him to venture an attack with any prospect of success, all the more so as the difficulty of provisioning his army had compelled him to send two corps northwards

[1] On September 11th he wrote to Murat: "Had it been possible to bring cannon down the mountain passes I might have attacked the enemy in flank and we might have won great successes, but all attempts were vain". Nevertheless he adds: "The event which befell the Berlin Army prevented me proceeding farther" ("Corr.," xxvi. 20,540). He has been justly blamed for desisting too soon in his pursuit of Blücher and returning to Dresden. Had he driven the Silesian army far back, he might then have flung himself against the Austrians as they advanced through Bohemia and might possibly have changed the course of events.

to protect the convoys on the Elbe. Towards Schwarzenberg he had to content himself with pursuing a sort of "hither and thither" system, as he described it in a letter to St. Cyr on September 18th. He longed impatiently for the allies to attack him; but in vain. They avoided giving battle to the great commander-in-chief and defeated his generals.

Nevertheless the Emperor dared not remain any longer inactive, for the allied armies were now enclosing him within a constantly narrowing circle, and the difficulty of provisioning his troops increased with each day. Then came news from Ney, who had crossed again on to the left bank of the Elbe, that Bernadotte was making preparations to cross the Elbe near Dessau, and that a division of Blücher's army was approaching in a north-westerly direction, thus imperilling the Emperor's communications with Torgau and Dresden. To avoid the danger of being outflanked Napoleon ordered the retreat to the left bank of the Elbe and abandoned the right bank.

Ever since he had let slip his golden opportunity after the battle of Dresden, the Emperor seemed to have lost his power of decision and to have become the mere sport of his opponents, pursuing them sometimes in one direction, sometimes in another, till his frequent marches to and fro to Bautzen earned him from the local peasantry the nickname of the "Bautzen Courier"! But at last his advanced position became no longer tenable. His army was in the most desperate straits, discouraged and embittered, especially the higher officers. "It seems to me," wrote the Württemberg General Franquemont to his King on September 10th, "the French generals and officers are sick of the war and only the Emperor's presence can animate the soldiers." Indeed, when his eye was not upon them, they threw aside their duties like some oppressive burden, frequently rid themselves of their weapons and left the lines, or maimed themselves and crept in among the "slightly wounded". Scarcely a month had passed since the outbreak of hostilities, and already over 60,000 men and nearly 300 guns had fallen into the hands of the enemy. Over 40,000 sick and wounded

lay in the hospitals of Dresden, Leipzig, and Torgau, while hundreds, even thousands, of unarmed soldiers were wending their way westwards, driven from the ranks by the horrible sufferings that ensued when the harried lands of Saxony and Silesia could yield no more food, and when Ney's defeat had made it well-nigh impossible for the convoys from the Elbe to get through.

"M. le Comte de Daru," wrote the Emperor on September 23rd to the head of the commissariat, "the army is no longer being fed. It would be a sheer delusion to think otherwise." But he had no remedy to suggest, nor did he even know the full extent of the sufferings which his unprincipled and time-serving officials carefully concealed from him, contriving only too often to mislead him as to the actual state of matters.[1] Under these circumstances it was small wonder that of the 400,000 men whom the Emperor had at his disposal in Saxony in the middle of August, scarcely 250,000 answered the roll-call by the end of September, and these were ill-equipped, ill-clad, without boots, and soon, too, even without ammunition, for the transports from the west were being more and more frequently captured by hostile bands of irregulars. So great was the number of cavalry required to check these depredations that the shortage in this branch of the service seriously affected the army. While the allies were reinforced by over 50,000 Russian and Polish reserves under Benningsen, Augereau was advancing on Leipzig with only 13,000 troops. On September 27th, orders were issued at Paris for 160,000 conscripts of 1815 and 120,000 men of the last seven age-classes; but although the Senate at once issued the necessary decree, the new recruits were not available for the crisis that was close at hand.

During the last days of September, when the "chessboard

[1] Bertrand especially, a servile favourite, without great talent or special merit, brought into notice by his breach of parole in 1805 during the war with Austria, sought to make things pleasant by such information. His reports after the battle of Gross-Beeren may have led Napoleon not to strengthen the Army of the North and so have facilitated the second victory of the Prussians.

was growing confused," as he said to Marmont, the Emperor again sought to improve his position by diplomatic manœuvres. On the 25th, he sent a letter to the Emperor Francis by his adjutant Flahault, who delivered it under cover of a flag of truce to General Bubna, then attached to Blücher's army. In this letter Napoleon made the proposed surrender of the Polish fortress of Zamosc the pretext for introducing the subject of a peace. He further gave his envoy verbal instructions to declare that his master was especially desirous of concluding peace, and prepared to make great sacrifices to Austria and Prussia "if they would only give him a hearing". But under the influence of the victory in the north, the Emperor Francis had abandoned his attitude of mere companion-in-arms, and at Teplitz on September 9th, he had entered into a firm alliance with Russia and Prussia and was now bound by his pledges to these Powers. On October 3rd, he signed a convention with Britain for subsidies, and five days later the negotiations at Ried with Bavaria ended in that State formally entering the coalition.[1] Napoleon's diplomacy had

[1] This treaty with England increased the subsidies granted in August by other £500,000. The conditions of the treaty were those of the other conventions of September 9th. The original is given by Neumann "Recueil des Traités conclus par l'Autriche," II. 379, from the unpublished secret articles in the Vienna State Archives. Sorel, VIII. 162, like Oncken, II. 462, does not reject the secret treaty of July 27th, 1813, between Austria and England, by which the Vienna Court acquired rights over Italy as given by Bianchi in his "Storia della diplomazia europea in Italia," I. 333. This treaty never existed. Negotiations as to subsidies between the Austrian General Nugent and Cathcart did not lead to a convention, which Metternich then regarded as being too compromising (so he wrote to the Emperor on August 19th). It was only on the conclusion of the congress that a convention was agreed to. Moreover, Metternich's protest to Castlereagh on May 26th, 1814, referring to the secret treaty, is manifestly spurious; the Emperor Francis appearing as early as July 27th, 1813, as a member of the coalition, the Czar being alluded to as King of Poland, in addition to many inaccuracies such as "nome" instead of "nom," "de la parte," instead of "de la part," "participer à" for "faire part," etc., all betraying an Italian origin, while the Bourbons were to be compensated for Parma and Tuscany "on the dissolution of the German States".

Metternich's actual letters to Castlereagh on May 26th, 1814, are couched throughout in harmony with the friendly relations then existing

thus failed and once more everything depended on his generalship. It remained to be seen if even his genius was equal to the task of making headway against the loss of auxiliary forces, the chilled ardour of his troops, and the lack of valour and self-denial that had lately manifested itself throughout the whole army. In September, Napoleon had decided to await Blücher in a strong position behind the Elbe, between Königstein and Meissen. "In this position," he wrote Murat on the 23rd, "I shall be able to follow the enemy with my eyes, and if he shows any disposition to attack, I shall fling myself upon him, so that he cannot avoid a battle." But he waited in vain. A week and more passed without any attack from Blücher. In order to deceive Macdonald, Blücher had made preparations to cross the river at Mühlberg, and on the 26th he had set out with his army from Bautzen through Kamenz and on towards Württemberg, where Yorck, on October 3rd, forced the passage of the river in spite of Bertrand. Meanwhile the Russian reserves under Bennigsen, marching through Silesia and Bohemia, had reached Teplitz; Bernadotte had crossed the Elbe at Dessau on October 4th and 5th, and the main army had assumed the offensive in the direction of Leipzig. Napoleon was long in learning of all these movements. On October 4th, he asked Macdonald where Blücher's corps was. When at last he realized the true state of affairs he was completely taken aback; he had not credited the allies with such an extensive plan of operations. Now that it was evident that they meant to concentrate in his rear, he could no longer hold the line of the Elbe, nor even remain at Dresden. He decided to form two armies, one of three corps and cavalry under Murat he intended to station between Schwarzenberg's army and Leipzig with orders to remain strictly on the defensive and gradually to fall back towards Leipzig before the superior forces of the allies. The second army he intended to lead in person by rapid marches through

between Austria and England. Welschinger in his "Le Pape et l'Empereur," p. 409, is also wrong when he relies on this document in justifying the Emperor Francis's claim upon the Papal States as "King of Rome, hereditary Emperor, and head of the German Empire".

Meissen and Wurzen to support Ney, and uniting with him to thrust their combined forces in between Leipzig and the Silesian Army, which he would defeat and disperse. Then, joining forces with Murat, he meant to fall upon the allies' main army. "Hold back the Austrians as much as possible," he wrote on October 7th to Murat, "so that I can defeat Blücher and the Swedes before you reach Schwarzenberg." To this plan he adhered, except that he left behind two corps under St. Cyr to occupy Dresden. Possibly he thought this might form a decoy to keep Schwarzenberg in Bohemia; or, perhaps, as Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, he did not wish to allow the capital of the most faithful of the Confederate Princes to fall into the hands of the enemy and so impair his prestige. Be that as it may, in the great decisive battle that followed, he bitterly regretted the absence of these 30,000 troops.

Blücher and Bernadotte, who had joined forces on October 7th and had decided to march together to Leipzig, were for a long time unaware of Napoleon's advance, and the sudden news that he was near when they had thought him far away completely upset their calculations. Hitherto Bernadotte had gained his victories with Prussian troops and had carefully guarded his Swedes from loss, and now he immediately advocated a retreat across the Elbe; but failing to persuade Blücher to this course, he finally consented to remain on this side and march southwards from Aken. Blücher meanwhile was to cross the Mulde and then in junction with the North Army to withdraw behind the Saale. As a result of this manœuvre, Napoleon found himself once more confronted by a retreating foe instead of the battle on which he had so confidently reckoned. During the four days he spent at Düben, October 11th to 14th, he was in the worst of humours. As he could not lay hold of Blücher he thought of operating against the rear communications of the Silesian and North Armies at Wartenburg and Dessau, thereby compelling them to give battle, defeating them and driving them back across the Elbe. Then he intended to return by the right bank to Dresden, pick up the troops

garrisoned there, advance against the main army and "pay Berlin a visit". For the present he knew nothing of Blücher's march on the Saale, and of his being at Halle, where he was seeking to effect a junction with the main army. He actually ordered an advance to the Elbe; and as Tauenzien's corps, which Bernadotte had left behind on that river before proceeding to Connern, was forced to cross on to the other bank, he lulled himself in the false belief that Bernadotte was already over the river with all his troops. It was only on the morning of the 12th that he got anything like accurate information of Blücher, whom he did not expect to have already reached Halle. As Schwarzenberg was now constantly drawing nearer Leipzig, the Emperor decided to engage him to the south-east of the town and defeat him totally before Blücher had time to come up. Alas! he had tarried too long at Düben, waiting for news that never came. "To see him there," as Odeleben did, "constantly expecting news from the Elbe, sitting idly on a sofa in front of a big table, scrawling capital letters on a sheet of paper," well might Marmont say, "No one would recognize Napoleon during this campaign"! Not that he was altogether idle, but it was a tentative activity, until he saw clearly what he wrote to Ney on the 13th—that he must return to Leipzig "where undoubtedly a great battle will take place". Everything now depended on that, for as things stood no manœuvres could prevent the co-operation of the allied armies. Strategically the Emperor was already defeated, the decisive battle was merely a last chance which he would need to venture against enormous odds, less than 200,000 to 300,000. "We are drawing near the great day of reckoning," wrote Metternich to his friend Hudelist on the 8th.

The Emperor, however, was far from viewing his position in such an unfavourable light when he left Düben on the 14th for Leipzig. Although by that time he had learned that Bernadotte had not crossed the Elbe, he still thought himself safe on the north and the west, and that he would only have Schwarzenberg on his hands in the forthcoming engagement. Had he not been so long inactive that would

have been the case, for as yet it was only a fraction of the allies' main army that was lying opposite Murat. Bennigsen with his reserves and a corps that had been watching Dresden and was now ordered up to Leipzig, were still two days distant on the 15th, while Bernadotte, who constantly imagined that his rear was threatened, wanted to march back with his 60,000 troops "to protect Berlin," and was only prevented from doing so by the unanimous disapproval of his council of war and by the threatened withdrawal of the English subsidies. He had not advanced in co-operation with Blücher, and on the 15th, owing to his exaggerated fears for his left flank, he was still several miles from Halle, and so Blücher, who had been obliged to move very cautiously in consequence, only went from Halle to Schkeuditz on that day. Moreover, Schwarzenberg had taken up a position on ground broken by the rivers Elster and Pleisse and by the Leipzig Ratsholz, so that had Napoleon arrived but one day sooner, with his superiority in numbers—he had nearly 190,000 troops at his disposal—he might have attacked and routed his badly posted enemy.[1] But it was only on the 15th that the Guards and the cavalry joined Murat, who on the previous day in an engage-

[1] Schwarzenberg had originally intended to assume the offensive farther to the west, almost on the scene of the battle on May 2nd, so as to block Napoleon's retreat entirely, thinking that by forcing him back on this retreat the allies could then co-operate and with their overwhelming numbers annihilate him. This defensive plan, which forced the attacking enemy on to the unfavourable ground, was replaced on the 14th, at the intervention of the Russian head-quarters, by another which discarded the wider enveloping movement and contemplated assuming the offensive from the south, where the difficulties of the ground between the Elster and the Pleisse hindered the allies but left open the road to the west; especially if, as happened, Blücher did not come direct from Halle but reached Leipzig from the north (*vide* Kirchnawe's "Kavallerieverwendung, Aufklärung, und Armeefuhrung bei der Hauptarmee in der entscheidenden Attacke vor Leipzig," 1904, where Schwarzenberg's strategy, long severely condemned, receives more impartial criticism. Of late years there has been a revulsion in favour of this modest, unselfish, but not incompetent general (*vide* Delbrück, second edition of his "Gneisenau," Kaulfusz, "Die Strategie Schwarzenbergs"; and Friederich, "Der Herbstfeldzug 1813," I. 141.

ment with the allies' vanguard under Wittgenstein had succeeded in holding the line between the Pleisse and Liebertwolkwitz. Macdonald did not reach the left wing till the following day, while Marmont was obliged to remain north of the Parthe, as Blücher had meanwhile come up. Ney with three divisions and a cavalry corps was still at Düben. The Emperor therefore postponed the battle for a day. He himself was at the most important post, south of the town, facing the enemy with a powerful force, but the situation on the north was more critical than he was aware, and might have been worse had Bernadotte decided to lead forward his troops at once.

On October 16th Napoleon's plan was to attack the allies' main body with the troops hitherto under Murat's command, along the line of Markkleeberg-Liebertwolkwitz, while two army corps, under Macdonald and Augereau, with corresponding cavalry, were to proceed against their right wing. Threatened thus by a turning movement, the enemy would be forced to weaken their centre, which Napoleon then meant to pierce by a decisive attack by the Guards, Ney's divisions, and Marmont's corps. But this plan was foiled by Macdonald arriving too late, while Marmont never reached the southern part of the battlefield. Thus at the very outset of the battle the Emperor forfeited the advantage of the attack. At nine o'clock in the morning the allies began the struggle in the villages of Markkleeberg, Wachau, and Liebertwolkwitz, and for two hours the battle raged with fierce obstinacy. Then Macdonald's troops came in sight, and Napoleon, who had meanwhile been reinforced by Augereau's troops, decided to assume the offensive, in the belief that the forces opposed to him were much smaller than he had thought. Had he acted immediately he might possibly have won the battle, for he would not have met with strenuous resistance, but he wasted precious hours waiting for Macdonald, who at noonday had captured an important position on the Kolmberg, and vainly hoping that Marmont would arrive. It was two o'clock before he began his attack. He had meant to shatter the enemy's centre between

Wachau and Liebertwolkwitz by the fire from a hundred cannon, followed by a powerful cavalry charge, while Macdonald turned their left flank at Seiffertshayn. The bulk of the allied troops would thus be driven westwards to the rivers and cut off from their reinforcements. Such was the Emperor's intention. A terrific cannonading began, followed by a cavalry charge, and the enemy's centre was actually thrown back beyond Güldengossa. But all too late; for during the interval of waiting, the Czar had ordered up the Russian and Prussian guards, and Schwarzenberg the Austrian reserves from across the Pleisse to the battle-field at Wachau. The allied guards foiled the charge of the French cavalry and offered a stubborn resistance to the retreating columns, while the Austrians, under Bianchi, drove their opponents out of Markkleeberg and inflicted a decisive check on Napoleon's right wing. Under these circumstances, although Victor, reinforced by Oudinot and the Young Guard, pushed forward victoriously as far as Auenhayn, and Macdonald forced the allies' right wing round as far as Gross-Pössna, and an ill-timed attack of Merveldt's Austrians on the French right flank had failed utterly, it was all of no avail; the battle had not been won, only a part of the battle-field. But a decisive victory, which would have routed and scattered his enemies, is what Napoleon would have required to save his cause from utter ruin. For Marmont meanwhile, after an obstinate resistance, had been driven from Möckern and Widderitsch back beyond Gohlis and Eutritzsch to the Parthe. And so in spite of the ground gained at Wachau, Napoleon had lost the day; and whereas he was powerless to fill up the gaps in his ranks, Bernadotte and Bennigsen would arrive next day bringing the allies strong reinforcements. Then, indeed, he would no longer have only one of the armies to combat but all three.

Although a reconnaissance on the morning of the 17th showed him his desperate plight, he was not yet prepared to quit the battlefield. Reynier's corps was still behind, also Maret and the Foreign Office clerks.; they must be waited for. Besides, to sound the retreat at once, would be like confessing

defeat, and we have already seen how careful Napoleon was about appearances. Finally, the troops who had fought with such splendid valour the day before were now so exhausted that they were not fit to resume marching at once, especially as the retreat could not be conducted without serious fighting. Something therefore had to be done to gain time. Sending for Merveldt, who had been taken prisoner at Dölitz, the Emperor gave him back his sword, released him on parole, and sent him that afternoon to the Emperor Francis at the allies' head-quarters with proposals for an armistice. "Why do they not accept my proposal to open negotiations?" said he to Merveldt. "You see England will not have peace.[1] I shall withdraw, if desired, beyond the Saale; let the Russians and Prussians retire beyond the Elbe, you to Bohemia, and let poor Saxony be neutral." He also hinted that he would be willing to let Hanover go to England, to surrender the German north coast, and all the States of the Rhine Confederation who voluntarily deserted him; also Poland, Spain and Holland, but the last only on condition that its independence of Britain was guaranteed. Italy, however, was not to return to its old conditions and its subjection to Austria; it would be more in line with the European system if united under a ruler of its own.[2] By this last stipulation he robbed Merveldt's mission of all hope of success. For it was precisely for her supremacy in Italy that Austria had been contending for the past ten years, and it had required an Austerlitz to make her renounce her claims. At the allies' head-quarters they promptly and unanimously decided to leave the proposals unanswered. The renewal of the struggle was postponed till the following morning, when they expected to be reinforced by upwards of 100,000 troops. Soon after-

[1] This reproach refers to an attempt at a *rapprochement* made by Napoleon on September 25th, when he sent his adjutant Flahault with a flag of truce to the Emperor Francis at the Austrian outposts. The answer he received was that a partial peace was out of the question, but that his overtures had been forwarded to England (Oncken, "Aus den letzten Monaten des Jahres 1813," "Hist. Taschenbuch 1883," p. 12).

[2] *Vide* Burghersh, "Memoiren," p. 200; Sbornik, XXXI. p. 336; Toll, III. p. 523.

wards Blücher's army, which had driven the French beyond Gohlis and the Parthe, abandoned its attack.

Early on the morning of the 18th, while he was waiting vainly for Merveldt's return, Napoleon began his preparations for a retreat westwards. He ordered Bertrand, who had held Lindenau on the 16th against an Austrian corps, to proceed along the Lützen road to Weissenfels and secure the passage of the river; two divisions of the Young Guard were to relieve him at Lindenau. For the time being, nothing farther was done, and historians are at a loss to explain to themselves and others why the Emperor did not immediately begin the retreat through Leipzig and push on with the utmost vigour as soon as night came down, for Reynier had arrived by this time, the troops had rested, and their leader's reputation was no longer in danger. Possibly he still hoped for some result from Merveldt's mission, or it may be he dreaded the confusion of a night march through the city and over the one bridge, for they had omitted to build others. He may even have thought that such a step would only be necessary if it came to the worst. "The 17th passed quietly," relates Marmont in his Memoirs. "The enemy was waiting reinforcements. As for us, we were busy restoring order among the troops. Yet we ought to have begun our retreat without an instant's delay; or else to have prepared the means of effecting it when night came on. But a certain indifference on Napoleon's part, impossible to explain and painful to relate, filled up the cup of our misfortunes." Towards midnight the Emperor brought his army somewhat nearer Leipzig but kept it still in battle order. It was now certain he meant to dispute the extremely difficult passage through Leipzig, engage the whole of the enemy's army to the east, and make a stand against it at every village, so as to allow each corps as it came up a secure retreat westwards. Hence the fighting on October 18th, was really in a manner a retreating battle and as such certainly the greatest on record.[1] After Reynier's ar-

[1] "Leipzig might be regarded as a *tête-de-pont* which could easily be defended the whole day long if, as at Dresden, the suburbs and the old walls had been advantageously utilised" (Jomini, "Précis politique et militaire

rival and Bertrand's departure, the Emperor had still upwards of 160,000 troops and 600 guns, but the allies had close on 300,000 troops and more than double the number of the French guns, for Bernadotte had at last come forward, and when Blücher generously spared him 30,000 of his own troops, he declared himself ready to take an active part in the fighting.[1] But this great superiority of numbers was not turned to account in the battle, because the Crown Prince wished to save his Swedes, the Czar and the King of Prussia their guards, and consequently upwards of 100,000 troops took no part in the action.

On the 18th the French Army was posted along a line extending from Connewitz up the Pleisse to Dölitz, and on through Probstheida, Dösen, Zuckelhausen, and Holzhausen, northwards to Schönfeld, along the Parthe to the suburbs of Halle and as far as Gohlis. Napoleon took up his position at a tobacco-mill on the Colditz road near Stötteritz. At eight o'clock the allies began the attack. After fierce and deadly struggles the Austrians on the left pushed on through Dölitz, Dösen, and Lössnig, the Russians in the centre captured Zuckelhausen and Holzhausen, while the Prussians under Bernadotte, who had crossed the Parthe at Taucha with 50,000 troops, advanced late in the afternoon in co-operation with Bennigsen and drove back the French to the villages of Anger, Krottendorf, and Volkmarsdorf.

des campagnes de 1812 à 1814," II. 186). Jomini can only account for Napoleon's dilatoriness on the 17th by his expecting some result from Merveldt's mission.

[1] A French *emigré*, Rochechouart, who was in Russia's service and commissioned by the Czar to urge Bernadotte to take prompt measures, throws some light on the latter's conduct. He relates a conversation in which Bernadotte stated that in addition to his very natural disinclination to shed French blood he had also to consider his own reputation. His fate depended on a battle ; if it were lost, no one in Europe would lend him a farthing. With Napoleon alone the case was quite simple ; he was a thief who must be killed, for as long as he lived he was the scourge of the world. An Emperor is no longer necessary, the title is not French, France requires a King, one certainly who is a soldier. The Bourbon race is played out and will not come to the surface any more. Who would suit the French better than I ?" (Rochechouart, "Souvenirs," p. 251.)

Then darkness came down and ended the murderous strife. An overwhelming victory, proportionate to their great numerical superiority, the allies did not obtain; for the positions at Connewitz, and the centre at Probstheida, and Stötteritz remained in the hands of the French. But the danger threatening from the left wing, where a Saxon division and a brigade of Württemberg cavalry had gone over to the allies during the fight, compelled Napoleon to surrender these positions and thereby confess defeat. At midday he had already ordered the transport corps to retreat and the three cavalry corps followed during the afternoon. As night came on the great artillery park drove through the town and the Emperor then dictated to Berthier the order for a general retreat. Shortly before this he had fallen asleep, utterly exhausted. "They had brought him a wooden stool," so Odeleben relates, "and worn out by the exertions of the last few days, he fell asleep. His hands, loosely clasped, rested on his lap, and he looked at that moment like any other mortal man bowed by bitter adversity. His generals stood round the watchfire, gloomy and silent, and a short distance off the retreating troops marched past." Napoleon then proceeded to Leipzig, to the "Hotel de Prussie," where he spent the night working with Berthier.

It was long after midnight before the troops which had so nobly defended the positions at Probstheida and Stötteritz entered the suburbs of Leipzig. A rear-guard, consisting of three corps under Macdonald, was to remain behind to keep the enemy away from the town till noon of the following day. Should a general engagement then occur, they were to hold Leipzig if at all possible until midnight. But events turned out very differently. During the night of the 18th, and on the following morning, the confusion in the town was indescribable. For the troops, pouring into the town by three gateways, had only one gate by which they could leave. Early in the afternoon Napoleon had difficulty in fighting his way through the chaos and reaching Lindenau, for the possession of the inner town was already being hotly disputed. Then, too, the unexpected advance of a detachment of Rus-

sian chasseurs from Rosenthal so misled the corporal posted on the high bridge over the Elster as to the real situation that he blew up the bridge too soon, and thereby sealed the fate of the rear-guard corps.[1] Nothing was left for these troops but to surrender. Their leaders tried to escape. It was here that Macdonald saved himself by swimming the river with his horse, while Poniatowski, the noblest and one of the bravest of the Imperial marshals, perished in the river. Lauriston and Reynier, both wounded, were taken prisoner; Ney, Macdonald, Marmont, Latour-Maubourg, Sebastiani, and many others were wounded; and five generals of divisions were killed. The fighting on the 18th and the 19th alone had cost Napoleon over 60,000 troops, 25,000 of whom were taken prisoner.[2] Heavy losses these for a rear-guard action! Nor was that all. The retreat to the Rhine was now inevitable, and that meant that the garrisons in the fortresses on the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula, numbering over 150,000 troops, almost exclusively French, must also be surrendered. War claimed yet another victim—King Frederick Augustus of Saxony, to whom Napoleon, before his departure, had pretended that he was only leaving Dresden to manœuvre in the open country, and that he would return in a few days and relieve it.[3] The King went to Berlin as a prisoner. Stein, as president of the "Provisory Administrative Commission," became the executive head of the Saxon Government, which although conducted in the name of the three

[1] *Vide* Macdonald's "Souvenirs," p. 218, who relates that while the battle was in progress, an officer in the engineers had proposed to his superior officer that they should make their preparations for the passage of the river, but was told that it was time enough when the Emperor gave the order. The order was never given. They had all grown accustomed to trusting the Emperor to think of everything.

[2] Gneisenau estimates the losses on both sides as amounting "certainly to 100,000 dead and wounded" (Delbrück, "Gneisenau," I. 410). That figure was below the mark. The allies alone since October 14th had lost over 50,000 (Friederich, III. 226).

[3] King Frederick Augustus repeated Napoleon's misrepresentations to several people, the Russian Toll, the Prussian Natzmer, and others (Aster, "Die Gefechte und Schlachten bei Leipzig," II. 307).

allied Monarchs, was under the immediate supervision of a diplomatic council presided over by Hardenberg.[1]

When Napoleon sought to restore order in his retreating army at Weissenfels, he still had upwards of 120,000 troops who, at the outset, had continued their march in tolerable order in spite of the hostile attacks of the enemy's vanguard under Yorck, and of the Austrians under Gyulai. But as soon as they crossed the Saale and the enemy was no longer in sight, the army began to break up. Thousands left the ranks every day. Some threw away their arms and deserted; some formed into bands and pillaged the countryside, while others remained behind, too exhausted to march any farther. Hunger and typhus were working dire havoc in the columns. At Erfurt, owing to the allies' slackness in the pursuit, Napoleon was able to rest his men for two days, get them better in hand again, and obtain supplies. But after leaving the Thuringian Forest, which he had skirted at Eisenach on his way to Frankfort and Mainz, he had only 60,000 troops, rank and file, and they had again to make good their retreat by fighting. For at Hanau, on October 30th, Wrede blocked his way with a united corps of Austrians and Bavarians, numbering in all about 30,000, while Blücher had pursued Napoleon almost to Fulda. Had he continued along that road, and had Wrede held his ground, the French army would have been in sore straits. At the allies' head-quarters, however, the opinion prevailed that the French would endeavour to reach the Rhine, not through Fulda and Hanau, but by Alsfeld and Giessen, and Blücher and Wrede had accordingly received instructions to follow along the latter road. Wrede, consequently, not knowing that he had come upon the French main body on the 30th, attacked with the utmost confidence, and on discovering his mistake he still continued the fight—for political reasons. "We are too recent friends," said he, "not to show our goodwill in dead earnest." Napoleon, on his part, had only about 17,000 troops at his immediate disposal, including the Guards; the rest of his army was still some distance off. At first he wished to wait till all his

[1] *Vide* Lehmann, "Stein," III. 322.

troops had come up, and it was only with reluctance that he allowed himself to be persuaded by Macdonald to attack with the Guards; which was done, with good results. General Drouot of the artillery succeeded in bringing a considerable number of guns to play upon the enemy's left flank, and after an obstinate resistance, Wrede was defeated and the road to Mainz was free.

On November 2nd the Emperor reached Mainz and a few days later he left for Paris. Of the 500,000 troops who had crossed the Rhine at his beck during that year, scarcely 90,000 returned, and of these many were without weapons, their blood poisoned by a deadly disease. For typhus was then raging with such virulence in the Rhine city that long afterwards the "*Typhus de Mayence*" still retained its sad notoriety. "The crowds of human beings filling the houses and the streets baffles all description," says an eye-witness. "Here you would see soldiers, half-dead, forsaken, helpless, and tortured by hunger, lying on the hard stones without any protection from cold and rain, waiting and longing for death. Hundreds died every day and often lay unburied in the streets for several days." Every one, the Emperor too, if he cared to look out on the square from the Palace windows, could see how the Second Grand Army was wasting away. What must have been his feelings! Before the campaign began he had said to Count Molé at Paris: "Do not think I have not a sensitive heart like other people; I really am 'a good sort,' but since my earliest childhood I have accustomed myself to silence this side of my nature, and now it is dumb". He gave a very different description of himself at Dresden to Metternich, who had asked him: "When the generation of Frenchmen whom you have prematurely summoned to fight for you has passed away, will you then call out the next generation?" Nettled by the awkward query, the Emperor replied: "You are not a soldier; you do not know what it is to have a soldier's soul. I rose to power through the camp, and a man like me cares nothing for the lives of 1,000,000 soldiers." His last two campaigns had cost him almost that number. And although at Mainz he carefully tended the

sick and wounded, it was not so much from pure kindness as from utilitarian motives, wishing to have their services again at his disposal. One thought dominated all his energy at this time. It was briefly summed up in a remark he made at Erfurt: "By May I shall have an army of 250,000 combatants on the Rhine".

CHAPTER XVIII.

ELBA.

A SECOND year of war had thus closed for Napoleon with enormous losses. The national resistance of the Russians had compelled him to leave the Empire of the Czars by a *via dolorosa* of horrors unparalleled. The national enthusiasm of the Germans had driven him back across the Rhine. For under the weight of the elemental passions of patriotism and independence of foreign oppression, the statecraft of Princes and Cabinets had sunk out of sight. All King Frederick William's reluctance and the timid temporizing of his diplomatists had proved vain; he had to join in the war against his ally of the previous year. Austria's neutrality, built up by Metternich with such elaborate skill and fortified by alliances, was swept aside, and Francis I was compelled to draw his sword against his son-in-law. In vain Frederick Augustus of Saxony testified his loyality to the founder of his throne; his regiments deserted and left him to his fate. In the same way the Westphalian troops, the Württemberg cavalry, and the Baden infantry had all gone over to the enemy long before the last week of October, when Jerôme left his country and King Frederick I and the Grand Duke Charles joined the allies. Soon all the Princes of the Rhine Confederation were in arms against their Protector. And as among the Germans so too among the other peoples who had furnished contingents, the national party carried the day. This was the case in Italy where Alfieri's "*miso gallo*" had not been without effect. Before the battle of Hanau, Murat withdrew with his Neapolitans on the pretext that the state of affairs in his kingdom demanded his return. The fact was that Murat's thoughts were running

in far other channels; not only did he wish to retain the Crown of Naples, he aimed at wearing that of a United Italy —provided Austria did not assert her ancient rights. Towards the end of October, 1813, the Austrians under Hiller drove back Eugène's troops behind the Adige and regained possession of Trieste and the Dalmatian fortresses. In the middle of November, the Dutch openly revolted against Napoleon at Amsterdam and declared in favour of the House of Orange. While these things were happening, the national war in Spain, under British guidance and co-operation, had resulted in new victories over the French. In September the fortress of San Sebastian, and in October that of Pampeluna, had fallen into Wellington's hands and the road to Bayonne was then free. On hearing of the fresh disasters that had overtaken Napoleon, Wellington immediately set out for France and continued his advance, fighting incessantly with Soult. At the same time Suchet, in order to preserve his communications with France, withdrew from Catalonia and recrossed the Pyrenees.

So it was that the peoples of Europe threw off the heavy yoke of France, and Napoleon's own creation, his international Empire, crumbled into dust under the active hostility of the nations. And now his own fate was in the balance and it remained to be seen whether the nation whose land and strength he had made the nucleus of his universal sovereignty, would any longer tolerate a regime which had spilt their blood and squandered their wealth with such ruthless persistence. This time he could not blame the hostile elements of Nature as he had done a year ago. A second powerful army which had been entrusted to him in the hope of victory and peace, had been defeated and destroyed, and his prestige, which he himself regarded as the real foundation of his power, was shaken to its very base. Yet he meant to ask for a third army for a new war.

Before the decisive blow had fallen on the plains of Leipzig, the Senate, with its usual servility, had voted him 280,000 troops. Yet that was but a handful against all Europe! The Convention had also waged war against the

entire continent, but that had been in the enthusiasm of a newly won liberty, when the nation's strength was fresh. Since then twenty years of almost uninterrupted warfare had passed, France had once more forfeited her freedom, and the nation's enthusiasm for the man who had restored order and brought her fame, vanished now that his glory had grown dim, and that instead of the dreamt-of rest and peaceful enjoyment, successive feuds demanded ever-increasing sacrifices. The time was long past when the Emperor had laid province after province at the feet of France, maintaining that all these wars cost the nation next to nothing. In the previous year he had only succeeded in filling up the terrible deficit in the budget by an arbitrary seizure of the national domains, i.e. by ordering the sale of the communal lands. It now turned out that this experiment had met with scant success, and that only a trifling fraction of the value of the property could be realized in money. The State consequently found itself not only in desperate circumstances, but deficient even in material resources. For owing to the appalling waste of life in war, the fields lay fallow, the factories were idle, and trade at a standstill. The question was how to obtain the needful money? The tariffs could be raised, but the imports were too inconsiderable to be of any use; or the land tax (about 30 per cent) might be increased, also the taxes on doors and windows, patents, salt, and the various indirect taxes; and that is what the Senate decreed on November 11th. But the income from these sources was still insufficient. In January, 1814, the land tax was raised 50 per cent and the others in proportion. All in vain. The revenue from taxes that year showed a falling off of 50 per cent. National securities (*rentes*) fell to 50, the shares in the Bank of France, which had previously been worth 1400 francs and more, now stood at little over 700. No one bought, for no one had spare money. The vine-growers stored their produce in vaults; the warehouses of the manufacturers were full to overflowing. If Napoleon still meant to prepare for war he would only have his Tuileries' Treasury at his disposal for immediate use, and of the 65,000,000 it contained,

the greater part was swallowed up within the next few weeks.[1]

But the Emperor was short of men as well as of money. The October conscription was tolerably successful. After all the enemy was at the frontiers and patriotism demanded its rights. The country had no other general in whom it could trust with as great confidence as in its gifted Emperor. Hence the vast majority of the nation, as the police reports testify, remained sound Imperialists. It was only in the northern provinces, exposed to Anglo-Bourbon influences, such as Flanders, Artois, and Normandy, and in the southern provinces of Guyenne, Gascoigne, and Provence, that the population was either indifferent to the invasion or disaffected towards the Empire. Barante, then Prefect of Nantes, writes in his memoirs, "the populace began to agitate, and their discontent increased in proportion as the Imperial Government forfeited the powerful authority of victories". In other parts of the country the peasant resignedly offered up his last remaining son; and it was only when a second decree of the Senate on November 15th, 1813, ordered the levy of 300,000 men belonging to age-classes from 1803 to 1814, who had already completed their term of service and had become bread-winners and heads of families, that the difficulties proved insurmountable. Those called up did not answer the summons or else escaped to the woods. At the beginning of the new year, in spite of punishments, of the 300,000 demanded, little more than a fifth part had been obtained. The formation of a new National Guard, consisting of 450 cohorts, which had been sanctioned by the Senate on December 17th, presented difficulties quite as great. The

[1] The figures vary as to the sum available. Napoleon in conversation with Bethmann, the Frankfurt banker, speaks of having 80,000,000 in cash (*vide* Fournier, "Kongress von Châtillon," p. 2) but to Mollien he writes on November 17th, "I have only 30,000,000 in the Crown Treasury". Nevertheless he wishes the report spread that there are over 200,000,000 francs in it. Mollien accepted the Emperor's estimate of ready money, and added to it about 150,000,000 paper money which, of course, at a crisis it would be extremely difficult to convert into hard cash (Mollien, "Mémoires," 111, 345).

peasant had learnt in the last campaign that, when more soldiers were needed, the Emperor made no distinction between militia and regulars; and though he was ready to defend hearth and home, he was not prepared to march off to foreign wars and leave his wife and family in the lurch. There were barely 20,000 men at the recruiting stations, and even for this insignificant number there were not sufficient accoutrements, uniforms and weapons.

Although the nation had not yet deserted him, and the liberal agitation had so far obtained no foothold among the humbler ranks of the people, although the Bourbons and their aristocratic followers still roused the old enmity, the prospect was none the less a disquieting one for the Emperor, in view of the fact that he meant to renew the struggle against an allied Europe. If only he had not been engaged simultaneously in the east and the south, the troops of Soult and Suchet would then have been available against the allies. Napoleon therefore decided to release the captive Ferdinand VII, to restore his country to him, and conclude peace. A treaty to this effect was signed at Valençay on December 8th. But instead of sending the King back to Spain immediately, the one condition, as Wellington testified, on which Britain would have consented to terminate the war, Napoleon, at Talleyrand's instigation, decided that the treaty must first be submitted to the Cortes at Madrid. There they refused to accept it, a result secured beforehand by Talleyrand, who at this time was secretly and zealously undermining the Emperor's political position. Negotiations dragged on till January, and the Army of the South was therefore not free to serve against the allies.

Napoleon was now thinking of liberating his second prisoner, the Pope. The collapse of the empire had cut the ground from under Napoleon's schemes of ecclesiastical supremacy. He had expected a great deal from his personal control of the Holy Father. "I would have raised the Pope again," said he afterwards, "and surrounded him with pomp and homage, and have made an idol of him. He would never have missed his temporal possessions. I would

have held my ecclesiastical sessions like my legislative sessions. My councils would have been the representation of Christendom with the Pope as President; I would have opened and closed them, approved and announced their decrees, just as Constantine and Charlemagne did. How fruitful in great events this would have been! The Papal influence in Spain, Italy, the Confederation of the Rhine, and Poland, would have welded the bonds of alliance throughout the great empire all the more firmly, and that which the Head of the Church exercised over the faithful in England, Ireland, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary, would have become the inheritance of France." But the great empire was already tottering and its influence on the neighbouring States was at an end. Now that France had shrunk back within its national boundaries the Emperor could no longer hope to combine it with the international and universal system of the Papacy. At the very beginning of the last war, Pius VII had renounced the Concordat of Fontainebleau, and later, when the Congress of Prague was sitting, he had appealed for support to his Apostolic Majesty of Austria. Napoleon was now prepared to release the Pope, but only on condition that he signed a treaty. This, however, the Pope absolutely refused to do, declaring that such negotiations could only be conducted in Rome, not in Paris; whereupon Napoleon kept him prisoner.

By acting thus, the Emperor had complicated his political position instead of improving it, and now there were only two courses open; either, in spite of his shrunken forces, he must defeat an enemy vastly superior to himself in numbers, or he must conclude a peace before crossing the Rhine. For years past France had been yearning for peace, and the terrible losses of the last campaigns had only quickened her desire for it. But the Allied Powers had advanced victoriously to the Rhine and the question was, would they be willing to halt there and listen to overtures? All doubt on this point was set at rest by the appearance of a French diplomatist, Baron de St.-Aignan, who came to Paris from Frankfurt, the head-quarters of the allies. St.-Aignan had

hitherto represented France at the Courts of Gotha and Weimar, and after the battle of Leipzig he had been taken by the allies to Frankfurt, where they intended him to play a rôle similar to that which Napoleon had recently entrusted to Merveldt. Metternich informed him in the presence of Nesselrode (who was acting for Hardenberg) and Lord Aberdeen (the British plenipotentiary), and with their formal consent, that the Powers were willing to conclude peace, and England to return most of the French colonies, provided Napoleon would accept the natural boundaries of France, i.e. the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, as the basis of the peace, and send delegates to a congress with a view to a general pacification. This offer was supplemented by the restrictive clause that the prosecution of the war was not to be interrupted by the diplomatic negotiations. Nevertheless peace was in sight, and any true friend of the Emperor was bound to counsel him to accept it without delay for as St.-Aignan's report justly remarked: "Napoleon would save humanity many sufferings and France many dangers if he did not postpone negotiations for even a day". This offer was really the reply to Napoleon's overtures before the decisive battle of Leipzig, and hence the same form of communication was adopted.[1]

[1] After Napoleon's conversation with Merveldt, Metternich wrote to Hudelist in Vienna (October 19th, 1813, "Kongress von Châtillon," p. 8): "We shall send our reply from the Rhine". St.-Aignan's report of his conversation with Metternich and of the conference in Frankfurt appears in a mutilated form in the "Moniteur" of January 20th, 1814, and in Fain's "Manuscrit de 1814". It is given more fully by Bignon, "Histoire de France," XIII. p. 24, and in Haussonville, "Souvenirs et Mélanges," p. 119. The diplomat's written note with the allies' proposals has been repeatedly reproduced (Sbornik, XXXI. 341; D'Angeberg, "Congrès de Vienne," I. 76). Sorel (VIII. 200), advocates the view that Metternich was not in earnest with the Frankfurt offer of the natural boundaries, and that he was aiming at turning popular opinion in France against Napoleon so as to increase his demands and either bring the humiliated son-in-law under Austria's influence or, in the event of Napoleon abdicating, exercise that influence on Marie Louise and her son. Sorel maintains that even had Napoleon immediately consented, peace would not have been signed on the basis of the natural frontiers. Against this it must be remembered:

The allies' conduct in calling a halt and offering this peace, is partly explained by the fact that in reaching the Rhine they had gained the goal of the war, as defined in the Teplitz treaty, and also it was to Austria's interest not to let France be too severely crippled, so that she might effectively counterbalance the threatening preponderance of Russia. This last had already made itself felt on the conclusion of the Treaty of Alliance on September 9th, when the clauses of the Reichenbach treaty relating to the Duchy of Warsaw were substantially modified. Instead of the duchy being divided between the three Powers, its fate was left open for amicable settlement, which did not preclude the possibility of the entire duchy falling to Russia, provided suitable compensation could be found elsewhere for Prussia and Austria. We have seen how greatly Metternich dreaded this powerful accession to Russia's strength; and victories beyond the Rhine would inevitably provide territories suitable for compensation. Hence the necessity for peace under such conditions as would be honourable to the French nation and would give Napoleon no pretext for rejecting them off-hand. If these proposals were supplemented by an invasion of France, the French would thereby be convinced of the seriousness of the situa-

(1) That Metternich, Aberdeen, and even Stadion, stated in a Memorandum that they would consider the repression of France beyond the Rhine and the Alps as a great thing with which they might rest content. (2) That Metternich on November 28th, i.e. after Napoleon's inadequate reply on the 24th had been received, had accepted the "natural frontiers" in the draft of the Manifesto to the French, adding the assurance that the allies themselves, even after victories on French soil, did not desire more than that—which did not come to pass after all (Aberdeen's dispatch of November 28th in Oncken, "Hist. Taschenbuch," 6, F. II. 38). (3) That the Czar Alexander, who before Stein's arrival was under Metternich's influence, on December 6th, after the Manifesto had been published, sent a messenger to England with instructions that peace was to be signed with France on the basis of the "natural frontiers" (Martens, XI. 198). Things turned out quite differently, but not at Metternich's instigation, and in view of the Allied Sovereigns' disinclination for the war it is by no means certain that Napoleon's immediate acceptance might not have led to negotiations on the basis of the Frankfurt proposals. The armies only crossed the Rhine in the end of the year.

tion, and their attitude would react upon the Emperor whose warlike preparations would thus be checked and curtailed. While on the march to the Rhine, Metternich had succeeded in commending this view to Lord Aberdeen and the Czar. But the latter dreaded the loss of the preponderating influence he had recently acquired and so was not anxious to prosecute the war in France.[1] Hence St.-Aignan's mission. Metternich frankly declared that nothing would come of it, and repeated this remark in a private letter to Caulaincourt which he entrusted to St.-Aignan. Was that not an indirect hint to Napoleon to close with the offer at once? Everything now depended on his decision.

Napoleon himself was perfectly aware of his plight. His continental blockade had broken down utterly in Russia, and now in Germany his "Protectorate" over the Rhine Confederation had been snatched from him. "Yes," said he, while resting at Frankfurt in the house of Bethmann the banker, "the Confederation of the Rhine is a thing of the past. I am done with it; politically it was really bad calculation to have created it. The continental system too, was a chimera. I shall never revert to it." Thus he sternly dismissed ideas which for years past had occupied a foremost place in his thoughts and the execution of which had cost hundreds of thousands of lives. "My position," said he about this time to his brother Joseph, "does not allow me to think of sovereignty over any foreign Power, and I shall deem myself fortunate if I can maintain the ancient territory of France by means of this peace. Everything about me is threatening ruin. My armies have been destroyed and the losses they have sustained can only be made good with the utmost difficulty. Holland is irrevocably lost, Italy is wavering; the conduct of the King of Naples is a source of anxiety to me. The reinforcements which the Viceroy so

[1] Alexander repeatedly observed to Labouchère in Frankfurt: "People need not think I am so mad as to carry the war across the Rhine. I shall not repeat the mistake which did my friend so much harm, and seek in Paris the fate he suffered in Moscow" (Pasquier, "Mémoires," II, III.). The Russian generals were also hostile to any further advance.

urgently needs have failed to come forward; the Austrians are pressing him hard and the Italians whom he commands are wavering. Belgium and the Rhine Provinces are showing signs of discontent. The Spanish frontier is in the hands of the enemy. At such a crisis, how can one think of foreign thrones? How can France, barely able to defend herself, be expected to make sacrifices for anything beyond her own maintenance, when at best one can only reckon on such sacrifices as are indispensable for the defence of her own territory"?[1] Nevertheless Napoleon did not straightway accept the enemy's offer of peace. In his letter of November 16th, he took no notice of the suggested basis of the treaty and merely proposed Mannheim as the meeting-place for the Congress. Possibly he was hoping to gain more time for his armaments so as to avoid being defenceless and obliged to accept the enemy's dictation. Possibly he did not really wish peace, and in consenting to negotiations was merely seeking to conciliate public opinion, which was eagerly desiring an end to these interminable wars. In the first Council of State at which he presided on his return, the Emperor said to his councillors, who were insisting on the country's need of rest, and on its unprosperous condition: "You speak too much about peace. Do you wish to descend from the height to which I have raised France? Do you wish to become a simple monarchy again instead of a proud empire? And that will happen if you lose Holland. You require these estuaries and barriers against the north. Rather than give them up, I will break down the dams." When he was describing how that the defection of his allies, especially Bavaria, had brought about his defeats, his eyes flashed as he exclaimed: "Munich must burn! And burn it shall!"[2]

[1] Miot de Melito, "Mémoires," III. 309. It should not be forgotten that these words were simply the prelude to the demand that Joseph should renounce the Spanish throne, and therefore represent the situation as more sombre than Napoleon himself believed it to be. None the less they are borne out by the actual facts.

[2] *Vide* notes of two eye-witnesses: Molé in the "Revue de la Révolution," 1888, and Pasquier, "Mémoires," vol. II.

To Napoleon personally peace under such circumstances was a bitter misfortune. As Pasquier, the Prefect of Police, relates: "Despoiled of his prestige as an invincible conqueror, surrounded by his captains whom he was no longer able to reward with the possessions of conquered peoples, and now summoned by the nation who had done everything for him, to give an account of his stewardship, of the lives and wealth lavished in his reckless enterprises, he chafed at the thought of peace, his pride winced at the slightest abatement of his possessions". One circumstance ought to have made him cautious. Along with the proposals he brought, St.-Aignan announced the allies' decision not to interrupt the hostilities during the progress of the negotiations. That was how he had acted in the days of his victories—after Lunéville, for instance, and after Jena—and in proportion to his successes he had augmented his demands. His enemies only needed to follow his example to raise their claims the farther they penetrated into France. Hence, of what avail was it to commit himself prematurely? He had no intention of letting himself be hoodwinked. In a Manifesto issued by the Allied Sovereigns to the French nation, Metternich turned the Emperor's temporizing to account, by calling attention to the fact that the Senate had granted other 300,000 conscripts. "The Allied Powers," so runs the document, "are not waging war against France but against that openly asserted preponderance which the Emperor Napoleon has too long exercised beyond the limits of his own empire, for the misfortune of Europe and of France. Victory has brought the allied army to the Rhine, and the first use which their Imperial and Royal Majesties have made of the fact was to offer peace to the Emperor of the French." The Rhine, the Pyrenees, and the Alps, as stated in Metternich's first proclamation, are no longer mentioned. Shortly before this, in the middle of November, the Dutch had seceded from Napoleon, and as there had long been an understanding that the English were not to return their colonies, they sought compensation on the Continent and found it in Belgium. Thus it came about that the London

Cabinet disavowed Lord Aberdeen's action, and again the "old" frontiers of France were spoken of as the basis for negotiations. But neither Metternich nor the Czar were prepared to go this length; they wished to avoid alienating the popular desire for peace in France and they were even more anxious not to embroil themselves with England; so they fell back on the vague remarks that "the Allied Sovereigns wish France to be great, strong and happy," and "the Powers guarantee the French Empire an extension of territory such as France never enjoyed under her Kings". Thus the Cabinets of the old legitimate Sovereigns appealed from the Emperor to the people, from the ruler of an international empire to the French nation—yet another proof of how strongly the current of national feeling was then running. In this distinction between Prince and People with its appeal to the higher tribunal of the latter, lay the real significance of this otherwise feeble proclamation. Its influence soon made itself felt. Napoleon detected it even in the reports submitted by the Prefects, and hence he sent down Senators and members of the Council of State to the provinces to rouse public opinion there, and to induce a more friendly attitude towards the Imperial Government. These envoys received extraordinary powers. They could if necessary proclaim martial law, punish the refractory, and arm the populace against an advancing foe. In his present plight the Emperor did not disdain to appeal even to the old revolutionary love of battle, and the long tabooed "Marseillaise" was heard once more, played through the streets on barrel-organs. But on December 19th, 1813, when the Legislative Body met, the Emperor saw with unwelcome plainness that the French had at last begun to distinguish between themselves and himself.

Napoleon had postponed the opening ceremony till that date, hoping by then to be able to give some tangible proof of his love of peace. Public opinion, misled in this instance by Savary, viewed Maret as the stumbling-block in the way of peace. He was deprived by the Emperor of his post as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and succeeded by Caulaincourt,

who was believed to favour a general pacification. On December 2nd, Caulaincourt wrote Metternich that he now accepted the proffered basis of peace, to which the Austrian Minister replied that nothing stood in the way of opening the Congress, and that England would be notified at once so that she might send her representative. Napoleon considered he had now sufficient materials to hand to pose, as he had so often done before, as the peace-seeker whose good intentions had been frustrated by wicked Europe. The correspondence bearing upon the peace negotiations was laid before the deputies, and although the Emperor assured them in his speech from the throne that all the original documents in the Foreign Minister's portfolio would be communicated to them, he carefully withheld St.-Aignan's overtures and the vague and temporizing reply which had well-nigh wrecked the negotiations at the very outset. The conclusion of his message, in which he appealed to the national honour, contained the ominous demand for fresh sacrifices: "Nations only act with safety when they develop their strength to the utmost". The Senate, which had recently been strengthened by a dozen safe members, replied to the speech from the throne in a submissive address, granting the Emperor a last effort of strength, so that he and the country might obtain a worthy peace. But the deputies, whose consent was required for the increased taxation, viewed matters in quite a different light. They were for the most part men of no great distinction, all of them over forty years of age, and accustomed for years past to serve merely as parliamentary decorations; hence their protest shows how deep-seated was the discontent throughout the country. This feeling is expressed in clear and bold language in the report of a committee drawn up by Lainé, deputy for Bordelais. "All means of resistance," it states, "would only be effective if the French were convinced that the Government was sincerely striving for the glory of peace, and that their blood would be shed only in defence of their country and its protecting laws." This last hint plainly said that the French were no longer minded to fight for arbitrary power. The Emperor was requested

to "ensure the full and reliable execution of the laws which guaranteed to Frenchmen the rights of liberty and the security of property, and to the nation at large the unrestricted exercise of its political rights". The report was greeted with a storm of applause and carried by a large majority. The Government representatives laboured hard to modify its uncompromising phraseology. But its character was too pronounced, and the Emperor angrily forbade its publication. He closed the Legislative Body, and on January 1st, 1814, in public audience, he accused its members of attempting to discredit him, thereby doing him graver injury than the loss of ten battles; for people should not wash their dirty linen in presence of strangers. By their conduct they had encouraged the enemy whose repulse was the first consideration. He then told them they were "refractory," and that he would have them under surveillance.[1] The closing of the Legislative Body caused a great deal of ill-feeling, especially in the provincial towns. It almost seems as if only the war then threatening the country with all the sufferings and excesses it entailed, saved Napoleon and his government from the internal crisis which was already fermenting. Now, in their hour of need, the nation looked to Napoleon, not as their Sovereign but rather as a general, the greatest of such and the most zealous, too, for he was fighting for his throne.

As Metternich told St.-Aignan while on the march, the allies had no intention of abandoning hostilities, and early in November they unanimously decided to prosecute the war immediately, despite the objections of the Russian generals, and of a few old-fashioned military men like the Austrian General Duka, who advocated taking up an entrenched position along the Rhine and actually induced the Emperor Francis to threaten General Radetzky with a court-martial for having advised the offensive! At the allies' head-quarters opinions were long divided as to the plan of operations. Gneisenau was in favour of the Silesian Army assuming the

[1] Pasquier, "Mémoires," II. 129. Madame de Chastenay, "Mémoires," II. 250.

offensive in Belgium, while the main army was to cross the Rhine between Strassburg and Mainz. Schwarzenberg, on the other hand, held that the main body of the army should advance through Switzerland (which was to be won over to the side of the allies, as otherwise their flank would be exposed), invade France, and endeavour to seize the plateau of Langres. In this way they would be nearer to the Austrians, who were advancing through Upper Italy, and also to Wellington. Blücher's army was to cross the Rhine at Bonn and Cologne, and help Bernadotte's army to conquer Holland; Wrede's South German troops were to take up a position on the Middle Rhine, while a corps under Bülow was to keep open their communications with the Silesian Army. The following essential points were agreed upon, viz., that the Trachenberg-Reichenbach treaties were to remain in force; the main army was to march to the left and endeavour to invade Central France; Blücher was to cross the Rhine to the right and engage the enemy until the main army had established its communications; the conquest of Holland was to be left to the North Army. It was a methodical plan, requiring much time, aiming rather at a strong position than at gaining a victory, but there was no disputing the justice of Radetzky's contention that "by this step, the whole of Southern France, in which there is not a single soldier at present, will be deprived of the power of organizing, and the Emperor Napoleon will lose a large portion of his resources". The Czar reluctantly acquiesced, but King Frederick William was utterly opposed to an invasion, and all who disapproved rallied to him. The Emperor Francis hesitated between the schemes of Duka and Schwarzenberg. But as the allies had pledged themselves in their manifesto to the French not to suspend hostilities until peace had been concluded, it was finally decided to continue the advance.

Early in December orders were issued in the greatest secrecy for the various corps of the main army to cross the Rhine at Basle on the 13th. But this plan was thwarted by the Czar. For under the influence of his old tutor Laharpe (a native of Canton Vaud), Alexander had guaranteed the

neutrality of their country to a deputation of Swiss, and he now suddenly declared that any march through that country would be regarded as a cause of war with Russia. The other two Monarchs then gave way, and Metternich promised the Swiss that their territory would be spared. However, when it was found that hundreds of recruits were being drafted from "neutral" Switzerland into France, and that officers of the allied army who had escaped from imprisonment, were being arrested there and handed over to Napoleon, Schwarzenberg and Radetzky insisted so strongly upon the occupation of the country that Metternich also concurred, and endeavoured by secret means to carry through the occupation without bloodshed—i.e. without resistance from the Swiss troops. This was completed by December 21st, and by the 28th, the allied main army, numbering 200,000 troops, was in possession of the principal passes over the Jura mountains into France. Three days later, on New Year's night, Blücher crossed the Rhine at Caub with 60,000 troops. Bülow with 30,000 had already crossed the Dutch frontiers on November 23rd; Wrede was besieging Hüningen.

In advancing on this wise, the allies were adhering to their main purpose of invading France, so as to frustrate the Emperor's preparations and induce him to make peace by rendering him incapable of a prolonged resistance.[1] There was no thought of annihilating him or of driving him from his throne. As a matter of fact when the allied army entered France early in January, more than a third of the whole country was thereby withdrawn from the armaments while Napoleon's new army was as yet only in the first stages of its formation. All that remained of the troops under Macdonald, Marmont, and Victor, on the

[1] Gentz, writing from Freiburg on December 19th, to the Prince of Walachia, says: "The military operations would nevertheless be pursued with greater effect if one could hope that the re-organization of the army in Central France could be hindered in this manner and Napoleon's inclination towards peace proportionately strengthened" (Metternich—Klinkowström, "Osterrichs Teilnahme au den Befreiungskriegen," p. 146).

Rhine, and those assembled by Ney and Mortier at Nancy and Langres, did not amount to much over 50,000, for fully that number had died of typhus during December.[1] During January, 1814, these forces, retiring before superior numbers, fell back in the direction of Vitry on the Marne and were reinforced by the Guards and a few thousand reserves, which was altogether inadequate. The attempt at a "*levée en masse*" proved a total failure, and the decree of January 3rd, authorizing it, remained a dead letter.

While on his advance to the Rhine, Napoleon had not expected that the allies would resume hostilities before the following spring. But when he found he was mistaken he then concluded they would advance across the Lower Rhine, and immediately sent on the Guards to Belgium. In the end of December, learning to his surprise that they were advancing through Switzerland, on whose neutrality he had confidently reckoned, he hastily recalled the Guards and decided to allow the allies to approach till they were in the neighbourhood of Paris, where meanwhile he expected to have stationed and trained his new army. Then, concentrating all his available forces he meant to fight a decisive action. But to prevent the allies from seizing too much French soil with all its supplies, he gave up this plan and decided instead to fight between the Seine and the Marne, although at the outset he could only count upon the remnants of his old army. He intended to attack the oncoming hosts singly before they had effected a junction, and then, as much from political as from strategic motives, to fall upon Blücher, who was marching rapidly on St. Dizier while the main body was slowly advancing upon Montbéliard and Langres. For this slowness there were various reasons, not the least of them the lack of experience in handling such large masses and in obtaining supplies, and so forth. There were also political difficulties.

The occupation of Switzerland by the Austrians had been effected not only against the Czar's wish but without his knowledge. Considering himself now compromised towards

[1] For the official figures see Houssaye, "1814," p. 59; cp. Weil, "La Campagne de 1814," p. 11.

the Swiss and intensely annoyed, he withdrew his confidence from Metternich, on whom he had relied implicitly since Leipzig, and bestowed it on Stein, who had just then arrived at head-quarters. The latter and Pozzo di Borgo succeeded in weaning Alexander from the views instilled by Metternich and in persuading him to prosecute the war with the utmost vigour, and to aim at reaching Paris and overthrowing Napoleon, the Protector of the Poles. Alexander thereupon reverted to the attitude expressed in his words "He or I," in the summer of 1812. He had even then entertained the idea of removing Napoleon and replacing him by Bernadotte, to whom he had made overtures at Åbo, holding out hopes not merely of Sweden but even of the French Crown. This circumstance is probably not unconnected with the fact that Bernadotte, instead of taking part in the invasion of France, now turned aside with part of the North Army against Denmark, which Power he compelled by a treaty at Kiel on January 14th, 1814, to cede Norway, and so kept open the door to Sweden. Bernadotte certainly did not commend himself thereby to Russia's allies, and Austria especially viewed this proceeding with disfavour. In the middle of January, when Metternich learned that Bernadotte was Russia's candidate for the French throne (for Alexander hoped by this means to get rid of a dangerous neighbour in the north and to gain a grateful friend in France), he and his master resolved not to further Russia's plans for pushing on to Paris, or, at least, not to do so at the cost of the Austrian troops. Schwarzenberg, who had received orders on January 8th to proceed "cautiously," and on the 18th had seized the plateau of Langres, was now ordered to remain stationary. The English Minister, Lord Castlereagh, had arrived at head-quarters; Caulaincourt had reached Lunéville, and but for the Czar's ambition to enter Paris, nothing now stood in the way of opening the negotiations for peace.

Metternich succeeded in arriving at an understanding with the other two allies, and a judicious hint to the effect that Russia's accession of territory might induce Austria to seek to recover Belgium made Castlereagh willing that Napoleon should remain on the throne so long as the French

nation tolerated his rule. But England, for well-known reasons, wished France to be reduced to the frontiers of 1792, and so Metternich, who required Britain's support in dealing with Russia, agreed to this, and definitely abandoned the Frankfurt programme, which granted France the natural boundaries. For the sake of appearances, however, Metternich sought to obtain concessions from both allies, modifying (favourably for France) the old frontiers, which were to form the basis of the peace. Hardenberg soon consented, on Metternich undertaking that Austria would offer no resistance to Prussia annexing Saxony, provided Prussia opposed the Czar's Polish plans. Alexander was thus isolated, and it was only when Austria threatened to withdraw from the coalition, that he consented to negotiate with Napoleon for peace. He then wanted not only to insist upon the "old" frontiers, but even to take away Alsace and give it to Austria as compensation for Galicia, while he himself took all Poland, an arrangement Metternich naturally declined. For while such an exchange was a certain gain to her rival, to Austria it would only have proved a source of political embarrassment. The most Metternich would concede to the Czar was that the war should continue during the negotiations.

After these *pourparlers* it was decided at a Ministerial Conference at Langres in the end of January, that plenipotentiaries from the four Powers should meet with Caulaincourt at Châtillon and arrange a peace with Napoleon on the basis of the old frontiers. In the instructions issued there was no longer any mention of the "Empire Français" but merely of "France," while the term "*Chef du gouvernement*" left the reigning dynasty an open question. The defection of Holland and the invasion of France, hitherto unopposed, were the reasons alleged for now offering only the frontiers of 1792; and stress was laid upon the fact that Murat had joined the coalition. On January 11th, 1814, the latter had formally signed an agreement with Austria in which, in return for his supporting the coalition in Italy with 30,000 troops, Austria guaranteed his supremacy in Naples and promised to use her influence to procure him an increase of

territory of 400,000 inhabitants at the expense of the Papal States. Metternich would have liked to obtain a settlement at Langres of the various open questions—Poland in particular—affecting the future relations of the Powers, and as he could reckon on being supported by the Prussian and the English plenipotentiaries, the settlement might not have been too favourable to Russia. The Czar, however, declined to have these matters discussed, and left Langres. The war, he said, must be ended first, and at present it was only beginning.

On January 25th Napoleon drove off from Paris, and early on the morning of the 26th he entered Châlons. Blücher was then on his way from St. Dizier to Brienne, intent on getting nearer to the main army and marching in advance of it on Paris, so as to compel the allies to take the offensive. Such was the plan secretly arranged, through Stein's intervention, by Alexander and the head-quarters staff of the Silesian Army. Blücher had barely 27,000 troops at his disposal, for he had dispatched Yorck's corps to the Moselle and had left Langeron's behind (with the exception of one division) to observe Mainz. Napoleon thought he had even fewer troops and decided to attack him, although he himself had not more than 40,000 at his beck and only 30,000 of these were available for an action. He had expected Blücher to be still at St. Dizier, but on the 27th, finding only his rear-guard there, he left Marmont behind, and hurried on to Brienne. There, on the 29th, he defeated Blücher, who was already advancing to the west, and compelled him to fall back to the south, in the direction of Trannes. The Emperor followed him thither, intending to crush him before Schwarzenberg arrived. But in that hope he was disappointed, for Blücher directed his movements to the left for the precise purpose of joining Schwarzenberg who had advanced from Langres to Bar-sur-Aube, and there, in spite of the Czar's urgent requests, had remained stationary, knowing that Napoleon was on his right hand at Châlons and at Vitry. Although intensely annoyed with those who were so very eager to reach Paris, and with Metternich who had not yet negotiated a peace, on learning of Blücher's defeat, Schwarzenberg decided to send

two corps to support him, thus bringing up his strength to 60,000 troops, all Russians and Austrians. Napoleon had only 40,000. And as Wrede's corps hastened up from Joinville the allies were able to meet the dreaded Emperor with double the number of his troops. Thus what Napoleon had hoped to hinder, had come about, and the very persistence with which Blücher remained at Trannes showed him beyond a doubt that the enemy's main body was close at hand. His forces were unequal to such demands, and besides, there was the chance that while Blücher held him in check, Schwarzenberg might be marching on Troyes to cut off his communications. Hence Napoleon abandoned the idea of attacking, and on February 1st he had already given orders to retreat westwards when Blücher assumed the offensive at La Rothière. All afternoon the French troops held their own against the superior numbers of the enemy, but towards evening their left wing at Chaumesnil was driven in by the onslaught of Wrede, and the reserves, though led by Napoleon in person, were unable to retrieve this disaster. The village of La Rothière was lost and with it the battle.

The allies' victory was a brilliant one and might have been final had it been turned to account by an energetic pursuit. That, however, was not done, for the allies believed Napoleon incapable of further resistance. On the evening of the battle, Blücher wrote that "everything was, so to speak, settled," and that they would be in Paris in eight days. Yet they neglected to follow up their vanquished foe immediately, so as to prevent him restoring order among his distracted troops, and finally they even lost touch with him. Napoleon nevertheless felt the full weight of the blow that had been dealt him. He reached Troyes without further loss and there toiled with marvellous energy to gather in all his forces so as to guard the approach to Paris. Again he sought to find a way of escape by negotiations; only, as he wrote on February 4th to his Foreign Minister, it was doubtful if the allies would any longer be willing to negotiate.[1]

[1]Perhaps it was to make them more compliant that he added in a postscript that there had been no battle; the enemy had opposed 15,000

Maret, who was with him during these dreary days at Troyes and acted as Secretary of State, relates in his Memoirs that the Emperor was prepared to be very submissive, and had given "*carte blanche*" to Caulaincourt, who, now that circumstances had completely changed, had demanded definite instructions for the congress opening on February 5th. "The Duke of Bassano," so run the Memoirs, "handed Napoleon Caulaincourt's letter and entreated him to yield. The Emperor seemed at first scarcely to listen to him, then he pointed to a passage in Montesquieu which he was perusing in a listless fashion. 'Read it,' said he, 'read it aloud.' The passage ran: 'I know nothing more noble than the determination of a Monarch in our days to bury himself under the ruins of his throne rather than accept proposals unbecoming a King'. 'But I know of something nobler still,' said Maret, 'that you sacrifice your glory and thereby fill up the abyss which will otherwise engulf both you and France.' 'Well then, gentlemen, make peace; Caulaincourt shall conclude it and sign everything that will help to bring it about; I will bear the disgrace. But do not ask me to dictate the terms of my humiliation." Maret then wrote to Caulaincourt that the Emperor gave him "*carte blanche*" to conduct negotiations to a successful close, to save Paris, and to avoid a battle in which the last hopes of the nation would be at stake. Alarmed at such great responsibilities, Caulaincourt, on February 6th, requested definite instructions as to how far he might go, and Maret then at last persuaded the Emperor, who had returned to Nogent on the 7th, to "dictate the terms of his humiliation". "It was now settled," so the narrative proceeds, "that for the sake of peace Belgium and even the left bank of the Rhine must be surrendered, and the instructions were based on the understanding that the plenipotentiary should offer first Belgium, then, if absolutely necessary, the left bank of the Rhine. Italy, Piedmont, Genoa, and first of all, even the colonies were

Frenchmen with their entire forces, but the French troops had held their own all day and had only lost a few guns, etc. This Caulaincourt was to mention ("Corr.," XXVII. 21,178).

to be sacrificed." Napoleon was to sign the new instructions on the following morning. But ere the day dawned, news had come in which upset everything, and when Maret appeared in the Emperor's private room to get his signature to the document, he found his master pouring over his maps. "I am thinking of something quite different," was the greeting he received. "I mean to beat Blücher." All thought of signing the instructions was at an end. Talleyrand was right; the Emperor Napoleon could not become King of France.[1]

Now indeed it was no easy task for him, for the victory at La Rothière, had awakened in the allies slumbering doubts as to whether after this fresh disaster Napoleon had sufficient political support among his own people to be a guarantee for peace. Nor were these doubts without some justification; for no hostility had been shown by the populace towards the foreign troops, and everywhere the Allies had been greeted with cries for peace. On February 9th, Metternich wrote to Vienna, "The general cry is, 'Away with Napoleon!'" Unmindful of the consent he had given at Langres, the Czar had instructed his ambassador in Châtillon to prolong the negotiations in every possible way. But at head-quarters even those in favour of peace thought it advisable to await the impression produced on the French by recent events before coming to terms with Caulaincourt. Hence at one of the first meetings (which were almost entirely taken up with elaborate formalities), when Caulaincourt asked whether, if he accepted all their proposals, the Powers would really sign the peace and thereby end the

[1] Even though Maret's version (*vide* Ernouf p. 621) may be quite accurate, it must not be forgotten that Napoleon had been following Blücher's movements for several days, and on the evening of February 7th, after sending Marmont to Sézanne with 20,000 troops, he wrote to Joseph: "I have still no news of the Duke of Ragusa, but I shall throw myself with all my forces on the enemy's lines at Meaux-Châlons. They ought to stop these forty-hour prayers and interminable Misereres at Paris; all these monkey-tricks might ultimately land us in terror of death. It has long been said that it is doctors and priests who make dying bitter. In such a state of affairs, we must appear confident and take bold measures" ("Corr.," XXVII. 21,205).

war, he received the evasive reply that they could not definitely say, but they would consider the matter. The negotiations made no headway and came to a complete standstill on February 9th, when the Czar sent orders to his ambassador to absent himself from the conferences until further notice. Hardenberg wrote in his diary on that date, "The Czar Alexander wishes to protract the negotiations, proceed meanwhile to Paris and there make peace". But the road to Paris was much broader than they had counted on.

After the victory at La Rothière, it was believed at headquarters that Napoleon was retreating on the Loire and that the allies might therefore continue their advance without further battles, a mistake they soon discovered.[1] For on February 8th, Schwarzenberg learned from reliable sources that the Emperor, far from retreating on the Loire, was concentrating his troops at Nogent, bringing up reinforcements from Spain, and was quite capable of fighting a new battle. As a matter of fact 15,000 troops from the South Army were at this juncture drafted into the forces under Napoleon. The allied Monarchs consequently found themselves faced by the prospect of new sacrifices, and so the question was again mooted whether they should re-open the conferences at Châtillon and conclude peace quickly with Napoleon, especially as Caulaincourt, in a letter to Metternich on the 9th, had expressed his willingness to negotiate on the basis of the old frontiers, provided they guaranteed a truce. Furthermore, contrary to their expectation, the French had not turned against their Emperor, and they were now beginning to show resentment at the depredations of the foreign troops. The health of the latter too was seriously affected. In February, in the main army alone, there were said to be 50,000 sick. And then there was always the possibility that in a decisive action the Emperor's genius might prove more than a match for their superiority in numbers. Thus quickly

[1] Knesebeck had not shared this opinion, but Alexander had already ordered Blücher not to enter the capital before him; even Schwarzenberg wrote home on February 5th that Blücher would be outside Paris in a few days ("Châtillon Congress," pp. 87 and 108).

had their reckless over-confidence changed into cowardly prudence, disguised under the most diverse pretexts. Hardenberg contended that they might quite well make peace with Napoleon after having concluded a truce, provided they had adequate guarantees in the evacuation of the fortresses. Metternich deprecated the idea of risking a new and embittered struggle, merely to find out to what extent the Emperor had the support of the French nation. The allies, said Castlereagh, had invaded France in order to conquer peace, which they considered they could not obtain at the Rhine, but not to effect a change of dynasty; hence they had invited the present head of the State to negotiate with them, and as there had been no national movement against this head of the State, it was not for the allies to introduce a personal element into the struggle. The Czar alone opposed this view, and his Minister Nesselrode (against his own convictions), demanded that the truce be refused and the advance on Paris continued even at the risk of fresh battles. Once in the capital, a conference of representatives from the various public bodies could be summoned and the question of the throne discussed; and if settled in favour of Napoleon, peace could then be concluded with him. King Frederick William besought the Czar urgently to abandon this project, but in vain; for under the influence of Stein and Pozzo, Alexander was no longer thinking of Bernadotte for the French throne, but of the Bourbon Duc de Berry, a possible suitor for his sister Anna. This new crisis among the allies could only be settled by the events in the field. But when Napoleon assumed the offensive and gained considerable successes over Blücher, the Czar's thirst for battle rapidly abated and he consented to a preliminary peace being signed with Caulaincourt on the basis of the old frontiers. In the event of any spontaneous revolt against the Emperor, the allies were then to favour Louis XVIII. This arrangement was made in the middle of February while the result of the last engagement between Napoleon and Blücher was unknown. It proved so unexpectedly disadvantageous to the allies as to seriously affect the political situation.

Shortly after La Rothière, the two armies of the coalition, owing to the difficulties of supplies, had again separated and had arranged to advance on Paris by parallel marches. Schwarzenberg proceeded through Troyes and Fontainebleau, while Blücher with the corps of Sacken and Olssuvieff (about 40,000 troops) marched north at first, then turned to the west past Fère Champenoise. He was to be joined by Yorck, who was marching along the Marne behind Macdonald, and by reinforcements from Germany then advancing under Kleist and Kapzewitch. Such movements presupposed slow progress, and Schwarzenberg also was moving very cautiously. Suddenly Blücher decided to push forward rapidly to the north-west through Montmirail with his two Russian corps, block Macdonald's road to the Marne, cut him off from Paris, and crush him between himself and Yorck. As he did not wait for his reinforcements, his army was consequently broken up into three widely separated columns. Realizing Macdonald's danger, Napoleon decided to succour him, and on February 8th, with Ney, Marmont and the Guards, about 30,000 troops in all—an equal number under Oudinot and Victor was left behind to observe Schwarzenberg—he hurried northwards from Nogent through Sézanne to Champaubert. Here, on February 10th, he came upon Olssuvieff's corps on the march and well-nigh exterminated it. Sacken, too, had already started for Montmirail, for Gneisenau's advice to recall all the troops had been discarded by Blücher. Leaving Marmont behind, Napoleon then pressed forward in pursuit of Sacken, and came up with him at Montmirail. Here on the forenoon of the 11th, under cover of his excellently served artillery, the Emperor warded off the onset of the enemy and allowed his troops time to come up. By leaving his left wing purposely weak he induced Sacken to attack it, while he himself overwhelmed the allied left wing with superior numbers and so frustrated Blücher's junction with Yorck. The latter, who was advancing from Château-Thierry, was driven back, Sacken was totally defeated, and both generals withdrew with heavy losses to Château-Thierry. Here the Emperor followed them on the 12th, and finding to his regret that

Macdonald had not barred their passage, he sent him with reinforcements to Montereau on the Seine. He then turned against Schwarzenberg, but not immediately, for Blücher, with the corps of Kleist and Kapzewitch, was now advancing upon Montmirail, and Marmont was falling back before him. The Emperor therefore desisted at once from the pursuit of his lately defeated foe and marched rapidly south from Château-Thierry to mete out to the third column the fate of the other two. At noon on the 14th the French came upon the enemy's advance-guard at Vauchamps, and defeated it. Blücher then resolved to retreat, but that he was only able to effect amid constant fighting and with heavy losses, especially when Napoleon sent a cavalry corps under Grouchy by a wide circuit to intercept the retreating column at Etoges. Here indeed the brave troops, retreating in excellent order, succeeded in breaking through, but only with great sacrifice of life. They withdrew to Châlons, where Yorck and Sacken also found the remnants of their forces. Altogether the allies had lost 16,000 troops.

These rapidly succeeding victories at Champaubert, Montmirail, and Vauchamps, with ill-fed troops, over mirey ground, have been compared to the early triumphs of the youthful general. And indeed it was the same ardour, the same daring energy, the same force of genius, now ripened by a rich experience. But these qualities alone were not sufficient to bring the unequal contest to a profitable conclusion; and there was the danger that after having fulfilled his duty as a general, Napoleon might spoil his own work, as had so often happened during these last two years, when he acted as Emperor. After his third victory within five days, he dared delay no longer in turning against Schwarzenberg, who had continued his march westwards in order to engross Napoleon's attention and so divert him from Blücher.[1]

[1] Nowadays the blame for Blücher's defeat can no longer be laid upon Schwarzenberg for not having succoured him in time. Apart from the fact that Blücher's reports did not reveal the whole extent of his disasters, it was believed at head-quarters, where they were not eager for big battles, that Blücher would repeat his old Silesian manœuvre of retreating in pre-

So Marmont was thus left behind alone to face Blücher, with orders to retreat slowly through Montmirail whenever Blücher resumed the offensive, and to get into touch again with Napoleon. Imagining the allies' main body to be already far beyond the Seine, above Montereau, the Emperor took with him the troops of Ney and Gérard, and the Guards, and pushed on with incredible speed to Guignes on the Yères where he found Macdonald, Oudinot and Victor, and so had his whole army together with the exception of Marmont's corps. After these last successes his hopes knew no bounds, and he fancied that what had proved so successful with the first army might succeed with the second and much more powerful one. Besides, there was just a chance that he might be able to defeat Schwarzenberg's columns singly as they came up. And at first this did seem possible; for at Mormant on the 17th, when marching from Guignes to Nangis, Napoleon came upon the vanguard of the enemy's right wing under Wittgenstein on its way from Nogent through Provins to Paris and annihilated it. If only Victor had been able to advance across the Seine at Montereau on that day, as he was ordered to do, Bianchi's Austrian corps which had reached Fontainebleau on the 15th, and was now hastily recalled, might have been cut off like Sacken at Montmirail. This advance, however, could not be undertaken till the 18th, when it was conducted by Napoleon in person; but by that time Schwarzenberg had succeeded in withdrawing all his forces beyond the Seine and the Yonne.

The commander-in-chief of the allied army, deeply depressed by Blücher's fate, was in the depths of despair on

sence of Napoleon, and that Schwarzenberg's advance would certainly rid him of the Emperor. This advance was not suspended during these days, and although it is true that the Emperor Francis issued an order, dated the 13th, directing the commander-in-chief not to cross the Seine, it was not sent till the 16th, by which date they already knew at Troyes that Blücher was safe, and that Napoleon was marching against the main army. *Vide* Fournier, "Kongress von Châtillon," p. 145 also Dechend, "Das treffen bei Bar-sur-Aube," "Beihefte zum Mil-Wochenblatt," 1897, p. 127, where the views prevalent in King Frederick William's entourage are set forth.

learning of Napoleon's rapid advance on the Seine when he had imagined him far distant, delayed by the badness of the roads. "To avoid being defeated separately," he wrote from Bray to Metternich, who had remained at Troyes with the Emperor Francis, "I shall confine myself to disputing obstinately the bridges of Bray and Nogent and to concentrating my forces behind the Seine and the Yonne." He was indignant at the Czar for having rejected the truce requested by Caulaincourt which he, Schwarzenberg, considered urgently necessary to prevent a battle. He now meant to make good this remissness, and at Bray, on the 17th, he was authorized by the Czar and King Frederick William to write a letter to Berthier proposing an armistice, as the plenipotentiaries at Châtillon had been commissioned to conclude preliminaries on the basis of Caulaincourt's proposal, and ought to have done so on the 16th. This latter statement was a mere ruse which Napoleon instantly detected. He noted his opponent's ill-concealed embarrassment and his spirits rose proportionately. On the 18th he wrote Joseph: "According to the latest news, things have changed completely with the allies. The Emperor of Russia, who had broken off negotiations a few days ago because he wanted to impose worse terms on France than the 'old frontiers,'[1] wishes to resume them again; and I hope to obtain a peace on the Frankfurt basis, the minimum which I can honourably concede. Had I, before the last operations, concluded a peace with the old frontiers, I would have taken up arms in two years' time and have told the nation that it was not a peace, but a capitulation. In the new position of affairs I could no longer say this, for my good fortune has returned and I am again master of my terms."[2] After his victory at Montmirail he had made the Duke of Bassano write in a similar strain to Caulaincourt: "There can be no reasonable peace except on the Frankfurt basis; any other would

[1] That was so. Alexander at Troyes had not yet entirely abandoned his project of indemnifying Austria for Galicia by giving her Alsace. Towards the end of February he declared he was only claiming West Galicia, which no longer belonged to Austria ("Kongress von Châtillon," p. 303).

[2] "Corr.," XXVII. 21,293.

merely be a truce ".[1] Caulaincourt's unlimited powers were accordingly curtailed, and whereas during the last ten days the allies had driven him to despair by their dilatory methods, he now temporized and, under pretence of testing their offer of peace, forwarded it to Napoleon. Eugène meanwhile received orders to hold his ground in Italy.

Napoleon was right—" things were different ". Under the pressure of Blücher's defeat Alexander had complied with the demands of the other three Powers and the negotiations at Châtillon were resumed. Schwarzenberg meanwhile, who had received no reply to his proposal of peace, had suffered a reverse at Montereau, where a Württemberg corps had been defeated, and he now withdrew to Troyes. He did so, imagining that he had left the field clear, not for the victor, but for peace, and that in recalling Blücher (who had soon rallied) from Châlons, he was merely providing against an emergency. Although the allied troops numbered over 150,000 and those of Napoleon marching boldly upon Troyes less than 70,000, Schwarzenberg was resolved not to risk a battle. All the more so as General Bubna, who had lately been detached to the south, had just sent word that Augereau had concentrated 30,000 troops at Lyons and was operating on Basle. This had necessitated other 15,000 troops being sent to reinforce Bubna, and henceforward Schwarzenberg was never free from anxiety about the south. On February 23rd, he returned to Bar-sur-Aube and even thought of retreating to the plateau of Langres if his dreaded foe should pursue him farther.[2] The commander-in-chief's hopes of peace were not destined to be fulfilled. At Châtillon on the 17th the Powers demanded the boundaries of 1792 as the condition of a preliminary peace, and as a guarantee, not only the evacuation of all the fortresses outside France garrisoned by French troops, but also of the French fortresses of Belfort, Besançon, and Hüningen. When Caulaincourt announced this news, Napoleon replied:

[1] Houssaye, "1814," p. 103.

[2] Napoleon accurately divined the situation when he wrote Joseph on the 23rd: "They seem to dread a decisive battle and its consequences" ("Corr.," xxvii. 21,356).

"I am so indignant at this project that I feel myself already dishonoured by the mere proposal". He declared he himself would send in an ultimatum. This he never did; for just then events took a decisive turn and the campaign engrossed all his energies. Blücher, who had reached Méry on his advance, refused to take part in Schwarzenberg's inglorious retreat, and acting on the advice of Colonel Grolman, the head of Kleist's general staff, he requested permission from the Sovereigns to march off to the right, join Bülow and Winzingerode who were coming from Belgium, and thus reinforced, advance on Paris. At a council of war held at Bar on the 25th, the idea of risking a battle, as favoured by the Czar and King Frederick William, was rejected, and Blücher's proposal accepted.[1]

It was a momentous step. Who knows what might have happened had Blücher also joined the retreat. For under the galling yoke of invasion, the people of France had been growing more embittered, and everywhere, especially since Napoleon's recent victories, the peasants sought to defend themselves against the foreign oppressors.[2] The enthusiasm for the conqueror who had defeated these invaders waxed greater every day, and although in December the Emperor had failed to effect a *levée en masse*, it was not improbable that he might have succeeded in March. But Blücher's forward movement put an end to that, and withdrew Napoleon's attention from Schwarzenberg to Paris, about which he was becoming anxious. The main army and the Silesian Army had now virtually exchanged rôles, as King Frederick William wrote Blücher, and as there was also a South Army, these three divisions of the allied forces produced

[1] *Vide* Fournier, "Kongress von Châtillon," p. 166.

[2] Since Houssaye, in his "1814," has collected authentic data on this point, Napoleon can no longer be accused of exaggeration in his letters. Even the Quartermaster-General of Blücher's staff wrote Gneisenau: "The officers scarcely dared say anything to the troops," and Schwarzenberg was of the opinion that "in order to prevent excesses among these nationalities on such a long line we would need to station another army behind the troops operating". The French themselves, however, were by no means free from blame.

a situation similar to that which had brought about the collapse of the French army in the previous October. The offensive warfare now lay entirely with the Prussians and Russians.

Schwarzenberg was not at all disposed to join the others in advancing farther east, as he believed he would then have Napoleon behind him, and exaggerated reports were rife as to the masses of troops at the latter's disposal. Moreover Napoleon's presence was in itself equal to an army and often withheld his opponents from boldly assuming the offensive.[1] His vanguard had actually reached La Rothière before Schwarzenberg discovered that it was only the corps of Oudinot and Macdonald who were following him. He then stopped his retreat, defeated the French troops on February 27th at Bar-sur-Aube and drove them back on the Seine. This completely upset Napoleon's plan for leaving Marmont and Mortier behind to hold Blücher in check in front while he himself came upon him from the rear and so caught him between two fires. For all this was to have been done before Schwarzenberg had discovered that the Emperor was not there.

But events did not fall out as Napoleon had hoped. On the 28th, Marmont and Mortier blocked Blücher's path successfully to the east of Meaux, on the right bank of the Marne, and drove back his vanguard. Owing, however, to a late start, and to the depth of mud on the roads, Napoleon was prevented from taking part in the action on that day, and so the Silesian army was able to retreat northwards on Soissons, where the corps of Bülow and Winzingerode had just arrived and had compelled that important fortress to surrender. Very opportunely, too, for Blücher had not only escaped the fate Napoleon had planned for him, he had now brought up his strength to 100,000 men, as the corps of Bülow and Winzingerode had been assigned to him. The Emperor's situation had in turn become extremely difficult, for if he fell back from the Marne to face Schwarzenberg,

[1] "I have 50,000 troops," said Napoleon once to General Poltaratzky, —"and myself, that makes 150,000."

who was again advancing with the main army, Blücher would then crush Marmont and Mortier and seize Paris. To rid himself of the latter anxiety, the Emperor decided to turn first against Blücher. Reckoning the latter's forces at 55,000—much too low an estimate—he hoped to drive him far to the north, and while Macdonald held Schwarzenberg in check on the Seine, to operate via Rheims, Châlons, St. Dizier, and Joinville, on the flank and rear of the main army. Augereau was to support his movement from the south by a sortie from Besançon. If only the garrisons in the fortresses of the Ardennes and the Moselle reinforced the Imperial troops, and a national rising suddenly burst forth, the allies might be compelled to retreat on the Rhine. It was a foolhardy plan, and it was wrecked at the outset by Blücher's obstinate courage.

In order to secure the road to Rheims, Napoleon advanced in a north-easterly direction to Berry and from there he marched against Blücher, who, on Bülow's advice, remained on the defensive. At Craonne, on March 7th, a Russian corps was driven back with heavy loss, and two days later a battle was fought at Laon where Blücher had taken up a strong position. As Napoleon had gained control of the road to Soissons while Marmont had been sent on in advance from Berry along the Rheims road, the army was therefore moving on Laon in two divisions, between which it was extremely difficult to keep up communications owing to the intervening marshes, and to Cossack patrols intercepting the couriers. So it came about that although Napoleon had twice retaken the villages of Sémilly and Ardon on the 9th, he did not know that Marmont had only reached Laon at noon, instead of in the early morning, that he had not captured the village of Athies till the evening, and that when night had come down and he thought his bloody task was ended, the enemy had driven him forth again, sending his troops in headlong flight back as far as Corbény over the road by which they had come. Fortunately the stand made by a few thousand troops sent out under Fabvier to establish communications with Napoleon, and who were now returning, prevented a

continued pursuit. All this the Emperor did not learn till midnight, as also that his right wing had again been driven out of Ardon and communications with Marmont thus rendered even more difficult. He was beside himself with indignation at Marmont, who had acted "like a lieutenant". Of course he could not then know that since the fall of Soissons and the reinforcement of Blücher, the Duke of Ragusa considered his master's cause as lost and only did what was absolutely necessary and sometimes not even that. But the Emperor suspected nothing; he merely saw that an important part of his army had been thrown into disorder and must be preserved from a destructive pursuit. He therefore remained boldly drawn up in battle order in presence of an enemy twice his number, and thereby deterred Blücher from renewing the fight and allowed Marmont time to rally his men and effect an orderly retreat. That done he turned towards Soissons, only, however, to hasten two days later to Rheims, which had meanwhile been occupied by a Russian corps. On the evening of March 14th, the Emperor succeeded in driving out the latter and then at last he allowed himself and his jaded troops a couple of days' rest.

At the allies' head-quarters a fresh development had taken place, not in military affairs, but in diplomacy. It was due to the fact that Caulaincourt had neither accepted the offer of February 17th nor made any counter-proposal, and that Napoleon in his letter to the Emperor Francis on the 21st, had announced the Frankfurt programme as his ultimatum and that of France. Lord Castlereagh, who insisted on knowing what was being done for the money Britain was paying out, was mainly instrumental in bringing about this change. On February 28th, at the fourth sitting of the Châtillon Congress, Napoleon's envoy was notified that he had till March 10th at farthest, to bring forward counter-proposals, which, however, were not to differ fundamentally from the proposals of February 9th. The negotiations for an armistice which had at last begun, were now broken off, for since the 27th circumstances were in favour of the allies, and they were convinced that war alone would force Napoleon to

make peace. As Caulaincourt brought forward no counter-proposals on March 9th, the four Great Powers, Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia concluded a treaty at Chaumont by which Britain pledged herself to pay £5,000,000 during that year to the three continental Powers, who bound themselves to continue the war until France had been reduced to her boundaries of 1792, and until the complete independence of Holland, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and Germany had been secured, even though the war should last for twenty years. Each of these Powers was to furnish 150,000 troops. The treaty was antedated March 1st, but only received full weight after the victory at Laon. For Schwarzenberg, after having defeated Marmont at Bar-sur-Aube, had advanced to Troyes on March 4th, and had remained there inactive ever since, although the Czar had urged him to move out to the right and support Blücher. But Schwarzenberg protested that in any case he would arrive too late, that he would then need to risk a decisive battle while isolated, and meantime his communications with the South Army would be interrupted. For even if they won the battle, they would still need to return to the Seine to resume operations against Paris. The commander-in-chief believed he was acting according to the principles originally agreed upon for the conduct of the war, just as he had done in February. So recently as March 5th, Gneisenau had stated, "our task is to hem in the enemy by simultaneous movements and well-chosen positions; even the temporary glamour of a brilliant deed of arms must yield to this larger purpose". But the Czar was not convinced by Schwarzenberg's arguments, and when the latter brought forward a plan of operations to be undertaken on the issue of the struggle between Blücher, with his numerically superior forces, and Napoleon, a violent scene took place at Chaumont, the Czar bluntly asking Metternich if the Emperor Francis had ordered his general not to fight and to retreat on the Rhine, while King Frederick William accused the Austrians of treachery and of sacrificing Blücher.[1] When

[1] This view has even found its way into historical writings, evidently on the authority of Radetzky's memorial of November, 1813; in which he

Schwarzenberg had cleared himself of these accusations and news had come in of the battle on the 9th and its favourable issue, the discord was allayed and the main army immediately took a more active part in the struggle.

At the Châtillon Congress the prospect was gradually becoming more hopeless. Metternich had written letter after letter begging Caulaincourt to urge his master to be more compliant; for the Russian project of placing the young Duc de Berry on the throne of France made peace with Napoleon seen highly desirable. Caulaincourt, in his thankless task as plenipotentiary for France and for Napoleon, had spared no effort to convince his master that all was lost unless he withdrew his demand for the Frankfurt basis. Joseph, who supported the Empress as Regent, wrote warning letters showing that the state of public opinion in Paris made peace indispensable; even were it an unfavourable peace, the fault would not be laid to the Emperor's charge, for all classes of the community wanted it. But Napoleon's obstinacy proved insurmountable. The evacuation of Wesel, Kehl, and Castel, was the utmost he would concede and he ordered the negotiations to be prolonged. Before the time limit expired Caulaincourt, on his own initiative, submitted some proposals drawn from the various directions he had previously received. But these differed so widely from the demands of the Powers [1] in-

alludes to the Prussians as those "of whom, as they now show themselves, the fewest troops are desirable, in the event of peace". That passage is not sufficient evidence for charging the commander-in-chief four months later with the deliberate sacrifice of a whole army, and consequently in recent works this view is no longer mentioned. Schwarzenberg's military inefficiency, his dread of starvation, and his terror of the *levée en masse* which was being organized close to where he was, are amply sufficient to account for his behaviour. Moreover he was supported in his unenterprising policy by Metternich, who considered that "the remedy lay not in battle, but in the military attitude". His conduct requires no further explanations, but does not deserve suspicions which it would be difficult to justify (*vide* Metternich-Klinkowstrom, "Osterreichs Teilnahame," p. 814. Also Metternich's ostensible letter to Stadion on March 13th, in Fournier, "Kongress von Châtillon," p. 344).

[1] *Vide* Fain, p. 388, D'Angeberg "Congrès de Vienne," I. 130, also Fournier "Kongress von Châtillon," p. 218.

sisting not only on the "natural frontiers" but also on the Kingdom of Italy for the Viceroy Eugène, while Elba and Lucca were to remain in the hands of France, the allies broke off the negotiations, and on March 19th the congress ended.

Metternich had all along hoped for some peaceful settlement, but within the last few days he had changed his mind. In the first place, because Prussia and England had definitely abandoned Napoleon, and while not actually abetting the Bourbons, they had shown that they were prepared to welcome their return. In the second place, because if Austria too abandoned Napoleon, Hardenberg would then bestir himself with the Czar over the Polish question; and finally, because on March 20th, a letter had been intercepted from Maret in which Caulaincourt received instructions that if compelled to cede Mainz, Antwerp, and Alessandria, he was to do so in vague terms, as after the ratification of the treaty Napoleon would be guided solely by military considerations, i.e. in certain circumstances he would break the agreement. Hence it was abundantly clear that the Emperor would not be "reasonable," and so Metternich, too, was now ready to abandon him. The first consideration was how to defeat him in the field as quickly as possible.

Napoleon's obstinate attitude would be incomprehensible were it only a question of his personal supremacy in France and not of a great principle which he represented, and which came into conflict with an opposite principle in the allies' camp. It was utterly impossible for the representative of the Revolution with its disregard of class distinctions and boundaries of States, and its gospel of universal citizenship, to adapt himself to the old pre-Revolutionary system of the balance of power. It was only the logical result of this fundamental difference, that Napoleon should regard peace on the basis of the Bourbon territorial State, as a mere "capitulation". Furthermore, whereas the Revolutionary idea, with its inevitable sequel of unlimited expansion, had been for long years incarnate in this one personality, the people of France under the compulsion of necessity had already re-

turned to the path of national life; hence the conflict between ruler and ruled which now demanded a solution. At Paris, after the Emperor's victories in February, the old confidence in him had been restored; but in March, when news came of Macdonald's retreat, and of the disaster to Soult, who had been defeated by Wellington at Orthez on February 27th, and no word of Napoleon, Government securities fell to 51, and the people in their hearts turned from one who could extort peace neither from himself nor from others.

Napoleon, however, was at Rheims, dominated by the idea of wresting one more favour from Fate. He was considering the advisability of uniting with Macdonald and intercepting the allied main army at Meaux, so as to dispute their advance on the capital. But he discarded this plan in favour of a much more daring one which he had thought of before the battle of Laon, and which he now meant to carry out in spite of that first reverse. He began by a "diversion" from which he counted on "incalculable successes". Leaving Macdonald in front of Schwarzenberg, whom he believed to be on the other bank of the Seine, above Nogent, with almost the entire allied army, he himself with about 22,000 troops meant to operate in his rear on Méry or Troyes. Mortier and Marmont remained behind, in and around Rheims, to observe Blücher and obstruct his advance on Paris. On the 17th, the Emperor left Rheims, and marching southwards reached Plancy on the 19th, while a division marched on Arcis-sur-Aube, where Schwarzenberg had gone to support Blücher and, if the latter were attacked, to join in the action. When news came in that Napoleon had turned south, the Czar, depressed by the loss of Rheims, advocated retreating as far as possible, while Schwarzenberg, on the other hand, contented himself with retiring to Trannes, where he intended to concentrate all his troops from west and east and assume the offensive. But before this concentration had been effected news reached the allies' head-quarters that Napoleon had already crossed the river at Plancy. Schwarzenberg then ordered the three corps under the Crown Prince of Württemberg which had reached Troyes from the west, to diverge

towards the north, while he himself, with Wrede's corps and the Russian and Prussian guards, marched again on Arcis so as to force the Emperor back before he had crossed the Aube with all his forces, and to drive him towards Blücher, in case the latter had followed in pursuit. This manœuvre completely foiled Napoleon's intention to break through the lines of the main army and crush their troops in the west between himself and Macdonald. He mistook the movements of the troops concentrating for a retreat eastwards, and the fact that the enemy had withdrawn their outposts at Arcis, as he learned on the 20th, confirmed him in the belief that he had a fleeing foe in front of him whom he must pursue and surround, in order to prevent him co-operating with Blücher. He therefore decided to extend his original plan, to march on Vitry, capture the town which was in the hands of the enemy, and summon hither Marmont and Mortier and the garrisons of Metz and Nancy. Macdonald was to follow via Arcis. Then, with a compact mass of about 90,000 troops, the Emperor meant to fall upon the enemy's communications in the rear, marching by way of Plancy and Arcis, so as to keep Schwarzenberg all the more securely on the defensive. But in this hope he was bitterly disappointed.

On the morning of the 20th, when the peasants informed the French troops marching east through Arcis that the enemy was approaching from the south, Napoleon refused to believe it. He sent out an orderly to reconnoitre, but this officer did not ride far enough to see the enemy's columns, and so confirmed the Emperor in his error. Shortly afterwards, while on the march, the army was attacked by superior numbers and part of it fled in wild confusion back to Arcis. There, on the bridge over the Aube, they found their way barred by an officer with drawn sword. "Who dares cross before me?" he demanded. The men instantly recognized their Emperor and submitted to be led once more against the foe. Meanwhile, the vanguard under Ney had been attacked at Torcy, where the battle raged with such reckless courage and such contempt of death that the enemy, in spite of their superior numbers, could not wrest any decisive ad-

vantage. Schwarzenberg's right wing alone took part in the fighting, for the great bulk of his troops had moved out from Troyes and were still on the march. The fact that the enemy's forces had only been partially engaged misled Napoleon into regarding the whole affair as a rear-guard fight and strengthened his conviction that the enemy's main body was retreating. He therefore adhered to the route he had already planned, and on the morning of the 21st he was advancing full of hope against what he supposed to be the enemy's rear-guard when suddenly he found himself confronted by the whole enormous main body of the allies. Now indeed he ordered a retreat on the Aube, and, thanks entirely to Schwarzenberg's dilatoriness, he succeeded in withdrawing the great bulk of his troops almost unmolested on to the other bank. But when the 100,000 troops attacked the 30,000, it was only by heroic struggles that the remainder could effect their retreat. The battle of Arcis was lost.

His error as to the enemy's intention cost the Emperor over 3,500 men, but he did not abandon his plan for all that. Now, however, he continued his march to Vitry on the other bank of the Aube with such rapidity that at the allies' headquarters they soon were unable to discover where he had actually gone. Macdonald, who had not taken part in the battle, also marched on the other bank of the Aube to the north-east and escaped with a rear-guard skirmish. At this juncture, March 23rd, the Austrians captured a courier bearing a letter from Berthier to Macdonald, stating that the Emperor was posted between Vitry and St. Dizier, in the rear of the allied army, and that he had already sent on his cavalry as far as Joinville. About the same time the Cossacks intercepted a second messenger with a letter from Napoleon to the Empress at Paris, confiding to her his plan of moving nearer to the Marne and the fortresses of the east, "so as to keep the enemy away from Paris". Other letters again described the gloomy state of public opinion in the capital, and the inability of the citizens to defend their city. In view of these statements and of the fact that on March 12th the British had occupied Bordeaux, which had declared for the

Bourbons, and that Blücher had advanced through Rheims on Châlons, the allied Monarchs decided to abandon the pursuit of Napoleon and to march upon Paris with their combined forces. A manifesto to the French nation dated March 25th, laid all the blame of this bloodshed and unrest on Napoleon, and his insatiable ambition, and condemned the principle which he represented. "France has only her own Government to blame for all the ills she suffers. Peace alone can heal the wounds dealt her by a spirit of universal conquest such as the annals of the world cannot parallel. This peace will be the peace of Europe; any other is inadmissible. It is time at last that Princes should be enabled to watch over the welfare of their peoples without interference or pressure from outside, that nations should respect their mutual independence, that social institutions be protected against daily assaults, that property be secure and commerce free."[1]

If the French nation concurred in this, it would then be turning its back on the political programme of the Revolution, and the man who had hitherto championed it, with all the might of his genius and his ambitious will, would be annihilated.

Napoleon has been censured for continuing his march eastwards after the second day's fighting at Arcis, when he must have been convinced of the enemy's determination to assume the offensive. It is contended that had he hastened west with all his available troops to Paris, he might have

[1] *Vide* D'Angeberg "Congrès de Vienne," I. 143, as to the suggested boundaries of France. The Powers had already declared their willingness to consider "modifications of the frontiers previous to the Revolutionary wars," but on March 15th a counter project was brought forward with utterly unsuitable conditions. Ancillon, a confidential adviser of King Frederick William, had also drawn up a document showing that they had proposed more favourable terms at Frankfurt, but that, as the English Minister had made the return of the French colonies conditional on France being restricted to the old frontiers, considerable modifications had been made. This document was naturally rejected as highly undiplomatic. Ancillon actually told the French that England's wishes had been considered because they required her money. *Vide* also Fournier, "Kongress von Châtillon," p. 237.

gained a considerable advance on his enemies and have had time to take measures for the defence of the capital. But plausible as this argument sounds, the Emperor's plan also presented great advantages, had not untoward circumstances supervened. Napoleon had advanced from Vitry through St. Dizier to Doulevent where he halted on March 25th, trying to discover the enemy of whose whereabouts he knew nothing. From here Caulaincourt, who had rejoined his master, wrote to Metternich offering peace, and stating that he believed the Emperor was in earnest.[1] But well he knew he was now too late. That same day, March 25th, Count Bombelles was sent from the Austrian head-quarters' staff to the Comte d'Artois at Vesoul to negotiate for the return of the Bourbons. At Doulevent the only information Napoleon obtained of the enemies' movements was that a strong corps had made its appearance in the neighbourhood of St. Dizier. Uncertain as to whether this meant that the enemy had divided and scattered, in which case, as at Champaubert and Montmirail, he might defeat them, he immediately advanced against this corps and routed it on the 26th. It consisted of 10,000 men left behind under Winzingerode to observe the Emperor. Puzzled by the fact that the prisoners brought in were not Schwarzenberg's soldiers but Blücher's, the Emperor hastened back to Vitry to get accurate information, and there he found that all statements agreed that the enemy was marching with their combined forces on Paris. To reach the capital first and forestall them was impossible, for they had three days' start of him. But he could move farther east, summon the garrisons, and call out the militia. This might have proved successful, for throughout the east, where the peasants were scouring the countryside in bands and bringing in prisoners to head-quarters, they were ready for resistance. Hence Macdonald advocated carrying the war into Alsace and Lorraine; and it has been thought, not without reason, that Napoleon himself favoured this plan rather than that proposed by Caulaincourt, Maret, Berthier, and

[1] To Hauterive he wrote on the 28th: "His Majesty seems decided to make the needful sacrifices" (Houssaye, "1814," p. 397).

others of his entourage, to attempt to save the capital. Closeted in his private room at St. Dizier, the Emperor spent some hours of painful tension, deciding which course he was to pursue. Finally he resolved to go through Bar, Troyes, Fontainebleau, and on to Paris, there to fight a last great battle. So he declared to the Austrian diplomatist Wessenberg, who was taken prisoner on March 28th, and with whom he had a political conversation in which he explained his view of peace. "I have requested," said he, "that France should be allowed to retain the boundaries it possessed when I ascended the throne.[1] But I do not maintain that I would not conclude peace on less favourable terms, under compulsion." The possession of Antwerp was he declared an indispensable condition for the sake of the French fleet; if only Austria were commissioned by the other Powers to negotiate for peace, it would soon be concluded. Then he continued: "The Empress is beloved by the French. You would prefer her Regency and that of the Senate to the return of the Bourbons. During my absence she has gained greatly in public estimation and I would be willing to lay the government in her hands." Wessenfels doubted this decision. "No, no," answered the Emperor, "even ambition wears itself out. You see what genius can do; only two years ago the world obeyed me, now it is against me." With these words and the assurance that he was prepared to make great sacrifices, he dismissed Wessenfels and sent him to the Emperor Francis.[2]

When Napoleon adopted this tone of resignation, which was an indirect appeal for help to his father-in-law, he was aware that his military position was hopeless. He already knew that Marmont had been defeated on the 25th at Fère-Champenoise and that the allies were now driving him and Mortier before them. On the evening of the 28th, a letter reached the Emperor at Doulevent from Lavalette (now Postmaster-General) telling him that his presence in Paris was

[1] The first words of the Emperor's Oath according to the Constitution of 1804 were, "I swear to maintain the integrity of the Empire".

[2] Arneth, "Wessenberg," I. 188.

absolutely indispensable, and that if he meant to keep his capital, there was not a minute to lose. Shortly afterwards, news came in that the allies had reached Meaux. The Emperor's impatience now rose to fever pitch. When he arrived in Troyes he was scarcely able to sleep, and handing over the command to Berthier he road off, accompanied only by the squadrons of his bodyguard, to Villeneuve-sur-Vannes. Here, leaving even this escort behind, he jumped into a carriage with Caulaincourt and sped on to Paris at a furious pace.

Meanwhile the allies had reached the vicinity of the capital, and on the 29th, Marie Louise and the King of Rome had fled to Blois. The councils of the regency had rightly protested against this step, but an explicit order from Napoleon bidding them not to expose his son to the fate of Astyanax, required his removal.[1] The incident produced a painful sensation in Paris where intense anxiety was caused by the arrival of so many wounded soldiers and fugitive peasants, and by the alarming statements of the press bureau as to the impending fate of the capital. Government securities fell to 45, and Joseph, who remained behind as Regent, was powerless to restore confidence. His proclamation to the Parisians telling them the Emperor was at hand, and urging them to oppose the enemy, roused no enthusiasm. Even if it had, there would not have been sufficient weapons and ammunition for those who volunteered. The fortifications had been planned but not completed. There were only some 30,000 National Guards in the city, and these fought heroically with Macdonald

[1] On March 16th, 1814, the Emperor wrote to Joseph: "Should the enemy advance in great strength against the capital and all resistance become impossible, send off the Empress-Regent, my son, the high dignitaries and Ministers, the principal officials of the Senate, the presidents of the Council of State, the chief officers of the Crown and Baron Bouillerie (treasurer of the *domaine extraordinaire*) with the Tuileries treasury, in the direction of the Loire. Do not abandon my son, and remember that I would rather see him in the Seine than in the hands of the enemies of France. The fate of Astyanax, taken captive by the Greeks, has always seemed to me the saddest in history (Corr. XXVII. 21, 497). Already on February 8th, he had written to his brother: "I had rather that my son were strangled, than see him grow up at Vienna as an Austrian Prince" (Corr. XXVII. 21, 210).

and Mortier's troops in an engagement outside the town on March 30th. Nor did the fighting cease till late in the afternoon, when the Prussians, by their superior numbers, succeeded in capturing Montmartre and planting a large number of cannon there. Empowered by Joseph, who had fled at noonday, Marmont on the same evening concluded a capitulation delivering Paris into the hands of the enemy. At the same time Mortier sent off one of his generals in a southerly direction to arrange about cantonments for the columns retreating from Paris. At dusk this messenger reached a little wayside hostelry, the "*Cour de France*," where he found two travellers waiting for a change of horses. One of them greeted him. It was the Emperor. On learning then that his capital was lost, Napoleon was beside himself with indignation at Joseph and at Clarke, his Minister of War, whom he unjustly blamed for this disaster. He wanted to start immediately for Paris, nor would he be convinced that he was too late until the fires of Mortier's vanguard became visible in the night and General Flahault arrived with a letter from Marmont describing the mood of the Parisians as wholly unfavourable to further resistance. He thereupon withdrew to Fontainebleau.

On the following morning, March 31st, the Czar and King Frederick William III entered the conquered city. The Emperor Francis had remained with Metternich at Dijon, whither he had gone after the battle of Arcis, probably also to avoid appearing in the foreground as one of the conquerors of his relative. The Monarchs were greeted by cheers for "King Louis XVIII" by a small but excessively active party of Royalists, and were thereby wholly misled as to the mood of the people. The fact was the populace had become absolutely indifferent to the Bourbons, and seldom thought of them—least of all of bringing them back. Only in the Faubourg St. Germain could the Bourbons look for devotion and sympathy. There, indeed, the old Royalist aristocrats still regretted their forfeited privileges, still cherished their narrow-minded prejudices against all other classes, and looked forward to the return of the old Court and with it the good old times. Napoleon had sought in vain to win over the

ancienne noblesse. Only a very few of the more clear-sighted among them, who discerned the trend of public affairs, acknowledged and respected the Emperor's work of reform. All the others longed for his downfall, while some had even become the willing tools of intriguing enemies who for years past had been scheming to overthrow the insatiable conqueror. It was this party who now contrived to masquerade before the allied Sovereigns as the representatives of the people, and with success, for Talleyrand pled their cause, though he had originally favoured the idea of a regency under Marie Louise. In doubtful, hesitating fashion the Czar (then Talleyrand's guest) had proposed Bernadotte, who was constantly intriguing in Paris, but his host immediately replied, France did not want another soldier. "If she did, we would keep the one we have; for he is the greatest in the world. After him, any other would certainly not get ten men to follow him." It was either Napoleon or Louis XVIII; there was no third. In a proclamation which the allies presented, through Talleyrand, to the Senate on March 31st, and copies of which were immediately posted up in the streets of Paris, they announced that they would no longer negotiate with Napoleon Bonaparte nor with any member of his family, but that they were willing to recognize the Constitution which the French nation wished to adopt. And the Senate—which only a few weeks earlier had obeyed its creator and master with slavish zeal—first decreed its own existence indispensable, and on the following day, April 2nd, announced the deposition of the Emperor, and released the nation and the army from their oath of fidelity to him. The nation offered no protest; the Legislative Body confirmed the Senate's vote, and the high Imperial Offices, the Court of Accounts, the Court of Appeals, etc., went over to the Royalist camp. The presence of these foreign soldiers in Paris filled all good citizens with shame and with rage against the man who had brought this fate upon them. It remained to be seen if the army, the faithful tool of this artist in war and battles, would also be wrenched from his grasp.

While at the "*Cour de France*" Napoleon had sent Caulaincourt to the Czar with full powers to conclude a peace

such as the allies had wished at Châtillon. But Caulaincourt returned to Fontainebleau bringing as the enemy's answer what was virtually Napoleon's own remark—that peace with him would only be a truce, while even to the acceptance of the son, the father would prove an obstacle. Yet the Czar did not destroy all the envoy's hopes of a regency; only the Emperor must first abdicate. That the latter in no wise contemplated. He had been defeated but not vanquished; he had still troops left. Marmont was at Corbeil and Essonnes with 12,000 men, behind him was Mortier with 8000; on April 1st the troops defeated at Arcis had arrived, and on the 2nd the Guards, while the rest were already advancing from Troyes. Ere long he would have nearly 60,000 men at his disposal, and his presence, on his own admission, was equivalent to another 100,000, so that, judging from the experiences of this campaign, he was not prepared to throw up the game. Then, too, there was Maison with a division in the north, Augereau, who had certainly been overhasty in abandoning Lyons, in the south, while Soult and Suchet were facing the British and the Spaniards; and all of them, soldiers and officers alike, were enthusiastic for him. He could see that at a review of the Guards on April 3rd, when they had replied to his address by loud cries of "A Paris!" But the case was different with the generals. Amongst them, too, Napoleon had ardent partisans, such as Mortier, Drouot, Gérard and others, but the majority, those occupying the highest positions, the Marshals, Dukes, Princes, and Counts, richly dowered and richly deserving it, had served reluctantly even in the previous year, foreseeing no end to this incessant warfare, yet longing to enjoy in peace the fruits of their arduous valour. To continue the struggle seemed to them utterly aimless. If they did conquer, at what a sacrifice! If peace were concluded, how easily it might be followed by civil war! The mere thought of a restoration of the Bourbons was odious to them, but there was yet another way. Caulaincourt had come back from Paris with the proposal that the Emperor should abdicate in favour of his son, and Napoleon had discussed the matter with his suite. The

marshals accepted it, as they had done the Senate's decree of deposition, and the allies' proclamation, for they regarded it as the only means of maintaining the present system and their own position and prestige without exposing themselves to fresh toils and changes.

On April 4th, after parade, they summoned up their courage. Ney, Lefebvre, Oudinot and Macdonald, as representing the others, appeared before the Emperor, who was accompanied by Berthier, Caulaincourt, and Maret, and explained to him that now, when the Senate had decided against him, and peace was still delayed, nothing was left but for him to abdicate in favour of his son, with the Empress as Regent. Napoleon thereupon disputed the Senate's right to deprive him of the throne. He pointed out the bad position the enemy held, counted up his own fighting force, and unfolded his plan of attack; but all in vain. He was forced to yield and signed the desired document. It ran as follows: "The Allied Powers having proclaimed the Emperor Napoleon the sole obstacle to the restoration of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares himself ready to descend from the throne, to leave France, and even to give up his life for the country's welfare which is inseparable from the rights of his son, from the Regency of the Empress, and from the laws of the Empire".[1]

When Napoleon consented to this, the thought was probably in his mind that the allies might reject this conditional surrender. In that case he would be able to convince those

[1] It is not uninteresting to read the first draught of this decree announcing his abdication, which the Emperor himself wrote and from which he stroked out certain passages. Here it is: "The Allied Powers having declared the Emperor Napoleon the sole obstacle to the restoration of Peace in Europe and as, without violating his oath, the Emperor cannot renounce a single one of the Departments which were incorporated with France on his accession to the Throne, the Emperor Napoleon declares himself ready to abdicate and leave France, and even to give up his life for the welfare of his country, and for the preservation of the rights of his son, the King, of the Empress Regent, and of the laws and institutions, which ought not to undergo any change until peace has been definitely concluded, and while foreign armies stand on our soil" ("Corr.," XXVII. 21,555).

who now compelled him to abdicate that they had no alternative but Louis XVIII; then he counted they would no longer refuse him their support. With this idea in his mind, instead of sending Caulaincourt alone to Paris with the abdication, he sent Ney and Macdonald with him, so that they might come to an understanding on their own account as the representatives of the army. On the evening of April 4th, they were received as such by the Czar, who even seemed on the point of wavering, especially when Macdonald assured him that the army could only view with abhorrence the restoration of the Monarchy which had no sympathy with their achievements and was a stranger to their glory. Scarcely had these words been uttered when they were refuted in the most astounding way. An officer sent from Schwarzenberg made a communication in Russian to the Czar who immediately turned to the marshals. "Gentlemen," said he, "you base your request for a Regency on the unalterable fidelity of the troops to the Imperial Government? Well, then, your vanguard has deserted and is now within our lines." And so it was! For Marmont had yielded to Talleyrand's solicitations when he was compelled to relinquish the defence of the capital. "The army and the people," wrote Marmont to Schwarzenberg on April 3rd, "have been released from their oath of fidelity to Napoleon by the decree of the Senate. I am willing to help in bringing about a good understanding between the nation and the army, which might avert the possibility of civil war and more bloodshed." He arranged with a deputy from the provisory government at Paris, to march his corps on the night of the 4th from Essonnes to Versailles—i.e. within the enemies' lines. When Napoleon's emissaries passed his camp and told him their mission, he probably regretted his action, for he left with them for Paris and ordered General Souham, who was in his confidence, to do nothing further till his return. But Souham, fearing betrayal, or perhaps better aware of Marmont's real intentions, marched out with the troops, 12,000 strong, under cover of night and on the pretext of advancing against the enemy, he led them right into the heart of the Austrian lines. When

morning dawned these brave fellows saw with impotent rage what their leaders had done. News of this was at once sent to the Czar, who made it his principal argument for rejecting the idea of a Regency—a proposal which even Austria did not support. Napoleon's surrender must be unconditional. Ney and Macdonald now gave up the Imperial Cause as lost and on their way back concluded a truce with Schwarzenberg, without Napoleon's knowledge.[1]

The Emperor had meanwhile heard of Marmont's defection, and as his position north of the Loire was now utterly untenable, on April 5th the order was given to march to Pithiviers and Orléans. At first he had talked of throwing himself into Italy, joining Eugène, and supporting the cause of Italian unity with his army and with all the force of his genius, and so gaining a new basis for his homeless policy. But his soldiers still had homes, and on that fact his new schemes were wrecked. He gave the order to cross the Loire, but the marshals, who had now returned from their interview with the Czar, openly refused to obey. On April 6th they informed him that nothing was left of the army but a feeble remnant, and it was surrounded; and that even if escape beyond the Loire were possible, civil war was bound to ensue. They advised the Emperor to abdicate unconditionally. Again he hesitated, but feeling himself forsaken by his marshals, he then wrote out a new form of abdication in which "he renounced the thrones of France and Italy for himself and his heirs".[2]

[1] For Austria's attitude on the subject of the regency, *vide* Sorel, VIII. 330; Fournier "Kongress von Châtillon," p. 356; also his article on "Marie Louise und der Sturz Napoleons" ("Deutsche Rundschau," Sept., 1902, and in French in the "Revue Historique," 1903), in which he has quoted a number of authentic letters. Further confirmation is given by Macdonald in his Memoirs, p. 272, where he relates a meeting on April 4th between the marshals and Schwarzenberg who, to their great surprise, had strenuously opposed the idea of a Regency.

[2] *Vide* Houssaye, "1814," p. 635. Since then the Memoirs of Pasquier and of Macdonald (the former belonged to the provisional government, the latter to the military commission) have thrown open fresh sources of information and give valuable light on this subject.

Once more Caulaincourt and the two marshals repaired to Paris, and there, with this new declaration as its basis, they concluded a treaty with the allies. According to its terms Napoleon was to retain his title of Emperor, to have sovereign rule over Elba, to be granted a revenue of 2,000,000 francs, and to have a body-guard of 400 of the Guards. Marie Louise was to receive the Duchy of Parma, and pensions were to be given to Napoleon's mother and to his brothers. The Czar had clung to the choice of Elba in spite of warnings and remonstrances from Talleyrand and Metternich. Even the Emperor Francis thought the proximity of the dethroned Cæsar somewhat disconcerting, and there was much heated discussion before the erstwhile Dictator of Europe was thrown even this sop. It was pouring contempt on the idea of sovereignty rather than a proof of the small compass within which it could be exercised. On April 11th, the treaty of Fontainebleau was signed at Paris by Ney, Caulaincourt, Macdonald, and the four Ministers representing the allied Powers. On the following day, April 12th, Napoleon signed his name and thereby completed his renunciation. It is hard to conjecture what his emotions must have been; whether he felt himself vanquished in life, or only defeated, as in war; whether his indomitable spirit accepted his lot with resignation or secretly hoped to thwart it. A few days before the conclusion of the treaty he had commissioned Caulaincourt to recall the abdication and break off the negotiations because Allix, one of the generals still loyal to him, declared he had learned from the Austrian courier that the Emperor Francis would not allow his daughter to be driven from the throne. But the hopes he built on Austria proved vain. The rumour was false, and so the conference continued its course. A few days before this he had sent a letter to Marie Louise at Blois telling her that his hour had come, that he did not wish to involve her in his misfortunes, and urging her to throw herself into her father's arms. This poor-spirited Princess took the hint literally, accepted advice from no one but the Emperor Francis, and absolutely refused to go to Fontainebleau

whither the Czar's adjutant-general, Count Schuvaloff, was to conduct her.[1] Some of Napoleon's personal attendants, who were constantly about him and served him with implicit obedience, believed that their master would not care to live longer. Maret was so sure of this that he removed the Emperor's pistols. Those like Metternich, Fouché, and others who were not so constantly under the spell of his personality, and who were far from considering him above criticism, did not expect such an act on his part; and although there was a definite rumour that the Emperor had taken poison during the night of April 12th, it is difficult to credit the statement. Such an act is wholly out of keeping with the nature of this man who, even at St. Helena, did not regard his rôle in the world as finished. It is much more probable that his violent sickness on the 12th was not due to poison, but was a premonitory symptom of the fatal disease again threatening him as it had already done at Pirna, after the battle of Dresden. It may possibly have been caused by a strong narcotic taken to soothe his nerves. One thing is certain, Napoleon's sickness had entirely disappeared by the next day, and during the following days he was full of fresh courage, foresight, and hope, nervous only about one thing—his life.[2]

[1] *Vide* Fournier, "Maria Louise und der Sturz Napoleons"; Wertheimer, "Der Herzog von Reichstadt," p. 104, as against the view held by Masson, "Marie Louise," p. 578.

[2] Fain, Napoleon's secretary, after the Emperor's death first mentioned the attempted suicide in his "Manuscrit de 1814"; the subject is more fully treated in Ségur's "Histoire et Mémoires," VII. 196. Ségur even maintains he had had a direct statement from Ivan, the surgeon, "who after having placed his Master's life out of danger would no longer be responsible for it," and fearing suspicion might fall on him, "lost his nerve," and absconded. But there are conflicting statements in Ségur's narrative. Fain's story differs with regard to the supposed poison. One day previously Napoleon had said to Bausset, who brought him a letter from Marie Louise, that death had shunned him on the battle-field of Arcis, and added: "A death which I could only gain by an act of despair, would be cowardice. Suicide is neither in harmony with my principles nor with the rank I held in the world." To the same messenger he "seemed" full of indifference, disguised under the name of philosophy and of an extraordinary confidence in the Fate which controls everything

Even before the abdication, the Palace of Fontainebleau had lost many of its military guests, and soon the dethroned monarch was left desolate. Berthier also took his leave, never to return. Only a few remained faithful to him until April 20th, when, escorted by the commissioners of the allied Powers, partly as guard and partly as protection, he left the place from which he had so often issued his decrees to Europe. Before entering his carriage he bade farewell to the Old Guard. He thanked them for the noble zeal they had shown. Although part of the army had betrayed and deserted him, he could have maintained the war; behind the Loire or from his fortresses for two or three years. But France would then have been torn by civil war; and since this had become clear to him, he had sacrificed all his personal rights and interests to the prosperity and glory of the country. He admonished them to pursue the path of duty and honour, and

and from which no one can escape (Hérisson, "Cabinet noir," p. 299). Macdonald, who brought the treaty from Paris after it had been signed, speaks merely of an indisposition ("Souvenirs," p. 29) which prevented the Emperor, whom he found calm and cheerful, from taking dinner. On the following morning he noticed the change in his appearance, as if he were awaking from a dream. No mention is made of any attempted suicide. To the Austrian general, Koller, who accompanied him to Elba, Napoleon remarked before his departure: "People will blame me for surviving my downfall, and wrongly. I see nothing noble in ending my life like a gambler who has lost his money (Helfert, "Napoleon I, Fahrt von Fontainebleau nach Elba," p. 81). That is hardly the language of a man who had tried to take away his life only a week earlier. Ménéval in his "Souvenirs," III. 297, affirmed that Ivan on the previous day had thrown out part of a dose of opium which Napoleon had carried with him ever since the Russian campaign (Ségur says since the Spanish campaign) and that the Emperor had tried to poison himself with the remainder. But according to this account Napoleon was present when the doctor reduced the dose and thus rendered its effects uncertain. Nevertheless there may have been quite enough to cause acute distress, which would account better for Ivan's panic. Thiers wrongly gives the night of the 11th as the date of this incident—*vide* also Maret's notes in Ernouf, p. 641, in which he speaks in disapproval of suicide. *Vide* also Charlotte de Sorr, "Napoleon et le duc de Vicence," II. p. 213, and Napoleon's narrative at St. Helena in Gourgaud's Journal. For Napoleon's anxiety for his life at this time, *vide* Helfert, p. 82, and Campbell, "Napoleon at Fontainebleau," p. 199.

to serve faithfully the Sovereign whom the nation had elected. He might have ended his life, but he wished to continue to live that he might write and describe to posterity the great deeds of his warriors.[1] He then embraced General Petit, who commanded the Guards, kissed the colours, and with a final greeting to his old comrades, he drove off. "One heard nothing but sobbing all along the ranks," says Coignet in his diary, "and I confess I was weeping too when I saw my beloved Emperor leave."

On May 4th, the "Undaunted" dropped anchor in the harbour of Porto Ferrajo and the dethroned monarch stepped ashore. He assured a deputation of the inhabitants of his miniature empire, that he would bestow on them a father's care, and he then immediately mounted on horseback and inspected the fortifications of the island. With these he seemed not ill-pleased, but considered many improvements indispensable, and soon after gave orders to place two batteries on the island of Pianosa to the south. "It is a prison they have allotted me," he had said to Caulaincourt in April, "but the key is in my hands. They will not catch me there. I could defend myself for six months and finally blow up the place."[2] He was far from feeling safe. His journey through Southern France made a deep impression and long kept him uneasy. Indeed, in spite of the presence of the foreign commissioners, it had been a perilous journey, so fiercely hostile had the people of Provence shown themselves. It was only by changing his seat in the carriage, by disguising himself in an Austrian uniform, and sporting the white cockade of the Bourbons, that he managed to escape from the rage of his former subjects. More than once during these days his escort saw tears of despondency in his eyes and every appearance of fear in his words and looks. Royalist

[1] The text of the address is given in an official report by Fain, "Manuscrit de 1814," and has thence passed in to the "Correspondance". The actual words are also given in the dispatches of Koller (Austrian Commissioner), Truchsess-Waldburg (Prussian), and Campbell (English), which were afterwards published.

[2] "Kongress von Châtillon," p. 238.

agents, he had been told, had stirred up the populace against him and he persisted in maintaining that the provisional government was partly responsible for this. Not till he had boarded the English corvette which took him from Fréjus (where he had landed on his return from Egypt), past Corsica to Elba, did he feel safe and recover his equanimity. He readily agreed that the British plenipotentiary, Campbell, should remain with him at Porto Ferrajo, where three weeks later the 400 grenadiers of the Old Guard arrived, for whom he had stipulated in the treaty of Fontainebleau. These, with some Polish Lancers who had joined the Guards, part of the French garrison, and a local contingent, formed a little army of about 1000 troops on whom the Emperor bestowed the same care and zeal as he had devoted to the gigantic hosts of his international wars. Yet his army and his efforts to equip a small flotilla did not absorb all his energies. This restless man, who required every minute to be occupied, busied himself in the smallest details of his miniature Government. Here, too, he had his Council of State which included Generals Drouot and Bertrand, and a dozen of the inhabitants. Its first decrees aimed at increasing the output of the iron mines of Rio and of the salt-works, in both cases with success. New roads were made, mulberry trees planted, sanitary regulations instituted, and many other improvements planned. He supervised strictly even the details of his household, and he knew far better than Bertrand (who was Master of the Household) how many mattresses, sheets, and bedsteads he possessed. In money matters he was unpleasantly parsimonious, though not without reason, for the 4,000,000 francs which he had saved from his Tuileries treasury could not go far nor last long, and Louis XVIII did not pay the 2,000,000 francs income, as stipulated in the treaty. Who can blame him therefore for collecting the taxes rigorously in his little country? He had even to cut down the reduced pay of his beloved Guards. In 1812, when he met de Pradt at Warsaw, on his return from Russia, he made light of his desperate position, remarking, "from the sublime to the ridiculous is only a step". The remark was not quite à propos then;

now, however, it would have applied. For the monarch of Elba kept his Court with all the etiquette of his Paris days. Every Sunday he held a reception in his residence at Porto Ferrajo. But what a contrast! Here were no bearers of proud names to gratify the potentate's eye. He had to content himself with the citizens of the little town and their worthy wives—among the latter Campbell noticed the woman who had recently mended his uniform. General Bertrand, who brought with him his wife and family, was Grand Marshal of the Court, but with a very small suite and very limited resources. Of the great number of gentlemen-in-waiting of former days, not one remained; and the four now in attendance were natives of the island. The other officials of the Court consisted of a doctor, an apothecary, Péyrusse, who was Master of the Treasury, two adjutants, one of whom was Prefect of the Palace and the other Master of the Horse, and Rathéry, who was Secretary. In Napoleon's study Rathéry sat at his writing-table just as Ménéval and Fain used to do in Paris, and Napoleon dictated decrees and notes with all his old haste. But how different the contents! "Scold the gardener," begins a long letter to Bertrand, "for requiring three assistants to keep a garden about as big as my one hand." Another document runs: "You ask for 500 francs for uniforms for the Court officials; that I cannot grant. . . . Take off the porter's epaulettes; they do not suit him." All this of course could easily have been communicated verbally, but he was a Sovereign, and would not forego the apparatus of sovereignty.[1]

As the heat during summer made residence in Porto Ferrajo unpleasant, Napoleon and his suite moved up to the heights of Marciana. Here, under the shade of some old chestnut-trees they pitched their tents, in an exquisite spot whence the eye could rove at will across the blue waters of the Mediterranean, from Bastia in Corsica to Leghorn in Tuscany, an outlook such as he loved. Here he received a visit from Countess Walewski whom he had met in Poland in

[1] *Vide* Pélissier, "Le Registre de l'île d'Elbe," where over 200 letters of Napoleon on similar trivial matters are reproduced.

1807, and with whom he had since kept up a close intimacy. While at Fontainebleau he had invited her to come to Elba. She brought with her her little boy, Napoleon's son.[1] The profound secrecy in which this visit was shrouded gave rise to the popular belief that it was the Empress. She, however, did not come. Her father, who had persuaded her to return to Austria, prevented her holding any intercourse with her husband, and she acquiesced unresistingly. During the summer, on Napoleon's advice, she took a course of the waters at Aix in Savoy, and he had hoped to see her again in the autumn, refreshed and invigorated after the troublous times she had passed through. But she never came and Napoleon's bitter reproaches produced small impression on her. Ere long her affections were bestowed on another. Seven years later, after Napoleon's death, she wrote to a friend that she had never felt an ardent attachment for him, but as he had always been attentive to her she would not have grudged him many a happy year, "provided he kept far away from me". Napoleon sought other consolations at Elba, but he often longed for the little King of Rome, and he bitterly resented the lack of letters from his wife, though largely for political reasons. After the short visit from the Countess Walewski, Pauline Borghese joined the dethroned Cæsar. She was the only one of all his sisters and brothers who did so. Old Mother Lætitia, unwilling to be left alone, also came hither.

The Emperor was not without means of communicating with his relatives. The secret police of Leghorn, especially the French Consul Mariotti and his agents on the Island of Elba, maintain that they knew of a very active correspondence

[1] Count Alexander Florian Walewski, Minister of Foreign Affairs under Napoleon III, was born on May 4th, 1810. Of Napoleon's other sons, born out of wedlock, the following are known for certain: Count Léon, born in 1806, whose mother, Madame Revel, belonged to the suite of the Princess Caroline; a certain Devienne born at Lyons in 1802; and, finally, the son of the housekeeper at St. Helena, who afterwards married a Mr. Gordon. Gordon-Bonaparte died in 1886 at San Francisco, where he was a watchmaker (*vide* the periodical "Le Curieux," No. 8, of 1884; and No. 40, of 1887).

with Murat. Uncertain whether the Powers would reward his defection from Napoleon by recognizing his sovereignty over Naples, Murat had again opened communications with his brother-in-law. What they debated and arranged is all the more difficult to establish with any degree of accuracy, as their intercourse was effected by trusted agents and was almost entirely verbal. They may have been devising a plan for an insurrection in Italy, such as was sent to Napoleon in May, 1814, by a number of conspirators, or it may be he was already scheming how to come to the front again in France. In any case Napoleon received a great many Italians in Porto Ferrajo during the autumn, and they made no secret of their discontent with the Austrian supremacy (which had again been restored), and of the hopes they placed on him. It is possible he did not altogether discourage them. The recollection of his experiences in Provence may have somewhat misguided his calculation as to a reaction in France and have turned his thoughts in another direction.[1] But this idea of a rising in Italy, if it was ever more than a fleeting thought, fell immediately into the background when secret intelligence and newspaper reports left him no longer in doubt that public opinion in France was changing completely, and in a way which could not fail to be favourable to him.

As a matter of fact the Government of Louis XVIII was daily growing more distasteful to the nation. On May 30th the King had made peace with the Powers, amongst them Britain, who surrendered most of the colonies she had con-

[1] This view is advocated by Livi in his "Napoleone all' isola d'Elba". It is doubtful if he is really warranted in regarding as authentic the speech of Napoleon reported in the anonymous pamphlet, "La verité sur les cent jours," p. 218, where the Emperor speaks of a United Italian Kingdom with Rome as capital. He must have entirely forgotten what he had told La Besnardière in the previous December about Murat who had the same plan in view: "Does that foolish man not see that it is only my extraordinary supremacy in Europe which prevents the presence of the Pope in Rome? It is the interest and the wish of Europe that he should return there (Pallain-Bailleu, Talleyrand's Briefwechsel mit Konig Ludwig XVIII," p. 163). Moreover a plan which included all Italy, completely frustrated any chance of resuming relations with Austria, which would have been of great value in the event of Napoleon's return to France.

quered. A few days later he made a sort of compromise with the Revolution by granting France a constitution, the Charter. Despite various faults and deficiencies, this document was none the less a valuable concession, and allowed the nation a larger share in the legislation than Napoleon had ever granted. The King, moreover, was a prudent man, and faced the new conditions with a willing mind, but he was old, slow, dull and sickly, incapable of restraining the reactionary party, who were indignant at his compact with rebellion. Chief among these was his own brother, the Count d'Artois, the leader of an ultra-royalist party of *émigrés* whose attempts to restore the old conditions compromised the Government and alienated the great mass of the people from it. Little can be said of any great sympathy for the Bourbons themselves. As Wellington justly remarked, they had become as much strangers to the country as if they had never reigned over it. The very fact that they had mounted the throne under foreign protection brought them into discredit. A popular cartoon had represented Louis XVIII on horseback behind a Cossack, galloping over the dead bodies of French soldiers. It was certainly unwise of him to be constantly expressing his gratitude to the Prince Regent of England for the protection he had afforded him; and on the other hand it was equally unwise in him to shut himself off from his subjects by antiquated ceremonials. Nor was that all. The very fact that the new Constitution was represented as a royal gift, violated the principle of the sovereignty of the people which had taken deep root in this proud nation. Although the Constitution guaranteed that the new proprietors of national land should retain their estates unimpaired, one of the Ministers in the Second Chamber expressed the hope that the rightful possessors (i.e. the returned *émigrés*) would be reinstated. These now pleaded the sacrifices their fidelity had cost, and as they were for the most part not qualified to occupy Government offices, they were rewarded by peerages, sinecures, and pensions, enough to make all those employed in the service of the State wish the imperial regime back again. The money for these handsome endowments

was procured by arbitrarily adding Napoleon's "extraordinary domain" to the civil list, and by imposing indirect taxes, methods which led to disturbances even in Vendée and Provence. In spite of these rewards, the returned *émigrés* were constantly striving to effect the recovery of their old estates. In this they were supported by the clergy, who shared their views and not infrequently abused the confessional to induce the dying to make restitution by alarming their scruples as to the lawfulness of their possessions. Favoured by a sanctimonious Court clique, the clergy obtained other successes. The office of Grand Almoner, which had been suppressed under Napoleon, was restored, and it hampered the efforts of the Ministry of Public Worship. A police regulation ordered Sundays and fête days to be observed under penalty, in spite of the fact that religious liberty was guaranteed in the Charter, and that for a long time back the French nation had observed only the fête days prescribed by the Concordat of 1801. Processions through the streets were again introduced, and to such extremes did things go that a favourite actress at the *Théâtre français* was actually refused Christian burial, an action which provoked a storm of indignation and led to a riot.

The ill-feeling roused by these arbitrary proceedings was intensified when, as a mark of gratitude, the Government repealed the tax on the corn trade with England, in consequence of which the price of food rose in the towns while along the seaboard the poorer peasantry were ruined by smuggling. But it was in the treatment of the army that the greatest tactlessness was shown. The old *noblesse*, from the Royal Princes downwards, sneered at the new nobility of the marshals and generals and thereby earned for themselves the enmity of the whole army. And after the captive garrisons from the fortresses in Eastern Europe and the troops from Spain and Italy had returned, the army represented no inconsiderable number and was quite too large for peaceful times. Retrenchments were made; the pay of the Old Guard was cut down, and thousands of officers were put upon half-pay. There would not have been much

to object to in these measures, had it not been that the places of the latter were filled by Royalists who were appointed officers, and that a new and richly paid royal guard was formed, composed of *émigrés* and aristocrats, and a military school founded for the sons of the nobility. These changes not only involved a heavy outlay, but also threatened to restore the old social inequality in military careers. The abolition of the schools for the orphans of soldiers who had won the Legion of Honour, provoked a storm of indignation that was felt even beyond the circles immediately affected. Under such circumstances it was little wonder that the army should become out and out Bonapartist, that some of the younger generals should have formed a conspiracy to let the exile at Elba know the state of feeling in the country. Little wonder, too, that his prospects brightened every day. "The French," says a contemporary, Fleury de Chaboulon, "prone by nature to changes of opinion and feeling, passed from their previous prejudice against Napoleon to outbursts of enthusiasm for him. They compared the state of confusion and humiliation into which France had sunk under the King, with the rapid growth, vigour, and unity of administration she had known under Napoleon; and now they began to consider Napoleon no longer as the cause of all their misfortunes, but as a great man, a hero in adversity." And although no one wanted him back, they began to palliate his faults; and they hated his successors.

But there were not lacking clear-sighted men who recognized the danger lurking in this change of public feeling. One of the most sagacious of these, Talleyrand, was then absent from Paris. He was representing Louis XVIII at the congress being held in Vienna for the settlement of the various political questions left unsolved by these national wars. His keen eye detected the spark glowing at Elba which might kindle the inflammable material accumulating in France into an international conflagration, and he resolved to stamp it out. He first thought of having Napoleon secretly abducted, but Mariotti, his confidential agent at Leghorn, declared this would prove very difficult and only possible if the captain of

one of the Emperor's four ships were won over. This they are said to have attempted, but Napoleon's vigilance frustrated the project.[1] The Chouan Bruslart, who in previous years had vowed to kill the Emperor, was appointed Prefect of Corsica with the deliberate intention of compassing the abduction of the Emperor, if not more; but this plan also failed.[2] Talleyrand now turned to the allied Powers at the congress, and in October, 1814, he proposed that the exile should be banished to the Azores, "500 leagues from the mainland," an idea which Louis XVIII thought excellent.[3]

But the Powers had more important matters on hand. Russia's one anxiety was how to secure her Polish booty unimpaired; Prussia wanted Saxony intact for herself; and each opposed the other's claims with such determination that a general conflict seemed imminent. France wished to break up the European Coalition in order to restore her own prestige and to preserve Saxony from injury, for the mother of Louis XVIII was a Saxon Princess; Britain strove hard to counteract Russia's preponderance, while to Austria, the aggrandisement of her two neighbours was a thorn in the flesh. Accordingly on January 3rd, 1815, these three Powers signed an agreement binding them to extreme measures if necessary; and although this compact was at first kept secret, the friction among the Powers was too evident for Napoleon not to learn of it at Elba, as well as of their secret

[1] *Vide* Jung, "Mémoires de Lucien Bonaparte," III. 222. Pellet, "Napoléon à l'île d'Elbe". Although Jung speaks of the dismissal of Captain Taillade, against that we have the statement of various authorities that Taillade remained in Napoleon's service and afterwards commanded the Emperor's ship on his voyage to France.

[2] *Vide* Houssaye, "1814," I. 172.

[3] On December 4th, Talleyrand wrote to the King that they must make haste to get rid of the man at Elba and of Murat. Castlereagh had already given his consent and only Metternich was hostile. But Talleyrand's zeal cooled down noticeably when Murat held out to that covetous diplomatist the prospect of disposing profitably of his princedom of Benevent, and he would say, for instance, when Pozzo di Borgo urged the congress to arrest Napoleon: "Do not mention him. He is a dead man" (Lehmann, "Tagebuch des Freiherrn von Stein," "Hist. Zeitschrift," N.F. XXIV. 446).

intention to banish him from Europe. He had heard of this latter plan early in December, and had immediately made preparations for a siege, improved his defences and made his gunners practise throwing bombs. He would have preferred to leave Elba at once, but at that time it would have been presumptuous folly. Later on, however, the complications at the congress, and the turn of events in France, gave his mind something to build upon; but the right opportunity had not yet come. In his conversation with Fleury de Chaboulon, who had come to Porto Ferrajo in February as Maret's envoy, he mentioned April 6th, as a likely date for his departure for the mainland. By then, he counted the Princes would probably have given up the congress in disgust, and once home again they would feel no desire to plunge afresh into war. But so long as they were still together they were sure to make it a point of honour to resist him; and of this much he felt sure, that Europe would not look on with indifference while he did what he contemplated, broke his oath, violated the treaty, and incited others to join him.

Nevertheless about the end of February he resolved to put his plan into execution. It is difficult to ascertain what led him to do it so early, whether or not he was aware of a provisory treaty on the Saxon and Polish questions signed by the Powers on February 8th, of Castlereagh's departure, and of the preparations of the Sovereigns to leave the congress. If he knew of these circumstances, he may have judged his chance had come; or, if he were in ignorance of them, he may have expected to turn the prevailing dissensions to his own account. Possibly Fleury's description of the widespread dissatisfaction in France prompted him to leave the Bourbon Government no time for tranquillizing measures. Then, too, more and more of his old Grenadiers, chafing at their meagre existence, were applying for leave. In mentioning the 1st of April to Fleury, whom he sent to Naples, not to France, he may have been wishing merely to guard his secret and conceal his real intentions from his agent. He afterwards declared at Paris: "I chose a time

when the congress should have been ended, and while the nights were still long enough to conceal my flight".[1] That may be. In any case he used to humour his old soldiers by saying: "Patience, friends, we shall leave together". On February 16th, he commissioned Drouot to have the ships in readiness by the 25th. On the 24th, the British Commissioner, Campbell, who also represented Britain at the Court of Tuscany, having just then left for the mainland, he ordered his troops to make ready to leave, and meanwhile he laid the island under an embargo so as to prevent any news leaking out. On the same evening he received deputations of magistrates and others who expressed their regret at his departure. On Sunday, the 26th, 1100 troops with a few guns were embarked on seven transports, and as night came down Napoleon himself stepped on board the "Inconstant," after having said good-bye to his mother and sister. Both of them favoured his plan; some of his courtiers, such as Bertrand, welcomed it with enthusiasm, as did the troops; Drouot alone, with manly sincerity, expressed his disapproval. Yet who could have held back this daring gamester from staking all on a last desperate throw?

On the voyage they passed a French cruiser steering for Leghorn, there to place itself at the service of Consul Mariotti and keep a look-out on Elba. It came too late, however; and Mariotti's lament afterwards, that this delay prevented him from capturing Napoleon's ship, is a gross exaggeration. Castlereagh was much more candid. When accused in Parliament of having allowed the Emperor to escape, he reminded the House that Napoleon was not a prisoner at Elba, and that any forcible restraint would have been a violation of the treaty concluded with him; moreover surveillance would have been utterly impossible, as the whole British Navy could not have prevented one man's escape from the island.[2]

[1] Thiers (XIX. 199) gives a different reason, p. 321.

[2] Hansard, "Parliamentary Debates," XXX. 426, Pellet ("Napoléon à l'île d'Elbe," p. 84) seems fully convinced of the secret connivance of Campbell and even of Britain, which was a widespread belief at that time. A few days before Napoleon's departure, Mariotti's secret agent had

On March 1st, the flotilla anchored in the Gulf of Juan between Cannes and Antibes. General Cambronne disembarked the Guards and once more Napoleon stood on French soil. While still on board ship he had told his suite he was counting on the surprise of the population, on public opinion, on the ill-will towards the allies, on the devotion of his soldiers, in short on all the Napoleonic elements in France, —but especially on the consternation and perplexity caused by such a startling novelty. But there were other forces to be reckoned with as well. He knew that public opinion in France was not everywhere hostile to the new rule and that if he advanced northwards along the high-road from Cannes, for instance, passing through Aix and Avignon, his daring enterprise would be immediately wrecked by the Royalists of Provence. Hence he was not dismayed by the hardships entailed in crossing the Alps Maritimes by roads still deep in snow. The guns which he had brought with him had to be left behind, and passing through Grasse and Sisteron, he reached Dauphiné where the peasantry were thoroughly disaffected towards priests and *émigrés* and were desirous to be left in undisturbed possession of their farms, most of which had come out of the national domains. Indeed the population of the mountain valleys from Gap onwards proved very friendly and did everything in their power to assist the jaded troops. But for Napoleon the all-important question was whether the soldiers whom they encountered on their march

written to his master : " His Majesty's departure, favoured by the English, will take place at an early date ". But who would accept the accuracy of the report on that evidence ? Compare with this what Napoleon said to Maret's envoy : " Surely you don't believe the police know everything ? The police invent far more than they discover. My police were quite as capable as these men and yet they often only got their information after one or two weeks, by chance indiscretion, or treachery." The fact is he represented his undertaking as favoured by Britain, just as he alluded to his good relations with Austria, and in both cases his aim was to mislead. Britain's private relations with the Court of Louis XVIII, and Castlereagh's policy, were significant of her actual attitude, which considered the Bourbons the safest guarantee that the Netherlands should not again fall into the hands of France.

would pass over to him, as he hoped they would do, or remain loyal to their oath to Louis XVIII, as he had exhorted them to do when he bade them farewell. If they took the latter course, he was lost.

From Sisteron onwards the troops marched in three divisions, first a small vanguard of 100 men under Cambronne, then the bulk of the troops under the Emperor, and lastly the rearguard. Near La Mure they came upon an advancing battalion who looked so hostile that Cambronne halted and waited orders from Napoleon. The latter decided to advance in person towards the troops, who were well posted near Laffray. Sending on an officer with a flag of truce to inform the battalion of his presence, he thereafter placed himself at the head of his vanguard. The critical moment had come at last. The officers were ready to follow their duty rather than their inclinations. They ordered their men to fire on the invaders; but the order was not obeyed. Napoleon saw his opportunity. Advancing within gunshot, he opened his grey over-coat exclaiming, "Which of you will fire on his Emperor?" Instantly a cheer burst from the ranks, and waving their helmets on their bayonets, the soldiers shouted, "*Vive l'Empereur!*" Then, mingling with the detachment from Elba and full of enthusiasm, they followed their idolized leader. The officers had perforce to yield to the revolutionary impulse of their men, but they did so willingly.

At Grenoble, the capital of Dauphiné, where there was a strong garrison, Napoleon had secretly circulated a manifesto to the French army: "Soldiers, we were not defeated," it began, "although two men from our ranks (Marmont and Augereau) betrayed our laurels, their country, their Princes, and their benefactors. And are those whom we have seen roaming through Europe for twenty-five years past, stirring up enemies against us, even stooping to serve against us in foreign armies, and cursing our fair France, shall they now claim to assume the command, and chain up our eagles, the sight of which they could never bear? Your rank, your possessions, your glory, and the possessions, rank, and glory

of your children have no more inveterate enemies than these Princes who have been imposed upon us by foreign Powers. Their honours, their rewards, their favour belong only to those who have served them in fighting against their native country and against us. Soldiers ! Come and range yourselves under the banner of your leader. His life is bound up in yours, his rights are those of the people, and yours ; his interests, his honour, his fame are your interests, your honour, your fame. Come ! Then victory will approach at a gallop, and the eagle shall carry the national colours from spire to spire till it lights on the towers of Notre Dame." This and much more he said to the soldiers of France, and they listened enraptured ! It was the same voice which had so often thanked them for their victories and predicted new triumphs, the speech of a man who justly appreciated his warriors, and who knew thoroughly how to treat them although they were but a tool in his hands to carve out his greatness. But this British protégé treated them as a mere burden and never considered them at all.

The garrison of Grenoble, headed by Colonel Labédoyère's regiment, went over to Napoleon, as the battalion at La Mure had done. These iron veterans succumbed to the spell of this man's personality just as the children of Hamelin followed the rat-catcher's flute. Napoleon now reckoned confidently on success. He perfectly understood Macdonald, Oudinot, and others of his marshals, feeling no desire to join his cause, for their careers were practically closed and they had earned their rest by long and arduous service. Others again, like Masséna at Marseilles, and Ney, who had even boasted he would chain up this invader .and bring him to the King, could not stem the strong tide of sentiment in the army, and they too became imperialists once more.

So the army went over to Napoleon, but only after he assured them he would not make war ; for that the army had no further desire. " We must forget," said he in his appeal, " that we were once masters of the nations." The same statement, only more emphatic, he repeated at every opportunity to the citizens in the towns ; for in spite of much

sympathy with him and a hearty dislike of the insolent pride of the aristocrats, it was justly felt that his return endangered the peace. "The French," said Labédoyère, with a frankness which Napoleon did not resent, "will do every thing for your Majesty, but your Majesty must also do everything for them; no more ambition, no despotism; we wish to be free and happy. Hence, Sire, the system of conquest and of force which has brought misfortune upon you and upon France, must be abjured." Soon after this when he received a deputation of the magistrates of Grenoble, he did not shrink from admitting that he had been too fond of war, but henceforth he would leave his neighbours in peace; he had used his ten months of exile to reflect on the past; the ignominy he had undergone, far from embittering him, had taught him wisdom; he saw what France required; Peace and Liberty was the crying need of the time, and he would henceforth make that the mainspring of his conduct. He had loved greatness and had yielded too much to the absorbing passion of conquest. But he was not the only one guilty. The submissiveness of the European Powers, the readiness with which he was granted French lives and money, and the country's approbation of his martial zeal, had all contributed their share. Hence his effort to make France master of Europe was pardonable. It ought to be forgiven him and never again used as a reproach.[1] On March 10th he entered Lyons at the head of 7000 troops and was welcomed by the populace with tumultuous delight. He now declared himself anxious to defend the interests and the principles of the Revolution against the *émigrés* and to restore her glory to France without subjecting her to war. This he hoped to avoid, as he accepted the treaties concluded with the foreign Powers and was willing to live at peace with them, provided, of course, they did not interfere in French affairs. France must now be content to be first among the nations, without claiming to rule them. In former years he had often sought to justify his aggressive policy by asserting that he had been diverted from his peaceful intentions by the other Powers; but this argu-

[1] Fleury de Chaboulon, "Mémoires de 1815," I. 179. Thiers, XIX. 91.

ment he knew was now discredited. There was the ring of penitence in his admission of his martial desire for power and fame.

At Lyons he was again Emperor.[1] He dissolved the Chambers and summoned the Electoral Colleges to send deputies to Paris, to an assembly which he termed by the Carolingian name of the *Champ de Mai*. There the Constitution was to be altered and amended, and the coronation of the Empress and his son was to take place. He wished by this means to indicate that not only was there no danger to be apprehended from Austria, but that he even hoped for some understanding with that Power—a wild delusion, as he afterwards confessed to some of his intimates. Another decree expelled all *émigrés* who had only returned in 1814, and confiscated their property. He abolished the old nobility, proscribed Talleyrand, Marmont, Augereau, the Duke of Dalberg and others as traitors who had betrayed France to the foreigners, dismissed all *émigrés* from posts to which they had been appointed by Louis XVIII, and disbanded the royal guard, the so-called "*maison militaire*".

At first the Court at Paris was inclined to view the arrival of the "Man of Elba" as a mere escapade that was doomed to fail. They were quite convinced that he wanted to find a road over the mountains into Italy, to rouse the people there to revolt; and false reports of his impending downfall continued to appear in the "Moniteur," even after he had recaptured the hearts of the army. In the Chambers, King Louis was still supported by the liberals, the *frondeurs* of 1800 under Benjamin Constant, and those of 1813 under Lainé; but beyond that, there was nothing done, except making high-sounding speeches. For all decrees, such as that declaring property in the national lands inalienable and any attack on it punishable by imprisonment, came too late and inspired no belief, because dictated by the needs of the moment. On March 18th, when Napoleon had reached Fontainebleau, Louis addressed a manifesto of his own to the

[1] "From Cannes to Grenoble I was an adventurer; in this town I became a sovereign again," Gourgaud, Journal inédit, I. 378.

army, reminding them of their fidelity to the oath they had sworn to him, of the danger of civil war in the country, and of the conflict with foreign Powers already threatening afresh. But all in vain. A reserve army, south of Paris, went over to Napoleon, and Louis, anxious for his own safety, left the capital next day.

On the evening of March 20th, Napoleon ascended the steps of the Tuileries, leaning on the arm of one of his staunchest supporters. The streets of the capital were again in possession of the military. Outside the palace a crowd of Bonaparte enthusiasts was cheering and rejoicing, but the rest of the community held aloof, resigned rather than interested. Not a trace was there of the enthusiasm with which they had welcomed Napoleon on his return to Paris in 1799 or in 1806. "Every one was gloomy," says de Broglie, "listless, uncomplaining, without hope, but not without anxiety." Such was the impression produced also upon the Emperor, who now watched the mood of the nation with infinitely greater care than before. "They have let me come," said he to Mollien, "as they let the others go."

CHAPTER XIX.

WATERLOO.

"PEACE and Liberty," such was the watchword by which Napoleon now sought to commend himself to the French nation, and to disarm the distrust with which he was everywhere regarded in civilian circles. For how could they believe him now, remembering as they did how often he had promised "Peace" and had broken his word, and the manifold ways in which he had suppressed "Liberty". On the day of his arrival in Paris he assured Maret, Davoût, Cambacérès and other devoted followers who had rejoined him at the Tuileries, that he had no intention of repeating the past, that a man must learn to profit by his enemies' faults as well as by his own, and that now he knew what to avoid and what to desire; he himself had only loved power so long as he was building the foundations of a mighty empire, when power was indispensable for his purpose; now, however, all that was a thing of the past. And they believed his words. Maret again became Secretary of State, Davoût, after much persuasion, accepted the post of Minister of War, Cambacérès that of Minister of Justice, Gaudin that of the Treasury, Mollien, the Finances, and Decrès the Navy. It was comparatively speaking an easy task to win back these men, for they were more or less dependent on him. The difficulty was to offer the nation guarantees that he had come back a changed man, and for that words would not suffice. At Paris he repeated the solemn assurances he had uttered at Grenoble and Lyons. To the various deputations he declared that he meant to forget that France had ever been master of the world, that he had renounced the idea of a universal empire, and that now he thought only of the

happiness and stability of the French empire. He was no longer aiming at arbitrary power; his desire now was to secure the rights of the individual, the protection of property, and freedom of thought; for Princes were merely the first citizens of the State. But the nation required deeds; nor did Napoleon fail them. First of all, though reluctantly and with serious misgiving, he made Fouché Minister of Police, a man whose past record afforded a certain guarantee to radical and liberal circles, and whose close touch with all classes as well as with foreign Courts made his services well-nigh indispensable. Then he abolished the censorship, though this indeed cost him no great sacrifice, for he justly reckoned that after all the Press had written against him during the past year there was nothing more left to say about him, but a great deal about his enemies. Far more important than this measure was the fact that he persuaded Carnot, a staunch Republican, and a man of proved honour and ability, to become Minister of the Interior, and Benjamin Constant, the leader of the party in favour of a constitutional Monarchy, and who had stoutly combated Napoleon in the old Consulate days, to become a member of the reorganized Council of State.

Shortly before the Emperor's return, Constant had published a violent attack on him in the "Journal des Débats" (even then a leading paper), comparing him with Attila and Chengis-Chan, and protesting in the name of the friends of Liberty that he would never have any dealings with him. Now, however, Napoleon invited him to Court (on Joseph's suggestion it is said), and treated him with such winning frankness and trust that the hostile tribune was won over and even persuaded to serve the empire. The nation, said the Emperor, has had a twelve years' respite from political agitations, and a year's rest from war, and this respite has revived her need of activity. She again wanted tribunes and assemblies which she had not always desired. "She flung herself at my feet when I rose to power. You must remember that, for you were then in the Opposition. What support had you, what strength? None. I accepted less power than

was given me. To-day things are changed. The love of debates, constitutions, and speeches, has returned because a feeble Government, inimical to the national interests, has provoked criticism of the authorities. But it is only the minority who want these things; make no mistake on that point. The people, or, if you prefer it, the masses, want only me. You did not see them crowding round me, hastening down from the mountains to welcome me. I am not—as has been said, a soldiers' Emperor. I am the Emperor of the peasants and plebeians of France, and hence the people come to me, in spite of all that has happened. There is a community of feeling between us. I am sprung from the ranks of the people and they know my voice. I have been surrounded by Montmorencys, Rohans, Noailles, Beauvaus, and Mortemarts, but there never was any sympathy between us. Look at these conscripts, these peasant lads. I have not flattered them, I have even treated them harshly, and yet they flock round me in crowds and shout, "*Vive l'Empereur!*" They look to me as their stay and their deliverer from the *noblesse*. On a sign from me, the nobles in all the provinces would be slain. But I will not be made King by a peasant war. And so, if it is possible to govern the country by means of a Constitution, well and good, let it be done. Because I wanted a universal empire, I required unlimited power in order to found it. Who in my place would not have aimed at universal supremacy? Did not Sovereigns and subjects vie with one another in hastening under my sceptre? I have found more resistance in France from a few unknown and defenceless Frenchmen than from all these Kings who are so proud because none among their subjects is their equal. Now I am no longer a conqueror, and cannot be one, for I know what is possible and what not; . . . and for governing France alone, it is perhaps better to have a Constitution. Think out what you consider practicable and submit your plans to me; open debates, independent elections, responsible Ministers, a free Press, all these things I approve. And furthermore I want peace, and shall obtain it by victories. I do not wish to rouse any false hopes in you. Although I

have circulated a report that negotiations with foreign Powers are in progress, such is not the case. I consider a long and tedious war much more probable, and in order to weather it the nation must support me. In return she will demand Liberty and she shall have it." Such was the gist of the Emperor's remarks to Constant, who has himself related the interview; and so impressed was he by the manly frankness with which Napoleon described his position that he expressed his willingness to draft a Constitution.

So after all it was not to be "Peace and Liberty," as had been proclaimed in every corner of France, but War and Liberty, and all this gigantic expenditure in blood and money which had ended by restoring the old "legitimate" balance of power, was to count for nothing? No one had less reason than the "Man of Elba" to expect that the Powers would look on calmly while he broke the engagements he had signed and again seized the leadership of the most restless nation in Europe. No one had called him back. Even in the army there had been no conspiracy of any importance demanding his recall. For the plot in the northern garrisons, in which Fouché was implicated, had aimed at establishing a regency for his son.[1] He had made his appearance unexpectedly to conquer by "bluffing," and even in the army it had required his personal magnetism to kindle revolt. Both in form and in tone his appeals—especially at Lyons—had been highly Revolutionary.[2] The European Powers could not let such a wanton violation of their political rights pass unheeded. In March, 1814, they had solemnly pledged themselves never to conclude peace with Bonaparte; and he, on his part, had

[1] Napoleon was intensely annoyed that the opponents of the Bourbons should have thought of a regency and not exclusively of him, and this was one of the principal reasons that induced him to leave Elba so soon (cp. "Fleury de Chaboulon," I. 126).

[2] On July 20th, after all was over, Metternich wrote to Hudelist: "Between France in 1815 and in 1814 there is as great a difference as between France in 1814 and in 1793. The one service that Bonaparte had rendered France and Europe was to muzzle the Jacobins, but even this service is not to outlive him, for now he has again let loose Jacobinism" (W. St. A.).

promised at Fontainebleau to renounce the supremacy in France for ever. Well he knew—for he frankly admitted it to Constant—that his enterprise would provoke their opposition, and that by seizing the crown of France he was exposing the country to enemies far superior to her in numbers and resources, and was conjuring up a new and terrible war. Therein lay his inexpiable sin.

On the morning of March 6th the news of the departure of Napoleon and his troops from Porto Ferrajo reached Vienna, where the Congress had not yet broken up as Napoleon had hoped, almost all the Princes and diplomatists being still present. Under the great sensation produced by this news, the Czar and the German Sovereigns immediately resolved to oppose the "adventurer," as the Emperor Francis termed him, with their united forces. At first they were uncertain as to the goal of his journey, and as Talleyrand thought Italy probable, Bellegarde, the Austrian field marshal, received orders "to attack him at once and crush him". Castlereagh had already left, but Wellington, who succeeded him, was authorized to sanction this step. The two sources of discord, the Polish and the Saxon questions, had already reached a settlement. The former by the compulsory moderation of the Czar, the latter at the expense of the King of Saxony, who ceded one half of his country to Prussia while King Frederick William withdrew his claims to the other half, thus frustrating completely the calculations Napoleon had founded on the dissensions among the Powers. His action indeed had produced exactly the opposite effect, and had created a unifying interest which led them unanimously to oppose him. Britain was concerned for the new kingdom of the Netherlands, Prussia for her Rhine provinces, the Czar (with whom lay the blame for the choice of Elba) was eager to beat off the usurper by immediate and energetic hostilities, while the Emperor of Austria wanted it to appear that he no longer considered there was any bond between him and the heir of the Revolution. On March 13th the congress issued a declaration of outlawry against Napoleon, in which he was delivered up to public justice as "the enemy and

destroyer of the peace of the world". On the 25th the four Great Powers renewed their agreement of Chaumont, by which they pledged themselves to furnish 150,000 troops each—Britain the equivalent in money—and "not to lay down arms till Bonaparte had been rendered wholly incapable of ever again disturbing the peace, or of renewing his attempt to seize for himself the supreme power in France". To this the other States gave their adherence.

Outlawed thus by Europe, whom he had once seen at his feet, Napoleon strained every nerve to counteract the unfavourable impression this verdict was bound to produce on the French nation. He even sought to secure some modification of its harsh terms at Vienna. In vain he represented the declaration of March 13th as the handiwork of Louis XVIII's agents. The truth soon became public when the foreign diplomatists requested their passports and left the capital. In vain he protested that he meant to respect the Paris Peace of May, 1814, and on April 4th he wrote to all the Sovereigns that his dearest wish was to make the Imperial Throne of France a bulwark for the peace of Europe. The only reply he received was that the Powers mobilized their armies, which had not yet been put on peace establishment, in the direction of France. Nor did he gain anything by sending letters by secret messengers to Marie Louise calling her back to France, and to the Emperor Francis, requesting him to send back his wife and his child as their coronation was already in prospect. Wife and child did not return. Marie Louise even sent a written communication to the leading members of the Congress, stating that she had no sympathy with Napoleon's projects and that she placed herself under the protection of the allies. Soon afterwards she sent a similar letter to her father, surrendering herself entirely to his care and guidance. The little Prince, however, owing to rumours of a plot for abducting him, was closely guarded. Nor did Napoleon meet with any better success in his attempt to sow discord between the Courts by revealing to the Czar the secret offensive alliance of January 3rd; nor in his attempt to resume relations with Talleyrand, who, having learned that he had been proscribed along with

Bourrienne, Marmont, and ten others, naturally kept out of the way. Seeing that France tolerated Napoleon, the Princes and their advisers at Vienna did indeed consider the question as to whether they should adopt a different line of action from that agreed upon; but in a protocol of May 12th, signed by all the plenipotentiaries, they decided to make no alteration in their plans: "The Powers are not authorized to give France a Government, but they will never forego the right to prevent anything under the title of 'Government' from making the country a centre of disturbance and unrest to other States". They rejected the Emperor's offer to respect the Treaty of Paris, as that peace had been concluded with a Government which provided sufficient guarantees for the peace of Europe, and they would never have consented to the same conditions with Bonaparte without much stronger guarantees.[1] To Fouché, who was already plotting against Napoleon, now that all Europe was threatening him, Metternich wrote: "The Powers will have nothing to do with him. They will fight him to the last, but they do not want to fight against France." Again the crucial question arose, Could they discriminate between France and Napoleon?

Soon every Frenchman knew that the Emperor's professions of negotiating with Austria and other States were empty delusions, and that they were face to face with a new war for which the Emperor alone was responsible, and which was entirely due to his reappearance. And the deep-seated disaffection towards him produced by the consciousness of this, was the determining factor in the Emperor's destiny. Government securities, which had risen slightly on the strength of his representations, fell from 80, at which figure they stood in the beginning of March, to 57 in April. This further alienated owners of property, especially the great body of small investors. But the Emperor had not only injured the people's pockets, he had embittered their hearts. Ten long years they had yearned for peace and only found it when the empire broke up. Now it had been re-

[1] D'Angeberg, "Congrès de Vienne," I, 1184. Talleyrand, Dalberg, and Noailles also signed the document for France.

stored and already the necessity for more bloodshed was threatening anew all the families who would be affected by war. "I cannot conceal," says Miot de Melito, whom Napoleon had sent as commissioner to the department of the north, "that everywhere the women are your avowed enemies, and in France their enmity is not to be despised". The Emperor had to admit that he heard similar reports from the other envoys. "Every one is a prey to dejection," wrote an Englishman in Paris to Lord Castlereagh. Owing to this change in public opinion, Napoleon did not benefit to any considerable extent by his success in stamping out the Bourbon risings in the south, where the Duke and Duchess of Angoulême had rallied a party around them. The Duke was forced to sign a capitulation and the Duchess to flee the country. France had certainly lost touch with the Bourbons, but it had by no means been won for Bonaparte. Carnot had foreseen this weeks before, when he asked Napoleon if he really had any assurances from Austria; and on his replying in the negative, he added, "Then there is more for you to do than you have yet done". In order to control public opinion somewhat, Carnot dismissed sixty-one out of eighty-seven prefects, but this was of little effect, as it took some time before their successors could make their influence felt. Moreover the new prefects met with a passive but persistent opposition from the mayors, who were mostly drawn from the old noble families. The mayors, too, were removed, still without effecting the desired result, for the parishes demanded the right of choosing their own representatives, and having now launched out upon the current of liberalism, the Emperor yielded to their request, and granted all towns with over 5,000 inhabitants the right of having their mayors elected by the votes of the citizens (Decree of April 30th, 1815). But as the humbler classes, the artisans and day labourers, i.e. the Emperor's most devoted adherents, had no votes, in the majority of cases the mayors were re-elected and could not be set aside. The army alone—but only so far as it was actually under arms—was sincerely loyal to its great chief. At that time there was an abundance of

splendid war material in the country, thousands upon thousands of veterans who had returned from imprisonment and from the Spanish and the Italian armies, and most of whom had either been discharged by Louis XVIII, or had left the service without permission. They numbered roughly 120,000, a valuable asset in the event of war, as at the outset there were barely 200,000 troops in the army. When the hero of Austerlitz and Friedland raised his standard anew he had expected they would all come forward enthusiastically. They did so only to a very limited extent; even although in the decrees summoning them they were assured that immediately peace had been signed they would be released from service. By the beginning of June only 52,000 had rejoined the ranks, and Napoleon had reckoned on at least double that number.[1] After all, it was but natural. Even the most hardened veterans were at last longing for rest, and they had only just begun to taste its delights when the Emperor's summons gave the alarm. Castlereagh's agent at Paris represents some soldiers saying to the host on whom they were billeted, "We like '*Père Violette*' (i.e. Napoleon) far better than '*Gros Papa*' (Louis XVIII) whom we don't know; but we are sick of war, and if we have to fight all Europe, we would rather have '*Gros Papa*' back again". Soon the Emperor recognized that he had plenty of officers and *cadres* but a dearth of rank and file. One day he asked Peyrusse (now Master of the Treasury) in confidence if people believed in Paris that he would be able to gather a large army? "Your Majesty will not be left alone," said he; "I'm almost afraid I shall," was Napoleon's reply.

The dearth of rank and file was mainly due to the fact that out of regard for public opinion Napoleon fought shy of again having recourse to the hated conscription which had been abolished by Louis XVIII, and other means of increasing his fighting force failed him. For example, five foreign regiments were formed, but only the Polish one reached 800; the others remained far below that figure. Napoleon had hoped to have from fifty to sixty battalions of soldiers, instead

[1] *Vide* Houssaye, "1815," II. 5.

of which he had fifteen, and even these would not be ready before June. There were only from 15,000 to 20,000 volunteers, as owing to the low state of the finances, the Emperor was unable to make payments. There were still the National Guards, and, according to an old Revolutionary law of 1792, he could call up some 200,000 of them between the ages of 20 and 40. But he saw all too plainly that in most of the towns the National Guards had become thorough-paced democrats and would only stand by him on condition that he yielded to their radical demands. It is scarcely surprising that he hesitated about arming them and that he did not reckon on their services in war. He sent them to relieve the line troops in garrisoning the fortresses and allowed them to be replaced by substitutes. He was very anxious, so Molé assured Lord Holland, lest the Republican party should gain the upper hand, and he lamented the impossibility of rousing France to war against the allies unless by resorting to methods which he had always repudiated. Indeed he is even said to have admitted to his entourage that he would never have left Elba had he foreseen how complaisant he would require to be to the democrats.[1] All these things depressed him. "He was full of anxiety," writes one of his councillors, "the confidence in himself which had characterized all his speeches in the old days, the tone of authority, the soaring thought, had all disappeared. Already he seemed to feel the hand of misfortune soon to weigh him down so heavily. He no longer trusted in his star." Others spoke of him as being in indifferent health, due, some thought, to over-indulgence in hot baths; according to others, to an internal malady; and he required a great deal more sleep than he used to do. To all he seemed changed.[2] Carnot came upon him once gazing at a picture of his little son, the tears streaming from his eyes; yet this man had once known how to bear both bodily and mental anguish without flinching. Nevertheless,

[1] "Reminiscences of Lord Holland," p. 166, German edition.

[2] *Vide* Miot de Melito, III. 395. Houssaye, "1815" I. 614. Cp. General Koller's statement in Helfert, "Napoleons Fahrt von Fontainebleau nach Elba," p. 39.

Napoleon utterly rejected the suggestion of those about him, to abdicate in favour of his son, by which means, according to Fouché's secret information from Metternich, war might have been avoided. "I am not such a fool," said Napoleon to Lucien, with whom he had been reconciled and who was already thinking of himself as Regent. As a matter of fact Metternich's assurances to the secret agent who was to meet Fouché's emissary at Bâle, were not sufficiently reliable to induce Napoleon to risk sinking his own personality.[1] When Napoleon learned the full extent of these secret plottings he seriously thought of arresting Fouché, and to his dying day he regretted the consideration he showed to this man, who was even then scheming to secure himself and his post under the next regime, whether it were a regency, the Duke of Orleans, or the Bourbons.

If Napoleon remained at the head of the State, war was inevitable; hence it was of paramount importance that the foreign Powers should not learn how poor a response the appeal to his old and proven fighting forces had met with, nor the fact that the nation was hostile to the prospect of war. He could not make up his mind to entrust the new Constitution to a representative assembly who might put his promises of liberty into execution. He dreaded the debates that were sure to ensue, and also the danger of them crippling his freedom of action and so depriving him of the one means by which he could effect his own salvation—a victory over the allies. Maret declares that the Emperor would have preferred a dictatorship, but he had committed himself too deeply by his concessions, speeches, and manifestoes, to retrace his steps. He hoped to find a way out of the difficulty by embodying the concessions he had already made, and those he would soon be forced to make, in the form of a supplement to the former Constitutions issued during his reign. This was to be carried out by his councillors and simply adopted by the "sovereign" people. Such was the task for which he had summoned Constant, who now set to work forthwith.

[1] *Vide* Metternich, "Nachgelassene Papiere," 11, 514.

On April 22nd the work was finished, and after being submitted to a committee of the Council of State, and thereafter to the full council, it was published under the title of "Additional Act to the Constitutions of the Empire". Constant himself is said to have advocated drafting an entirely new Constitution which, in a way, would have disavowed all the previous legislation of the empire, but to this the Emperor would not agree. He was intent on explaining and justifying the dictatorial procedure of his earlier days, and he now represented what he had achieved under the overmastering impulse of ambition, as having been premeditated, and as forming part of a definite, world-wide, beneficent policy. "Our intention then was," he says in the preamble to the new Act, "to found a great European Federative system, which we had chosen as being in harmony with the spirit of the age and favourable to the progress of culture. With the idea of making it complete, and giving it the widest scope and the utmost stability, we have meanwhile postponed the enactment of various internal measures which are intended to guarantee the liberty of the citizens. Nevertheless, henceforward our sole aim is to promote the welfare of France by safeguarding her public liberties. Hence the necessity for important changes in the Constitutions, senatus consulta, and other documents by which this empire is governed." Certainly it was a federation of States he had wanted but they were to be subject to the absolute power of one man who could suppress at will the individual members of the federation, just as he had done in the case of Piedmont, the Papal States, Holland, the Hanseatic towns, Oldenburg, Hanover, the northern departments of Spain, and Le Valais, and who knows how much farther he intended to go. And the whole federation was to centre not in France, but in Napoleon I. That was his real aim. Perhaps people still remembered his article published in the "Moniteur" in 1807, admonishing his nephew, the young Crown Prince of Holland, always to regard the duties of a Regent towards the Emperor as coming first in importance. When he destined Lucien to fill a throne, he announced for his guidance "that

soldiers, laws, taxes, in short everything in the land he ruled, was there solely for the service of the imperial throne".[1] Four years previously, he had written to the Viceroy Eugène that he would instantly incorporate Italy in France, if it did not comply with his fiscal system. Yet it is indisputable that, in spite of all the mischief it wrought, the ambitious activity of this man with his vast conceptions and unparalleled energy, had accomplished much that was valuable in the development of Europe, much that was in harmony with the spirit of the age, and that made for progress. It is grossly unjust to belittle this fact. But to assert, as he now did, that he had been guided in his career of conquest by an ideal aim which had constantly floated in his mind, was a specious perversion of facts.

This preamble was incidentally intended to prove in the most solemn way to the rest of Europe that the Empire had at last finished its rôle of conquest. It was followed by sixty-seven articles containing the new Constitution. Numbers 59-66 dealt with the question of Liberty, and enacted that no one was to be denied fair trial by law, or imprisoned, or banished, till sentence had been pronounced; religious liberty and the freedom of the Press were both guaranteed; all property, the possession of which had been legally attested, was declared inalienable; the right of appeal was vouchsafed to all; Government could declare martial law only in case of invasion, or after passing an Act. The other articles dealt with the transformation of the Legislative Body into a Representative Chamber composed of 629 members chosen by the Electoral Colleges of the departments, thereby raising the number of electors from 15,000 to 100,000, and granting a passive vote to each French citizen. The Senate was replaced by a Chamber of Peers, the members of which were nominated by the Emperor, with the exception of the Princes of the reigning family who, in virtue of their rank, were entitled to a seat and a vote: the peerage was declared hereditary. The great privileges hitherto enjoyed by the Senate were not to be transferred to the Chamber

[1] Lucien, "Mémoires" (ed. Jung) vol. III. pp. 111, 326.

of Peers. Both Chambers were to hold sittings in public, and both were entitled to initiate legislation, and to vote on the budget. The Chamber of Deputies was to be the special representative of the industrial interest. Ministers were made responsible and could be impeached by the Chamber, in which case the Peers acted as Judges. The right of interpreting the law (formerly held by the Council of State), now fell to the deputies. A final article excluded the Bourbons for ever from the Government of France.

Before submitting his first draft to the Council of State, Constant had had long discussions with Napoleon on two points. In the first place, he maintained that making the Peerage hereditary was sure to give offence to the liberal and democratic circles which it was desirable to conciliate. But the Emperor would not forego the advantages of an aristocracy; he thought that after winning one or two battles, the old French nobility would seek him out once more and they would then find a more suitable field of public life in the first Chamber than had been possible in the Senate. In the second place Constant proposed that there should be an article depriving the head of the State of the right of confiscation. This the Emperor also opposed, declaring that he could not afford to deliver himself without any means of defence into the hands of political factions, and that it was necessary the people should recognize the Emperor's old power. "I am being forced into a path that is not mine," he exclaimed with flashing eyes. "I am being weakened and fettered. France looks for me and does not find me. It asks what has become of the Emperor's strong arm which it needs to master Europe. It is no use talking to me of goodness, abstract justice, and natural laws. Necessity is the first law; public safety the first justice. Once peace is concluded, then we shall see. Every day has its task, every circumstance its special law, each individual his own nature. Mine is not that of an angel, and, I repeat, it is necessary that people should again feel the Emperor's arm as of old."[1] It is evident therefore that while in his heart he was not in

[1] Constant, "Cent jours," p. 48.

sympathy with the strong tide of liberal sentiment, he could not escape from it, as it seemed to him that on it his power depended. Yet if "each circumstance had its own law," it was quite possible that after a victory circumstances might arise demanding a new Constitution. When Cambacérès called his attention to the strongly marked liberal tendencies among the people the Emperor remarked—just before the war in Belgium—"Within six weeks, I shall have silenced this idle talk". Even at St. Helena he repeatedly declared that in the event of him remaining victor in the field, he had meant to dismiss the Chambers.[1] The old autocratic spirit which he had so carefully silenced was thus asserting itself again. In order to secure the rest of the Constitution his advisers gave way on this disputed point and the offending article was omitted.

Both this and other matters, however, were much commented upon after the publication of the Constitution, which was recommended to the acceptance of the people of France just as had been done with the laws of the Senate in 1802 and 1804. But the title "Additional Act," was unfortunate and created a bad impression. It was felt that after all it was just the old despotic rule over again, which had had Constitutions drafted by officials like an administrative decree, and then submitted to a plebiscite, when all conceivable pressure was brought to bear so that things could be put to the vote and settled with Ayes and Noes, without the possibility of a debate or an amendment. All political France was indignant. "What was wise and liberal in the new Constitution was entirely disregarded," relates de Broglie. "The fact remained; it was a charter that had been forced from him, a new, revised, and improved edition of the Constitutions of the Empire. What more was needed to let loose the clamours of a populace that troubled themselves little about the kernel of things?"

So the new Liberal Constitution did not win the success on which the Emperor had counted. "Liberty," could not out-balance "War". The mistrust was too deep. Even

[1] Chastenay, "Mémoires," II. 497. Gourgaud, "Journal," I. 93, II. 323.

when he consented to publish a decree summoning the electoral colleges to nominate the deputies, who were to meet immediately after the announcement of the plebiscite, he failed to efface the unfavourable impression. It showed itself unmistakably in the voting, for while 3,500,000 had voted for the Consulate for life in 1802, and for the Empire in 1804, Napoleon now gained only 1,500,000 votes, and that included 244,000 from the army. Of the 5,000,000 electors more than two-thirds had refrained from voting, for there were only 5000 dissentients. The elections too were unfavourable. For of the 629 deputies, only 80 were thorough-going Bonapartists who wished the Emperor to be not merely a constitutional monarch but a dictator with unlimited powers. Over 500 were liberals of various shades who had little confidence in the Emperor and were only prepared to tolerate his rule provided his powers were strictly limited. These were defeats which all the theatrical pomp of the "*Champ de Mai*," where the results were announced, was powerless to conceal.

On the 1st of June an immense concourse of people flocked to the review on the Champs de Mars, where the Court had assembled along with the Ministers, the chief Government officials, the leading clergy from the provincial centres, thousands of delegates from the provinces, national guards, and troops of the line, upwards of 45,000 people. The Emperor drove up in a state coach drawn by eight pairs of horses. He was accompanied by four marshals on horseback and an enormous suite. It was the last flash of the imperial splendour. After solemn mass, the spokesman of the representatives from the Electoral Colleges, addressing the Emperor, assured him he could expect from them everything that a hero and a restorer of order was entitled to demand from a faithful, energetic nation, steadfast in her desire of liberty and independence. That sounded very loyal, but it was accompanied by qualifications. "Trusting to your promises," ran the address, "our deputies will revise our laws wisely, after mature consideration, and bring them into harmony with the Constitutional system," in other words, they considered the work of framing the Constitution by no means complete, and the

people meant to take their lawful share in articulating their rights. Fortunately the orator had previously been persuaded to omit one sentence which ran: "We flock around you because we hope that you bring with you from your exile the repentance of a great man". On the other hand foreign relations were treated from a patriotic standpoint and the question was put, "What do these Monarchs want, moving upon us with all the apparatus of war? Wherein have we provoked their attack? Have we violated treaties since the Peace? Every Frenchman is a soldier; victory will again accompany your eagles, and our enemies, who reckoned on dissensions among ourselves, will soon repent of having challenged us." To this and other matters Napoleon replied, after he had announced the result of the voting, signed the additional Act, and taken the Oath. His speech was vigorous and full of confidence. What, he asked, did the foreigners want? They would like to increase the Netherlands by making the strongholds of Northern France her boundary, and to divide Alsace and Lorraine among themselves. That must be prevented. Then, when that has been accomplished, the various scattered provisions of our Constitutions shall be combined by a solemn law in accordance with the spirit of the "Additional Act". By referring to the latter as something purely temporary he hoped to disarm the hostile criticism it had everywhere aroused. He also touched on another and very delicate point. There was a widespread rumour that in order to avert the danger threatening the country from a renewal of the war, he meant to abdicate; but this rumour was the work of that arch-schemer Fouché who had again turned all his powerful machinery against the Emperor. It was in allusion to this report that the Emperor remarked he would willingly offer his life as a sacrifice to the foreign Kings, seeing they were so embittered against him, were it not that he saw that they had designs on France; from which he meant his hearers to infer that they were mistaken in looking upon him as the rock of offence. He was more candid when he told one of his intimates, "In me they are combating the Revolution".

But all his speechifying did not calm people's minds, and

certain things even increased the irritation. For instance, instead of wearing the uniform of the national guard, he had chosen to assert his independent authority by appearing in a dazzling and fantastic costume symbolic of his sovereign rank. Equally distasteful was the repeated use of the words, "My people," "My capital". Such expression from one who was the heir of the Revolution, the people had never liked and least of all now. After the Te Deum, Napoleon descended from the throne and advanced to a dais in the centre of the field, where he proceeded to distribute the eagles. When he demanded of the national guards if they were ready to defend their eagles with their blood, even the most zealous Bonapartists admitted that their response lacked enthusiasm.[1] The imperial guard alone swore with passionate fervour. "As they defiled past the Emperor," narrates an eye-witness, "there was an ominous gleam in their flashing eyes; one could almost read on their lips '*Morituri te salutamus!*'" So after all, the splendid Champ de Mai had not increased the popularity of the new Government and had even intensified the opposition to it. But it produced its full effect of majestic splendour and power on one spectator at least—a little, fair-haired boy of seven, afterwards known to history as Napoleon III.

When the Representative Chamber met on the 3rd of June, the tension between the people and Emperor became immediately apparent. If Napoleon had expected to commend himself to the nation as a liberal Monarch by means of the "Additional Act" and his solemn oath at the Champ de Mai, his hopes were disappointed at the outset. For when the disaffection persisted and was fanned by the Press, now released from all restraint, he was finally compelled to take the step urged upon him by all parties and convoke the deputies. He did so with the utmost reluctance, foreseeing clearly the harassing discussions and debates that would inevitably ensue, and which would reveal to the rest of Europe

[1] "The Oath," says Coignet, "lacked energy, the enthusiasm was feeble. These were not the cheers of Austerlitz and Jena. The Emperor did not fail to notice it."

their internal dissensions and the insecurity of his own position. He reckoned at least on being able to influence and control this Chamber, but the very first day this hope was frustrated, for the deputies proceeded to show their independence by electing as their president Lajuinais, a former member of the Senate, and one of the few who had opposed the Emperor. Any chance of controlling this assembly was therefore out of the question. The only means of counteracting it was through the Chamber of Peers, the members of which Napoleon now proceeded to elect. These included—besides his three brothers now in Paris, Joseph, Lucien, and Jerôme—Uncle Fesch, Eugène Beauharnais, his Ministers, all the marshals who were loyal—Davoût, Masséna, Suchet, Ney, Brune, Moncey, Soult, Lefebvre, Grouchy, Jourdan, and Mortier—a large number of generals, foremost among them Bertrand and Drouot, four admirals, four bishops, several former senators, the savants Monge, Chaptal and Lacépède, a few representatives of the *ancienne noblesse*, some councillors of state, financiers and others, Ségur, his Master of Ceremonies, Sieyès, and Roger Ducos. On June 7th, the Emperor opened the sessions of both chambers by a speech from the throne, from which he carefully eliminated all statements which had been unfavourably received on June 1st, and consequently on this occasion his speech produced a better impression. Those standing near him, like Lafayette, noticed the effort it cost him to make this formal renunciation of autocratic power. "I have begun the constitutional monarchy. Individuals are incapable of deciding the fate of nations; institutions alone can safeguard them." As to the foreign invasion, he and his army would do their duty. Yet he must have felt that even this sacrifice of his personal authority brought him little confidence and recognition, for on the 11th, when the Chamber of Deputies placed the country's forces at his disposal for its defence, their address ran: "Even the will of the victorious Prince would be powerless to compel the nation to go beyond what is required for its defence". So great was the distrust of the conqueror of other days that even the loyal majority in the Chamber of Peers reminded him that the new institu-

tions of France "offered Europe guarantees that the French Government would never let itself be misled by the glamour of victory".

Yet all their precautions were vain, for the great general who left Paris, anxious and harassed, on the morning of June 12th, 1815, to rejoin his army, returned to the capital nine days later, defeated and annihilated for ever.

As a result of the unfavourable state of home and foreign affairs under which he began his new reign, Napoleon found at the beginning of June that he had not the fighting forces at his disposal upon which he had originally counted. To avoid appearing to France and to Europe as the aggressor, even after war had become inevitable, he delayed for weeks over his armaments and then described them as defensive, as, for instance, when he had Paris and Lyons fortified. Out of consideration for public opinion, and to avoid demanding those sacrifices which had made him hated before, he did not at once call up the Conscription of 1815. It was not till after the elections that the Council of State ventured to summon the conscripts of 1815 who had seen service in the previous year. Now, however, dread of the threatening invasion had quickened patriotism, and in many of the departments, notably in the centre and the east, the summons met with much less opposition than in the previous year. By the middle of June there were upwards of 50,000 conscripts in readiness. Compulsory methods were used for the dilatory, and the parishes were saddled with the financial responsibilities for the equipment and unkeep of the national guards and even of the 45,000 reserves attached to the regular army which, exclusive of garrisons and depots, numbered in all 180,000. The remaining national guards, volunteers, sailors, etc., formed an auxiliary corps of other 180,000 combatants who, however, were not available for active service. Yet that was but a small number with which to combat all Europe. And what an expenditure of thought and energy to equip even such a force! For the gigantic struggles of recent years had exhausted the reserves of war material, and under Louis

XVIII's peaceful regime no attention had been paid to such things. Hence new materials had to be created with feverish haste, and thousands of horses had to be procured to put the cavalry and artillery on a war footing. Fortunately there were still 50,000,000 francs in the State Treasury. With that, and credit from bankers and the payment of the taxes, the most urgent expenses could be met. The Emperor might have delayed longer, gained time and materially strengthened himself; nevertheless as soon as all the resources of diplomacy had been exhausted, he immediately assumed the offensive. And with good reason.[1]

In their preparations for the war with Napoleon the allies had been much more prompt in forming their decisions than in carrying them into effect. Prussia alone had mobilized quickly and, on Wellington's advice, had sent a corps posted on the Lower Rhine into Belgium and followed it by other three corps; and so by the beginning of June she had an army of 120,000 troops in the field. Blücher was again in command, supported by his faithful Gneisenau. At the same time, Wellington had gathered an army of 105,000 troops, British, Dutch and Germans (from Brunswick, Hanover and Nassau), destined primarily for the defence of Brussels and Ghent. Twelve thousand of that number were to garrison the fortresses and were not available for service in the field. Both Wellington and Blücher wished to assume the offensive, so as not to leave Napoleon time for preparations; but they did not succeed in carrying their point at Vienna, where they had decided upon a plan based on great masses of troops, aiming at a sure and victorious advance, and therefore requiring much time. The Russians were moving westwards very slowly, for the Czar again aspired to the leading rôle he had played in the previous year, while Austria, partly to baulk him in this, and partly on account of recent events in Italy, connived at Russia's dilatoriness. In Italy, towards the end of March, Murat had suddenly taken up arms on behalf of his brother-in-law and had issued

[1] For Napoleon's military preparations during these weeks *vide* Houssaye, "1815," II. (Waterloo), p. 1.

a proclamation to the Italians, summoning them to fight for their independence. He had then advanced rapidly on the Po, but not finding the national support on which he had reckoned, he was forced to retire before the Austrians and was defeated by them at Tolentino on May 2nd and 3rd. He then fled to Naples and from there escaped to France. In view of these circumstances the Powers decided to wait till June 27th, before beginning their great co-operative movement, in which from 700,000 to 900,000 troops were to be engaged. To this Wellington agreed, as, for political reasons, he wished to foil Russia's aim to play the leading rôle and spare her own troops, and he further requested that the action should begin from the Upper Rhine before he and Blücher advanced simultaneously, according to the plan agreed upon at Tirlemont on May 3rd. The offensive movement against France was therefore to begin on July 1st.

Napoleon had now to decide whether or not he would hazard striking a blow at once, or wait till the enemy's armies had developed their concentric advance and were all equidistant from Paris. The British and Prussians were to march upon France from the north-east, the Russians and the Austrians from the east and south-east. But, owing to the precariousness of the French position, to the nation's aversion to war, and to the necessity of a rapid victory for his own security, Napoleon dared not expose the country to the miseries of an invasion without taking some steps to avert it, nor risk the disastrous effects which the advance of the Bourbon's patrons would inevitably produce in Royalist Vendée and in the Legitimist south. But the allies had not all mobilized with equal speed; for while the British and the Prussians stood ready, the Austrian and the Russian armies were only in process of formation, and so Napoleon conceived the plan of defeating the former by a sudden and powerful attack before the latter had time to come up. The political consequences of such a victory would have been incalculable; for Napoleon was well aware of the dissensions which had lately embittered the Councils of the allied Powers and had brought them almost to the verge of hostilities. He knew,

too, that even at Vienna the Bourbon prospects were at a low ebb, and that the allies were not unanimous as to the future occupant of the throne of France. Such being the case he decided (contrary it is said to Carnot's advice) to go north and assume the offensive immediately in Belgium. The whole of his army was not then available, 10,000 troops being detained in La Vendée in putting down a rebellion kindled by Royalist agents, and three corps under Suchet, Rapp and Lecourbe, being required to protect the country between the Rhône and the Moselle, while three smaller detachments under Brune, Decaen, and Clausel had to suffice for protecting the south. This left him with only 124,000 troops for assuming the offensive in Belgium; nevertheless he judged that number sufficient.[1] On the whole they were good soldiers but presumptuous, for the consciousness that they alone had replaced the Emperor on the throne of France, and their distrust of the political attitude of their superior officers, made them only too prone to insubordination and excesses. In all secrecy—even Soult, chief of the general staff, was not fully informed of his plans—Napoleon drew up his troops south of the Sambre, between Beaumont and Philippeville. He had 21,000 Guards, five army corps under Drouet d'Erlon, Reille, Vandamme, Gérard and Mouton, and four cavalry corps with a cavalry reserve under Grouchy. On the 14th he himself arrived at Beaumont and with a skill peculiarly his own concentrated all his troops close to the frontiers, opposite Charleroi. Early on the 15th he began operations.

Wellington and Blücher were aware of the limited numbers of the French, and, on that account and also because all the previous rumours of the French advance had proved false, they had not provided against their assuming such a rapid offensive. The corps of the allied armies were scattered over a wide extent of country. Wellington's idea being to "cover everything," and to protect Brussels and Ghent,

[1] Recently he has again been blamed, as Charras had formerly done, for detaching so many of his active troops in other directions, and for not having recalled Rapp to the north with his 20,000 men (Grouard, "La Critique de la campagne de 1815," pp. 6, 267).

he had extended his cantonments from Binche, on the French frontiers, westwards to Oudenarde, with his line of retreat northwards through Brussels (where the head-quarters and the reserves were), to the sea. The Prussians, owing to the difficulty of victualling the troops, were spread out over fifteen miles of country, from Binche and Charleroi eastwards to Liège, with their head-quarters at Namur and their line of retreat through Liège to the Rhine. Binche therefore formed the connecting link between the two positions; and to the right of it, at Charleroi, where the Brussels and Liège roads met, Napoleon meant to break through. He hoped to repeat the success of his first campaign in Italy, and just as he had then descended from Savona and severed the Piedmontese and the Austrians, so now he hoped to separate the two armies, overthrow Wellington and Blücher singly, and force them back on their diverging lines of retreat, as he had done with Colli and Beaulieu. Having then defeated his two nearest and most formidable opponents, he meant to join with Rapp, bring up reinforcements from the depots, and turn against the Russians and Austrians. Such was his plan.

On June 15th he captured Charleroi with little difficulty, for the Prussians had neglected to fortify the line of the Sambre. Dividing his army into two wings and a reserve corps, he sent Ney with the corps of Reille and d'Erlon to the left, along the Brussels road to Gosselies; Grouchy, supported by Vandamme and Gérard, marched off to the right towards Fleurus, while he himself with the Guards and Mouton's corps, intended to strike in whichever direction he was most needed. When the Prussian vanguard had been defeated at Gosselies, and Ney's cavalry had pushed forward as far as Quatre-Bras on the Nivelles-Namur road, and Grouchy had advanced through Gilly to Fleurus, the Emperor considered he had succeeded in taking the enemy by surprise and in breaking through his lines. But this was a delusion. He would have required to move out quickly with all his available troops through Fleurus to the Nivelles road, in order to defeat the Prussians (who had now been

warned) while they were still isolated. For Wellington, thinking that the French main army was directing their attack on himself, did not consider that Blücher was in any serious danger and viewed the sortie against the Prussians as a mere feint. Hence on the 15th he neglected to concentrate his troops on the left, and as he was long in receiving news from Blücher, it was evening before he issued orders to the reserve army to advance southwards early on the following morning. Napoleon might easily have caught the Prussians unprepared that day and have crushed them. But he omitted to do so. The exhaustion of his troops and delays in their movements were probably to blame. Even on the following day he might still have defeated them, had he advanced rapidly; for Blücher was so far surprised that he was unable to bring up Bülow's corps on the 16th in time to take part in the action. Relying, however, on Wellington's promise, to come to his aid next day—provided he himself were not attacked in front—and support him with his entire army, Blücher resolved to await Napoleon at Sombreffe.[1]

But Wellington did not come. He had promised too much. There is no conclusive evidence as to whether or not he did so intentionally, to avoid blunting the Prussian general's decision to offer battle, which, although Wellington certainly meant to co-operate with all his forces, would

[1] Wellington's conditional consent is seen from a letter of Müffling's —"If the enemy does not immediately begin the attack at Nivelles (i.e. simultaneously with the attack on Blücher) the Duke will be to-morrow with his entire force in the neighbourhood of Nivelles, in order to support Your Excellency or, in the event of the enemy having already begun the attack, he would then, after consultation, proceed against his flank or rear" (Pflugk-Harttung, "Vorgeschichte der Schlacht bei Belle-Alliance," p. 55). Gneisenau's letter of the 17th (Lettow-Vorbeck, I. 526) does not mention Wellington's stipulation, but merely his "written assurance that if the enemy attacks us, he will attack them in their rear". Now the French attack was not directed against Nivelles, but to the right of that, against Quatre-Bras, which, after the fight at Gosselies and the Prussian retreat from there eastwards, was in the English front as was justly recognized by the Dutch officers, Constant and Perponcher, in the Orange corps, and hence on the 15th it was occupied and held.

have relieved his own position.[1] Fortunately, however, Napoleon did not arrive till the following afternoon. Perhaps he imagined that he had already separated his opponents; possibly he was suffering from physical depression,—on the previous day he had suddenly fallen asleep at Charleroi—in any case it was late on the morning of the 16th, when the Emperor issued his orders to his lieutenants. Ney was to advance on Quatre-Bras and hold himself in readiness to march on Brussels; a detachment was to reconnoitre in the direction of Wavre; Grouchy was to attack the enemy in Sombreffe or in Gembloux and drive them back, while the Emperor himself was to co-operate, via Fleurus, with the Guards, and immediately thereafter, in conjunction with Ney, to turn against Brussels and the English. So confident was he that he could easily dispose of the Prussians, whose main body he fancied in retreat, that he left Mouton's corps at Charleroi, probably intending to send it on afterwards direct from there along the Brussels road. Hence when he reached Fleurus at noonday and found there only Ziethen's corps which had abandoned the line of the Sambre on the previous day and had fought at Gilly, he determined to put it out of the way and sent orders to Ney to drive the enemy in front of him northwards, and then turn east and march upon the Prussians from the rear. At two o'clock Napoleon still believed he had only the Prussian rearguard to deal with. Meanwhile, however, Blücher had had time to bring up two of his corps and to place the one at Sombreffe and the other at Ligny, to support Ziethen. Then at last Napoleon realized that Blücher, supported by strong forces, meant to risk a battle. The surprise was not altogether unpleasant, for he reckoned that if Ney drove back the English rear-guard,—yet another mistake—and advanced with his troops from Quatre-Bras, they would then win such a decisive victory as might determine the issue of the whole campaign. He sent

[1] Lettow-Vorbeck, "Untergang," I. 302, speaks of Wellington's intention to deceive Blücher being dictated by political motives, but I have failed to find any justification for that statement, or for that of Wellington's "unconditional" promise.

a passionate appeal to Ney—"the fate of France lies in your hands"—bidding him leave the English and hasten instantly to the right with the bulk of his troops. Finally, however, the Emperor decided instead to send only one of Ney's corps against the enemy's flank, and hence he also ordered up General Drouet D'Erlon, whose troops had not yet been under fire. How he must have regretted his failure to begin the day earlier, and his delay in calling up Mouton, who had not received the order to proceed to Fleurus till after four o'clock! Ney himself could not now take part in the battle. At Quatre-Bras he had met with an obstinate resistance, hourly increasing, for Wellington kept on sending forward fresh reinforcements. By the afternoon Ney found himself compelled to fall back on the defensive, and even then, he was hotly engaged. To march off to the right was out of the question; he could not even spare any of his troops, and contrary to the Emperor's orders, he recalled d'Erlon, who with his 18,000 men was by that time almost within range of the Prussians. D'Erlon then marched back to Quatre-Bras, where he arrived too late to avert Ney's defeat, whereas his help at Ligny might have proved disastrous to the Prussians. Blücher had lost the battle. Nor was he free from blame; for in view of the support expected from Wellington, his position was badly chosen, stretching as it did from St. Amand through Ligny to Sombreffe and thence to Tongrinne, in such a way as compelled him to fight on the defensive till his allies came up, and to remain on the defensive if they failed him,[1] which was not congenial to the old Field Marshal's temperament, nor in keeping with his hopes of aid from Wellington. After the battle had raged for several hours at St. Amand, and with especial obstinacy at Ligny, Blücher ventured to charge the French right wing with the reserves from his centre. But the French parried the blow, and the Emperor, instantly taking advantage of this weakening of the enemy's centre,

[1] The Prussians numbered 83,000. The French 79,000. Ten thousand of the latter (under Mouton) remained behind and took no part in the fighting, while 20,000 troops on the Prussian left wing were scarcely engaged at all.

sent forward all the Guards, and routed the Prussians whose cavalry failed them, driving the enemy in headlong flight back to Brye. In the mêlée at the close of the battle, Blücher was thrown from his wounded horse and given up for lost. The direction of the retreat was undertaken by Gneisenau, who chose Tilly, on the far side of the high road, as the rallying point for the first and second corps. Here he counted to restore order in his own troops and call up the two remaining corps,—the 3rd under Thielmann, which, held in check at Sombreffe by superior numbers, had done little fighting and had finally retired to Gembloux; and the 4th, under Bülow, which had been dispatched in the direction of Ardenelle. But at Tilly the fugitives would not halt; they streamed along the road in the direction of Wavre, and so after consultation at head-quarters, the latter place was made the rallying point. The fact that, in spite of this reverse, the plan of co-operating with the English was still adhered to, decided the fate of the campaign.

Napoleon now realized how greatly he had erred in imagining that he had surprised the Prussians in the act of concentrating, and that he had driven them back on their line of operations. The battle on the 16th had shown him how things stood. Nevertheless he had won the victory, he had seen the Prussians in headlong rout, and now he considered things had again righted themselves. Blücher was undoubtedly falling back along his line of retreat and would concentrate again, possibly at Namur. From Gembloux word came of a strong force of the enemy (Thielmann's corps), and General Pajol, who was sent in pursuit with two divisions, came upon great numbers of fugitives hurrying east—upwards of 5000 stragglers according to reports—which confirmed the Emperor in his belief that he had now shaken himself completely free of the Prussians and could advance against Wellington without fear of being molested, and also without undue haste.[1] On the morning of the 17th,

[1] On the following morning Soult, who now filled Berthier's place, wrote to Ney: "The Prussian army has been routed, General Pajol is pursuing them along the roads to Namur and Liège".

he allowed his exhausted troops a well-earned rest, and at noon he sent orders to Grouchy to go in quest of Blücher with 33,000 troops, i.e. the cavalry corps of Pajol and Exelman, the infantry corps of Vandamme and Gérard, and one of Mouton's divisions. He was to find out where Blücher was concentrating and whether he had already evacuated Namur. The instructions ran: "March with all the troops in your charge to Gembloux. Find out where the enemy is marching, tell me his movements so that I can guess what he is aiming at. It is important to know what Blücher and Wellington think of undertaking, whether they intend to unite their armies in order to cover Brussels and Liège, and to risk a battle." As soon as the Prussians evacuated Namur, Grouchy was to occupy it, but always to keep in close touch with head-quarters, which was transferred to Quatre-Bras. This shows that Napoleon confidently expected the Prussians had fallen back on Namur, but might have rallied quickly (for he knew Blücher's indomitable pluck), and be already marching on the high road to Louvain, or else in a north-westerly direction towards the British. In that case Grouchy was to push on beyond Gembloux till he overtook Blücher, and to hold him in check while Wellington was being defeated. But such movements required considerable time. Never for a moment did Napoleon imagine that the routed and disorganized Prussians would rally and proceed to march in good order within the same day; and so dominated was he by his own ideas that he failed even to realize the immediate likelihood of them continuing their retreat northwards from Brye. Least of all did he suspect that after having suffered a loss of 20,000 in killed, wounded, and missing, they would press forward with the utmost vigour, straight from the scene of their disaster, to succour their allies in the fierce fight that was impending, and help them to victory.

When Grouchy and his men marched off to the east, the other French troops were already on their way to Quatre-Bras to join with Ney and follow Wellington, who, on hearing of the Prussian defeat, had retreated northwards through

Genappe to Mont Saint-Jean, and had fixed his head-quarters at Waterloo. Here the French found him on the 17th, drawn up in order of battle, and as he remained so, the Emperor's fear lest he should continue to retreat and avoid battle was groundless. From Wavre, where his army arrived before midnight in tolerable order, Blücher had sent word to Wellington that if the battle took place on the following day he would immediately send him two corps—Wellington had not asked for more—and would also support him with his other forces. Of all this the Emperor had no suspicion; otherwise he would not have allowed his army to bivouac in marching columns, nor have been afraid of Wellington moving off. Even on the following morning he was still ignorant of the real state of affairs when he decided to attack the British and rout them as he had done the Prussians. Grouchy, indeed, spoke in his dispatches of only one Prussian column marching off east, on Perwez, but of another one advancing in the direction of Wavre. The latter, however, was only a single column which he was quite able to cope with while Wellington was being defeated; in any case, so he wrote the Emperor on the evening of the 17th, he would keep it away from the English. On the following forenoon Grouchy sent word that three Prussian corps were marching in the direction of Brussels and that a fourth (Bülow's) coming from Liège, had joined them, plainly showing that the enemy was not retreating eastwards. He further stated "positively," that this body of troops was camping east of Wavre on the Louvain road, and that by the evening he would be posted between it and Wellington. So little danger did Napoleon apprehend that on the 18th, instead of beginning the battle in the early morning as was his custom, he gave orders for the troops (73,000 strong) to be in their positions by nine o'clock, and owing to the ground being sodden by long and heavy rains, this was not accomplished till past twelve. Had he only known that during the hours he lay there inactive, Bülow was toiling across the same heavy, clayey soil by unbeaten routes, that the troops he had defeated at Ligny were coming up in his rear,

and preparing for him a catastrophe such as has seldom overtaken the Mighty Ones of this earth with more terrible swiftness, how he would have made speed to fight and conquer!

At eleven o'clock in the forenoon Napoleon rode from Caillou, where he had spent the night, past Plancenoit and along the Brussels road as far as the garden of La Belle Alliance. Here the ground gradually descends into a hollow, rising again about a mile farther on, behind the farm of La Haye Sainte, into a gentle hill on the northern slope of which lay the village of Mont Saint-Jean. It was on this rising ground that Wellington had taken up his defensive position, for it was impossible for him to fight otherwise than on the defensive, owing to the small number of troops at his disposal. He had only 69,000, and was then unaware that a third of his opponent's forces were not present. Excessive prudence had led Wellington to detach 19,000 troops to Hal, to prevent him being surrounded from the west. For the time being therefore, the Emperor's numerical superiority amounted only to 4,000 cavalry and artillery. But the troops under Napoleon's command were the very flower of his army, veterans who had served under him in many a campaign, who were devoted to his cause—which was their cause as well—and from whom despair alone could wrest the victory. The Emperor drew up his army in three lines to right and to left of the high road. At La Belle Alliance on the southern half of the aforementioned hollow were two corps under Ney, their right under Reille, extending as far as the Nivelles road, their left under D'Erlon, to the castle of Frichermont. Behind these, in the second line, were two cavalry corps, Kellermann's and Milhaud's, in the two wings; and at the centre, as the first reserve, were two infantry and two cavalry divisions belonging to Mouton's corps, drawn up along the *chaussée*. The third and last line consisted of the Guards, massed in three divisions, the Old Guard in the centre as the second reserve, with their cavalry drawn up to the right and to the left, behind the cavalry of the second line. On reaching the garden of La Belle Alliance, Napoleon reconnoitred his enemy's position. But he was unable to get a complete view of it, and could only

see those troops who were drawn up on the most advanced positions, as the other lines were concealed by the rising ground behind which Wellington had posted his one division of reserves. There, sheltered and unobserved, he was able to move them during the course of the action and employ them wherever the shock of battle was fiercest and demanded most resistance. The Emperor then rode down the front of his troops to animate them by word and look, and to show the British general, who commanded a view of the whole French army, what he was about to face. He probably knew that a portion of Wellington's army consisted of unreliable elements, though that general's remark that it was "the worst army that ever stood on legs" was an exaggeration. At twelve o'clock the Emperor gave orders to begin the battle, a valuable gain of time to the allies. From the instructions he issued at eleven o'clock, it is evident that Napoleon's object was to pierce the enemy's centre with its main body of troops posted to the west of the high road, to advance along this high road as far as Mont Saint-Jean, then, by separating the enemy's forces, reach Brussels and drive Wellington back from that city westwards, and away from the Prussians. (He had a proclamation to the citizens of Brussels printed and ready for circulation.) In order to accomplish this, without waiting till his dispositions were completed, he began the action by a spirited attack with his left wing on the castle of Hugomont, hoping thereby to divert Wellington's attention. At half-past one the "main attack" was to follow. But at the very outset the Emperor's calculations were upset. For the British had transformed the castle into a citadel and defended it with incomparable fortitude. Charge after charge broke against it in vain, till finally an entire corps of the French first line had shed their blood there and all to no avail. As the British troops had maintained their footing at Hugomont without it having been necessary for Wellington to strengthen his right wing by depleting his centre and his left, Napoleon now had to launch his grand attack against unimpaired columns. Nor was that all. Just as the troops were preparing for this movement the Emperor learned from a captured letter that he was

about to have the Prussians also upon his hands, and that Bülow was to fall upon his right flank. As if to preclude all doubt on this point, masses of troops now came in sight at the Chapelle St. Lambert, about a league distant, and an adjutant sent out to reconnoitre, brought back word it was the Prussians. And so he suddenly found himself confronted by an immediate danger with which he had entirely omitted to reckon; for within two hours Bülow also might join in the battle. To protect his flank, Napoleon had to send the larger part of the first reserves under Mouton to the north of Plancenoit against Bülow, and these troops numbering about 10,000, could therefore take no part in the great charge which was to rout Wellington. Besides Bülow, there were the other Prussian corps whom Grouchy was to hold in check, provided he was able. How much better if Grouchy had been there to help to defeat Bülow! Napoleon now sent him an urgent message, "Do not delay for a moment to come and join us in crushing Bülow".[1] But the chances were that the message would not reach Grouchy for three or four hours, and that then he might not be able to shake himself free of his opponents. It was a vain hope. Grouchy was now at Wavre (where he had arrived much too late), engaged with a Prussian corps under Thielmann, while two others were following Bülow to join Wellington, advancing along the miry roads slowly, but inexorably. Grouchy did not come. He afterwards sought to defend himself by a paltry excuse.

[1] Afterwards at St. Helena, Napoleon in his account of the campaign declared that he had sent a message at ten p.m. on the previous evening to Grouchy at Wavre, where he then thought him, bidding him send on a division before daybreak from there to St. Lambert and so restore his communications with the army ("Corr.," xxxi. p. 179). But that is a subsequent invention, for the Emperor did not then know that Grouchy would go to Wavre and it was only at ten o'clock on the morning of the 18th that he wrote, "The Emperor wishes that you should direct your movements on Wavre" (Lettow-Vorbeck, i. 415). This was the answer to a dispatch from Grouchy which came in after midnight, suggesting the idea of advancing on Wavre, only "if the cavalry (sent out from Gembloux to Sart-à-Walhain) brought back word that the Prussian main body was retreating on Wavre" (Houssaye, "1815," ii. 249).

Ignorant of these circumstances, Napoleon now resolved to make an end of his enemy straightway, before the first gun was fired on the right. The four divisions of D'Erlon's corps advanced in closed columns *en échelon* along the high road against the enemy's left centre at La Haye Sainte, while the remaining divisions proceeded against Papelotte and La Haye. The orchard of La Haye Sainte was carried by storm, but could not be held, as the subsequent attack on the rising ground was repulsed, and the divisions had to fall back before the onslaught of the English heavy cavalry. Napoleon, who was at La Belle Alliance, then attempted to pierce the enemy's centre by a cavalry charge on a colossal scale. Milhaud's cuirassiers flung themselves upon the English position, but with little effect, for the vigour of their attack was foiled by the wet soil in the low-lying ground, and although they silenced the guns on the top of the slope, there their career was checked by twenty squares of British infantry, who held their ground unshaken. Moreover, Wellington had seen the danger coming, and had strengthened his centre, which he was able to do all the more easily as his left wing had already warded off the attack, while on his right, Hugomont still maintained its resistance. Then followed a new attack with redoubled numbers. Six and thirty squadrons in all, a veritable sea of cavalry, swept across the plain and broke in fearful waves against the British battalions, many of which were overwhelmed, of some only a mere handful was left, while the Hanoverian Brigade and the German Legion on the right centre were practically effaced. A deep gap was thus cleft in the British position, and by six o'clock La Haye Sainte, Papelotte, and La Haye had been stormed by the French, whose infantry columns were gradually creeping up higher. Had the Emperor now sent forward his fresh infantry into the gaps torn by the cavalry charge, he might easily have secured the victory. But he had already spent all his reserves, except the Old Guard, and he was not prepared to risk them yet; for at five o'clock Bülow's batteries had begun to play, and Mouton had been forced back on Plancenoit. That point had to be held at all costs, otherwise

the enemy would fall upon the French line of retreat, and a catastrophe would be inevitable. For these reasons Napoleon held back his Guards at the crucial moment when the chances were he might have been able to turn the tide of battle in his own favour. Meanwhile Wellington had strengthened his centre by bringing up some brigades from his left wing, which he had only been able to do when Zeithen's Prussians were seen approaching on the left. "The battle is lost," exclaimed General Müffling as he hastened to meet them, "unless the corps continues its advance and supports the English army immediately." And this it did.

During this time the Young Guard and a few battalions of the Old Guard had been engaged in driving out Blücher, who with Bülow's troops had at last captured Plancenoit. By seven o'clock they had accomplished their task. Fired by this success, Napoleon again ordered a general advance all along the line, and gathering his 5,000 Guards—all that was left of them, except two battalions—he made a last charge on the British centre. It was the act of a desperate man, for the battle was virtually lost when the cavalry charges failed, and he should have retreated while the trap at Plancenoit was still open. But that would have been to admit defeat, and what was to become of him if he were defeated? Hence he snatched at anything that held out even a gleam of hope. With shouts of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" the triarii of his host advanced to the charge, the Emperor leading them in person as far as La Haye Sainte. When Ziethen's guns now began to play upon the positions at Smohain and Papelotte which had been captured by the French, the latter were told, in order to keep their courage from flagging, that it was Grouchy who had come to their support. So vehement was the onset of the Guards that they penetrated into the last line of the enemy's centre, but there, mown down by a well-directed fire, and their strength exhausted, they fell into disorder and retired. Just then Ziethen's infantry also joined in the fight, and the French troops, worn out with the long struggle, were again driven from the captured orchards. Convinced that they were now faced by fresh foes, the disorder suddenly

became a panic and spread instantly through all ranks. Wellington's army, terribly shrunken, on a sign from their leader ventured to assume the offensive. It was eight o'clock. Only three squares of the Guards still held their ground at La Haye Sainte. In one of these the Emperor had taken refuge when the tumult began, and there, exposed to the fire of the British guns, he had awaited the success of the last charge. Now, however, surrounded by enemies against whom they defended themselves heroically, they were forced back on to the heights of La Belle Alliance.[1]

Here, with the aid of his adjutants, Napoleon sought to rally his fleeing troops; but in vain. During the last attack on the English position the third Prussian corps had come up and had joined in the action on the right. Again the French were driven from Plancenoit. It was about half-past eight. Soon the high road became impassable for it was raked by Prussian bullets, and the defeated army surged back westwards in wild haste. Obliged to take measures for his own safety, Napoleon mounted on horseback (for he could no longer reach his carriage at Caillou) and galloped across country to Genappe, accompanied by Soult, Drouot, and a small suite, with three battalions of the Guards as escort. But even here, owing to the energetic pursuit of the Prussians, no respite was possible, and Napoleon, who for some time past had been unable to ride any distance, however short, without pain, had to remain in the saddle till five in the morning, when Charleville was reached, and a carriage procured which took him to Philippeville. Then only he allowed himself a few hours' rest. While there he issued orders to the corps which had not taken part in the campaign, he wrote the bulletins on Ligny and Mont Saint-Jean, as he called the

[1] One of the squares then broke up. The others escaped, but the general in command, Cambronne, was forced to surrender. It has long been proved that he never uttered the words attributed to him : "*La garde meurt et ne se rend pas*". In any case by whomsoever uttered, they are eloquent of the spirit animating the troops. Bertrand at St. Helena attributed the words to General Michel, but more trustworthy witnesses ascribe to Michel a shorter and more drastic remark.

Battle of Waterloo, and dictated a letter[1] to his brother Joseph at Paris, showing plainly that he would only renounce hope with his last breath. Everything is not lost, he assured his brother. If he only succeeded in concentrating all his available troops, he would still have 150,000; indeed, including the national guard, and the battalions at the depots, he would have a total of 300,000. If Grouchy, from whom he had no word, were not made prisoner, he could still muster 50,000 troops here, and hold the enemy in check till Paris and France had done their part. His brothers were to see to it that the Chambers supported him in a worthy fashion. The letter concluded with the words in his own handwriting: "Courage, constancy!"

[1] Fleury de Chaboulon, II. 195, quotes the text of the letter, which the Emperor had dictated to him. I see no reason to doubt his testimony. Cp. Houssaye, "1815," II. 434.

CHAPTER XX.

ST. HELENA.

After the Emperor left to rejoin the army, the people of Paris waited anxiously for news, dreading a success to Napoleon almost as much as a reverse to the army. And that not merely because the Emperor's despotic instincts would reassert themselves if he were victorious, and would lead him to shake off the fetters he had lately imposed upon himself, but because victory would mean the beginning of a new war, and no one could foresee what the end would be. For a long time past the nation had recognized the glaring incongruity between the glory of their arms and the misery of the people; and moreover during the last few years this glory had been very perceptibly dimmed. Yet on June 18th, just as the firing began at Waterloo, the cannon of the Invalides boomed forth announcing a victory—Ligny, the first success of the new campaign. Those who were glad made no secret of their joy. The Bonapartists were triumphant at this new success of their idol, while the Revolutionary party and the excitable working-classes of Paris rejoiced at the discomfiture of the Legitimists and the Bourbons, and as for the rest of the populace, their pride was gratified merely because it was a French victory. But as a result of its influence on the thinking part of the nation, Government securities went down over four francs. Two days later, things were very different. Sinister rumours of a terrible defeat were circulating everywhere, and the cannon at the Invalides were dumb. On the 21st, the ominous news was confirmed; the army was a wreck, the Emperor in flight. Indeed it was even said that he was back again in Paris, and the idea that he had deserted his army instead of rallying it

so as to impede the enemy's advance upon the capital, roused a storm of indignation—but Government securities rose two francs.

As a matter of fact Napoleon had arrived early on the 21st at the Elysée where he had previously resided. At Laon he had discussed the immediate measures necessary with the officers of his suite and had decided to proceed to Paris. Grouchy he supposed a prisoner of war, and now for the first time he was able to realize the full extent of the disastrous battle on the 18th. It had cost the French over 30,000 troops.[1] The remainder were dispersed in all directions and it was with difficulty that even a few thousands could be rallied. And how easily he might have avoided all this and have conquered a second time, had he only pursued the Prussians vigorously without any delay after the battle of Ligny and then hurled his army on the English. The more dangerous opponent having been defeated, the other, isolated, unfamiliar with these new military tactics, with his forces ill-arranged, would have been virtually lost, provided he accepted battle and did not retreat on Antwerp. Then, too, the disintegrating effect of a success in war might have broken up the alliance of the Powers before they had learned how to conquer. "There is no more decisive battle in history than that of La Belle Alliance," wrote Gneisenau to Hardenberg, on June 22nd, "as decisive in its effects on the field of battle as in its moral effects. Had it been lost, what would have become of the coalition with all the memories of the congress still fresh?"[2] Not only on the enemy but also on the French, the issue of the battle on the 18th was destined to have a powerful influence. They had not expected the end so soon. Even that astute intriguer Fouché, whom Napoleon saw through yet dared not punish, had given him a longer time and had remarked to one of the old *noblesse:* "The fellow has come back madder than when he left. He is exerting himself tremendously, but he won't last three months."

[1] Wellington's army had lost 8000 and Blucher's (mostly Bulöw's corps) 7000.

[2] Delbrück, "Gneisenau," II. 225.

And in May he had said to Pasquier: "The Emperor will win one or two battles, lose the third, and then we shall have our innings".[1] Napoleon foresaw the possibility of a political disturbance in France, which might easily sweep him aside if he did not arrive upon the scene in time to avert the crisis. Hence he had hurriedly returned to Paris, and now, although unstrung and utterly exhausted, he sat closeted with his brothers and his Ministers discussing ways and means.

He thought he had found the right solution. Having represented the country's defensive forces as being far from hopeless, he expressed his conviction that a temporary dictatorship was what was required to save the country. He might grasp it for himself, but he considered it would be better and more dignified if it were offered him by the Chambers. Scarcely had he voiced this proposal when one of his most devoted followers, Regnauld d'Angély, informed him that the Chambers no longer considered him called upon to save the country, and that he must offer his abdication as a sacrifice. And such was the case. In the Chamber of Deputies, which had been sitting since the morning, Fouché had secretly sent news that the question of the Emperor's abdication was being discussed at the Elysée, and so intense was the excitement that Regnauld was powerless to allay it. Davoût then advised transferring the Legislative Body to another town. Lucien warmly advocated arbitrary measures, dissolving Parliament, and proclaiming a state of siege, and even Napoleon began to favour this idea. Just then a messenger came in from the Second Chamber announcing that they had declared themselves in permanence, that they would consider any attempt to dissolve them as high treason, and would prosecute any one guilty of such a crime; they also summoned the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of the Interior, of War, and of the Police, to appear immediately before the deputies. This was a *coup d'état* from below intended to parry the expected *coup* from above. The people's representatives, with Lafayette at their head, revolted against the law and will of the Emperor who under the latest Constitu-

[1] Madelin, "Fouché," II. 344 : Pasquier, "Mémoires," III. 195.

tion had been granted the right to dissolve the Chambers. So powerful was the current of resistance that even the Peers were swept along by it and joined with the representatives in their demand. Napoleon had forbidden his Ministers to comply with the summons of the revolting deputies, and he was still discussing with them the next step to be taken, when it became evident that the deputies meant to insist upon his abdication, unless the Ministers immediately appeared. Napoleon then yielded, though only after Davoût had told him that he could not place the armed forces of the country at his disposal for measures against the nation's representatives. To avoid the appearance of acting under compulsion Napoleon then sent his Ministers and Lucien to the deputies to announce that he had formed a commission consisting of Caulaincourt, Carnot, and Fouché, to open negotiations with the enemy and to end the war, in so far as that was compatible with the honour and independence of the country; and he reckoned on the patriotism of Parliament. But this did not satisfy the Chambers. The Powers, they declared, had proscribed him and would not negotiate with him, and his commission was therefore futile; Parliament itself must act as negotiator. "Against Napoleon alone," exclaimed deputy Lacoste, "Europe has declared war. I see only one man between us and peace.—Let him go and peace is assured." Others advocated deposing him if he did not abdicate, but the deputies decided to do nothing further that day beyond electing five commissioners from among themselves who, with five Peers and the Ministers, were to devise a means of saving the State.

On the following day, June 22nd, the situation had become so much more acute that even Napoleon's brothers advised him to abdicate. The deputies were informed that the commission had decided to send a deputation from the Chamber to begin negotiations with the allies, and also that the Emperor had declared that if his person were the only obstacle in the way of peace, he was ready to sacrifice himself. But this was not what they wanted. Again the demand was renewed for the Emperor's formal abdication, though some

insisted he should simply be deposed as in the previous year; finally, Deputy Duchesne's motion was accepted, that the Emperor should proffer his resignation in the interests of the State. An hour's respite was allowed him to send in his decision spontaneously. The Republican General Solignac, who had been a deputy during the Directory, but had fallen into disfavour under the Consulate, went privately to the Elysée with some of his associates to urge the Emperor to surrender his rank at once and so avoid being compelled to do it, and Napoleon then consented. But after the deputies left, he walked up and down the room and with quivering voice and features distorted by passion, inveighed against "this crew of Jacobins, quacks, and place-hunters," who wanted to injure him. It seemed as if he were determined to resist to the last. In the gardens and afterwards in his study, he paced to and fro in uncontrollable excitement, talking to himself, his ambition wrestling with necessity in hideous strife. During the previous night, as Lafayette afterwards admitted—he might still have arrested the more influential deputies, dissolved the Chambers and set up a Dictatorship. But the chance had slipped past; his power of initiative had failed him. Such a move would have been by no means impossible, for the Paris garrison numbered some 10,000 troops, and in addition to that there were the Revolutionary battalions from the suburbs, the "Federals" as they were again called. Hitherto he had only provided some 3000 of these with arms, but he could safely reckon on five times that number, and like the other troops, they would follow him even against Parliament. But to have acted as he had done in Brumaire would certainly have provoked resistance from the 20,000 National Guards who, being recruited from the middle classes, were ready to defend the Chambers. And that would have been the beginning of civil war which even at best would have made him merely the Sovereign of a faction, dependent upon elements whom he had long and justly characterized as "*canaille*".[1] His deep-rooted aversion

[1] "I might have maintained myself in Paris with the help of the *canaille*," said he at St. Helena (Gourgaud, "Journal II," 199).

to them was unconquerable, quite apart from other considerations,[1] and so he made his renunciation. On the afternoon of June 22nd he dictated his abdication "in favour of his son Napoleon II". But the deputies took no notice of this clause when they sent a deputation to thank him for his generous sacrifice, and they immediately appointed Carnot, Fouché, General Grenier, and the Peers Caulaincourt and Quinette, as members of a provisional government. It was like a copy of the Directory of Five which he had displaced when he first seized the reins of power, now slipping from his grasp. As if to complete the resemblance, there was also the apathetic public looking on without evincing any deep interest. An eye-witness writing of Paris at this time, thus describes the state of feeling: "Peace reigned supreme in the town and was not disturbed even for a moment. Tossed hither and thither from one Government to another, the people showed no partiality either for the ruler they were losing or for his successor. They went to sleep in the expectation that when they awakened next morning they would learn whether it was Napoleon II or Louis XVIII they were to obey." It would certainly not be Napoleon I, for his reign of a "Hundred Days" was at an end.

During the next few days crowds of the very lowest orders of the populace, mainly from the suburbs, gathered frequently in front of the Elysée, cheering the Emperor and clamouring for a Dictatorship. The mere presence of the dethroned Monarch in the capital was embarrassing to the provisional government. Besides these demonstrations at the Elysée, there was the fact that Grouchy had saved his corps, that the troops which had fought in La Vendée had returned victorious, that Soult had rallied the remnants of the Waterloo Army at Laon, and was now on his way to Paris with about 50,000

[1] Before the beginning of the campaign he once remarked to Réal, the Prefect of Police, "I see clearly what is required to rouse the masses. I should don the red cap and appeal to the passions. But the red cap would do me no good; I could not be what I once was, and besides I am too old for such things" (Chastenay, "Mémoires," II. 497). Subsequently at St. Helena he admitted: "After all, the fact was, I had not the nerve to do it" (Gourgaud, II. 283).

troops, all, with the exception of certain officers, clamouring for their chief. Under these circumstances Napoleon's immediate removal from Paris became highly desirable, and efforts were made to induce him to leave. In this Davoût ultimately succeeded, and although greeted by the Emperor with bitter reproaches against his disloyal Ministers, he discharged his task with unperturbed formality. On July 25th, Napoleon left the capital and repaired to Malmaison, where he was welcomed by the ex-Queen Hortense, who had inherited it from her mother. Here he spent the following days to all appearance absorbed in memories of the time when as Consul he had shaped his vast plans in these rooms; but he also thought out a project of settling in North America, if France finally rejected him. He was not thinking of himself merely, but also of the son in whose favour he had surrendered his rank. The accession of a provisional government on the 22nd, instead of the election of a regency, was in itself a sign of hostility on the part of the nation's representatives. For although the Bonapartists of the Second Chamber had succeeded on the following day in securing recognition of Napoleon II as Emperor of France, yet in the same breath the Chamber had decided to retain the provisional government, "as a guarantee of the liberty and the peace of the nation". And when a deputation from the Chambers went to the allies' head-quarters to make overtures for peace on the basis of the integrity of France and the sovereignty of the young Prince, Fouché, who was President of the Five and again actively supporting the Bourbons, knew well that the son of the fallen Emperor would not be recognized by any of the Powers, not even by Austria.[1] The members of the deputation were themselves aware of the fact, and when reminded of the resolution passed by the Chamber they re-

[1] *Vide* Metternich's letter to Ottenfels in April, 1815, "Austria, above all others, is far removed from desiring a regency" ("Nachgelassene Papiere," II. 515). *Vide* also his directions to Merveldt in London, Wertheimer ("Reichstadt," p. 184), and the deep aversion to such a project in the letters of Marie Louise at that time ("Marie Louise und der Sturz Napoleons," p. 415).

plied that it was a mere farce; their hands were free and they could do what they wanted. Hence Fouché promulgated the decree in the name of the French nation, not of Napoleon II.

Meanwhile the enemy was constantly drawing nearer; Blücher's Prussians were far in advance of the English, and soon Malmaison would be threatened. At the last moment, on June 29th, just after a French regiment had marched past with shouts of "*Vive l'Empereur*"—Napoleon decided to place his services at the disposal of the provisional government merely as a general, in order, as he said, to save the capital and to defeat the sundered allies. Fouché told the bearer of this almost ingenuous offer that Napoleon was wholly mistaken if he thought the members of the Government so mad as to accede to his proposal, and that he could only advise him to leave as quickly as possible, as they could no longer answer for his safety. Nor was this untrue. For a Prussian detachment had received explicit orders to secure his person and shoot him. No sooner did the messenger return to Malmaison than Napoleon gave the signal for departure. He had made preparations for this before leaving Paris, but at that time Fouché had held him back by various devices, possibly with a view to delivering him into the hands of the allies as the price of a truce. Wellington at least mentions such proposals in his dispatches to London. But when it turned out that the allies would not consent to a truce on any terms, and there was the danger that the troops returning from the war might tempt the Emperor to some new adventure, Fouché eagerly urged him to leave. Napoleon then laid aside his uniform, and, attired as a civilian, he drove off accompanied by Bertrand, Savary, and General Becker, who represented the Government.

They travelled through Tours to the seaport of Rochefort, where two French frigates stood ready to take him to America—provided they managed to escape the English cruisers; for the English Government had naturally declined his request for an escort. At Niort the Emperor was recognized by the officers of a Hussar regiment, who impor-

tuned him to place himself at their head, return to Paris, and assume command of the army. One of the Emperor's associates declares that letters on the subject were exchanged with Generals Clauzel and Lamarque, who were in command in Bordeaux and in La Vendée, with a view to rousing the army against the Paris Government. But there is no further evidence on the point, and in any case the impossible idea was immediately dropped.[1] On the following day, July 3rd, Rochefort was reached, and there they were confronted by the difficulty of escaping the blockading English cruisers and the "Bellerophon," and fresh delays ensued. Up till the 8th, Napoleon held long consultations daily with his suite (which now included Count Las Cases, Councillor of State, Count Montholon, General Lallemand and others) as to the best means of eluding the English. One proposal was to cross the ocean in small vessels, but this Napoleon declined; another, that the captain of one of the two frigates should engage the "Bellerophon" and so clear the way for the other frigate, but to this Becker objected; and it was only with difficulty he persuaded the Emperor to be rowed across to the adjacent Isle d'Aix and take refuge on board the frigate "Saale". Here he was visited by Joseph, who had secretly secured a passage at Bordeaux on board an American ship. It is said that he offered to exchange rôles with Napoleon, but the statement is not corroborated. In any case Napoleon did not accept it. Meanwhile, news arrived from Paris which put an end to farther vacillation. On July 8th, the day after the Prussians made their entry, Louis XVIII returned to Paris under England's protection and with the consent of the allied Monarchs, who two days later also arrived in the capital. As further delay would have proved ruinous, Napoleon immediately placed himself in communication with Captain Maitland who was in command of the "Bellerophon,"

[1] Montholon ("Captivité de Ste. Hélène," p. 33) speaks very definitely on the subject. Gourgaud ("Journal," II. 559) merely mentions a sort of council of war on the evening of July 2nd. "There is some thought of returning to Orléans where the army is," but he also relates that at nine o'clock Napoleon dictated to him his instructions for Rochefort.

and asked a refuge from his enemies. This thought had been in his mind before he left Paris. When Maitland sent word he would take him to England as he desired, and when the majority of the Emperor's suite counselled him to go, he determined to imitate the example of that Athenian who, although condemned and banished by his countrymen, sought and found a refuge among the Persians, whom he had so often opposed in battle. His political career was at an end, he wrote to the Prince Regent at London, and like Themistocles, he came to sit at the hearth of the British nation and to place himself under the protection of their laws. On July 15th, he stepped on board the enemy's warship.

Had Napoleon forgotten that Britain's representative had been present and had acquiesced when the Vienna Congress declared him an outlaw? The admiral to whose fleet the "Bellerophon" belonged, had received strict orders to capture him and bring him to Plymouth. Hence Napoleon must have had some ulterior aim in view in acting thus. His negotiators returned from their second interview with Captain Maitland, bringing back word that the Emperor would be courteously treated in England, for it was a country where the Monarch and his Ministers exercise no arbitrary power, and where the magnanimity of the people and their liberty of thought have greater influence than the Crown. On this the Emperor was calculating when he made his voluntary surrender. But his calculation was false, for when he left French soil, he did so not as the guest, but as the prisoner of the Power whom he had so long and strenuously combated.[1]

In what a state he left the country to which his insatiable thirst of power had lured him back a second time!

[1] *Vide* Houssaye's "1815," III. 398, where he shows that when Napoleon rejected the idea of a secret flight, he decided to surrender voluntarily to England as the lesser evil. Already messengers from the Royal Government were on their way to Rochefort with a warrant for the commander of the "Saale" to hand him over as a prisoner to England. Once at St. Helena he declared he would have done better to have gone to Austria rather than to England (Gourgaud, I. 579).

Vanquished in battle, overrun by enemies, torn by factions whom his return had again brought into conflict, such was France after Waterloo. No sooner did tidings of the lost battle reach Provence than the Royalist animosity burst forth anew and raged with such fury among the Bonapartists, Protestants, and Republicans of Marseilles, Nîmes, Avignon, Toulon and Toulouse, that the deeds of shame committed then were every whit as bad as those done during the Terror. Nor were these excesses confined to the lower ranks. Among the upper classes, cabals were formed against all those who had yielded to the spell of the great Corsican. A proscription list was drawn up containing the names of his followers, and all who did not flee the country were executed. So perished Labédoyère who, at Grenoble, had passed over to the Emperor with his regiment. A like fate was meted out to Ney, whom death had shunned at Waterloo, although he had sought it in despair. The members of the Bonaparte family who had filled the thrones of Europe so long as the Continent quailed under the sceptre of the man now lying in Plymouth Sound—a spectacle for gaping Britons—were ere long scattered to the four winds, as homeless as when they fled from Ajaccio, two and twenty years before.

On the night of July 25th, the "Bellerophon" put out to sea, and next morning it reached the shores of England and remained for a few days closely guarded till news came from London as to the fate of the prisoner. There they would have preferred that he had fallen into the hands of Louis XVIII and been executed as a rebel, so Lord Liverpool, then Prime Minister, wrote to Lord Castlereagh on July 28th. But Napoleon had escaped that fate, and now they had to decide for good or for ill what was to be done with him. On the 30th he learned their decision. As it would ill consort with Britain's duty to herself and to her Sovereign's allies, that "General Bonaparte" should obtain the means and the opportunity of again disturbing the peace of Europe, it was necessary to curtail his personal liberty. The Island of St. Helena had therefore been chosen as his

future residence, its climate being healthy and its isolated position allowing him to be treated with more consideration than the necessary precautions would render possible elsewhere. He was to be allowed three officers, a doctor, and twelve servants who were to accompany him thither and who, however, could not leave the island in future without permission from the British Government. Such was his sentence. It cannot have been a great surprise to Napoleon, for St. Helena had already been mentioned during the negotiations of the Vienna Congress, and he must have counted all the more surely on being removed from Europe as that fate had already threatened him at Elba. In now protesting against the violence done him, and maintaining that he had come on board a British vessel of his own free will as England's guest not her prisoner, he could only have one aim in view, viz., to rouse public opinion in Britain in his favour and exercise an influence upon it which would ultimately, and at no distant date, lead to his release. Henceforth this idea dominated his thoughts and actions. But things were not so simple. His fate was not determined by Britain alone. On August 2nd, 1815, a treaty was signed at Paris by the representatives of the allies, declaring Napoleon the prisoner of the four Powers who had signed the agreement of March 25th. The task of guarding him and the choice of his place of confinement was left to England, the other Powers reserved the right of sending commissioners to the place selected, to convince themselves of his presence. On August 7th, Napoleon went on board the "Northumberland," one of the ships of the line, which was to take him to St. Helena. He had chosen Bertrand, Las Cases, and Montholon as his companions, but General Gourgaud also obtained permission to go with him. The two former were accompanied by their families. O'Meara, the ship's surgeon on the "Bellerophon," was also in attendance on the Emperor. The parting from Savary (whom the British Government had expressly forbidden to accompany Napoleon), and the other members of his suite was described as deeply affecting. "You see, my lord," said Las Cases to the British admiral,

"it is those left behind who weep." Three days later, on August 10th, the "Northumberland," escorted by two frigates, left the Channel, and soon the shores of Europe faded from sight.

On October 15th St. Helena with its gloomy and almost precipitous shores came in sight, and at Jamestown, the only harbour on the island, the "Northumberland" cast anchor. The farm-house of Longwood, which was intended for Napoleon, lay on higher ground with a somewhat cooler temperature, but as it was not yet ready he went meantime to "The Briars," a villa belonging to a merchant named Balcombe. Here he mixed with the inmates in the most friendly way, played with the children and tolerated their pranks with great good nature. In December he removed to Longwood. At some distance from his house, a military cordon was established within which he had complete liberty of movement; beyond it he could only go in company of an English officer.[1] But this privilege was not allowed when ships came in sight; at such times neither he nor any of his suite were permitted to communicate with the inhabitants. All letters addressed to Longwood or written there had to be submitted to the governor's inspection. In 1815 Admiral Cockburn, stationed in these waters, acted temporarily in this capacity. In November a protest lodged by Napoleon through his "Master of the Horse," Bertrand, against the aforesaid measures of surveillance was returned to him, because it referred to the "Emperor Napoleon," and the admiral's instructions dealt only with "General Bonaparte". Then began that petty warfare between the French colony and the English officials which grew more embittered after the arrival of the new governor, Sir Hudson Lowe, who at the outset exercised his authority with quite unnecessary pedantry. He refused to allow the title of Emperor because England had never acknowledged Napoleon's Imperial dignity during his reign and had only done so temporarily at Elba, but after his violation of that

[1] In Seaton's "Napoleon's Captivity in Relation to Sir Hudson Lowe," this territory is marked on a map; it comprised thirteen English miles.

agreement she was no longer bound to do so.[1] Lowe had at one time defended Capri against the French and had been attached to Blücher's head-quarter staff during the wars of Liberation, and it is possible Napoleon may then have conceived an unflattering opinion of the man to whom his supervision was now entrusted. For the rest, Lowe did his duty as Governor, and although punctilious, taciturn, suspicious, and jealous of his authority, was nevertheless devoid of the malignity attributed to him by those at Longwood.[2]

In this low, one-storied farm-house the little company had established themselves in a sort of a fashion. Napoleon had a not very attractive bedroom with a bathroom attached, a *salon* with a billiard-table on which he played a great deal, a dining-room, and a room that was called the "topographical cabinet," in memory of happier days. In the same house there were two Las Cases, father and son, M. Montholon and his wife, and General Gourgaud. The Bertrands and their family were installed in a second house some distance off.[3]

[1] This was not quite accurate, for the protocol of the Châtillon conference of February 17th, 1814, granting the title to the Emperor and "to his heirs and successors," was also signed by the English plenipotentiary (*vide* d'Angeberg, "Congrès de Vienne," I. 110, and Rochechouart, "Souvenirs," p. 309). Towards the close of 1816 the question of the title cropped up once in conversation between Napoleon and Admiral Malcolm (Cockburn's successor). When Malcolm represented to him that they could no longer treat him as a Sovereign he replied "Why not? I might quite well be allowed the satisfaction of that honour in such a position. What harm could it do on this rock?" But on being asked if he were to be described as an Emperor—he admitted he could not, as he had abdicated. Yet, he maintained since Egypt he was no longer a general. He then proposed he should be called "Napoleon," and to this Malcolm ultimately consented.

[2] I still adhere to the judgment I formed sixteen years ago. Lord Rosebery's attempt in "The Last Phase" to defend Napoleon against the measures of the Tory Government and Lowe does not hold good in view of the impartial criticisms of Rose in his "Napoleon," vol. II. 539, and "Napoleonic Studies," p. 305. *Vide* also Seaton's "Napoleon's Captivity in Relation to Sir Hudson Lowe," 1903.

[3] The Emperor's personal servants consisted of Marchand his valet, the Mameluke St. Denis, two grooms and several lackeys whom he brought with him from France; a steward, a butler, a *chef*, and a footman formed the staff of household servants.

As far as circumstances allowed they kept up the appearance of Court life. Bertrand retained his title of Grand Marshal, Gourgaud, though partly in jest, received that of Master of the Horse, and had charge of the four carriages and eight riding-horses and the one barouche in which Napoleon on rare occasions drove out of an evening with the two ladies. Count Montholon acted as a sort of Master of Ceremonies for the household.

This little Court had its own etiquette. No one approached the Emperor without being commanded or without having requested an audience; no one might sit down in his presence unless at his bidding—even Bertrand often stood till he was ready to drop from exhaustion. At dinner the ladies appeared in full evening dress, the gentlemen in uniform, the Emperor wearing the grand cross of the Legion of Honour. At first Napoleon spent the morning in bed, had lunch by himself and dined at seven o'clock. As a result of this routine he often rose during the night and read or had a bath, which he prolonged inordinately under the impression that it was beneficial for his health. By and by, however, he fell into more regular habits, and as the doctors advised him to take a greater amount of exercise he rose early and worked in the garden with his servants and some hired Chinese labourers. Goats and other intruding animals he shot. He generally wore a comfortable gardening suit, which he exchanged in the afternoon for his uniform or for a green hunting costume. In the course of time these clothes began to wear out, but in order to avoid using English cloth he declined to lay them aside. A considerable portion of the day was spent in working on his Memoirs, which he dictated, generally to Las Cases, Gourgaud, or Montholon, often for several hours on end without tiring himself. The rest of his time was taken up with billiards, chess, reading the English newspapers (for he was now learning the language for himself) and the new books which were sent him. In the evening he read aloud from Voltaire, Corneille, the "Odyssey," or the Bible, and he was highly indignant when one or other of the ladies in his audience grew oblivious of etiquette and fell asleep.

He was much more fascinating to his audience when he expressed his views on mind and matter, and the great realities of life. His opinions were not always the same; they varied with his moods, but they were always interesting, as, for example, when he launched into hypothesis about eternity, and opened up the subject of the future of the soul and its fate after death. He was a thorough-going materialist. "Where is the soul in a baby? and in a madman?" he asked. "A nail driven into your head makes you mad. Where is your soul then? It accompanies the body, it grows with the child, and fails with the old man. . . . I cannot remember what I was before my birth. What will become of my soul after death? As for my body, it will go to form turnips or carrots . . . once we are dead, we are dead for good and all. What is electricity, galvanism, magnetism? That is the great secret of Nature. Galvanism works in silence; for my part, I believe that man is the product of this fluid and the atmosphere, that the brain sucks in this fluid and life is thereby created, that the soul is composed of this fluid, which after death goes back into the ether whence it is again absorbed by other brains. . . . The thought of a God is certainly the most obvious. Who made all this? Neither our soul nor our brain can penetrate that veil. The simplest idea would be to pray to the sun which fertilizes everything. I repeat, I believe that man is the product of the atmosphere, warmed by the sun, and that after some time this effect ceased . . . were I to choose a religion I would do homage to the sun which quickens everything; it is the real divinity of the earth. . . . After all, I, too, would believe in a religion, but only in one that had existed from the beginning of the world. But there is Socrates, Plato, Moses, Mohammed, and so I can no longer believe. All that was discovered by human beings. I know too much about history to be religious, and I myself have had sufficient dealings with the various religions. . . . I especially admire that of Mohammed because it is less ridiculous than ours. The Turks are not altogether wrong in calling us idolaters. They conquered half the world in ten or twenty years while

it took Christianity 300 years to do as much. . . . I am not convinced that Jesus ever lived, and I would only believe in the Christian religion if it had existed from all time." In any case Romanism was preferable to Anglicanism, etc. When the pious Gourgaud declared the Emperor would end his days in sanctity, the latter retorted that people became pious when the body grew feeble and the brain had lost its vigour. . . . Religion was nevertheless necessary to preserve the social order of mankind.[1] He talked freely of the relations of Church and State and of the best methods of organizing the latter. He showed himself thoroughly out of sympathy with recent constitutional developments in France. "I was perhaps wrong in forming Chambers; I thought they would be serviceable to me and that if I became dictator I would find them indispensable. I was wrong to waste precious time on a Constitution, all the more as my intention was to dissolve the Chambers as soon as I saw myself victorious and out of the difficulty. . . . I was merely following the fashion in busying myself with a Constitution, for an advisory assembly is a horrible affair. The English Constitution is only suited to England. Deliberative assemblies ought not to be introduced; the men you reckon upon change their mind too quickly. O Waterloo! Waterloo! Everything depended on Waterloo! . . . I am of opinion that a Constitution is not wanted in France; it is purely a monarchical State; i.e. no deliberative assembly, no Legislative Body! If you wish to bring about a revolution in any country, all that is needed is to inaugurate a representative body; two parties form immediately and hatred and strife are engendered." [2] His listeners followed with the keenest attention when he spoke of his young days and of his success in life. He was not always quite accurate, as, for instance, when he boasted of his "Discours" for the Lyons prize, and declared it had received an award worth fifty louis. Nor did he attribute his success in France solely to

[1] *Vide*, Gourgaud, "Journal," I. 409, 435, 440, 451; Vol. II. 22, 270, 275, 437, etc.

[2] *Ibid.* I. 93, 99, 103, 135, 325.

his own personality. On one occasion when reading aloud Voltaire's "Mahomet," he remarked of that prophet, that he had found the conditions of his historic position ready to his hand, and, he continued, "that was the case with me. All the elements of an empire were there. People were tired of anarchy and wanted to be rid of it. Had I not come, some one else would probably have done the same thing; France would always have conquered the world. I repeat it, a man is only human. His means are nothing unless circumstances and opinion favour him. Opinion rules everything."[1] He spoke freely about those who had served him, and did not hesitate to express his disapproval frankly. Amongst countless other topics he gave his views on women in general and on his own wives in particular. He descanted on Josephine's winsomeness, loquacity, extravagance, and untruthfulness and on the *naïveté*, reticence, and truthfulness of Marie Louise, who, he incidently remarked, had saved his life at Amsterdam.[2] He related his various amours, even a recent one at Lyons, with no small gusto, but he was not partial to women, and he declared that the only deep emotion they had ever roused in him was that called forth by Josephine in his young days. He held that in France women received too much consideration; they ought never to be treated as the equal of man; in reality they were simply a means of rearing children. He considered it ridiculous that a man should only have one legitimate wife. At other times, however, his verdict was more favourable. It was well to consult women, he said, and if he again came to the throne he would spend two hours every day in the society of intelligent women. He thought it in no wise improbable that he would regain the throne. He expected to live "another thirty years," and he considered "his career by no means closed".

[1] Gourgaud, II. 78.

[2] *Ibid.* 196, 278. Austria threw me over yet the Empress saved my life in Amsterdam. . . . I was helpless and she sent me her doctor and her pages. But there is no notice of this illness in Marie Louise's letters nor in the memoirs of those accompanying Napoleon. Even Masson ("Marie Louise," p. 346) takes no notice of Gourgaud's remark.

Then too his feud with Lowe took up no small amount of time. He repeatedly indulged in unjustifiable outbursts of rage towards that officer. On one occasion he threatened him, that the first person who crossed his threshold without his permission would get a bullet through his head. Another time he called him his executioner, and so ultimately Lowe discontinued his visits and simply had a daily report of his presence from the officer on duty, who moreover very rarely saw his ward.[1] Napoleon was pursuing a definite line of action, aiming at his ultimate release. He would neither flee nor be liberated by force. He had repeated opportunities of the latter. Some of his devoted adherents who had escaped to America offered to venture an attack upon St. Helena. In August, 1816, a naval officer, Fournier by name, volunteered to cross the ocean with four schooners and carry away the exile. But Napoleon judged such methods unworthy of him and, furthermore, he was too nervous about his personal safety. I would not be six months in America," said he to Montholon, "without being waylaid by assassins in the pay of the Royalist committees that returned to France in the train of the Comte d'Artois. In America I have nothing to look for but murder and oblivion, and therefore I prefer to remain at St. Helena." "Murder and oblivion" were equally abhorrent to him, yet there was no resignation in his tone; he confidently expected his liberation when the Opposition came into power in the English Parliament, or when the Bourbons were again expelled from France. When Lowe, soon after his arrival, undertook to get a new and more commodious house built for him and to have it ready within two years, he replied: "In two years there will be a change of Ministry in London or a new government in France, and I shall no longer be here."[2]

[1] *Vide*, officer's letter, Rose's "Napoleonic Studies," p. 395.

[2] Napoleon afterwards denied these words, but Lowe gave Montchenu his word of honour that he had uttered them. The new building was begun nevertheless and finished in 1820, but it was never occupied by Napoleon. In Gourgaud (II. 129) there is a passage in which he prophesies in 1817 that Louis XVIII will only live other three years and

This testimony harmonizes completely with his twofold intention, on the one hand to win a party for himself in England, and, on the other, to recover the lost confidence of the French.

He thought he could attain his first point if he managed to throw discredit on the Tory Ministry and to pose as the victim of unparalleled tyranny. Hence he viewed with suspicion all the official regulations and exaggerated their effects. The order prohibiting him from taking long rides beyond the prescribed boundaries, unless accompanied by an English officer, was met by his decision to give up riding altogether and to lay the blame of the injury thereby caused to his health, on the governor who had robbed him of his liberty of movement, and on the Government who left him to rot in such an unwholesome climate. When Lowe one day alluded, perhaps not very tactfully, to the question of household expenses, Napoleon sent some of his plate to be broken up and sold in order to get money, really, however, for the purpose of exciting pity by showing to what sacrifices he was driven by the penuriousness of this regime. As early as November 30th, 1815, Las Cases wrote in his diary, "We have nothing left but moral weapons. And in order to use them with the greatest effect it was necessary to systematize our conduct, feelings, and privations. That was indispensable in order to make people in Europe take a lively interest in us, and the Opposition in the English Parliament did not fail to attack the Ministry on the ground of its treatment of us."[1] The privations were certainly far from severe. On Montholon's showing, Napoleon took out with him 400,000 francs in gold, diamonds almost equal to that in value, and letters of credit amounting to millions of francs. Of the silver service, a dozen dishes and plates were taken for Napoleon's use, as he objected to dinner served on crockery. For the rest, as the Emperor admitted to his confidential circle, "they lived very

then there will be a crisis. In England, he said, he had built great hopes on the Princess Charlotte, but she died too soon. (*Ibid.* I. 82).

[1] Forsyth, "Captivity," I. 5. Las Cases afterwards suppressed this passage, which Lowe had seen in the original manuscript.

well".[1] But of this no hint was to reach the outer world; it was to believe that they were living in a deadly climate, miserably fed, worried and oppressed by the hard-hearted agent of the English Government who played the rôle of jailer only too well. All this was to be made known speedily, far and wide. Hence the "Letters from the Cape of Good Hope," which Napoleon either dictated or directed Las Cases to compose, and which gave a long list of Lowe's sins and of the sufferings of those under his charge. These letters were secretly forwarded to London, where they were translated into English and published in 1817 as the work of an Englishman.[2] They described the climate of St. Helena as unhealthy, the temperature as hot and cold in turn, although Napoleon once admitted in confidence to his suite that if one had to live in exile, St. Helena was after all the best place, the atmosphere being dull and not healthy, but the temperature mild and pleasant. The climate was rendered even more injurious in its effects—so said the "letters"—by the restrictions imposed by the new governor on the movements and intercourse of his captive, who, moreover, was no prisoner, for he had voluntarily placed himself under England's protection while it had still been in his power to put himself at the head of the army and continue the war. "Napoleon had formed false ideas of the influence of a free, strong, and magnanimous nation on their Government, and he had thereby been misled into preferring the protection of the laws of England to that

[1] "We are quite well off here," said he, "we keep a good table, and if we do complain it is only because people must always have something to grumble at" (Gourgaud, I. 324). Between January and March, 1817, this little company consumed several thousand bottles of wine, each lackey received one bottle of Cape wine per day. Eighteen pounds of butcher meat were used per day, and a corresponding number of chickens, etc.

[2] These letters, re-translated into French as "Lettres du Cap de Bonne Esperance," are included in Napoleon's officially edited correspondence. They are addressed to a Lady C., and form the sequel to a book published by Warden, the surgeon of the "Northumberland". Lady C. is evidently a certain Lady Clavering, a Frenchwoman to whom Las Cases had secretly attempted to send a native servant, who, however, betrayed the plot and so brought about the arrest of Las Cases and his separation from Napoleon.

of his father-in-law, or of his old friend" (Alexander I). This was intended for the same address as the closing sentences, in which Napoleon's style is unmistakable: "The spectacle of persecution and injustice has always roused my indignation. Judge what I felt when I saw this man, who had conquered in sixty battles and had once been master of as many kings and countries, tormented in this cowardly fashion. I said to myself: 'I respect thee higher with the crown of thorns which the wrath of strangers has pressed on thy brow, than circled with the many diadems which once adorned it'."

But this appeal proved fruitless. Already in March, 1817, when Lord Holland, who was in the Opposition, laid Napoleon's complaints, as formulated by Montholon in an expostulatory letter, before the House of Lords, the House sided with the Ministry, and even prominent colleagues of Holland's voted against his motion to submit the correspondence with Lowe to Parliament. This ruined Napoleon's cause in England for the time being, and so the "Letters from the Cape" fell flat. For although the Whigs maintained that only Napoleon at the head of France was able to hold the balance against Russia, Britain's coming rival on the Continent, the country was so tired of war that this reason was not judged sufficient for releasing the prisoner.[1] Not only so, but the Liverpool-Castlereagh Cabinet concluded an agreement with the other continental Powers at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, "concerning the rumours arising in England, and repeated in other parts of Europe, as to the treatment meted out to the man whose sinister fame has not yet ceased to disturb the world". And the representatives of Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Britain, in a protocol of November 30th, 1818, declared "that the more stringent instructions of the

[1] *Vide* Schlitter, "Kaiser Franz I und die Napoleoniden," p. 32. There is a remarkable unanimity as to the fact that Napoleon made capital out of this circumstance with the British travellers who visited him at St. Helena with passes from the governor, all of whom he received with the most winning frankness. Russia, said he, for instance, to Lord Amherst in 1817, "is the Power now most to be feared. France and England are the only countries whose interest it is to oppose her plans" (Scott's "Napoleon," vol. IX. Appendix IX).

British Government to Sir Hudson Lowe have met with the unanimous approval of the signatory Powers," and "that all interchange of letters with the prisoner, all sending of money, or other communication which is not submitted to the governor's scrutiny, must be considered as an attack on the public safety and be punished accordingly."

So the Continent, hand in hand with Britain, and with Russia, too, on her side, annihilated Napoleon's hopes that things would take a turn in his favour. So far he had only prejudiced his own case, for by his secret intercourse with Europe and America, which had not escaped the governor's notice, he had caused the latter to redouble his precautionary measures. As early as November, 1816, Lowe had been obliged to arrest Las Cases and to banish him from the island, and a year and a half later he had to do the same with O'Meara, the surgeon. It is possible that they both had exposed themselves purposely to be sent away, so that they might work in Europe on behalf of the exile.[1] In his petty war with the governor Napoleon had imposed restraints upon himself which were immediately prejudicial to his health, as, for instance, his abstention from active exercise. He became seriously ill. Symptoms of cancer in the stomach, the disease of which his father had died, showed themselves in frequent shooting pains and nausea. He himself was not ignorant of his danger, especially later when he learned that his eldest sister had died of this disease. As he rejected with contempt the doctor appointed by the governor, a young Italian surgeon, Antommarchi, a Corsican by birth, was sent out by Uncle Fesch and arrived in September, 1819. Napoleon let himself be persuaded by him into modifying his mode of life. He laid out a garden, in which he worked every day, made excursions on horseback, and even concluded a sort of truce with the governor, who for his part welcomed the change and extended the radius allowed his prisoner for exercise without an escort. After all what had he gained by his feud? Public opinion in Britain refused to be won over,

[1] Gourgaud too left him, ostensibly on account of a quarrel with Montholon. (Schlitter, Sturmer's Berichte, p. 122, 127.)

and meanwhile he had injured his own health which, even in spite of his altered regime, grew worse from day to day.

On New Year's Eve, 1820, he spoke for the last time in a confidential way about bygone days. Then his illness took a sudden turn for the worse. He grew listless and tired, lounged in an easy-chair and no longer took any pleasure in his old occupations, although he still forced himself to continue them, dictating now and again and arranging his papers. It was only with difficulty he could be persuaded to go out. He grew visibly thinner, for he was unable to retain any nourishment. His pulse, seldom more than from sixty to sixty-five beats per minute, was now feverish. Antommarchi misunderstood his disease, and Napoleon requested an older and more experienced doctor from the Paris Clinique. But before his wish could reach the Continent, he had ceased to live. On April 15th, after an English army surgeon had recognized how critical his condition was, he dictated his will to Montholon, dividing among his faithful followers the 6,000,000 francs which he had deposited with the Paris Banker Laffitte before his departure, and his other relics. Soon after the attacks of sickness became so frequent that his strength rapidly failed, and on May 3rd his mind, hitherto unclouded, began to wander. On the following night the death struggle began, and on May 5th, 1821, at ten minutes to six he died. After the autopsy, performed at his own request, his body was embalmed and clad in the old uniform he used to wear. He was buried not far from Longwood, in a secluded spot which had been one of his favourite haunts. British officers, visibly moved, stood round the freshly dug grave while the cannon of St. Helena boomed forth a last salute to the mighty conqueror.

The historian's task does not end when death closed that marvellous career. Napoleon left behind him a rich legacy which claims consideration, because it constituted an immediate appeal to future generations, a goal which he had long and incessantly pursued and never with greater zeal than when exiled on this rocky island, amid the wastes of the Atlantic. We have already seen how industriously he en-

deavoured to bring about a revulsion of feeling in his favour in England. The "Letters from the Cape" were written with a view to this, and his conversations with English visitors were all directed to this end. But he had also a second end in view. In France more than anywhere else he expected that faith in him would revive when once they had thrown off the yoke of the Bourbons. From the moment he set foot on the "Northumberland," he pursued his aim with tireless activity. Repeatedly in his conversations we find him expressing his anxiety lest history might not take sufficient notice of him owing to his last defeats; he even thinks it might have been best for his reputation with posterity if he had fallen at Moscow, Dresden or Waterloo. Sometimes he candidly acknowledged the mistakes in his policy, such as the expedition to San Domingo and the Spanish war, and that it would have been better if he had not concluded a truce in 1813, or had yielded at the Prague Congress and accepted the Châtillon conditions.[1] But no hint of this was to appear in his writings which he dictated on board ship and later on at the Briars and at Longwood, often very hurriedly, as if there was some urgent reason for haste. First of all his prestige as a general must be restored and made flawless. Consequently Waterloo was a blot which had to be scraped out and rubbed smooth till it was made to appear that it was not Napoleon who lost the battle, but Grouchy, whose blundering had rendered futile the success gained at Ligny. The fact that Blücher was able to fight again two days later was entirely the fault of Ney, who did not march quickly enough on the 16th, in spite of all the directions sent him, and hence the Emperor's splendid plans were foiled by his lieutenants.[2] This is what Napoleon dictated and what his

[1] Gourgaud, I. 199, 402; II. 71, 265, 346, 506.

[2] In view of the many well-authenticated facts now published, it would be difficult to find a more flagrant perversion of the truth than the following passage from Napoleon's "Campaign of 1815". "Marshal Grouchy left with the cavalry corps of Exelman and Pajol, the third and fourth infantry corps, and Teste's division of the sixth. His orders were to keep at the heels of the Prussian army and prevent it rallying, and he had definite instructions to keep himself always between the Charleroi-Brussels

officers wrote down. Such was his reward to Grouchy, who was in America constantly planning how to liberate his master from captivity, and to Ney, who was scarcely cold in his grave before he was slandered by the man for whom he had sacrificed his life.[1] The manuscript of the "Campaign of 1815" reached Europe secretly, just as the "Letters from the Cape" had done, and was published in 1818. Gourgaud was named as the author, but every line betrays the master's hand. Yet the work fulfilled its purpose and so completely that for many a decade even historians of repute accepted blindly the representations of the Captive of St. Helena. His other military failures had also to be patched up. In Russia, besides the fact that the war arose "from a misunderstanding," he told O'Meara that the early winter was to blame for the disaster to the army. He had made a calculation of the weather for fifty years back and found that the greatest cold had never begun before December 20th, i.e., twenty days later than in 1812. In one night, when Réamur registered 18 degrees frost, 30,000 horses perished. As the artillery, ammunition, and provisions could no longer be transported, nor the enemy be reconnoitred, the troops consequently fell into disorder. He had won the battle on the Moskwa with 90,000 troops against the Russians with 250,000; he had risked himself in the flames of Moscow till his clothes, his hair, and even his eyebrows were scorched, etc. All this

road and Marshal Blücher, so as to be constantly in touch with the army and in a position to rejoin it. It was probable that Marshal Blücher would fall back on Wavre; he was to be there at the same time."

[1] As to the execution of Ney and Labédoyère, Napoleon remarked: "People should never break their word; I despise traitors," as if he himself had not instigated them to act thus. Another time he said: "Ney dishonoured himself. He ought to have returned to Paris; that would have been far nobler." Of Labédoyère he remarked: "he acted from fanaticism and committed treachery, for he had taken the oath to the King". Of himself he justly remarked: "I only like those who are useful to me and only as long as they remain so"! As Bertrand rightly said to Gourgaud: "His character is the reason why he has no friends and so many enemies, and why we are here at St. Helena" (Gourgaud, I. 77, 136, 223, 491; II. 444).

was received and quoted with credulity and soon circulated throughout the world as historic truths.

Napoleon also dictated various other matters concerning the early part of his military career, his share in the siege of Toulon, in the Italian wars, in the Egyptian Expedition, in the Campaign of 1800,—in short all the services he rendered to the Revolution. Of his great exploits at Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, and in Bavaria, he gives no record. Nor was it that death had cut short the narrative, for during his last years he wrote various military works criticizing the deeds of Cæsar, Turenne, and Frederick the Great, all of which have been preserved. In refraining thus from telling more about himself and his great deeds he was obeying the motive which had guided his conduct on his escape from Elba. The Bourbons were to be overthrown by the Revolution; he had been the Man of the Revolution—witness how he had fought for it; none better. Hence there was not a word about the time when he had ruled France as an autocrat, nor of the wars of conquest by which he had meant to found his universal empire, and which instead had roused Europe against him. Liberty and universal Peace was now his watchword, although occasionally some unsuitable material slipped in, as when Montholon relates a conversation with an English officer in which Napoleon observed that the less freedom monarchs intended to give, the more they should talk about it, for the iron rod with which men are ruled must be gilded. But such slips were rare. In general one theme dominates all those conversations; the Bourbons must be expelled, for they represent a kingdom of nobles and priests and not of the people; nor ought the people to seize the power for themselves, the remembrance of the Terror under the Convention, and of the lamentable failure of the Directory, should preserve France from that; her only safety lies in a popular monarchy. But this he explained to Gourgaud should be as free from restrictions as possible, and on the latter remarking that in China the Monarch was venerated as a god, Napoleon replied, "That is as it ought to be". "Under a monarchical system of government," said he to his suite in the summer of 1816,

"the rule of my dynasty alone can furnish guarantees for the real interests of the people, because it is the creation of the people." Speaking thus, he was still hopeful for himself. Five years later, two weeks before his death, he expressed himself in a similar strain. Then, however, he was thinking of his son. "The Bourbons," said he "will not remain. When I am gone, everywhere, even in England, there will be a reaction in my favour. My son, after some civil disturbances, will reach the throne. Great things can be done in France only when one trusts the masses. My son must be a man of the new ideas and represent the cause which I have made triumphant everywhere; he must carry out everywhere these new ideas which root up the traces of the feudal system, he must secure the dignity of humanity and develop the seeds of happiness lying dormant for centuries: what has till now been the privileged possession of the few, he must make the portion of the people in general; he must unite Europe in an indissoluble federative league and spread the blessings of Christianity and civilization in all the uncivilized parts of the world. Such must be the aim of all my son's thoughts; that is the cause for which I die a martyr. By the hatred with which I pursued oligarchies he can measure the sacredness of my mission." But what was implied in this "indissoluble federative system"? It could no longer be the world-wide federation for which he had striven. The national forces of the Continent had thrust France back from her "grand empire" within her old boundaries, and these forces now demanded recognition. Hence he remarks: "There are national wishes which sooner or later must be satisfied; that is the goal towards which we must advance". As to the means to be employed, he had once stated to Las Cases: "In Europe there are, although scattered, 30,000,000 Frenchmen, 15,000,000 Spaniards, 15,000,000 Italians, and 30,000,000 Germans. Out of each of these peoples I would have made a single national body." Thus, sobered and enlightened by the triumph of a powerful principle, he recommended to the future ruler of France a national system both at home and abroad.

Just as in his words and dictated writings he sought to raise his image above the hard reality of facts into an ideal sphere, so in his last will he aimed at the same result, always thinking of the future of his dynasty in France, and always with the same contempt for truth. "I wish," he says in that document, "that my ashes should rest by the banks of the Seine in the heart of the French nation whom I loved so well." Furthermore he remarked: "I recommend my son never to forget that he is born a French Prince, and never to allow himself to become a tool in the hands of the three rulers who are oppressing the nations of Europe. He is never to fight against France nor injure her in any way; he must adopt my motto, 'Everything for the French Nation'." To avoid wounding the religious sentiments of any of the people he had priests brought to St. Helena to pray at his coffin, and he wrote in his will: "I die in the Apostolic and Roman religion in whose bosom I was born more than fifty years ago".[1] But should there be Frenchmen unable to reconcile the murder of the Duc d'Enghien with the principles of religion, these were now to learn from his will at St. Helena, "that this was necessary for the security, interest, and honour of

[1] A few years previously he had let fall various remarks on the character of religions which convinced Bertrand that Napoleon was essentially religious, although this was certainly not true of him at that time. Early in 1817, for instance, he remarked, "the forgiveness of sins is a beautiful thought; it makes religion beautiful and imperishable. No one can say he does not believe or that he will not one day believe." Another time he remarked: "Only a fool could maintain that he would die without a father confessor; there are so many things which one cannot know nor explain." He remarked later to Antommarchi: "Not every one is an atheist who wishes to be one". In 1820 we meet with the remark: "Although I feel I am growing weaker every day, I am still far from needing the comforts of religion". Yet he added: "But who knows? Even Voltaire desired the consolations of religion before his death, and perhaps I too might find much comfort and refreshment in the society of a priest who was capable of giving me a taste for religious conversation and making me pious" (Gourgaud, I. 474; II. 43, etc.). The fact remains that the Abbé Vignali, one of the priests sent out by Fesch, informed Marie Louise at Parma: "Your husband died, after having received extreme unction seven days before his death, with the most religious feelings in his heart" (Neipperg to Metternich, 1st October, 1821).

the French nation at a time when d'Artois, on his own confession, had sixty assassins in his pay at Paris". This same Count d'Artois was soon to mount the throne of France as Charles X.

Such was the intellectual legacy bequeathed by the Emperor. Even on the verge of the grave he sought to slake his ambition by unlawful means; and he succeeded. When the reign of Louis XVIII came to an end and that of his brother began of which every honest Frenchman was ashamed, when a new Revolution only resulted in replacing a foolish policy by one of self-seeking commercialism, then indeed the seed of St. Helena sprang up quickly in the soil of France, furrowed as it was by hatred and discontent. The first poets of the nation put the New Legend into verse, and so mightily was the spirit of the people swayed by the memory of the glorious days of a Great Ruler, that even the sober calling of the historian was swept in by the current till it seemed as if his own precepts were to be upheld even in the writing of his history. "A French historian," said the Emperor in 1816,[1] "who wishes to describe the empire, will, if he is a man of courage, give me full credit for my share. It was I who closed the crater of anarchy and brought order out of chaos, I purified the Revolution from her excesses, I ennobled the peoples and strengthened the kings, I stimulated ambition everywhere, rewarded every service, and greatly extended the boundaries of fame. That is certainly something. For what could I be attacked which a historian could not defend? For my aims? He knows enough to clear me of any reproach on that score. My despotism? He could point out that a dictatorship was necessary. Should people say I fettered liberty, he could prove that licence, anarchy, and disorder were at the door. If I were blamed for having been too fond of war, he can explain how I was always the party attacked. If I am blamed for having desired the supremacy of the world, he can demonstrate how that was the result of circumstances, and how it was my enemies themselves who

[1] Las Cases, "Mémorial," May 1st, 1816.

forced me to it, step by step. Or, finally, should they condemn my ambition, he can certainly find in me much of what is noblest and most sublime in creating and consecrating ambition—in short the supremacy of reason and the free exercise of all the human faculties. And the historian will only lament that such an ambition should have lacked its fulfilment."

Such was the watchword for the historians, and so clear was the voice of this immortal that it was obeyed for long years after his decease. There came a time—in 1840—when his body was borne in triumph to Paris and laid with every circumstance of pomp within the Dome of the Invalides, when Louis Philippe's Minister referred to him in the Chamber of Deputies in these words: "He was an Emperor and a King, the lawful Sovereign of our country, and as such entitled to rest at St. Denis. But he deserved more than the burial-place of a King." There even came a day when the Legend of St. Helena reached the throne of France, and it was only when the rule of Napoleon III proved unable to maintain what the Bonapartist tradition had so carefully fostered and so lavishly promised, that, at last, history came into its rights. The blots stood revealed, ineffaceable. None the less the image was that of one of the greatest of the sons of men.

Among the writings left by the Exile of Longwood for the guidance of the son whose way he wished to smooth, and of whose early death he had no foreboding, there occurs the following passage: "May my son often study history and reflect upon it, for it is the only true philosophy".

Yes—provided it be true history.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

CHAPTER XIII.—*For Home Affairs — vide* the authorities quoted in chapter VIII, also—Thiers, VI.-VIII, and Barni, "Napoleon I, und sein Geschichtschreiber, Thiers"; Lanfrey, III, IV; especially Taine, "Le régime moderne"; the "Moniteur" for this period; the "Correspondance" and the supplements to it; the Memoirs of Méneval, Rémusat, Beugnot, Chaptal, Pasquier, I, and the Duchesse d'Abrantès; the correspondence of Le Coz, Archbishop of Besançon (published by Roussel), Vol. II; Broglie, "Souvenirs," I; the "Considérations" of Staël, II; Véron, "Mémoires d'un bourgeois de Paris," I; the memoirs of Avrillon (Josephine's maid), 2 vols.; the dispatches of Metternich in Vol. II. and his "Charackteristische Beiträge zum Porträt Napoleons" in the 1st Volume of the "Nachgelassene Papiere"; the reports of Tolstoi in the "Sbnorik," Vol. LXXXIX; the "Liste des membres de la Noblesse impériale," in "La Révolution française," 1888; Pelet de la Lozère, "Opinions de Napoléon au Conseil d'État"; the memorandum in Vitrolles, "Mémoires," II, p. 443, *re* Maret and the State secretaryship; Faber, "Notices sur l'intérieur de la France"; Niemeyer, "Beobachtungen auf einer Reise nach Frankreich im Jahre, 1807"; Nemnich, "Tagebuch einer der Kultur und Industrie gewidmeten Reise," Tübingen, 1809, Vol. V; Gaudin, "Mémoires"; Chaptal, "De l'industrie française," Paris, 1810; Darmstaedter, "Studien z. napol. Wirtschaftsgesch." ("Vierteljahrschr. fur Sozial-und Wirtschaftgesch.," 1904.)

For Napoleon's attitude towards the literary circles—vide Welschinger, "La Censure sous Napoléon I"; Locré, "Discussions sur la liberté de la presse, la censure, etc., pendant les ans 1808-1811," Paris, 1819; Grouchy, "La presse sous le premier Empire d'après un manuscrit de la bibliothèque de l'Opéra," Paris, 1896; Boissonnade, "La critique litéraire sous le premier Empire;" Jullien, "Histoire de la poésie française à l'époque impériale"; Sainte-

CHAPTER XIII.—*Continued.*

Beuve, "Chateaubriand et son groupe litéraire," 2 vols.; Merlet, "Tableau de la litérature française, 1800-1815," 3 vols. 1877; Des Granges, "Geoffroy et la critique dramatique sous le Consulat et l'Empire," Paris, 1897; Brunetière, "Etudes critiques sur l'histoire de la litérature française; cp. also Fournier's essay on "Napoleon I und das Theater" in "Bühne und Welt," 1901.

For the University—vide Beauchamps, "Recueil des lois et règlements sur l'enseignement supérieur," 4 vols.; Fabry, "Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de l'instruction publique depuis 1789," I-III; Ambr. Rendu, "Essai sur l'instruction publique," 4 vols., 1819; Eugène Rendu, "Ambr. Rendu et l'Université de France," 1861. The edicts of the University Council are unpublished but were made use of by Taine, "Régime moderne," II; Charles Schmidt, "La Reforme de l'université en 1811," Paris, 1905.

For the Jewish question in France—vide Fauchille, "La question juive sous le premier Empire," Paris, 1886; Lémann, "Napoléon I et les Israélites," Paris, 1894; Lemoine, "Napoléon et les juifs," Paris, 1900; Ph. Sagnac, "Les juifs et Napoléon, 1806-1808" (in the "Revue d'histoire moderne," II, 1901, 1902) (exhaustive); also Pasquier, "Mémoires".

For foreign relations in general—vide Lefebvre, "Histoire des Cabinets," III, 2nd Paris edition; and Sorel, VII.

(*a*) *For Russia specially, vide* Vandal, "Napoléon I et Alexandre I"; also his "Documents relatifs au partage de l'Orient, janvier-juin, 1808" ("Revue d'histoire diplomatique," 1890); and "Lettres inédites de Napoléon I au duc de Vicence, 1808, 1809" ("Revue politique et literaire," 1895); Tatistscheff, "Alexandre I et Napoléon"; Bernhardi, "Geschichte Ruszlands im 19 Jahrhundert," II.

(*b*) *For the confederation of the Rhine—vide* Winkopp, "Der Rheinische Bund"; Lucchesini, "Hist. Entwicklung der Ursachen und Wirkungen des Rheinbundes"; Bockenheimer, "Dalberg in Paris, 1807, 1808" ("Revue Napoléonienne," 1902).

(*c*) *For Prussia—vide* Hassel, "Geschichte der preuszischen Politik, 1807-1815," I; Duncker, "Preuszen während der französischen Okkupation" (in "Aus der Zeit Friedrichs des Groszen und Friedrich Wilhelm III"); Briefwechsel, "Friedrich. Wilhelm III mit Alexander I" (published by Bailleu).

CHAPTER XIII.—*Continued.*

(*d*) *For Austria—vide* Beer, "Zehn Jahre österreichischer Politik"; Wertheimer, "Geschichte Österreichs und Ungarns," II; Metternich's Memoirs in Vol. II of the "Nachgelassene Papiere".

(*e*) *For the East—vide* Driault, "La politique orientale de Napoléon I"; Zinkeisen, "Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches," VII; Coquelle, "Sebastiani à Constantinople, 1806-1808" ("Revue d'hist. diplom.," 1904); Petrof, "Geschichte des russisch-türkischen Krieges, 1806-1812," St. Petersburg, 1885 (Russian). Schlechta, "Die Revolutionen in Konstantinopel, 1807 und 1808"; Pisani, "La Dalmatie de 1797 à 1815"; Rodocanachi, "Bonaparte et les îles ioniennes," Paris, 1898; Roloff, "Napoleons Plan eines Feldzuges nach Indien" ("Preuszische Jahrbücher," Vol. LXVIII); Ghika, "La France et les principautés danubiennes" ("Annales de l'Ecole des ss. pol.," 1896).

(*f*) *For the Papal States—vide* Haussonville, and the authorities previously mentioned on this subject.

(*g*) *For Spain and Portugal—vide* Lafuente, "Historia general de España," new edition, 1877; Rehfues, "Spain from within in 1808"; Cevallos, "Authentic descriptions of the events in Spain," German edition, 1808; Escoiquiz, "True statements of the reasons which moved King Ferdinand VII in April, 1808, to make a journey to Bayonne," German edition, 1814; Schlitter, "Briefe Murats an Savary, 1808" ("Transactions of the Institute for Austrian Historical Research," 1889); Lumbroso, "Correspondance de Joachim Murat 1791-1808," Turin, 1899; Chavanon et Saint-Yves, "J. Murat," Paris, 1905; Baumgarten, "Geschichte Spaniens," I, (in which mention is made of the Spanish Memoirs for this period); Bernhardi, "Napoleon I Politik in Spanien" ("Historische Zeitschrift," 40th vol.); Ducéré, "Napoleon à Bayonne," Bayonen, 1897; Thiers, VIII; also Masson, "Napoléon et sa famille," IV; Geoffroy de Grandmaison, "Talleyrand et les affaires d'Espagne en 1808" ("Rev. des questions historiques," 1900); Murat, "Murat, lieutenant de l'Empereur en Espagne, 1808," Paris, 1897; Grandmaison, "Savary en Espagne, 1808" ("Rev. des questions historiques," 1900); Grandmaison, "Les princes d'Espagne, à Valençay" ("Correspondant," 1900); Urries, "Memorias des Marqués de Ayerbe sobra la estancia de don Fernando VII en Valençay," Saragossa, 1896; also the Memoirs of Godoy (French

CHAPTER XIII.—*Continued.*

edition of 1836); of King Joseph, Miot de Melito, Pasquier, Talleyrand, I (a record of the literature criticising the latter is given in Kircheisen, "Bibliographie Napoleons," p. 165); Latino-Coelho, "Historia politica e militar de Portugal des de os finos do 18, seculo ate 1814," Lisbon, 1886; Accursio das Neves, "Historia da Invasão dos Franceses em Portugal," 5 vols., Lisbon, 1870; Clerc, "Guerre d'Espagne, La capitulation de Baylen," Paris, 1903; Ebeling, "Die Kapitulation von Baylen oder Konvention von Andujar, 24 Juli, 1808" ("Jahrbuch für die deutsche Armee und Marine," 1878); Titeux, "Le général Dupont (apologetic in its attitude towards the capitulation of Baylen); Sèze, "Baylen et la politique de Napoléon," Paris, 1904, confirming Titeux' favourable verdict on Dupont.

For the meeting at Erfurt—vide, in addition to the authorities already mentioned on foreign policy, specially Vandal, I, Sorel, VII, and Talleyrand's Memoirs; Bittard des Portes, "Les préliminaires de l'entrevue d'Erfurt" ("Rev. d'histoire diplomatique," 1890); Häusser, "Deutsche Geschichte," III; the Memoirs of the German Müffling, of Chancellor v. Müller, Steffens, "Was ich erlebte"; Metternich's Memoirs of 1808; especially Talleyrand's attitude in Vol. II of the "Nachgelassene Papiere"; also Beer, "Zehn Jahre," the Memoirs of Ménéval, Bausset, and Montgelas; Ernouf's "Maret"; Comtesse Choiseul-Gouffier, "Reminiscences sur Napoléon et Alexandre I"; Gabriac, "Souvenirs de l'entrevue d'Erfurt par un page de Napoléon I" ("Correspondant," Vol. LXIII).

For the Emperor's conversation with Goethe and Wieland—vide Goethe's Memoirs and letters; Sklower, "Entrevue de Napoléon I et de Goethe," 2nd ed., Lille, 1853; Suphan, "Napoleons Unterhaltung mit Goethe und Wieland" ("Goethe-Jahrbuch," XV); Menge, "Goethe und Wieland vor Napoleon in Erfurt und Weimar" ("Zeitschrift für den deutschen Unterricht," V, entirely from Talleyrand's point of view; A. Fischer, "Goethe und Napoleon," 2nd ed., 1900 (little about external events); Fournier, "Goethe und Napoleon" ("Jahrbuch des Wiener Goethevereins," 1896).

Addenda, 1910.—Driault, "La politique orientale de Napoléon, 1806-1808," Paris, 1904; Aulard, "Napoléon et l'instruction publique" ("La Révolution française," 1910); Geoffroy de Grandmaison, "L'Espagne et Napoléon, 1804-09," Paris, 1908; Connard, "La Constitution de Bayonne, 1808," Lyon, 1909.

CHAPTER XIV.—*For the Spanish campaign—vide* the "Correspondance," XVII, XVIII; Lecestre, "Lettres inédites"; Du Casse, "Les rois frères de Napoléon"; Toreno, "Aufstand, Krieg und Revolution in Spanien" (German edition in 5 vols., Leipzig, 36-38); Napier, "History of the War in the Peninsula," 1828; Jomini, "Guerre d'Espagne, 1808-1814"; "Extraits des souvenirs inédits," published by Lecomte, 18; also Foy, "Histoire de la guerre de la Péninsule sous Napoléon," 4 vols.; Guillon, "La guerre d'Espagne"; "The Composition and Organization of the British Forces in the Peninsula, 1808-1814" ("Engl. Hist. Review," 1902); Lecestre, "La guerre de la Peninsule, d'après la correspondance de Napoléon I" ("Revue des questions historiques, 1896); Balagny, "La campagne de Napoléon en Espagne," I, II, 1902; also, the Correspondence of Davoût; the Memoirs of Suchet, Jourdan, Fézensac, Gonneville, Ségur, Thiébault, Lejeune, and Coignet; Pouzerewsky, "La charge de cavalerie de Somo-Sierra," Paris, 1855.

For the expedition against Moore—vide "A Narrative of the Campaign of the British Army in Spain Commanded by Sir John Moore," London, 1809.

For the feeling in France—vide Thiers, who here made use of Cambecérès' "Mémoires"; also the Memoirs of Pasquier and Mollien, Metternich's dispatches; Madelin, "Fouché," II; Robinson, Wellington's Campaigns; and Moore's Campaign of Corunna, 1808-1810, London, 1904.

For the origin of the war with Austria—vide Metternich's "Nachgelassene Papiere," II (cf. Bailleu, "Memoirs of Metternich" in the "Historischen Zeitschrift," new series, Vol. VIII); Friedrich Stadion, "Berichte aus Bayern, 1807-1809" ("Archives of Austrian History," Vol. LXIII); Beer, "Zehn Jahre"; Wertheimer, II; Thiers; Bignon; Thibaudeau, VII; Sorel, VII.

For the attitude of Russia—vide Vandal, II; Tatistcheff; Schilder, "Geschichte Alexander I," II; Bernhardi, "Gesch. Ruszlands," II; Mazade, "Alexandre I et le Prince Czartoryski" (the latter's Correspondence in the 2nd vol. of the Memoirs); the Memoirs of Maistre; Danielson, "Finska kriget och Finlands Krigare, 1808-1809," Stockholm, 1898.

For the attitude of Prussia—vide Hassel, "Geschichte der preuszischen Politik seit 1807," I; Max Duncker's treatises "Preuszen während der französischen Okkupation," and "Eine Milliarde Kriegsentschädigung, welche Preuszen an Frankreich

CHAPTER XIV.—*Continued.*

gezahlt hat," in "Aus der Zeit Friedrichs des Groszen und Friedrich Wilhelm III"; also his "Friedrich Wilhelm III im Jahre, 1809" in his "Abhandlungen aus der neueren Geschichte"; Hinneburg, "Eine ungedruckte Replik Rankes" ("Researches in Brandenburg and Prussian History," V); Ranke, "Hardenberg und die Geschichte des preuszischen Staates von 1793-1813"; A. Stern, "Abhandlungen und Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der preuszischen Reformzeit" (I, the Fall of Baron von Stein and the Tugendbund; II, historical documents of the year 1809; III, the Mission of Colonel von Steigentesch to Königsberg); also his "L'origine du décret de proscription de N. contre Stein" ("Revue hist.," 1896); Cavaignac, "La Saisie de la lettre de Stein" (*Ibid.*); Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte im 19 Jahrhundert," I; Cavaignac, "La formation de la Prusse contemporaine"; Fournier, "Studien und Skizzen" (VIII, a History of the Tugendbund); Pertz, "Leben Steins"; Delbrück, "Gneisenau"; M. Lehmann, "Scharnhorst," II; also his "Stein," II; "Correspondence of Friedrich Wilhelm III" (published by Bailleu); Arneths, "Wessenberg," I; Thimme, "Zu den Erhebungsplänen der preuszischen Patrioten im Sommer, 1808" ("Historische Zeitschrift," Vol. LXXXVI); Boyen, "Erinnerungen," I; Meinecke, "Leben Boyens," I; Gaede, "Preuszens Stellung zur Kriegsfrage im Jahre 1809," Berlin, 1897 (also Bailleu, in the "Historische Zeitschrift," Vol. LXXXIV); A. Pick, "Aus der Zeit der Not, 1806-1815," Berlin, 1900; the rising in Hesse under Dörnberg ("Jahrbuch für die deutsche Armee und Marine," 1885); Bärsch, "Schill," 1860; Binder-Krieglstein, "Schill," 1902; A. Stern, "Gneisenaus Reise nach London, 1809" ("Historische Zeitschrift," Vol. LXXXV); and his "Einige Aktenstücke zur Geschichte Preuszens, 1809-1812" ("Researches in Brandenburg history," XIII); Martens, "Recueil des traités conclus par la Russie," Vol. VI; Heinrich v. Kleist, "Politische Schriften und andere Nachträge zu seinen Werken," by R. Köpke, 1862.

For the campaign in Bavaria and Austria—vide in addition to the works on military history repeatedly mentioned: (*a*) *French sources;* the "Correspondance de Napoléon I" and the supplements to it; Davoût, "Correspondance" (published by Mazade); Koch, "Mémoires de Masséna," Vol. VI; Lejeune, "Mémoires," Paris, 1895; Castellane, "Journal," Paris, 1895; Lasalle, "Cor-

CHAPTER XIV.—*Continued.*

respondance" (published by Robinet de Cléry), Paris, 1891; Oudinot, "Souvenirs" (published by Stiegler, 1894); Loewenstern, "Mémoires" (published by Weil), Paris, 1903, I; Cisternes, "Journal de marche du grenadier Pils," Paris, 1895; Mathieu Dumas, "Souvenirs"; Eugène Beauharnais, "Mémoires et correspondance" (published by Du Casse) IV; Ségur, "Histoire et mémoires," III; Marmont, "Mémoires," III; Rogniat, "Considérations sur l'art de guerre," Paris, 1816 (Rogniat was head of Lannes' engineer corps); Macdonald, "Mémoires" (published by Rousset, 1892); Gen. Poulin, "Souvenirs," Paris, 1895; Rapp, "Mémoires"; Comeau, "Souvenirs," Paris, 1900 (on the rapid marches of the French and their skill in taking up their positions instantly for battle, to be cautiously used); Chlopowski (one of Napoleon's orderlies), Memoirs and fragments (in the "Revue nouvelle" 1897, and in "Carnet historique" of 1901); Espinchal, "Souvenirs militaires" (published by Masson), 2 vols., Paris, 1901. Also Pelet, "Mémoires sur la guerre de 1809 en Allemagne," 4 vols., 1824; Cadet de Gassicourt, "Voyage en Autriche fait à la suite de l'armée française pendant la campagne de 1809," Paris, 1818; Saski, "Campagne de 1809 en Allemagne et en Autriche," Paris, 1899, 3 vols. (as far as the battle of Aspern); the works of Thoumas and Montebello on "Lannes," Paris, 1891 and 1900; Bonnal, "La manœuvre de Landshut, étude sur la strategie de Napoléon," Paris, 1905; Chelard, "Les armées françaises jugées par les habitants d'Autriche," Paris, 1893.

(*b*) *Austrian sources—vide* Angeli, "Erzherzog Karl als Feldherr," Vienna, 1897, IV; Ommen, "Die Kriegführung des Erzherzogs Karl," Berlin, 1900; The Letters of the Archduke are given by Fournier in the "Historische Zeitschrift," N. F., 22nd vol.; those of others by Wertheimer in his "Geschichte Österreichs und Ungarns," II, Stutterheim, "Der Krieg von 1809 zwischen Österreich und Frankreich" (up to the battle of Aspern in the French edition; the German contains only the Bavarian campaign); also: "Der Feldzug des Jahres 1809 in Suddeutschland" in Streffleur's "Österreichisch-militärischer Zeitschrift," 1862. As a continuation of Stutterheim *vide* Welden, "Der Krieg von 1809 zwischen Österreich und Frankreich vom Anfang Mai bis zum Friedensschlusz," 1872; Rühle von Lilienstern, "Reise mit der Armee," 1809; Binder von Krieglstein, "Ratisbon, 1809," Berlin, 1902 (the promised

CHAPTER XIV.—*Continued.*

sequel to the Campaign in Austria has not yet appeared); Bremen, "Die Tage von Regensburg" ("Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt," 1891); Mayerhoffer, "Österreichs Krieg mit Napoleon I, 1809," Vienna, 1904. (An accurate description of the war based on an exhaustive examination of the Austrian Archives is desirable.)

For details of the battle of Aspern—vide Mayer von Heldensfeld in the "Europ. Annalen," 1810; Schels, "Die Schlacht bei Aspern am 21 und 22 Mai, 1809" (in Streffleur's "Zeitschrift," 1843); Reinländer, "Taktische Beurteilung von gröszeren Schlachten," Vienna, 1872; Strobl, "Aspern und Wagram," Vienna, 1897; Smekal, "Die Schlacht bei Aspern und Eszlingen," Vienna, 1899; Pfalz, "Die Marchfeldschlachten von Aspern und Deutsch-Wagram," 2nd edition, Korneuburg, 1900; Menge, "Die Schlacht bei Aspern," Berlin, 1901. The dispatches of the commanders of the corps have been published by Kirchhammer in the "Fremdenblatt," 1902, *v.* 148; Grünne, "Relation von der Schlacht bei Aspern auf dem Marchfelde".

For subsequent events—vide Angeli, "Wagram, Novelle zur Geschichte des Krieges von 1809" ("Communications of the K. K. War Archives," 1881); Varnhagen, "Die Schlacht bei Wagram," in his Memoirs; Zwiedineck, "Deutsche Geschichte seit 1806," I; his "Erzherzog Johann von Österreich im Feldzuge 1809," Leipzig, 1892. (Cf. also Simon, "Die Verspätung des Erzherzogs Johann bei Wagram" Diss. Berlin, 1899); A. v. P., "Die Lobau im Jahre, 1809" ("Streffleur's militärische Zeitschrift," III); Erzherzog Johann, "Das Heer von Innerösterreich"; Friedr. v. Gentz, "Tagebücher," 1st vol.; Radetsky's Memoirs ("Communications from the K. K. War Archives, 1887); his "Denkschrift über die österreichische Armee nach der Schlacht bei Wagram" ("Jahrgang," 1884), and the valuable report of an Austrian officer on "Die Armee Napoleon I im Jahre 1809 mit vergleichenden Rückblicken auf das österreichische Heer" ("Jahrgang," 1881). From the papers left by Archduke John, Krones has communicated some interesting details in "Zur Geschichte Österreichs im Zeitalter der französischen Kriege". (Compare Fournier's discussion in the "Historische Zeitschrift," 1887.)

For the insurrection in the Tyrol—vide Egger, "Geschichte Tirols" III; Rapp, "Tirol, 1809"; Schmölzer, "Andreas Hofer und seine Kampfgenossen," Innsbruck, 1900; Heigel, "Andreas Hofer"

CHAPTER XIV.—*Continued.*

("Neue historische Vorträge und Aufsätze," Münich, 1883); Heilmann, "Der Feldzug in Tirol, im Salzburgischen und an der bayrischen Südgrenze" ("Jahrbuch fur die deutsche Armee und Marine," 1888, 1893); E. Richter, "Der Krieg in Tirol, 1809" ("Zeitschrift des deutschen und österreichischen Alpenvereins," 1875); Maretich, "Die zweite und dritte Iselschlacht," 1895.

For the campaign in Poland—vide Soltyk, "Relation des opérations de l'armée aux ordres de Pce Poniatowski pendant la campagne de 1809 en Pologne," Paris, 1841.

For the march of the Duke of Brunswick—vide Kortzfleisch, "Des Herzogs von Braunschweig Zug durch Norddeutschland, 1809" (supplement to the "Militär-Wochenblatt," 1894).

For the Peace negotiations—vide in addition to the "Correspondance" XIX, and Lecestre I, the "Précis de la marche des négociations qui ont amené le traité de Vienne," written by Wessenberg in "Klinkowström"; "Aus der alten Registratur der Staatskanzlei"; Gentz, "Tagebücher," I; and his letters to Bubna given in Fournier, "Gentz und der Friede von Schönbrunn" ("Deutsche Rundschau," 1886); Krones, "Zur Geschichte Österreichs, etc."; Fournier's treatise in the "Historische Zeitschrift"; Metternich's "Nachgelassene Papiere," II (the memoirs in the 1st vol. are quite unreliable; cf. Bailleu in the "Historische Zeitschrift," Vol. LVIII). The private correspondence of Prince John Leichtenstein was burnt after his death. His biography is being written. Thiers, XI, and Bignon, VIII, have made use of Champagny's notes. Cf. also Beer, "Zehn Jahre Österreichischer Politik"; Wertheimer, "Geschichte Österreichs und Ungarns II"; Demelitsch, "Metternich," I; Arneth, "Wessenberg," I; Sorel, VII; Vandal, "Napoléon et Alexandre I," II; Duncker, "Abhandlungen aus der neueren Geschichte"; A. Stern, "Abhandlungen und Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der preuszischen Reformzeit"; Thimme, "Innere Zustände des Kurfürstentumes Hannover, 1806-1813"; Bailleu, "Briefwechsel Friedrich Wilhelm III mit Alexander"; A. Stern, "Briefe Blüchers, 1809" ("Deutsche Rundschau," 1900); Gaede, "Preuszens Stellung zur Kriegsfrage, 1809". The records of the Altenburg Conference have been published by Welschinger. Floret's Journal, hitherto unpublished, has been used by Demelitsch. *Vide* also; Wimpfen; "Über den Waffenstillstand von Znaim" (anonymous, 1809); Sauerhering, "Die Entstehung des Friedens

CHAPTER XIV.—*Continued.*

zu Schönbrunn" (Diss.); Funk, "Bericht über eine Audienz bei Napoleon in Wien, 1809" ("Archives of Saxon History," N. F., Vol. IV (Napoleon therein talks of apportioning part of Northern Bohemia to Saxony); Wertheimer, "Zur Geschichte Wiens, 1809" ("Archives of Austrian History," Vol. LXXIV).

For Staps—vide "Fr. Staps, Erschossen zŭ Schönbrunn bei Wien auf Napoleons Befehl im Oktober, 1809" (a biography compiled from the papers left by his father); also Borkowsky, "Das Schönbrunner Attentat, 1809" ("Grenzboten," 1898); the Memoirs of Rapp and the notes of Sismondi in the "Revue Historique," IX, where Staps is said to have been pardoned and to have been kept prisoner.

For the text of the treaties for this period vide De Clercq, II, with the supplements in Demelitsch, I.

For Napoleon and Hungary—vide the Memoirs of Eugène Beauharnais, Broglie, I, und Villemain, "Souvenirs" (from Narbonne's recollections); Wertheimer, "Beziehungen Napoleons zu Ungarn" ("Ungarische Revue," 1883); and A. Becker, "Napoleon und Ungarn, 1809" ("Progr.," 1899).

For the relations of Napoleon with Russia and Austria after the peace Vandal, II, is the authoritative work, although one need not share his view that the Emperor was in earnest about the Russian marriage. Moreover he speaks elsewhere of a "double game". *Vide* P. Bertrand, "Projet de mariage de Napoléon I avec la grande-duchesse de Russie" (the correspondence of Champagny with Caulaincourt in "Le Correspondant," 1890) and Sorel, VII.

For the divorce there is abundance of literature from which the following may be singled out: Welschinger, "Le divorce de Napoléon"; Masson, "Josephine répudiée"; Duhr, "Ehescheidung und zweite Heirat Napoleons" ("Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie," 1888); also his "Napoleons Ehescheidung im Lichte der neuesten Aktenstücke" ("Stimmen aus Maria Laach," 38th vol.); Schling, "Die Ehescheidung Napoleons I" ("Zeitschrift für Kirchenrecht," Vol. XX); Fleiner, "Die Ehescheidung Napoleons," Leipzig, 1893; Schnitzer, "Katholisches Eherecht," 5th edition, 1898 (appendix). Also the Memoirs of Bausset; Ménéval, II; Pasquier, I; Beugnot; Pacca; Consalvi; Lyonnet, "Le cardinal Fesch," II; D'Haussonville, "L'église romaine et le premier Empire," III; Heigel, "Die Ehescheidung Napoleons und Josephines" in his "Geschichtliche Bilder und Skizzen," 1897.

CHAPTER XIV.—*Continued.*

In the "Revue Napoléonienne" of the years 1902 and 1903 a controversy began between Welschingert and P. Dodun about the indissolubility of the marriage of 1796, the legality or otherwise of the proceedings of 1810, and the attitude of Cardinal Fesch. The controversy has not yet ended.

For the Austrian marriage—vide Helfert, "Maria Luise"; "Correspondance de M. Louise, 1799-1847"; "Letters intimes," Vienna, 1887 (there are letters to the Countesses Colloredo and Crenneville); Metternich's "Nachgelassene Papiere," II; his lettres to other diplomatists in Hormayr's "Lebensbildern aus dem Befreiungskriege"; Ernouf, "Maret"; Montgelas' "Denkwürdigkeiten"; Imbert de St. Amand, "Les beaux jours de Marie Louise"; Vandal, "Lettres de Berthier sur le mariage de Napoléon avec M. Luise" ("Carnet historique," 1898); Wertheimer, "Die Heirat der Erzherzogin M. Luise" ("Archives of Austrian History," Vol. LXIV; and his "Der Herzog von Reichstadt"; A. Becker, "Der Plan der zweiten Heirat Napoleons ("Transactions of the Institute for Historical Research in Austria," Vol. XIX); Demelitsch, "Metternich," I; Percier et Fontaine, "Description des cérémonies et des fêtes qui ont en lieu pour le mariage de S. M. l'Empereur avec S. A. I. Madame l'Archiduchesse Marie Luise," Paris, 1810; Les fêtes du mariage de Napoléon et de M. Louise" in the "Carnet historique," 1902. *Vide* also Napoleon's remarks on Josephine and Marie Louise in various passages of Gourgaud's "Journal inédit".

Addenda 1910.—Fust, "Politik oder Strategie," Vienna, 1909; Wolff D. Eilmarsch Wrede's "Von Linz und Wagram" ("Mitteilungen d. Institut f. Geschichtsforchung," Wien, 1909; "Krieg, 1809," published by Austrian military archives, 5 vols., 1909. Hirn, "Tirols Erhebung, 1809," Innsbrück, 1909; Petre, "Napoleon and the Archduke Charles in 1809," London, 1908; Fust, "Der Friede von Schönbrunn," Vienna, 1908; Fournier, "Friedr. Gentz un der Friede von Schönbrunn, Neue Briefe" ("Deutsche Rundschau," 1910); Nesselrode, "Lettres et papiers," I, Paris, 1905; Erzherzog Johann's "Feldzugserzählung v. 1809" (published by Austrian Military Archives, 1909); Fournier, "Zur Heirat Napoleons I und M. Louise" ("Deutsche Revue," 1910);

CHAPTER XIV.—*Continued.*

Welschinger, "Le Cardinal Fesch et le divorce de Napoléon" ("Revue Napoléonienne," 1902, with replies to the same by P. Dodun).

CHAPTER XV.—*For the negotiations with the Pope and the Council of* 1811—*vide* Haussonville, "L'église romaine et le premier Empire," Vols. III, IV, authoritative, and supplemented from documents from the Parisian National Archives; Welschinger, "Le Pape et l'Empereur, 1804-1815," Paris, 1905; also Artaud, "Pie VII," II; Majol de Lupé, "Un pape prisonnier," in the "Correspondant" of 1887; H. Chotard, "Le Pape Pie VII à Savone, 1887" (from the correspondence of General Berthier with Borghese, and the Memoirs of Lebzeltern); De Pradt, "Les quatre Concordats" (unreliable; cf. Napoleon's remarks in the "Correspondance," XXX); the Memoirs of Talleyrand, II; Pacca, II; Rance-Bourray, "Mémoire inédit de Consalvi sur le concile de 1811" ("Université Catholique," XIV); Ricard, "Le concile nationale de 1811"; his "Correspondance diplomatique et mémoires inédits du Cardinal Maury," II; Gosselin, "Vie de M. Emery"; Grandmaison, "Napoléon et les cardinaux noirs"; Aulard, "Napoléon et le clergé hollandais" ("La Révolution française," 1902); Dudon, "Napoléon et les congrégations" ("Etudes de la Comp. Jésus," 1901); Madelin, "La domination française à Rome, 1809 à 1813" ("Revue des deux mondes," 1905); also his, "La Rome de Napoléon," Paris, 1906; Metternich, "Nachgelassene Papiere," II; Beer, "Zur Sendung Metternichs nach Paris, 1810" ("Mitth. d. Inst. f. öst. Geschich.," XVI); Demelitsch, "Metternich," I (from writings left by Lebzeltern).

For the relations with Spain—vide, in addition to the letters of Napoleon, the Memoirs of Joseph; Miot de Melito; Masséna, VII; Jourdan; Suchet; Thiébault, IV; Reiset, II; Delagrave (Paris, 1902); Gonneville; Lejeune, II; Marbot (to be treated with caution); Fririon, "Journal historique de la campagne de Portugal"; Foy, "Histoire de la guerre de la Péninsule" (also Girod de l'Ain, "Le Général Foy"); "Azanza's Justification" (French, Paris, 1815); Wellington's dispatches (ed. Gurwood); Baumgarten, "Geschichte Spaniens," I; Thiers, "Consulat et Empire, XII; Sorel, VII; Masson, "Napoléon et sa famille," VI; Maxwell,

CHAPTER XV.—*Continued.*

"Wellington"; Pertz, "Die politische Bedeutung des Jahres, 1810" ("Treatise of the Berlin Academy of Sciences," 1861, in which the negotiations with Azanza are given from Stein's Papers); Latino-Coelho, "Hist. polit. e militar de Portugal"; Atkinson, "The Composition and Organisation of the British Forces in the Peninsula" ("Eng. Hist. Review," 1902); Andrews, "Masséna's Lines of March in Portugal, etc." ("Eng. Hist. Review," 1901); Butler, "Wellington's Operations in the Peninsula, 1808-1814," London, 1904, 2 vols.; Costa de Serda, "Opérations des troupes allemandes en Espagne de 1808 à 1813," Paris, 1874.

For the Continental System and Napoleon's industrial policy—vide Duvergier, "Collection des lois," Vol. XVI; the "Correspondance," XXI; Kiesselbach, "Die Kontinentalsperre in ihrer ökonpolit. Bedeutung, 1850"; Art. "Kontinentalsperre," by Lexis in Conrad's "Dictionary of State Sciences"; Clément, "Histoire du Système protecteur en France," Paris, 1854 (somewhat faulty); Lumbroso, "Napoleone e l'Inghilterra" (with a bibliography); Rocke, "Die Kontinentalsperre und ihre Einwirkungen auf die französische Industrie" (Diss., 1894); P. Darmstädter, "Studien zur napoleonischen Wirtschaftspolitik" ("Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschrifte," 1904, 1905), especially valuable for its researches on the crisis in 1810; Ch. Schmidt, "L'industrie dans le Grand-Duché de Berg en 1810" ("Revue d'histoire moderne," 1904, from the notes of Beugnot before the crisis); also his "Le Grand-Duché de Berg," 1905; Hitzigrat, "Hamburg und die Kontinentalsperre," Hamburg, 1900; Fisher, "Studies"; Servières, "L'annexion et l'organisation des départements hanséatiques, 1810" ("La Grande Revue," 1902); Mollien, "Mémoires," III (the most valuable authority for financial matters); D'Ivernois, "Napoléon administrateur et financier," London, 1812 (polemical pamphlet with tables of statistics); Rupelle, "Les finances de la guerre 1796 à 1815" ("Annales de l'école politique," 1892); the Memoirs of Pasquier, Miot, Chaptal; Rose, "Napoleon and British Commerce" (in "Napoleonic Studies," 1904).

For the relations with Holland—vide Jorissen, "Napoléon I. et le roi de Hollande," 1868; F. Rocquain, "Napoléon et le roi Louis," 1875; Louis Bonaparte, "Documents historiques et réflexions sur le gouvernement de la Hollande 1820," Vol. III (its authenticity, denied by Napoleon in his will, has been confirmed by

CHAPTER XV.—*Continued.*

careful examination); Du Casse, "Les rois frères de Napoleon I" (Appendix); Wichers, "De Regeering van Koning Lodewijk Napoleon, 1806-1810," Utrecht, 1892.

For the secret negotiations with England—vide Coquelle, "Napoléon et l'Angleterre"; Madelin, "Fouché," II; and the "Memoirs of Ouvrard," Paris, 1827.

For the German North Sea States—vide Hauszer, "Deutsche Geschichte," III; the "Correspondance" Vol. XXII; Havemann, "Das Kurfürstentum Hannover unter zehnjähriger Fremdherrschaft, 1803-1813"; Mönckeberg, "Hamburg unter dem Drucke der Franzosen, 1806-1814"; Wohlwill, "Die Verbindung zwischen Elbe und Rhein durch Kanäle und Landstraszen nach den Projekten Napoleon I" (Transactions of the Hamburg Historical Society, 1884, IV); Meyer, "Erinnerungen an Hannover und Hamburg aus den Jahren, 1803-1813".

For the relations with Denmark and Sweden—vide Garden, "Histoire générale des Traités," Vol. IX; Lefebvre, "Histoire des Cabinets de l'Europe," V; Thiers, XII; Vandal, II; Sbornik, XXI; Swederus, "Schwedens Politik und Kriege, 1808-1814"; A. W. Schlegel, "Über das Kontinentalsystem und den Einflusz desselben auf Schweden, 1813"; (Staël's article mentioned by Lumbroso, "Le système Continental et ses rapports avec la Suède," which also appeared in the year 1813, is probably identical with that of Schlegel); Wetterstedt's "Erinnerungen" (published by Forsell in the works of the Stockholm Academy, 1886); Schinkel, "Minnen ur Sveriges nyare historia," Upsala, 1880 (containing letters from the Swedish Ambassador from Paris in 1810, unfortunately written in Swedish); Suremain, "Mémoires," Paris, 1902; Ahnfelt, "La diplomatie russe à Stockholm en 1810" ("Revue historique," 1888, XXXVII); Pingaud, "Bernadotte, Napoléon et les Bourbons; Hochschild, "Désirée, reine de Suède".

For Naples—vide Helfert, "Königen Karoline von Neapel und Sizilien, 1878" (where the earlier works are also quoted); also his "M. Karolina von Österreich"; "Anklagen und Verteidigung," 1884; O. Browning, "Caroline of Naples" (in the "English Historical Review," 1887, No. 6, founded on Bentinck's dispatches); Strongoli, "Memorie intorno alla storia dei regno di Napoli, 1805-1813"; Devernois, "Mémoires"; Masson, "Napoléon et sa famille," VI; Chavanon et Saint-Yves, "Joach. Murat," Paris,

CHAPTER XV.—*Continued.*

1905 ; Bonnefons, " Marie Caroline, Reine des Deux-Siciles," Paris, 1905 (inadequate).

For the friction with Russia—vide the " Correspondance," Vols. XXI to XXIII, and the other collections of letters ; the dispatches of Kurakin and Tschernischeff in the " Sbornik," XXXI (also Harnack, " Zur Geschichte und Vorgeschichte des Krieges von 1812 " in the " Historische Zeitschrift," 1889) ; Martens, " Recueil des traités conclus par la Russie," Vols. III and VII ; Nesselrode, " Lettres et papiers," III, Paris, 1904 ; Letters to Speranski and others ; the Memoirs of Ségur, IV, Villemain, I, Czartoryski, II, Oginski, III, Kozmian (Polish), the Countess Edling, the Countess Choiseuil-Gouffier ; Bignon, " Souvenirs d'un diplomate " ; Metternich, " Nachgelassene Papiere " ; Bernhardi, " Tolls Denkwürdigkeiten " ; Bray's " Denkwürdigkeiten," 1901 ; Mordwinows " Archives," St. Petersburg, 1901 (Russian) ; Vandal, III ; Sorel, VII ; Ernouf, " Maret " ; Tatistcheff, " Alexandre et Napoléon " ; Schilder, " Alexander I," III ; Schiemann, " Nikolaus I," I ; Wassiltschikow, " Les Razoumowsky (French edition), Vol. IV ; Bernhardi, " Geschichte Ruszlands," II ; Tegnér, " Gust. Mauritz Armfelt," 3rd vol. ; Pingaud, " Un agent secret " (D'Antraigues) ; Rüther, " Napoleon und Polen," Pt. II ; Skarbek, " Geschichte des Herzogstums, Warschau, Posen, 1876 " (2nd ed. Polish) ; Finkel, " Das Groszherzogtum Warschau " (in " Przewodnik naukovy," 1896) ; Ghika, " La France et les principautés danubiennes, 1789-1815 " (" Annales de l'école politique," 1896).

For the Russian campaigns in 1811 *and* 1812*—vide* the first volumes of the History of the Campaign of 1812 (French edition) published by the Russian General Staff.

For the French armaments—vide Margueron, " Campagne de Russie," I-III. Cf. also Bogdanowitsch, " Geschichte des Feldzuges im Jahre 1812 " ; Jähns, " Das französische Heer von der Revolution bis zur Gegenwart " ; Liebert, " Die Rüstungen Napoleons für den Feldzug, 1812 " (supplement to the " Militär-Wochenblatt," 1888) ; Lettow-Vorbeck, " Die französische Konscription unter Napoleon I " (*ibid.* 1892) ; Leymarie, " La conscription imperiale " (" La Nouvelle Revue," 1901) ; Schmeisser, " Die Refraktärregimenter unter Napoleon I " (" Supplement to the Militär-Wochenblatt," 1890) also, " Die kroatischen, illyrischen und dalmatinischen Kontingente in der Armee des österreichischen Kaiserreiches "

CHAPTER XV.—*Continued.*

("Programm," 1888); Boppe, "La Croatie Militaire, 1809-1813," Paris, 1900.

For home affairs—vide the "Correspondance" and also Lecéstre's "Collection," II; and Thiers, XIII; Forneron, "Histoire générale des émigrés"; Madelin, "Fouché"; Taine, "Le régime moderne," I; Grouchy, "Complots contre l'empereur, 1810, 1811" ("Nouvelle revue rétrosp." 1898); Morvan, "Le soldat impérial," II; Barral, "Histoire des sciences sous Napoléon Bonaparte," Paris, 1889 (a fine attempt inadequately realized); Welschinger, "La censure sous le premier Empire"; also his "La direction générale de l'imprimerie et de la librairie" (in the Chronicle "Le Livre," 1887 and 1890); Ch. Schmidt, "La Réforme de l'Université impériale en 1811," Paris, 1905; Véron, "Mémoires d'un bourgeois de Paris," I; Fievée, "Correspondance et relations avec Bonaparte," III, 1809, to March, 1813; the Memoirs of Barante, I, Bourgoing, Pasquier, I, Mollien, III, and Savary.

For the relations with the Confederation of the Rhine—vide Perthes, "Politische Zustände und Personen in Deutschland zur Zeit der französischen Herrschaft," Vol. II; Winkopp, "Der Rheinische Bund," Jahrgang 1810-1812; Memoirs and Correspondence of King Jerome; Du Casse, "Les rois frères de Napoléon"; Goecke, "Das Königreich Westfalen"; Lehsten-Dingelstädt, "Erinnerungen eines westfälischen Pagen," Berlin, 1905; Charles Schmidt, "Le Grand-Duché de Berg"; Goecke, "Das Groszherzogtum Berg"; Beaulieu-Marconnay, "Karl v. Dalberg und seine Zeit"; Darmstaedter, "Das Groszherzogtum Frankfurt," Frankf., 1901; (for Dalberg's Memoir in 1811 mentioned in the text cf. the August number, 1903, of the magazine "Vom Rhein"); Bernays, "Schicksale des Groszherzogtums" Frankfurt, 1882; Schloszberger, "Politische und militärische Korrespondenz Friedrichs von Würtemberg mit Kaiser Napoleon I, 1805-1813," 1889; also his "Briefwechsel der Königin Katharina von Westfalen," 1887; Montgelas, "Denkwürdigkeiten"; "La Bavière en 1812 et 1813" ("Revue Contemporaine," 1869); Wohlwill, "Weltbürgertum und Vaterlandsliebe der Schwaben," 1875.

For the alliance with Prussia and Austria—vide Häusser, III; Ranke, "Hardenberg" ("SS. WW.," 48); Duncker, "Preuszen während der französischen Okkupation" (the time of Frederick the Great and Fred. William III), corrected on various points by

CHAPTER XV.—*Continued.*

Lehmann; Scharnhorst, II; Delbrück, "Gneisenau," I; A. Stern, "Abhandlungen und Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der preuszischen Reformzeit, 1807-1813"; Bailleu, "Briefwechsel zwischen Friedr. Wilhelm III, mit Alexander I"; also Thimme, "Zur Geschichte Friedrich Wilhelms III und der Krisis von 1811"; Boyen's "Erinnerungen" (published by Nippold, II); Ernst, "Denkwürdigkeiten von Amalie und Heinrich von Beguelin"; Ompteda, "Politischer Nachlasz"; Meinecke, "Boyen," I; Gebhardt, "Wilh. von Humboldt als Staatsmann," I; Goldschmidt, "Kunth"; Fournier, "Stein und Gruner," "Zur Vorgeschichte der Befreiungskriege" ("Deutsche Rundschau," 1887); Cavaignac, "La formation de la Prusse contemporaine," II; Wachter, "Berichte des Grafen Beugnot über die Stimmung in Preuszen" ("Researches in Brandenburg and Prussian History," IX); also Martens, "Recueil des traités conclus par la Russie," III, VII; Bignon, "Histoire de France," X; Metternich, "Nachgelassene Papiere," II; Binder von Krieglstein, "Précis des transactions du Cabinet de Vienne de 1809 à 1816" ("Steiermärk. Geschichtsblätter," 1884); Ernouf, "Maret"; Oncken, "Österreich und Preuszen in Befreiungskriege," II; Demelitsch, "Metternich," I; Beer, "Die orientalische Politik Österreichs".

For the stay in Dresden—vide Vandal, III; the Journal of Castellane; the Memoirs of Bausset (II), Count Senfft-Pilsach, Méneval (II), Mme. Durand; the Court journal in the "Nouvelle revue rétrospective," 1900; the diary of Queen Caroline ("Revue hist.," Vol. XXXVI.); Guglia, "Kaiserin Maria Ludovica"; Welck, "Napoleons Aufenthalt in Dresden, 1812" ("New Archives of Saxon History," XX).

Addenda, 1910.—Schiemann, "Nikolaus," I; E. v. Meier, "Französische Einflüsse auf die Staats und Rechtsentwicklung Preussens," 2 vols., 1906; Engel, "Napoleons wirtschaftlicher Kampf mit England," 1908; Caumont la Force, "Lebrun, gouverneur de Hollande, 1810-1812," Paris, 1907; Coquelle, "La mission d'Alquier à Stockholm, 1810-1811" ("Rev. d'hist. dipl.," 1909): Bosq, "La conspiration Charabot".

CHAPTER XVI.—*For the Russian campaign* the literature is so extensive that only the more important works can be men-

CHAPTER XVI.—*Continued.*

tioned here. In addition to Vol. XXIV of the Correspondence of Napoleon, *vide* the memoirs of his generals, the notes of the Russian generals, the communications of German and French officers; also the official Russian sources of information which form the basis of the more recent military histories. The great part of the official French documents may have been lost on the retreat.

I. *Memoirs and documents*: (*a*) Those on the French side published by the general staff; Margueron, "Campagne de Russie," Pt. I, Paris, 1899; a collection of all the useful papers regarding the preparations for the campaign. Of the seven volumes of which it will consist, three so far have appeared—up to January 31st, 1812; Fabry, "Campagne de Russie," Pt. II, "Opérations Militaires," a continuation of the collection for the period from June 24th, 1812, onwards. Up to the present four volumes and a supplement reaching to the end of August, 1812, have been published. Murat's dispatches after the Emperor's departure in December are given in "Souvenirs et Mémoires," 1901. A supplement to the Imperial "Correspondance" by Grouchy, "Lettres, ordres, et décrets, 1812-1814" (not included in the "Correspondance"), Paris, 1897, contains nothing of importance for 1812. *Vide* also Du Casse, "Mémoires du Prince Eugène;" the Memoirs of Rapp, S. Cyr, Dumas, Ségur (in the 4th and 5th vols. of "Histoire et Mémoires"), Bausset, Constant; Gourgaud, "Napoléon et la Grande Armée en Russie ou examen critique de l'ouvrage de Ségur"; Fain, "Manuscrit de 1812"; Villemain, "Souvenirs contemporaines," I (from the Memoirs of Count Narbonne); Davoût, "Correspondance" (ed. Mazade), III; Blocqueville, "Le maréchal Davoût," III (Letters from him to his wife); the memoirs of Oudinot, Macdonald, Vandammes, Surgeon Bourgeois (1814); Peyrusse, "Mémorial et Archives"; also his "Lettres inédites" ("Revue politique et litéraire," 1894); Castellane, "Journal," I (noted down daily till Dec. 6th); Fézensac, "Souvenirs militaires"; Dutheillet de Lamothe, "Mémoires," Paris, 1899; Roy, "Les Français en Russie;" "Souvenirs," Tours, 1891; Séruzier, "Mémoires" (1st ed., 1823); Marbot, "Mémoires," III; Lejeune, "Souvenirs d'un officier de l'Empire"; Pion des Loches, "Mes Campagnes"; Girod, "Dix ans de mes souvenirs militaires, 1805 à 1815"; Berthezène, "Souvenirs"; Roguet, "Mémoires" (Old Guard); Faure, "Souvenirs du Nord" (Doctor in Davoût's Corps); Lemoine, "Sou-

CHAPTER XVI.—*Continued.*

venirs anecdotiques"; Sauvage, "Relations de la campagne de Russie"; Duverger, "Mes aventures dans la campagne de Russie"; Mailly-Nesle, "Mon journal pendant la campagne de Russie". Cf., Bertin, "La campagne de 1812 d'après des témoins oculaires," Paris, 1895 (which includes Mailly-Nesle, Duverger, and others). *Vide* also Beauchamp, "Mémoires secret et inédits," Vol. II; Denniée, "Itinéraire de l'Empereur Napoléon pendant la campagne de 1812"; Coignet (an officer in this campaign), "Cahiers;" Léher, "Lettre d'un capitaine de cuirassiers sur la campagne de Russie," Paris, 1885; Sergeant Bourgogne, "Mémoires, 1812, 1813," Paris, 1898; Vionnet, "Campagnes de Russie et de Saxe," "Souvenirs," Paris, 1899; Grenadier Pils, "Journal de Marche, 1804-1814" (éd. Cisternes); Méjan, "Lettres sur la campagne de Russie" ("Misc. napol." II, of little value); Jolly, "Souvenirs sur la campagne de Moscou" ("Revue hebdom.," 1903); D. de Gelder, "Mémoires," Paris, 1900; Gamiers, "De Paris à Vilna, 1812, d'après la correspondance d'un aidemajor" ("Revue des questions hist.," 1895); Vaudoncourt, "Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la guerre entre la France et la Russie en 1812," London, 1815; Labaume, "Relation circonstantiée de la campagne de Russie en 1812"; Larrey, "Mémoires de chirurgie militaire"; Colombe, "Mémoires reédits," Paris, 1896; Puibusque, "Lettres sur la guerre de Russie"; Sérang, "Les prisonniers français en Russie" (éd. Puibusque," 1836).

(*b*) *From the Allies' side—vide* v. Loszberg, "Briefe in die Heimat geschrieben während des Feldzuges, 1812, in Ruszland," Cassel, 1844; Wolzogen, "Memoirs of General von Wolzogen," Leipzig, 1851; Pönitz, "Militärische Briefe eines Verstorbenen"; Roos, "Ein Jahr aus meinem Leben"; Linsingen, "Auszug aus seinem Tagebuch, 1812" (Supplement to the "Mil.-Wochenblatt," 1894); v. Meerheimb, "Erlebnisse eines Veteranen der groszen Armee während des Feldzuges in Ruszland im Jahre 1812"; Martens, "Vor 50 Jahren," Stuttgart, 1862; Goethe, "Aus dem Leben eines Sächsischen Husaren"; Tiedemann, "Tagebuch und Briefwechsel, 1812" ("Jahrbücher für die deutsche Armee und Marine," Vol. XXIV); Funck, "Erinnerungen aus dem Feldzug des sächsischen Korps, 1812"; Legler, "Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem russischen Feldzuge"; Leisnig, "Erinnerungen eines sächsischen Dragoneroffiziers"; Rotenhan, "Denkwürdigkeiten eines württembergischen Offiziers, 1813," 3rd edition, Münich, 1900 (only as far as

CHAPTER XVI.—*Continued.*

Moscow); Thurn-Taxis, "Tagebuch eines Offiziers im Generalstab der bayrischen Armee, 1812" ("Mitth. d. k. u. k. Kriegsarchiv," 1893); O. Redlich, "Tagebuch des Leutnants Vossen, vornehmlich über den Krieg in Ruszland, 1812," Marburg, 1892; Haars, "Ein Braunschweiger in russischen Feldzug"; "Memoirs," new edition by Hänselmann, 1897; Markgraf Wilhelm von Baden, "Denkwürdigkeiten," Karlsruhe, 1864; Graf F. W. v. Bismarck, "Aufzeichnungen," 2nd ed. Karlsruhe, 1850; Tagebuch, "Jos. Steinmüllers" (published by K. Wild), 1904; "Röder von Bomsdorf, Mitteilungen aus dem russischen Feldzuge"; Soltyk, "Napoléon en Russie, 1812"; Albrecht Adam, "Aus dem Leben eines Schlachtenmalers im Hauptquartier Eugens bis Moskau"; Faber du Faure, "Blätter aus meinem Portefeuille im Laufe des Feldzuges von 1812 in Ruszland an Ort und Stelle gezeichnet" (1st ed., Stuttgart, 1831, French ed., Paris, 1896).

(*c*) *From the Russian side.* In the Transactions of the Russian Historical Society of 1874 and 1875, Liprandi in his "Literary Catalogue of the National War," mentions over 400 Russian publications. These have been supplemented by Dubrawin in the memorandum of the Russian Academy of 1883. The Russian General Staff has also published the official documents of the war; of these, two volumes translated into French have appeared—down to the end of 1810. Cf. especially: Herzog Eugen von Württemberg, "Memoirs," 1862; Helldorf, "Aus dem Leben des Prinzen Eugen von Würtemberg"; Bernhardi, "Denkwürdigkeiten des Generals Toll," Vols. I and II; Tschitschagoff, "Mémoires inédits," Berlin, 1855; larger edition, Paris, 1862; in "Russkaja Starina," 1886; (*vide* also, Harnack, "Zur Vorgeschichte und Geschichte des Krieges von 1812," in the "Historische Zeitschrift," Vols. LXI and LXII); Mitarewesky, "Erinnerungen von 1812," Moskow, 1871 (Russian); Langeron, "Mémoires, 1812-1814," published by L. G. Fabry, Paris, 1902; Loewenstern, "Mémoires," éd. Weil, Paris, 1903. (An older German edition in shorter form was published by Smitt under the title "Denkwürdigkeiten eines Livländers," Leipzig and Heidelberg, 1858, in 2 vols.) Cf. Bilbassow, "Memoiren von Zeitgenossen über 1812" ("Hist. Monographien," Vol. II, Russian); Boris Galitzyn, "Souvenirs d'un officier russe, 1812, 1813, 1814," St. Petersburg, 1849; Comtesse Edling, "Mémoires," Moscow, 1888. The

CHAPTER XVI.—*Continued.*

"Russian Archives" from 1863 to 1892, and the "Russkaja Starina" from 1870 till 1890, contain numerous communications from eye-witnesses, letters by Rostoppschin, memoirs by contemporaries and such like. Bogdanowitsch has made use of the unpublished journals of many Russian Generals. Cf. also Charkiewitsch, "1812 in the diaries, notes and memoirs of contemporaries," Wilna, 1900 (Russian). A good bibliographic review is given in Lavisse and Rambaud, "Histoire générale," IX, 1809-1812; Wilson, "Narrative of events during the invasion of Russia," London, 1860, is unreliable.

II. *For historical narratives of the campaign—vide* Chambray, "Histoire de l'expédition de Russie," 3 vols. (the later editions are especially good), also the Russian historical works by Buturlin, Michailowsky-Danilewski, Smitt, all of them surpassed by Bogdanowitsch's comprehensive work, "Geschichte des Feldzuges im Jahre 1812," 3 vols., 1861-1863, compiled from authentic information from the Russian Archives of military topography, but without making use of Napoleon's Correspondence as Osten-Sacken, had done with advantage in his "Der Feldzug von 1812," Berlin, 1901. *Vide* also Charkiewitsch, "Der Krieg von 1812" (from the Niemen to Smolensk), Bucharest, 1901 (Russian); Skugarewski, "Das Jahr 1812," 1898 (Russian); Thiers, XIII and XIV; Schilder, "Alexander I," Vol. III; Jomini, "Précis politique et militaire des campagnes de 1812 à 1814"; Clausewitz, "Hinterlassene Werke," VII; Yorck, "Napoleon als Feldherr," II; Labeaudorière, "La campagne de Russie de 1812," Paris, 1902 (too short and quite inadequate); better, George, "Napoleon's Invasion of Russia," London, 1899; Leo Tolstoi, "Napoléon et la Campagne de Russie" (French by Delines, Paris, 1888) is a brilliant but unsuccessful attempt to combine history and fiction.

For the conditions in the French army—vide Morvan, "Le soldat impérial," II; Martinien, "Tableau par corps et par batailles des officiers tués et blessés pendant les guerres de l'Empire," Paris, 1899.

For special points (*a*) *For the preparations and the beginning of the campaign—vide* De Pradt, "Histoire de l'ambassade dans le Grand-Duché de Varsovie en 1812"; Bignon, "Souvenirs d'un diplomate"; Lensky, "Notice historique sur les armements qui eurent lieu en Lithuanie pendant l'occupation française en

CHAPTER XVI.—*Continued.*

1882"; Ernouf, "Maret duc de Bassano"; Comtesse Potocka, "Mémoires"; "Zusammenstellung der diplomatischen und militärischen Masznahmen Napoleons I zur Einleitung des Feldzuges von 1812" ("Jahrb. für die deutsche Armee und Marine," 1878); Liebert, "Die Rüstungen Napoleons für den Feldzug 1812" (Supplement to the "Mil. Wochenblatt," 1888, Pt. IX); "Die Verpflegung des groszen Armee 1812 in Ruszland" ("Neue militär. Blätter," Vol. XXXIX; the notes of the army doctor Blanc (to Vilna) in the "Revue d. quest. hist.," 1897; Ullmann, "Studie über die Ausrüstung und das Verpflegs- und Nachschubwesen im Feldzuge Napoleons gegen Ruszland," Vienna, 1891; Marenzi, "Kritische Beiträge zum Studium des Feldzugs, 1812," Vienna, 1896; Skugarewski, "Praktische Winke für das Studium der Kriegsgeschichte von 1812" (to Smolensk, Streffleur's "Zeitschrift," 1899, I).

(*b*) *For the battle of Borodino—vide* Pelet, "La bataille de la Moskwa" ("Spectateur militaire," 1831); Galizyn, "Die Schlacht bei Borodino," St. Petersburg, 1840; Hofmann, "Die Schlacht bei Borodino," Coblenz, 1846; Ditfurth, "Die Schlacht bei Borodino," Marburg, 1887; Roth v. Schreckenstein, "Die Kavallerie in der Schlacht an der Moskwa"; "Über die Mitwirkung der sächsischen Kürassierbrigade in der Schlacht an der Moskwa" ("Österr. Militär-Zeitschrift," 1824).

(*c*) *For the burning of Moscow—vide* "Histoire de la destruction de Moskou en 1812"; Rostoptchine, "La vérité sur l'incendie de Moscou," Paris, 1823; Alex. Ségur, "Vie du Cte. Rostoptchine," Paris, 1872; Rostoptchin's, "Letters to Woronzow and others" in the "Woronzow-Archives," 1876, 1878; his "Oeuvres inédites," published by his daughter Lydia with a valuable introduction; his letters to Alexander I in "Le Carnet," 1903; also Fain, "Manuscrit de 1812"; "Castellane Journal"; the Memoirs of Bausset (II), Sergeant Bourgogne, Dumas (III), Fézensac, Boyen, Wolzogen; Lecointe de Laveau, "Moscou avant et après l'incendie," Paris, 1814; Idanof (Russian Merchant), "Mouvement de la présence des Français," St. Petersburg, 1813; Yzarn (French emigrant), "Relation du séjour des Français à Moscou" (éd. Gadarnel, Brussels, 1871); Mme. Fusil (French actress), "L'incendie de Moscou," Paris, 1817; Notes of the German Civilian Klee ("Pilgerschaft durchs Leben"); H. Schmidt, "Die Urheber des Brandes von

CHAPTER XVI.—*Continued.*

Moskau 1812" ("Greifsw.," 1904, thorough research). Cf. also Pierre de Ségur, "Rostoptchine en 1812" ("Revue de Paris," 1902) and Tzenoff, "Wer hat Moskau, 1812, in Brand gesteckt?" Berlin, 1900, untenable deductions.

(*d*) *For the incidents at the Beresina* compare the memoirs already mentioned, especially those of Castellane, Bourgogne, Langeron, Fézensac, Linsingen, Löwenstern, Tschitschagoff and others; also Rochechouart, "Souvenirs sur la Révolution, l'Empire," etc.; Solignac, "La Bérézina: Souvenirs d'un soldat de la Grande Armée," Limoges, 1890. For general histories *vide* Bogdanowitsch and Chambray. For special studies *vide* Charkiewitsch, "1812, Beresina," St. Petersburg, 1893 (a leading Russian authority); also Krahmer, "Die Operationen der russischen und französischen Armee im Kriege 1812 von der Schlacht bei Krasnoi bis zur Beresina" (Supplement in the "Militär-Wochenblatt," 1894. Cf. Hartmann, "Der Übergang über die Beresina," from the reports of the French Colonel Chapelle and Colonel Paulin (of the Engineers) published in the "Avenir militaire"; Lenoir, "Recherches sur le passage de la Bérézina" ("Rev. du génie mil.," 1894); Ségur et Blancard, "Note relative au passage de la Bérézina" ("Carnet hist.," 1898). *Vide* also Mosbach, "Der Übergang über die Beresina," from the unpublished memoirs of the Polish Colonel Bialkowski (Streffleur's, "Österr. militär. Zeitschrift," 1875); Clausewitz (who was with Wittgenstein), "Über die Schlacht an der Beresina" (Letter to Stein, given in the "Hist. Zeitschrift," 1888); Pfuel, "Der Rückzug der Franzosen aus Ruszland" (published by Förster, Berlin, 1867; Lindenau, "Der Beresina-Übergang," Berlin, 1896).

(*e*) *For Napoleon's retreat—vide* Ernouf, "Maret"; Bernhardi, "Denkwürdigkeiten Tolls"; Bernays, "Die Schicksale des Groszherzogstums Frankfurt und seiner Truppen"; Bourgoing, "Itinéraire de Napoléon de Smorgoni à Paris"; Senfft, "Mémoires"; and a printed report by Dunin-Wansowicz, the commandant of the escort, of which mention is made by Bourgoing (p. 20) and Ernouf (p. 467).

(*f*) *For the Allies' share—vide* Welden, "Der Feldzug der Österreicher gegen Ruszland im Jahre 1812," Vienna, 1870; Angeli, "Die Teilnahme des österr. Auxiliarkorps im Feldzug Napoleon I gegen Ruszland" ("Mitth. des k. u. k. Kriegsarchiv," 1884); Dittrich, "Schwarzenbergs Marsch auf Wolkowysk, 1812" ("Jahrb. für die

CHAPTER XVI.—*Continued.*

deutsche Armee und Marine," Vol. XC); Droysen, "Leben des Feldmarschalls Yorck"; Guretzky-Cornitz, "Geschichte des I. Brandenburg Uhlanenregiments"; Seydlitz, "Tagebuch des Yorckschen Korps," 2 vols., 1823 (also a French edition); "Die Teilnahme des preuszischen Hilfskorps am Feldzug von 1812" ("Kriegsgesch. Einzelschriften," Book 24, 1898); Pfister, "Aus dem Lager des Rheinbundes, 1812, 1813"; Exner, "Der Anteil der sächsischen Armee, 1812," Leipzig, 1896; Röder, "Der Kriegszug Napoleons gegen Ruszland," Leipzig, 1848 (with the use of the Prince of Hesse's diary); (Cerrini), "Die Feldzüge der Sachsen 1812 und 1813"; Zezschwitz, "Die Feldzüge der Sachsen 1812 und 1813"; Burkersrüda, "Die Sachsen in Ruszland"; Holtzendorff, "Geschichte der königl. sächsischen leichten Infanterie"; Liebenstein, "Die Kriege Napoleons gegan Ruszland 1812 und 1813"; Minkwitz, "Die Brigade Thielmann im Feldzuge von 1812"; Krausz, "Geschichte der bayrischen Heeresabteilung im Feldzuge gegen Ruszland"; Heilmann, "Feldmarschall Fürst Wrede"; also his "Die bayrische Kavalleriedivision Preysing im Jahre 1812" ("Jahrb. für die deutsche Armee und Marine," Vol. VII); Miller, "Darstellung des Feldzuges der französischen verbündeten Armee gegen die Russen im Jahre 1812 mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Teilnahme der königl. württembergischen Truppen"; Bernays, "Die Schicksale des Groszherzogtums Frankfurt und seiner Truppen"; Büdinger, "Die Schweizer im Feldzug von 1812" ("Histor. Zeitschrift," XIX); Maag, "Die Schicksale der Schweizer Regimenter in Ruszland 1812," 3rd. edition, Biel, 1900.

(*g*) *For the attitude of the St. Petersburg Court—vide* Cesse. Edling, "Mémoires"; Cesse. Choiseul-Gouffier, "Mémoires sur Alexandre," 1829; J. de Maistre, "Correspondance"; Pertz, "Stein," III, and VI, 2; Lehmann, "Stein," III; E. M. Arndt, "Meine Wanderungen und Wandlungen mit dem Freiherrn v. Stein"; also his, "Erinnerungen aus dem äuszern Leben" (published by Geerds); Boyen, "Erinnerungen," II; Fournier, "Stein und Gruner in Österreich" ("Deutsche Rundschau," 1887).

III. *For Malet's conspiracy—vide* Lafon, "Histoire de la conjuration du général Malet," Paris, 1814 (unreliable); Saulnier, "Eclaircissements historiques sur la conspiration du gen. M.," 1834; "Histoire des sociétés secrètes de l'armée et des conspirations militaires qui ont eu pour objet la destruction du gouvernement de

CHAPTER XVI.—*Continued.*

Bonaparte," Paris, 1815; Desmarets, "Quinze ans de haute police"; Savary, "Mémoires," VI; Fiévée, "Correspondance et relations avec Bonaparte," III; Fain, "Manuscrit de 1813"; Pasquier, "Mémoires," II; Grousset, "La Conjuration," etc., 1869; Hamel, "Histoire des deux conspirations du général Malet," Paris, 1875; Passy, "Frochot, préfet de la Seine," Evreux, 1867; A. Duruy, "La Conspiration du général Malet" (in the "Revue des deux mondes," 1879); Guillon, "Les complots militaires sous le Consulat et l'Empire," Paris, 1894; the reports of Pelet de la Lozère and of Pasquier to Savary in the "Nouvelle Revue rétrospective," 1901. *Vide* also Monod, "Fragment des souvenirs du Comte d'Argout" ("Rev. napol.," 1902) and George, "Public Opinion at Paris" ("Engl. Hist. Rev.," 1901).

Addenda, 1910.—Egloffstein, "Karl August v. Weimar auf dem Fürstentag in Dresden" ("Deutsche Rundschau," 1906); Grandmaison, "Napoléon en Russie, 1812" ("Revue des quest. hist.," 1902, from Spanish sources); Weber-Lütkow, "Die Verschwörung des General Malet" ("Münchener Allg. Zeitung," 1907); Thimme, "Wrangel u. die Convention von Tauroggen" ("Hist. Zeitschrift," Vol. C); "Zur Tauroggener Frage" (*ibid.*, 1908); Schiemann, "Natzmer über seine Mission zu Kleist, 1813" ("Forschungen von Brandenburger Geschichte"); Haumont, "Français et Russes en 1812".

CHAPTER XVII.—I. *Before the spring campaign*, (*a*) *For Napoleon's military preparations and their bearing upon his domestic policy—vide* in addition to the "Correspondance," that of Fiévée, III; the memoirs of Mollien, Pasquier, Savary; Fain, "Manuscrit de 1813," Thiers, XV, and Lanfrey-Kalckstein, VI; Welschinger, "Le pape et l'empereur"; Lumbroso, "Miscell. nap.," VI; also Rousset, "La Grande Armée de 1813"; Pelet, "Tableau de la Grande Armée en 1813"; and the most complete of all, Osten-Sacken, "Die französische Armee im Jahre 1813," Berlin, 1889.

(*b*) *For Prussia's defection—vide* Bailleu, "Briefwechsel Friedrich Wilhelms III"; Droysen, "Yorck," I; Eckart, "Yorck und Paulucci"; Natzmer, "Aus dem Leben O. v. Natzmers"; Henckel-Donnersmarck, "Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben"; "Aus den

CHAPTER XVII.—*Continued.*

Papieren Schöns," Vol. VI (his autobiography); Clausewitz, "Hinterlassene Werke," VII; Seydlitz, "Tagebuch des Yorckschen Korps"; "Mitteilungen aus dem Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Fr. Dohna"; "Aufzeichnungen über die Vergangenheit der Familie Dohna," Vol. IV; "Denkschriften des Ministers Canitz"; Rühle, "Briefwechsel Th. v. Schöns mit Pertz und Droysen," Leipzig, 1896; Boyen, "Erinnerungen," II, III (their reliability has lately been called in question); "Ancillons Denkschrift vom 4 Februar, 1813" (by Lehmann, "Hist. Zeitschrift," Vol. LXVIII); (Prittwitz), "Beiträge zur Geschichte des Jahres 1813"; Ompteda, "Nachlasz," II. Also Ranke, Hardenberg (SS. WW., Vol. XLVIII); Duncker, "Preuszen während der französischen Okkupation" in his "Aus der zeit Friedrichs des Grossen u. Friedrich Wilhelms III); Lehmann, "Scharnhorst," II; also his "Stein," III; Oncken, "Österreich und Preuszen im Befreiungskriege," 2 vols. (concise account in his "Das Zeitalter der Revolution, des Kaiserreiches und der Befreiungskriege" II); Cavaignac, "La formation de la Prusse contemporaine," II; Stern, "Abhandlungen und Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der preuszischen Reformzeit (containing the reports of the French ambassador in Berlin); Aegidi, "Knesebecks Sendung in das russische Hauptquartier" ("Hist. Zeitschrift," XVI); Pertz, "Das Leben Steins," III; Meinecke, "Boyen," I; Martens, "Recueil des traités conclus par la Russie," VII and III; Ernouf, "Maret".

(*c*) *For the Tauroggen convention* there are now conflicting opinions. Those who hold that York acted independently without the King's knowledge and against his wishes, are represented by Droysen "Yorck"; Lehmann, "Scharnhorst"; also his "Ein Vorspiel der Konvention von Tauroggen" ("Hist. Zeitschrift," Vol. LXIV); Delbrück, "Gneisenau," I; Grobbel, "Die Konvention von Tauroggen" (Diss.), Marburg, 1892; "Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften des preuszischen Generalstabs," Bk. XXIV (the part taken by the Prussian auxiliary forces in the campaign against Russia), Berlin, 1898; and Schiemann, "Zur Würdigung der Konvention von Tauroggen" ("Hist. Zeitschr.," Vol. LXXXIV). Those who hold that Yorck did not act without some instructions from the King and therefore not against his own convictions, are represented by Max Schultze, "Zur Geschichte der Konvention von Tauroggen," 1898; Oncken, "Die Sendung des Fürsten Hatzfeld

CHAPTER XVII.—*Continued.*

nach Paris" ("Deutsche Revue," 1899); Blumenthal, "Die Konvention von Tauroggen," Berlin, 1901; also Thimme, "Zur Vorgeschichte der Konvention von Tauroggen" (in the "Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preuszischen Geschichte," Vol. XIII, 1900), and his "König Friedrich Wilhelm III, sein Anteil an der Konvention von Tauroggen und an der Reform von 1807-1812" (*Ibid.* Vol. XVIII, 1805), (his share in the convention of Tauroggen and in the reforms of 1807-12 with sound arguments based on the unedited diary of Ludwig von Wrangel).

(*d*) *For the German risings and armaments—vide* Gildemeister, "Finks und Bergers Ermordung," Bremen, 1814; Rist, "Lebenserinnerungen"; Wohlwill, "Die Befreiung Hamburgs am 18 März, 1813"; also his "Zur Geschichte Hamburgs im Jahre 1813" ("Transactions of the Hamburg Hist. Society," 1888); Holzhausen, "Davoût in Hamburg"; Varnhagen's "Denkwürdigkeiten," III; Lefebvre, V.

(*e*) *For the Prussian armaments—vide* the part concerning it in Häuszer's "German Hist." IV; Ompteda, "Nachlasz," III; Steffens, "Was ich erlebte," VII; Lehmann, "Borstell und der Ausbruch des Krieges von 1813" ("Hist. Zeitschrift," XXXVII); also the biographies of Gneisenau by Pertz-Delbrück; of Jahn by Euler; of Scharnhorst by Lehmann, of Blücher by Wigger, of Niebuhr by Eyszenhardt, of Bülow by Varnhagen, of Grolman by Conrady, of Tettenborn, also by Conrady; Ziehlberg, "Ferdinande von Schmettau"; Koberstein, "Lützows wilde verwegene Jagd," in "Preusz. Bilderb.," 1887; K. v. L. Adolf Lützows Freikorps, 1884.

(*f*) *For the relations with the Rhine Confederation—vide* Schloszberger, "Korrespondenz König Friedrichs von Württemberg"; Pfister, "Aus dem Lager des Rheinbundes, 1812-1813"; Darmstaedter "Frankfurt"; Goedecke, "Westfalen"; Charles Schmidt, "Le Grand-Duché de Berg"; Heilmann, "Wrede"; Montgelas, "Memoirs"; Senfft, "Memoirs"; Flathe, "Geschichte Sachsens," III; Bonnefons, "Un allié de Napoléon".

(*g*) *For the policy of Austria—vide* Metternich's "Papiere," also Oncken, "Österreich und Preuszen im Befreiungskriege," revised in many points by Luckwaldt, "Österreich und die Anfänge des Befreiungskrieges von 1813"; also, Gebhardt, "Wilh. v. Humboldt als Staatsmann," I; Criste, "Der Beitritt Österreichs im Jahre

CHAPTER XVII.—*Continued.*

1813" ("Mitth. des k. u. k. Kriegsarchivs," 1894); Wertheimer, "Die Revolutionierung Tirols, 1813" ("Deutsche Rundschau," 1904); Ulmann, "Eine Denkschrift von Gentz aus dem Juni, 1813" ("Neue Jahrb. für das klassische Altertum, Geschichte," etc., 1904); Thiers, XV, XVI; Lefebvre, V; Sorel, VIII.

(*h*) *For the relations with the other States and the rise of a new coalition—vide* Castlereagh's "Correspondence"; Hormayr, "Lebensbilder aus dem Befreiungskriege"; Bernhardi, "Geschichte Ruszlands," II; "Aperçu des transactions politiques du cabinet de Russie" (in the "Sbornik" of the Russian Historical Society XXXI); Bignon, XII; Jackson, "Diaries in Bath Archives," II; Nesselrode's "Autobiography"; Ernouf, "Maret".

(*i*) *For Murat—vide* Weil, "Le Prince Eugène et Murat" I; Chavanon et Saint-Yves "Murat".

(*k*) *For Bernadotte—vide* Pingaud, "Bernadotte, Napoleon et les Bourbons"; Suremain, "Mémoires"; Woynar, "Österreichs Beziehungen zu Schweden und Dänemark, 1813, 1814" ("Archives for Austrian Hist.," Vol. LXXVII; Nielsen, "Bidrag til Sveriges politiske historie, 1813, 1814"; v. Schmidt, "Schweden unter Karl," XIV, Johann; Touchard-Lafosse, "Hist. de Charles XIV" and the work by Swederus mentioned in Chapter xv.

II. *For the spring campaign of* 1813 very few memoirs are of use. Those of Marmont, Macdonald and S. Cyr afford little information; while Ségur, Thiébault and Fézensac were not at the German seat of war. The diary of Péyrusse contains little of importance bearing on this point. Among the more valuable narratives from French sources are the Memoirs of Eugène (by Du Casse), the papers of Davoût (ed. Mazade and Blocqueville), the two works of Jomini, "Précis politique et militaire de 1812 à 1814" and "Vie politique et militaire de Napoléon," and the Memoirs of the Saxon officer v. Odeleben, "Napoleons Feldzug in Sachsen".

For valuable sources of information—vide Fain's "Manuscript of 1813," Norvin's portfolio of 1813 and especially the "Correspondance," XXV, with supplements by Lecestre, II; also Foucart, "Bautzen," Paris, 1897; Fabry, "Journal des opérations des 3ème et 5ème corps d'armée," Paris, 1902.

For the opposite side, i.e. non-French—vide Bernhardi, "Denkwürdigkeiten des Generals von Toll"; Müffling, "Aus meinem Leben (2nd ed., 1855); Eugen v. Württemberg's "Memoirs," III;

CHAPTER XVII.—*Continued.*

Wolzogen, "Memoirs"; Helldorff, "Aus dem Leben des Prinzen Eugen von Württemberg"; Prittwitz, "Beiträge zur Geschichte des Jahres 1813"; Wilson, "Private Diary of 1812, 1813, 1814" (unreliable); the memoirs of Boyen, III; of Löwenstern (ed. Weil); of Langeron (ed. Fabry).

For historical narratives of the campaign—vide Schutz und Schulz, "Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1813," 2 parts; Müffling, "Zur Kriegsgeschichte der Jahre 1813 und 1814"; Friccius, "Geschichte des Krieges in dem Jahre 1813 und 1814"; Michailowski-Danilewski, "Events in the War of 1813" (German edition, 1837); Plotho, "Der Krieg in Deutschland und Frankreich, 1813 und 1814"; "Beitzke, "Geschichte der Freiheitskriege" (2nd ed. by Goldschmidt); Charras, "Histoire de la guerre de 1813 en Allemagne" (Fragment); Bogdanowitsch, "History of the War of 1813" (German edition by A. S.). Among the more recent works are Treuenfeld, "Das Jahr 1813 bis zur Schlacht bei Grosz-Görschen" (Leipzig, 1901); Osten-Sacken, "Militär-polit. Geschichte des Befreiungskrieges im Jahre 1813," Vol. II*a*; "Der Frühjahrfeldzug" (till the French cross the Elbe, Berlin, 1904); Holleben, "Geschichte des Frühjahrs Feldzugs, 1813," 2 vols. (Berl., 1904); Lanrezac, "La manoeuvre de Lützen, 1813" (Paris, 1904), gives a brief and concise description of the whole spring campaign; Clément, "Campagne de 1813" (of no special worth and based on old narratives). Cf. also Ulmann, "Die neueste militärische Literatur über den Befreiungskrieg während des Frühjahrs 1813" (Appendix to the "Allg. Zeitung," Feb. 21st, 1905).

For before and after the battle of Bautzen—vide besides Foucard, Meerheimb, "Die Schlachten bei Bautzen am 20 und 21 Mai, 1813," 1873; De Bautzen à Plöswitz ("Revue de Cavalerie," 1898 ff., Paris, 1901); also, "Neue milit. Blätter," XXXI.

For the smaller engagements—vide "Militar-Wochenblatt" of 1843 and 1847.

III. *For the truce and the congress of Prague—vide* "Correspondance," XXV, XXVI; Lecestre, II; Fain, "Manuscrit de 1813," II; Bignon, "Histoire de France," XII; Thiers, XVI (from Metternich's Communications); also Ernouf, "Maret" (with the latter's notes); Metternich, "Nachgelassene Papiere," I and II; the report written in 1820 of the interview at Dresden on June 26th, is given by Helfert, "Marie Louise" (in the appendix); Broglie,

CHAPTER XVII.—*Continued.*

" Souvenirs," I; " Sbornik," XXXI; Radetzky, " Denkschriften milit.-polit. Inhaltes, 1858 " (also Wehner, " Über zwei Denkschriften Radetzkys aus dem Frühjahr," 1813); Radetzky's " Selbstbiographie " (in Mitth. des k. u. k. Kriegsarchivs, 1887); Hormayr, " Lebensbilder aus dem Befreiungskriege," III; Gentz, " Dépêches inédites aux Hospodars de la Valachie " (ed. Prokesch), I; his " Briefe an Pilat " ; De Clercq, " Recueil des traités de la France," II; Martens, " Recueil des traités conclus. par la Russie," III.

For historical narratives—vide Oncken, " Österreich und Preuszen im Befreiungskriege," II; Ranke, " Hardenberg " (" SS. Werke," 48 ff.); Lefebvre, V; Luckwaldt, " Österreich und die Anfänge des Befreiungskrieges " ; Bailleu, " Caulaincourt négociateur de l'armistice en 1813 (in the papers of the Hague Hist. Congress, 1899); Meerheimb, " Der Waffenstillstand vom 4. Juni bis 17. August " (Z. fürpreusz. Gesch.," X); Gebhardt, " Humboldt," I; Sorel, VIII.

For the Imperial camp at Dresden—vide Odeleben, " Napoleon's Feldzug in Sachsen " ; cf. also Schimpff, " Napoleon in Sachsen," Dresden, 1894.

IV. *For the autumn campaign* 1813—*vide* for the French side, in addition to the already-mentioned works, the memoirs of Marmont Fézensac, Ségur, Saint-Cyr, Macdonald, Norvin and Berthezène; also Bertin, " La campagne de 1813 d'après des témoins oculaires," Paris, 1896; Rogniat, " Considérations sur l'art militaire," Paris, 1816; Du Casse, " Vandamme ".

From the Allies' side—vide " Reiches Memoiren " (published by Weltzien); Colomb, " Aus dem Tagebuche des Rittmeisters v. Colomb, 1813 und 1814 " (1854, also Supplement in the " Militär-Wochenblatt," 1855); Blasendorff, " Fünfzig Briefe Blüchers " (" Hist. Zeitschr.," LIV.); Radetzky, " Erinnerungen " (" Mitth. des k. u. k. Kriegsarchivs," 1887); his " Reminiscences " ; Barclay's " Letters " (in the " Baltische Monatschrift " of 1888); " Radetzky im Feldzug, 1813 " (" Jahrbuch für die deutsche Armee und Marine," 1896, 1897); Wolzogen, " Memoirs " ; Kayserlingk, " Erinnerungen an der Kriegeszeit " ; Nostitz, " Tagebuch " (" Kriegsgesch. Einzelschriften," V.); " Briefe eines Neumärkers über seine Erlebnisse, 1813-1815 " (published by Bardey, 1903); Granier, " Schlesische Kriegstagebücher aus der Franzosenzeit " (especially the diaries of Volunteer Major Doerck), Berlin, 1904;

CHAPTER XVII.—*Continued.*

Prokesch-Osten, "Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem Leben des Fürsten v. Schwarzenberg" (new edition, 1861); Rochechouart, "Souvenirs"; the memoirs of Langeron and Löwenstein; Thielen, "Erinnerungen aus dem Kriegerleben eines 82 jährigen Veteranen der österreichischen Armee," 1863; Bernhardi, "Toll," III; Heilmann, "Fürst Wrede"; Metternich-Klinkowström, "Österreichs Teilnahme an den Befreiungskriegen," 1887 (with letters from Gentz, Metternich and Schwarzenberg).

For historical narratives—vide Friederich's comprehensive work "Der Herbstfeldzug," 1813, 3 vols. (1903-5); Grouard, "Stratégie napoléonienne"; "La campagne d'automne 1813," Paris, 1897.

Of the older works—vide Pelet, "Des principales opérations de la campagne de 1813" ("Spect. milit.," 1826, 1828); Londonderry, "Narrative of the War of 1813 and 1814"; Burghersh, "The Operations of the Allied Armies under Schwarzenberg and Blücher"; Hofmann, "Zur Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1813," 1843; Aster, "Schilderung der Kriegsereignisse in und um Dresden"; Wagner, "Die Tage von Dresden und Kulm"; Lüdtke, "Die strategische Bedeutung der Schlacht bei Dresden" (Diss. 1904) (also, "Dresdener Geschichtsblätter," 1905); Zahn, "Das Verhalten Napoleons I nach der Schlacht von Dresden" ("Jahrb. fur die deutsche Armee und Marine," 1902); Bégue de Germiny, "La bataille de Dresde" ("Revue des quest. hist.," 1901, with the diaries of Gersdorff and others); Jomini, "Réplique à Lord Londonderry sur les événements de la campagne de Dresde"; Aster, "Schilderung der Kriegsereignisse zwischen Peterswalde, Pirna, Königstein und Priesten und die Schlacht bei Kulm"; Helfert, "Die Schlacht bei Kulm"; Kleist, "Von Dresden nach Nollendorf" (Supplement to the "Militär-Wochenblatt," 1889, 3); Helldorff, "Zur Geschichte der Schlacht bei Kulm"; Pierron, "Napoléon de Dresde à Leipzig"; Fabry, "Journal des operations du III et V corps, en 1813," Paris, 1902; Weil, "La cavalerie des armées alliées, 1813," Paris, 1886; Pajol, "Pajol en 1812-1814," Paris, 1874; Conrady, "Grolman"; O. Harnack, "Die Ursachen der Niederlage Napoleons I, 1813" ("Hist. Zeitschr.," Vol. XXXIX, 1902); Waas, "Napoleon und die Feldzugspläne der verbündeten 1813" ("Hist. Vierteljahrschr.," 1900).

For the Allies' army of the North—vide "Geschichte der Nordarmee im Jahre 1813," Berlin, 1854, especially Quistorp, "Ge-

CHAPTER XVII.—*Continued.*

schichte der Nordarmee 1813," 3 vols., 1894; Wiehr, "Napoleon und Bernadotte im Herbstfeldzug, 1813"; Bernadotte, "Recueil des ordres de mouvement, etc., de S. A. R. Charles Jean, Prince Royal de Suède," Stockholm, 1838.

For Bernadotte's conduct cf. Pingaud, "Bernadotte, Napoléon et les Bourbons"; Meinecke, "Zur Beurteilung Bernadottes im Herbstfeldzug 1813" ("Researches in Brandenburg and Prussian History," 1894); Pflugk-Harttung, "Bernadotte im Herbstfeldzug 1813" ("D. Revue," 1905); Pallmann, "Die Schlacht bei Groszbeeren" ("Progr.," Berlin, 1872); Quistorp, "Zum Herbstfeldzug 1813" ("Jahrb. für die deutsche Armee und Marine," 1904), Meinecke, "Boyen," I.

For the Silesian Army cf. Müffling, "Zur Kriegsgeschichte von 1813 und 1814," and the treatises in the "Militär-Wochenblatt," 1844 and 1845; also Freytag-Loringhoven, "Aufklärung und Armeeführung bei der schlesischen Armee, 1813," Berlin, 1900; Wedelstädt, "Die Schlacht an der Katzbach" ("Jahrb. für die deutsche Armee und Marine," 1893); Droysen, "Yorck"; Delbrück, "Gneisenau," I; Widdern, "Die Streifkorps im deutschen Befreiungskriege," II; Petersdorf, "Thielmann"; Mirus, "Das Treffen bei Wartenburg"; Schels, "Die Operationen des Korps Bubna" ("Österr. mil. Zeitschr.," III Jahrg.).

For the time before the battle of Leipzig—vide Kerchnawe, "Kavallerieverwendung, Aufklärung, und Armeeführung bei der Hauptarmee in den entscheidenden Tagen vor Leipzig," Vienna, 1904; Bremen, "Die entscheidenden Tage vor Leipzig" (Supplement in the "Militär-Wochenblatt," 1889); Kaulfuss, "Die Strategie Schwarzenbergs am 13, 14, 15 Oktober, 1813" (Diss., 1902).

For the battle of Leipzig—vide Aster, "Die Schlachten bei Leipzig," 2 vols. (2nd ed., 1856); also the works of Hofmann (1835), Naumann and Wuttke (1863). As yet there is no comprehensive narrative based on recent researches.

After Leipzig—vide Kerchnawe, "Von Leipzig bis Erfurt" ("Mitth. des k. u. k. Kriegsarchivs," 3rd series, Vol. IV, 1906) is no longer available; Dörr, "Die Schlacht bei Hanau"; Bockenheimer, "Geschichte der Stadt Mainz 1813 und 1814".

Addenda, 1910.—Caemerer, "Die Befreiungskriege, 1813-15," Berlin, 1907 (a good review); Unger, "Blücher," I, II, Berlin,

CHAPTER XVII.—*Continued.*

1908; Osten-Sacken, "Frühjahrsfeldzug, 1813" ("Militär-polit. Gesch. der Befreiungskriege," II); Soldau, "Die strategische Bedeutung der Schlacht bei Dresden" ("Beiträge zur Kriegsgeschichte," 1908); Pflugk-Harttung, "Zur militärischen Memoirenliteratur der Befreiungskriege" ("Hist. Jahrb.," 1903); Ulmann, "Der Kronprinz von Schweden an Befreiungskrieg" ("Hist. Zeitschrift," 1909); Le Bégue de Germiny, "Napoléon et le roi de Saxe"; Anders, "Schwarzenberg's Disposition am 19 Oktober, 1813," Berlin, 1908.

CHAPTER XVIII.—I. *For the renewal of the war—vide* (*a*) *For the first negotiations for peace:* Castlereagh's "Correspondence"; Lord Burghersh, "Memoirs"; Martens, "Recueil," III, XI; Metternich, "Nachgelassene Papiere," I, II (also Bailleu, "Metternich's Memoirs," in the "Hist. Zeitschrift," XLIV); Metternich-Klinkowström, "Österreichs Teilnahme," etc.; Fain, "Manuscrit de 1814"; Ernouf, "Maret"; Bignon, "Histoire de France," XIV; Angeberg, "Le Congrès de Vienne," I; Oncken, "Aus den letzten Monaten des Jahres, 1813" ("Hist. Taschenbuch," 1833); also his, "Das Zeitalter der Revolution, des Kaiserreiches und der Befreiungskriege," 2nd vol.; Fournier, "Zur Geschichte der polnischen Frage" ("Mitth. des Instituts für österr. Geschichtsforschung," Vol. XX; also his "Kongresz von Châtillon," Vienna, 1900; Roloff, "Politik und Kriegsführung während des Feldzuges von 1814," 1891.

(*b*) *For the internal condition of France—vide* "Correspondance," XXVI and XXVII; Lecestre, II; Brotonne, both collections; Buchez and Roux, "Histoire parlementaire de la révolution française," XXXIX; "Bulletin des lois"; the Memoirs of Mollien, Miot, Bausset, Savary (new ed., 1900), Méneval, Pasquier (II), Barante, Broglie, Mme. de Coigny (ed. Lamy), Chastenay (2nd Vol.), Molé (in the "Revue de la Révolution," 1888). Also Béranger, "Ma biographie"; Rodriguez, "Relation de ce qui s'est passé à Paris à l'époque de la déchéance de Buonaparte" (1814); Journal d'un prisonnier anglais (in the "Revue brittanique," V, VI); "Journal d'un officier anglais pendant les quatre premiers mois de 1814" (*Ibid.* IV); Montaignac, "Journal d'un Français depuis le 9 mars jusqu'au 15 avril 1814"; Wehle, "Vertraute Briefe über

CHAPTER XVIII.—*Continued.*

Frankreich, 1814"; Véron, "Mémoires d'un bourgeois de Paris," I; Engerand, "Paris et les alliés en 1814" ("Nouv. Revue," 1896); Thiers, XVII; Vaulabelle, "Hist. des deux restaurations"; Lubis, "Hist. de la restauration"; Houssaye, "1814" (invaluable for the internal condition of the country and for information as to the departmental literature during that year); also Chuquet, "L'Alsace en 1814"; Pingaud, "Bernadotte, Napoleon et les Bourbons"; Welschinger, "Le Pape et l'Empereur".

II. *For the war in France—vide* (*a*) *For the campaign*, in addition to the "Correspondance," XXVII, the "Mémoires du roi Joseph," the Memoirs of Marmont, Macdonald, Belliard, and Lavalette; Fabvier's, "Journal des opérations du 6ème corps"; Bertin, "La campagne de 1814 d'après des témoins oculaires," Paris, 1897, and Percy, "Journal".

For narratives—vide Girard, "La campagne de Paris en 1814"; Beauchamps, "Histoire des campagnes de 1814 et 1815"; Vaudoncourt, "Histoire des campagnes de 1814 et 1815"; especially: Koch, "Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la Campagne de 1814," 3 vols.: Du Casse, "Le général Arrighi"; Pajol, "Pajol général en chef"; Nollet, "Oudinot"; Masson, "Flahaut"; and Weil's authoritative work, "La campagne de 1814," 4 vols.

For sources other than French—vide besides the works of Bernhardi mentioned in a previous chapter: Plothou, A; (Danvitz), "Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1814," 4 vols.; Schels, "Die Operationen der verbündeten Heere gegen Paris" ("Österr. milit. Zeitschrift 1845"); Thielen, "Der Feldzug der verbündeten Heere"; also his "Erinnerungen"; the "Memoirs of Eugen v. Württemberg"; Boyen's "Reminiscences"; Müffling, "Aus Meinem Leben"; Reiche's "Memoiren"; Schulz, "Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1814," 2 vols.; Nostiz, "Tagebuch" ("Kriegsgeschichtl. Einzelschriften," Books 5 and 6); Delbrück, "Gneisenau"; Meinecke, "Boyen"; Conrady, "Grolmann"; Heilmann, "Wrede"; Varndagen, "Bülow"; Droysen, "Yorck"; Ollech, "Reyher"; Kleist, "Kleist"; "Neues über Leop. v. Gerlach" ("D. Revue," 1900); Colomb, "Blücher in Briefen"; Boie, "Die Stunde der Entscheidung vor Beginn der unglücklichen Kämpfe im Februar, 1814" ("Jahrb. für die deutsche Armee und Marine," 1878); Danilewsky, "Der Feldzug in Frankreich"; Bogdanowitsch, "History of the Campaign of 1814"; Janson, "Der Feldzug 1814 in Frank-

CHAPTER XVIII.—*Continued.*

reich," 2 vols. 1903 and 1905. Cf. also Wojnovich, "Die Geschichte der Befreiungskriege" (in "Streffleur's Z," 1905); Hiller, "Geschichte des Feldzuges in Frankreich mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der württembergischen Truppen"; Oncken, "Gneisenau, Radetzky und der Marsch durch die Schweiz" ("D. Z. f. Geschichtswissenschaft," X); Roloff, "Entstehung des Operationsplanes zum Winterfeldzug, 1813, 1814" (Militär-Zeitschr.," 1894); Waas, "Napoleon I und die Feldzugspläne der Verbündeten von 1813" ("Hist. Vierteljahrschrift," 1900); Sauer, "Blüchers Rheinübergang bei Caub," 1892; Oechsli, "Die Verbündeten und die Schweiz"; Rouvier, "Les premiers combats de 1814," Paris, 1895; Petzel, "Die Operationen Napoleons von La Rothière bis Bar-sur-Aube (Supplement, "Mil.-Wochenblatt," 1900); Sothen, "Das Gefecht von Etoges" (Supplement, "Militär-Wochenblatt," 1894); Dechend, "Das Treffen bei Bar-sur-Aube" (Supplement, "Milit.-Wochenblatt," 1897); "Der Fall von Soissons"; "Das Nachtgefecht bei Laon" ("Kriegsgeschichtl. Einzelschriften," Vol. II.

(*b*) *For the diplomatic negotiations during the war—vide,* in addition to the authorities already mentioned, Fain, "Manuscrit de 1814"; "Sbornik," XXXI.; Gentz, "Letters aux hospodars de la Valachie," I; Ernouf, "Maret"; Metternich, "Memoirs" (unreliable; cf. Bailleu in the "Hist. Zeitschrift," 1888); Nesselrode, "Autobiography"; Arneth, "Wessenberg," II; Oncken, "Lord Castlereagh und die Minister-Konferenz zu Langres" ("Hist. Taschenbuch," 1855); also his, "Die Krisis der letzten Friedensverhandlungen mit Napoleon I" (*Ibid.* 1886); Houssaye, "1814" (he has misapprehended the policy of the allies); Sorel, VIII. Also, Fournier, "Der Kongresz von Châtillon"; Pons de l'Hérault, "Le Congrès de Châtillon" (based on Fain's manuscript and containing an accusation against Caulaincourt, is of no historical value); Trapp, "Kriegführung und Diplomatie der Verbündeten 1814"; Weil, "Le Prince Eugène et Murat"; Chavanon and Saint-Yves, "Murat"; Lehmann, "Stein," III; Pertz, "Stein," VI; Gebhardt, "Humboldt," II; Lady Burghersh, "Letters from Germany".

(*c*) *For the fall of Napoleon,* in addition to the standard works repeatedly named, *vide* the Memoirs of Bourrienne, also "A. B. Bourrienne et ses erreurs," Vol. II; Talleyrand's "Memoirs," II; his "Lettres in dites à la Princesse de Courlande" ("Revue

CHAPTER XVIII.—*Continued.*

d'histoire diplomatique," II); Vitrolles, "Mémoires et relations politiques," I (not altogether reliable); the Memoirs of Rochechouart, Semallé, Hyde de Neuville, Moriolles, Ségur, Plancy (ed. Masson, 1904); De Pradt, "Récit des événements qui ont amené la restauration de la royauté"; Rapetti, "La défection d'Essones"; Chateaubriand, "Mémoires d'outre tombe," and his pamphlet "Bonaparte et les Bourbons"; the Memoirs of Joseph, Pasquier, Macdonald, Savary, Méneval, Bausset; Fain, "Manuscrit"; Ernouf, Maret, Gourgaud, "Journal inédit". The "Souvenirs du Duc de Vicence," by Mme. Sorr, are not authentic. They consist of articles which had appeared originally under the title "Napoléon et le Duc de Vicence" in the "Nouvelle Minerve" of 1838. Caulaincourt did indeed write some Memoirs, but he had done little more than make a beginning when he died suddenly in 1827. Sorr, "Napoleon en Belgique et Hollande," p. 5.

For newspapers—vide "Moniteur," "Journal de l'Empire," "Gazette de France," "Journal des Débats". The pamphlets against Napoleon are specially numerous. A collection of these is mentioned, and extracts given from them by Germond de Lavigne, "Les pamphlets de la fin de l'Empire des Cent-Jours et de la Restauration," Paris, 1879. (The Berlin Library contains 130 pamphlets belonging to this period.)

For narratives—vide Thiers, XVII; Sorel, VIII; Masson, "Marie Louise"; also his "Napoléon et son fils". From a different standpoint, Fournier, "Marie Luise und der Sturz Napoleons" ("D. Rundschau," Sept., 1902; French, "Revue historique," 1903); Wertheimer, "Der Herzog von Reichstadt"; Helfert, "Marie Luise"; Fabry, "La Régence à Blois"; Wehle, "Vertraute Briefe über Frankreich und dessen Hauptstadt in der ersten Hälfte des Jahres 1814".

III. *For Napoleon at Elba—vide* (*a*) *For the journey thither*, Helfert, "Napoleons Fahrt von Fontainebleau nach Elba," 1874 (from the reports of the Austrian Commissioner Koller); Waldburg-Truchsesz (Prussian Commissioner), "Napoleon Bonapartes Reise von Fontainebleau nach Fréjus," Berlin, 1815 (Vol. VI; Schoell, "Recueil des pièces officielles"); Campbell (the British Commissioner), "Napoleon at Fontainebleau and Elba," 1869; Ussher (Captain of the "Undaunted"), "A narrative of events, etc."; J. Fabre, "De Fontainebleau à l'île d'Elbe," 1887 (worthless);

CHAPTER XVIII.—*Continued.*

Laborde, "Napoléon et sa garde, ou relation du voyage de Fontainebleau à l'île d'Elbe," Paris, 1840.

(*b*) *For the sojourn on the island—vide* "Correspondance," XXVII. (The supplements by Lecestre and Brotonne contain nothing dealing with this period.) Pélissier, "Le registre de l'île d'Elbe," Paris, 1897 (with 184 letters); Peyrusse (the Chancellor of the Exchequer), "Mémorial". The most exhaustive work is, Pons de l'Hérault (Director of the mines), "Souvenirs et anecdotes de l'île d'Elbe" (ed. Pélissier, Paris, 1897); also, "Mémoire de Pons de l'Hérault aux puissances" (ed. Pélissier, Paris, 1899, an apologetic pamphlet, as the publisher rightly describes it). The reminiscences of Labadie, Larabit, and Sellier Vincent, have been published by Pélissier in the "Nouvelle Revue rétrospective," 1894, 1895. G. Firmin-Didot, "Royauté ou Empire," Paris, 1897 (contains the reports of the secret agents of the Paris Government); Fleury de Chaboulon, "Mémoires de la vie privée, du retour et du règne de Napoléon en 1815," London, 1820 (describes his execution of Maret's commission).

For Napoleon's conversations with English travellers—vide Ebrington, "Memorandum of Two Conversations," 1824; Vernon, "Sketch of a Conversation with Napoleon" (in "Miscellanies of the Philobiblion Society," 1863); other conversations in "Holzhausen, Bonaparte, Byron und die Briten," Frankfurt, 1904.

For narratives—vide Lancelotti, "Napoleon auf Elba," Dresden, 1815; Pichot, "Napoléon à l'île d'Elbe" (drawn from Peyrusse, Campbell, and others); Foresi, "Napoleone all' isola d'Elba," 1884; Livi, "Napoleone all' isola d'Elba," 1888; Pellet, "Napoléon à l'île d'Elbe," Paris, 1888 (the two latter rely too much on the notes of the secret police); Houssaye, "1815," I; Larrey, "Madame Mère"; Brunschwig, "Cambronne"; Madelin, "Fouché," II; and the latest, P. Gruyer, "Napoléon, Roi (!) de l'île d'Elbe," Paris, 1906 (with many illustrations). Napoleon himself dictated the history of his sojourn under the title, "L'île d'Elbe et les Cent-Jours" (Vol. XXXI. of the "Correspondance"). Like almost all his dictated works it is biassed and unreliable.

(*c*) *For Marie Louise—vide* Fournier, "Marie Luise und der Sturz Napoleons" ("Deutsche Rundschau," 1902; French in the "Revue historique," 1903); Wertheimer, "Der Herzog von Reichstadt"; Helfert, "Napoleon und Marie Luise im Sommer 1814"

CHAPTER XVIII.—*Continued.*

("Dioskuren," Jahrg. 1874). The erroneous accounts given in Masson, "Marie Louise," and Houssaye, "1815," are largely based on a pamphlet; "Marie Luise und der Herzog von Reichstadt" (1843).

(*d*) The literature dealing with the Vienna Congress does not come under consideration here.

For Talleyrand's attitude with regard to Elba—vide Pallain, "Correspondance of T. with Louis XVIII," and M. Lehmann, "Tagebuch des Freiherrn von Stein während des Wiener Kongresses" ("Hist. Zeitschr.," 1888); Blennerhasset, "Talleyrand"; Fournier, "Talleyrand" (in the "D. Rundschau," 1888); Pasquier, "Mémoires," III.

For Murat—vide Helfert, "J. Murat, seine letzten Kämpfe und sein Ende," 1878; Dufourcq, "Murat et la question italienne en 1815"; also Chavanon et Saint-Yves, "Murat".

IV. *For Napoleon's return and his march to Paris—vide* the "Correspondance," XXVIII; the account given in Monier, "Une année de la vie de l'Empereur Napoleon" (1815, panegyric and incomplete); Peyrusse, "Mémorial"; Laborde, "Napoléon et sa garde"; also "Fleury de Chaboulon". Cf. also Napoleon's "Mémoires"; Gourgaud, "Journal inédit," I, 379 ff.; Berriat Saint Prix, "Napoléon à Grenoble". The most exhaustive are Houssaye, "1815" I; and Thiers, XIX.

For the feeling in France—vide the "Memoirs of Broglie," I; Pasquier, III; Barante, II; Vitrolles, II; Véron, I; B. Constant, "Mémoires sur les Cent-Jours (the first letters); Hobhouse, "Letters Written from Paris," London, 1816 f.; Houssaye, I (reports from the prefects).

Addenda, 1910.—Oechsli, "Der Durchzug der Verbündeten durch die Schweiz, 1813-1817," Zurich, 1906; Méneval, "Marie Louise et la cour d'Autriche," Paris, 1909; Vivian, "Minutes of a conversation with Napoleon at Elba" ("Revue Napol.," 1908).

CHAPTER XIX.—*For the hundred days—vide* "Correspondance," XXVIII and XXXI; also "Portefeuille de Buonaparte," contains letters to and from Napoleon, captured at Waterloo). Besides the memoirs mentioned in the former paragraph *vide* Molé,

CHAPTER XIX.—*Continued.*

"Mémoires, Fragment," in the "Revue de la Révolution," 1888; Carnot, "Exposé de ma conduite politique"; the "Mémoires sur Carnot, par son fils," II; Carnot, "Correspondance avec Napoléon"; and his "Exposé de la situation de l'Empire," in the "Moniteur," June 15th, 1815; (cf. also the Studies of Welvert in the "Revue historique," 1905); the Memoirs of Lavalette, Savary, VII, Fouché (with reservations), Mollien, III; Villemain, VI; Vitrolles, II; Barras, IV; Lucien, III; Lafayette, V; Staël, III; also "Alexandre I et Mme. de Staël, 1814-1817" ("Revue de Paris," 1897); Laborde, "Quarante-huit heures de garde aux Tuileries"; Barry, "Cahier d'un rhétoricien en 1815"; Hélene Williams, "Relation des événements"; Sismondi, "Notes sur l'Empire et les Cent-Jours" ("Revue historique," IX); his letters to his mother ("Revue historique," VI, unreliable); and his "Examen de la Constitution, 1815"; Hobhouse, "Letters" (cf. Napoleon's remarks in the "Correspondance," XXXI); Davoût, "Correspondance," IV (ed. Mazade); Blocqueville, "Le maréchal Davoût," IV; Vigier, "Davoût," Paris, 1898; Béranger, "Ma biographie"; Lord Holland, "Reminiscences"; Picaud, "Carnot," 1885; F. v. Weech, "Französische Zustände während der hundert Tage und der Okkupation" ("Hist. Zeitschr.," XVI, 1876, from Wellington's "Supplementary Dispatches," X). Also the historical works of Houssaye, I; Thiers, XIX; Vaulabelle, II; Lubis, III; Thibaudeau, "Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire," X; Bignon, XIV; Baudouin, "Anecdotes historiques du temps de la restauration"; Hélie, "Les Constitutions de la France"; Pölitz, "Europäische Verfassungen," III; "Bulletin des Lois, 1815"; the dispatches of Wellington, XII, and Castlereagh, X; "Archives parliamentaires," 2ième série; Germond de Lavigne, "Les pamphlets de la fin de l'Empire," etc.

For the newspapers—vide in addition to those mentioned in the last chapter "L'Aristarque," "L'Indépendant," "Le Patriote de 89" and "Le Nain Jaune" (comic journal). For pamphlet literature, *vide* Houssaye, I, 533 to 535, 546.

For the relations with foreign countries—vide the correspondence of Talleyrand with Louis XVIII; Pozzo di Borgo, "Correspondance"; Romberg and Malet, "Louis XVIII et les Cent-Jours à Gand," Paris, 1898, 1902; Metternich, "Nachgelassene Papiere," II; d'Angeberg, "Congrès de Vienne," I; Hansard, "Parliament-

CHAPTER XIX.—*Continued.*

ary debates," XXX and XXXI; Sorel, VIII; Madelin, "Fouché," II; for Murat *vide* the previous chapter.

II. *For the campaign of* 1815. The "Correspondance" has little concerning it.

For the preparations for war—vide Couderc de Saint Chamant, "Napoléon, ses dernières armées," Paris, 1902; Mauduit, "Les derniers jours de la Grande Armée". The Emperor's account of the war, as dictated to Gourgaud at St. Helena, under whose name "La campagne de 1815" appeared in 1818, has been made the basis of many historical narratives, amongst others of that of Thiers. Of the works which immediately appeared disputing the statements in Gourgaud, *vide* especially, Grouchy, "Observations sur la relation de la campagne de 1815," published by Gourgaud, Paris, 1819. Cf. also Heymès, "Relation de la campagne de 1815 pour servir à l'histoire du maréchal Ney (in d'Elchingen, "Documents inédits sur la campagne de 1815"); Janin, "Campagne de Waterloo," 1828; Jomini, "Précis politique et militaire de la campagne de 1815," Brussels, 1846. Also, Lefol, "Souvenirs"; Répecaud, "Napoléon à Ligny"; Salle, "Souvenirs" ("Nouvelle Revue," 1895); Gérard, "Quelques documents sur la bataille de Waterloo" and his "Dernières observations," unfavourable to Grouchy, to which Grouchy replied in "Fragments historiques," 1829, and later "Relation succincte de la camp. de 1815," 1843. Grouchy's Memoirs were then published by his grandson (Paris, 1873) with many documents in Vol. IV. But the text of the latter does not always agree with the original. The statements of the marshal (and of his descendants) require to be carefully examined, like those of Napoleon. Cf. also the Memoirs of Berthezène, Lamarque, Fleury de Chaboulon; Berton's "Précis historique"; General Foy's notes in Girod de l'Ain, "Vie militaire du général Foy," Paris, 1900; Flahaut's dispatches given in Masson, "Le général Flahaut"; those of Pajol in "Pajol, P.," also, Baudus, "Etudes sur Napoléon," Paris, 1840; the Memoirs of Jerôme; reminiscences of individual officers like Petiet, Pontécoulant, Lemonnier, Larrey (head-surgeon), and an anonymous description of the battle at Waterloo ("Nouvelle Revue rétrosp.," 1896). The official French reports of the battle of Waterloo are not published.

For English sources, Wellington's "Dispatches," XII, and "Supplementary Dispatches," X, stand first. (The latter include

CHAPTER XIX.—*Continued.*

the reports of the various lieutenant-generals upon the decisive battle.) Also Stanhope, "Notes of Conversations with the Duke of Wellington". Without studying Wellington's Papers, Siborne has written an ultra-English "History of the War in France and Belgium, 1815" (German, Berlin, 1846, 1847), and his son has published "Waterloo Letters," London, 1891, which are valuable and interesting as reminiscences of those who took part in the battle. Also Kennedy, "Notes on the Battle of Waterloo," London, 1865; Woodberry, "Journal"; Mercer, "Journal of the Waterloo Campaign"; Tomkinson, "The Diary of a Cavalry Officer"; Cotton, "A Voice of Waterloo"; Beamish, "History of the King's German Legion," London, 1832, 1837.

From Dutch sources, the book by Löben-Sels, "Précis de la campagne de 1815," 1846, is outstripped by De Bas, "Prins Frederik der Niederlanden," 3 vols., 1896 ff., with many documents.

On the Prussian side—vide, in addition to contemporary communications by Muffling, "Geschichte des Feldzuges," etc., 1817; his "Aus Meinem Leben"; Clausewitz, "Der Feldzug von 1815" ("Hinterlassene Werke," VIII); Plotho, "Der Krieg der Verbündeten gegen Frankreich, 1815," 1818; Wagner, "Pläne der Schlachten und Treffen"; Hofmann, "Zur Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815," 2nd ed., 1849; Schulz, "Geschichte der Kriege," XIV, XV; Damitz, "Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815," 1837. Köniğer, "Der Krieg vom Jahre 1815 und die Verträge von Wien und Paris," Leipzig, 1865, and Ollech in his "Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815," Berlin, 1876, have given comprehensive narratives based on the archives, the publication of which is not always altogether free from objection. Both works are now surpassed by Lettow-Vorbeck, "Napoleons Untergang, 1815," I (including the battle of Waterloo), Berlin, 1904; and Pflugk-Harttung, "Vorgeschichte der Schlacht bei Belle-Alliance," Berlin, 1903; and also his "Verhandlungen Wellingtons und Blüchers auf der Windmühle bei Brye" ("Hist. Jahrb.," 1902). Cf. also, "Zur Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815," in "Neue milit. Blätter," 1903. *Vide* from private sources, Colomb, "Blücher in Briefen aus den Feldzügen von 1814 und 1815"; v. d. Marwitz, "Nachlasz"; Henckel v. Donnersmarck, "Erinnerungen"; Nostiz, "Tagebuch" ("Kriegsgeschichtl. Einzelschriften," VI); Memoirs of General Reiche (published by Weltzien); the dis-

CHAPTER XIX.—*Continued.*

patches to the King of Württemberg in Pfister, "Aus dem Lager der Verbündeten". Cf. also Delbrück, "Gneisenau," II; Conrady, "Grolman"; Starklof, "Bernhard von Sachsen-Weimar"; Treuenfeld, "Die Tage von Ligny und Belle-Alliance," 1880; M. Lehmann, "Zur Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815" ("Hist. Zeitschrift," 1877); Bernhardi, "Geschichte Ruszlands," I.

For the battle of Waterloo, the legend of the exclusive guilt of Grouchy and Ney based on the notes of Napoleon was refuted by Charras, "Histoire de la campagne de 1815," 1857, who, however, went too far in his condemnation of Napoleon; and Quinet, "Histoire de la campagne de 1815," Paris, 1862, new edition, 1877. On the other hand, Houssaye has sought to exonerate the Emperor in his "1815," Vol. II (Paris, 1902) which is based on accurate researches among numerous and still unpublished sources. In Grouard, "La Critique de la campagne de 1815" (Paris, 1904), Houssaye has found a shrewd opponent who writes —not always fairly—very much from the standpoint of Charras. Cf. also Navez, "Pourquoi Napoléon a-t-il perdu la bataille de Waterloo?" Brussels, 1899.

For English sources—the most impartial is Chesney, "Waterloo Lectures," cf. also O'Connor-Morris, "The Campaign of 1815," London, 1900; Wood, "The cavalry in the Waterloo-Campaign"; Boulger, "The Belgians at Waterloo" (1901); Oman, "The French Losses in the Waterloo Campaign" ("English Hist. Rev.," 1904); Wolseley, "The Decline and Fall of Napoleon," 1894 (of small value); Ropes (American) "The Campaign of Waterloo," London, 1893; "Bustelli, "L'enigma di Ligny e di Waterloo," 3 vols. Viterbo, 1897.

For the beginning of the French flight—vide Büdinger, "Wellington" (in appendix).

For Cambronne and the catastrophe to the Guards—vide Knesebeck, "Leben des Freiherrn Hugh v. Halkett"; Poten, Artikel "Halkett" in the "Allg. d. Biographie"; Fransecky in the "Militär-Wochenblatt," 1876, No. 47.

Addenda, 1910.—Pflugk-Harttung, "Napoleon während der Schlacht bei Belle-Alliance Jahrb.," 1907; Paul Müller, "Zur Beurteilung der Persönlichkeit im Feldzug 1815"; De Bas, "La campagne de 1815," Brussels, 1908; Grouard, "La critique de la campagne de 1815. Réponse à M. Houssaye."

CHAPTER XX.—*For Napoleon's last days in France—vide* Fleury de Chaboulon, II; Sismondi; Benjamin Constant, "Lettres à Mme. Récamier"; his "Mémoires sur les Cent-Jours," II; the Memoirs of Joseph, X; those of Lucien, III; also his "Vérité sur les Cent-Jours"; Pasquier, III; "Esquisse sur les Cent-Jours" (from Lafayette's notes); Savary, VIII; Hobhouse, "Letters," II; Carnot, "Mémoires sur Carnot," II; the Memoirs of Villemain, II; Fouché, II; Méneval, III; Thiébault, V; Lafayette, V; Barante, II; Broglie, I; Doulcet Pontécoulant, III; Vitrolles, III; Gourgaud, "Journal," II (pièces annexes). Also Becker, "Relation de ma mission auprès de Napoléon"; Metternich, "Nachgelassene Papiere," II; Wellington, "Supplem. dispatches," X; La Brittonière, "Souvenirs du vieux Quartier latin"; Peyrusse, "Mémorial"; "Les deux Chambres de Buonaparte"; Regnaut-Warin, "Cinq mois de l'histoire de France"; Lamarque, "Souvenirs"; Maitland, "Narrative of the Surrender of Bonaparte"; Jourdan de la Passardière (Commander of the brig "Epervier"), "Relation" (in "Nouvelle Revue rétrosp.," 1897); Montholon, "Récits de la captivité de Ste. Hélène"; Comtesse Montholon, "Souvenirs de Ste. Hélène" (1815, 1816, published by Fleury); General Lallemand's notes and letters about the embarkation at Rochefort under the title "Embarquement de l'Empereur à Rochefort" (in "Nouvelle Revue rétrospective," 1899). The most exhaustive of the historical narratives is the 3rd Vol. of Houssaye's "1815". ("La séconde abdication—La terreur blanche," Paris, 1905.) In addition to the documents in the Paris archives, the author had access to valuable manuscript notes of a private nature especially from Queen Hortense (the "Mémoires de Madame X."), Davoût, Gaillard, Rousselin and the Valet Marchand. Cp. also Thibaudeau, X; Thiers, XX; Madelin, "Fouché," II; Silvestre "Malmaison, Rochefort, Ste. Hélène" (from notes at Rochefort). The action of the Chambers is given in the "Moniteur".

For St. Helena—vide, in the first place, the records of Napoleon's companions, "Las Cases' Mémorial de Ste. Hélène," Paris, 1823; Montholon, "Récits de la captivité de Napoléon à Ste. Hélène," Paris, 1847; and Gourgaud's "Journal inédit de 1815 à 1818," Paris, 1899, the latter is the most trustworthy. Also the "Souvenirs" of Countess Montholon for 1815 and 1816, Paris, 1901.

For the last period of the Emperor's life—vide Antommarchi, "Mémoires ou les derniers moments de Napoléon," Paris, 1825.

CHAPTER XX.—*Continued.*

The reports of the various commissioners are also published; those of the Austrian commissioner, Stürmer, in Schlitter, "Die Berichte des k. k. Kommissars Frh. von Stürmer aus St. Helena, 1816-1818," Vienna, 1886; those of the French commissioner, Montchenu, by Firmin Didot in "La Captivité de Ste. Hélène d'après les rapports inédits du Marquis de Montchenu," Paris, 1804; and of the Russian commissioner, Balmain, in "Le Prisonnier de Ste. Hélène" ("Revue bleue of 1897"). Of other persons present on the island the following are known: Mrs. Abell (formerly Betsy Balcombe), "Recollections of the Emperor Napoleon during the First Three Years of His Captivity" (London, 1844, 3rd edition, 1873); Lieutenant Jackson, "Recollections of St. Helena" (in "United Service Magazine," 1843); Henry, military doctor, "Events of a Military Life," London, 1843; Glover (Cockburn's secretary), diary in "Napoleon's Last Voyages," London, 1895; Jackson, "Notes and Reminiscences of a Staff Officer" (Seaton's edition, London, 1903); Dr. Stokoes (doctor on the Admiral's ship "Conqueror"), hearsay evidence, and a few notes not very reliable in Frémeaux, "Napoléon prisonnier" (Paris, 1896, also in English); Lady Malcolm's "Diary of 1816, 1817," London, 1899. The "Lettres du Cap de Bonne Espérance," dictated by Napoleon ("Correspondance," Vol. XXXI), which appeared in 1818, founded those legends of the Martyr which received further support from O'Meara, "Napoleon in Exile or a Voice from St. Helena," London, 1822, and were translated into almost all European languages in spite of the fact that the "Letters Written on Board His Majesty's Ship the 'Northumberland,' and at St. Helena" (Warden, doctor on the "Northumberland," London, 1816) which are couched in a similar strain, had already been unfavourably criticized in the "Quarterly Review," XXXI and XXXII (1817) and shown to be unreliable. The rest of Napoleon's dictated works, narrating the history of his time, appeared first as "Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France sous Napoléon, écrits à Ste. Hélène par les généraux qui ont partagé sa captivité et publiés sur les manuscrits corrigés de la main de Napoléon," Paris, 1823, 8 vols., and later on as appendix to the "Correspondance," Vols. XXIX-XXXII. In Volume XXXII, at the end, are given Napoleon's testamentary instructions. The "Mémorial relatif à la captivité de Napoléon à Ste. Hélène," published at Paris in 1830, under Lowe's name, is apocryphal. Of the

CHAPTER XX.—*Continued.*

narratives the most valuable is: Forsyth, "History of the Captivity of Napoleon at St. Helena," 3 vols., 1853 (based on documents belonging to the English Government). It has been well supplemented by Seaton, "Napoleon and Sir Hudson Lowe," London, 1898, and "Napoleon's Captivity in relation to Sir Hudson Lowe," London, 1903. *Vide* also Rose, "Life of Napoleon," Vol. II and his "Napoleonic Studies" (with Major Gorrequer's letters from St. Helena). Both these works differ from Lord Rosebery's inadequate study, "Napoleon, the Last Phase," London, 1900. There is valuable information also in Walter Scott's "Life of Napoleon," IX; in Lord Holland's, "Foreign Reminiscences"; in Yonge's "The Life of Lord Liverpool," II; in Schlitter, "Kaiser Franz und die Napoleoniden vom Sturz Napoleons bis zu dessen Tode," Vienna, 1888. Cf. also Advielle, "La bibliothèque de Napoléon à Ste. Hélène". (Paris, 1896); Héreau, "Napoléon à Ste. Hélène, opinion d'un médecin" (Paris, 1829, *re* Napoleon's illness). Holzhausen, "Napoleon's Tod im Spiegel der zeitgenössischen Presse"; Capeletti, "La leggenda napoleonica," Turin, 1903; Sorel, "L'épopée Napoléonienne" ("Revue bleue," 1904).

Addenda, 1910.—Masson, "Autour de Ste. Hélène," Paris, 1909. Frémeaux, "St. Hélène; les derniers jours de l'Empereur," Paris, 1909. Gonnard, "Les Origines de la légende Napoléonienne," Paris, 1907.

APPENDIX.

VOL. II.

I. Napoleon's Letters to Talleyrand.

79.

Liebstadt, le 21 février 1807.[1]

M. le Prince de Bénévent, je vous envoie une lettre de M. de Ségur. Je vous prie de me faire connaître votre opinion.

Napoléon.

80.

Osterode, le 2 mars 1807.[1]

M. le Prince de Bénévent, indépendamment du corps du général Dobrowsky, mon intention est de réunir à Neidenburg un corps polonais. Le maréchal Berthier écrit au Prince Poniatowski pour cet objet. Veillez à ce que tous les bataillons polonais qui sont à Varsovie à Nieporent et à Sierock, et qui sont habillés et armés, partent sur-le-champ pour Neidenburg.[2]

Napoléon.

81.

Osterode, le 3 mars 1807.[1]

M. le Prince de Bénévent, faites toutes les instances auprès du gouvernement et du gouverneur pour qu'on rétablisse le pont de Praga; il est ridicule que cela n'était pas déjà fait. L'idée de prendre des bateaux de ce pont pour transporter des vivres à Thorn est une idée folle s'il en fût jamais. J'espère qu'elle n'aura eu aucune exécution. Si Lemarois est encore à Varsovie, qu'il y reste pour faire marcher les dépôts.

Napoléon.

[1] Copy.

[2] Cf. Napoleon to Berthier, March 1st, 1807, "Corresp.," xiv. 11,909.

82.

Osterode, le 22 mars 1807.[1]

M. le Prince de Bénévent, j'ai donné l'ordre à l'Intendant général de verser 200,000 fr. dans la caisse de la division bavaroise du Prince Royal pour un mois de solde. Mais comme cet ordre n'arrivera que dans 5 ou 6 jours, puisqu'il doit passer par Thorn, vous pouvez dire au payeur qui est à Varsovie de faire l'avance de cette somme et qu'il recevra sous peu de jours de son supérieur l'ordre de la verser. J'ai accordé 6000 paires de souliers à la même division; il va en arriver à Varsovie. Il est bien entendu que je ne veux pas qu'on touche aux 3 ou 4 mille paires qui sont restées à Varsovie à la disposition du général Lemarois pour donner aux hommes sortant des hospitaux.

Napoléon.

83.

Osterode, le 26 mars 1807.[2]

M. le Prince de Bénévent, vous trouverez ci-joint le rapport du commandant de Sierock.[3] Vous lui donnerez l'ordre de se rendre à Varsovie, où vous le ferez interroger en votre présence, par le général Lemarois. Si cet homme m'a menti, comme tout me porte à le penser, c'est un brouillon que je veux punir sévérement. Vous instruirez de cela M. de Vincent. Vous avez très bien fait de faire donner de l'argent aux boulangers et ouvriers. Mais écrivez à M. Daru pour qu'il fournisse à tous ces besoins.

Napoléon.

84.

Osterode, le 26 mars 1807.[2]

M. le Prince de Bénévent, je vous envoie le rapport de M. Daru sur vos propositions relatives aux approvisionnemens que le gouvernement polonais peut fournir à l'armée par le moyen des achâts. D'après cela je ne vois pas d'inconvénient à ce que vous autorisiez le commissaire ordonnateur Pradel à faire un marché.

Napoléon.

[1] Copy. Cf. the letter to the Crown Prince of Bavaria on the same day ("Corresp.," XIV. 12,118).

[2] Copy. [3] Cf. Talleyrand's answer, Bertrand, p. 391.

85.

Finkenstein, le 3 avril 1807.[1]

M. le Prince de Bénévent, je ne sais pas si je vous ai déjà écrit de notifier la naissance de la Princesse Josephine, fille du Viceroi d'Italie; si vous ne l'avez pas fait, écrivez à Paris pour qu'on expédie toutes les lettres de chancellerie.

Napoléon.

86.

Au château de Finkenstein, le 9 avril 1807.[1]

L'Empereur dicte: "M.[2] a dû vous envoyer la liste des nominations que j'ai faites pour les chevaux-légers polonais de la garde". Je savais fort bien que vous étiez Vice-Roi de Pologne, mon cher Prince, mais comme je savais aussi que cela ne vous amusait pas beaucoup, je n'ai pas été très-soigneux de vos attributions et j'ai envoyé la liste à votre directeur de la guerre. Au reste la voici, et je répare mon omission aussitôt qu'on me l'a fait remarquer et autant qu'elle est réparable. Recevez mes excuses et mes hommages.

Hugues Maret.

87.

Finkenstein, le 11 avril 1807.[1]

M. le Prince de Bénévent, on me dit que le génie manque d'argent pour les travaux de Sierock. S'il en est ainsi, faites en sorte d'y pourvoir, afin qu'il n'y ait aucune interruption dans les travaux.

Napoléon.

88.

Finkenstein, le 24 avril 1807.[1]

M. le Prince de Bénévent, le Prince Jérôme vient d'avoir un nouveaux succès en Silésie. Les £80,000 votés par le parlement anglais avaient donné le moyen à la garnison de Glatz de se recruter

[1] Copy.

[2] Cf. the letter to Talleyrand of the same date ("Corresp.," xv. 12,333): "M. Maret vous aura transmis le décret des nominations que j'ai faites dans ce corps (des chevaux-legers polonais)". A Polish cavalry regiment was to be included in the Imperial Guards.

de beaucoup de monde ; ils se sont portés sur Frankenstein : ils ont perdu dans la journée du 17 trois pièces de canon et 600 hommes, et ils ont été poursuivis jusques sous les glacis de la place.[1]

Napoléon.

89.

Finkenstein, le 25 avril 1807.[2]

M. le Prince de Bénévent, je vous envoie une lettre de Vienne qui arrive par Breslau.

Napoléon.

90.

Tilsit, le 21 juin 1807.[2]

M. le Prince de Bénévent, je reçois votre lettre du 17. Je vous ai écrit hier [3] de vous rendre à Königsberg. Je suppose que vous êtes parti pour y aller.

Napoléon.

91.

Tilsit, le 8 juillet 1807.[2]

M. le Prince de Bénévent, donnez l'ordre à M. de Lesseps [4] de se rendre sans délai à S. Pétersbourg pour y reprendre la fonction de consul général.

Napoléon.

II. Napoleon's Letters to Champagny.[5]

1.

Saint-Cloud, le 12 août 1807.[2]

M. Champagny, un grand nombre de députés des états du Roi de Westphalie arrivent tous les jours à Paris. Il est convenable que vous les connaissiez et que vous m'en remettiez les noms avec des notes qui m'instruisent du degré de considération dont ils

[1] Cf. Bulletin 72, "Corresp.," xv. 12,459.

[2] Copy.

[3] Cf. "Corresp.," xv. 12,782, and "Bertrand," p. 472.

[4] French Consul in St. Petersburg. In February he had come to Warsaw. Cf. "Bertrand," p. 299.

[5] On August 10th Champagny, hitherto Minister of the Interior, succeeded Talleyrand as Foreign Minister.

jouiraient. Cela me servira de règle pour la manière dont je veux les recevoir et pour ce que je devrais en faire.

Napoléon.

2.

Paris, le 16 août 1807.[1]

M. Champagny, écrivez à mon ministre à Florence [2] que, lorsque une colonne de 6000 h. que j'envoie d'Italie à Livourne aura dépassé Florence, il ait à déclarer que cette colonne est destinée a tenir garnison à Livourne et empêcher tout commerce des Anglais. Lorsque cette colonne sera arrivée à Livourne, il déclarera que j'ai ordonné la confiscation de toutes les marchandises anglaises provenant soit des fabriques soit du commerce anglais. Vous lui ferez connaître qu'il doit garder tout cela secret jusqu'à ce que cette colonne soit arrivée.[3]

Napoléon.

3.

Paris, le 19 août 1807.[1]

M. de Champagny, faites mettre dans le "Moniteur" à l'article "Copenhague" un détail de ce que fait l'escadre anglaise, sans restriction.[4]

Napoléon.

4.

Saint-Cloud, le 3 septembre 1807.[1]

M. de Champagny, je vous renvoie vos deux porte-feuilles. Faites mettre dans le "Moniteur" tout ce qui est relatif aux mesures prises en Hollande contre le commerce anglais.[5]

Napoléon.

Ci-joint une lettre pour la Reine d'Etrurie.

[1] Copy. [2] Beauharnais.

[3] Cf. the letter to Eugène on the same day ("Corresp.," xv. 13,039).

[4] The article appeared in the "Moniteur" of August 21st under "Copenhague, le 8 août".

[5] The article appeared in the "Moniteur" of September 5th under "Royaume de Hollande, Amsterdam, le 31 août".

5.

Rambouillet, ce 14 septembre 1807.[1]

M. de Champagny, écrivez au Vice-Roi pour vous plaindre de l'article des journaux de Milan, relatif aux affairs de Toscane. Ecrivez au ministre d'Espagne que la mésure qui a été prise à Livourne n'est que provisoire et est dirigée contre le commerce anglais, qui se fait avec la plus grande impudence dans ce pays et qui nuit à tout le reste d'Italie ; que, si la Reine d'Etrurie avait mis plus de fermeté avec ses ministres et eut poursuivi l'exécution des mesures prohibitives adoptées, cela ne fût pas arrivé ; que je suis du reste décidé à ne laisser à Livourne que la garnison nécessaire pour empêcher le commerce avec l'Angleterre et à retirer tout le reste des troupes, et que j'ai ordonné que le journaliste de Milan qui s'est permis un article douteux soit recherché et puni. Présentez-moi un projet de réponse à la Reine.[2]—Je ne connais pas bien ce que c'est que ce M. Bentinck qui a un port ; probablement qu'il sera compris dans le rapport que vous me ferez sur les petits ports qu'il est question d'interdire à l'Angleterre.

Napoléon.

6.

Saint-Cloud, ce 17 septembre 1807
à 11h du soir.[1]

M. de Champagny, je vous prie de venir demain au lever et de m'apporter la note que vous avez passée au cardinal légat qui paraît avoir porté la cour de Rome à changer d'opinion. Vous m'apporterez également ce que vous avez rédigé en conséquence de ce que je vous ai dicté ce matin.

Napoléon.

7.

Fontainebleau, le 19 octobre 1807.[1]

M. Champagny, je vous envoie un mémoire dont la communication n'est que pour vous seul. Je désire que vous me remettiez une note des discussions qui peuvent exister sur la délimitation des

[1] Copy.

[2] *Vide* the letter to the Queen ("Corresp.," xv. 13,168).

frontières entre la France et l'Espagne, telles que le Port de Passage et autres cessions de cette nature.

Napoléon.

P.S.—Remettez-moi également une statistique du Portugal.

8.

Fontainebleau, le 21 octobre 1807.[1]

M. de Champagny, je ne vois pas dans ces affaires de Rome qu'il soit question du tiers des cardinaux. Je vous prie de m'apporter aujourd'hui la lettre que vous avez écrite au Cardinal Bayanne et la note que vous avez envoyée à M. Alquier.

9.

Fontainebleau, ce 23 octobre 1807.[1]

M. de Champagny, M. Didelot[2] ne sait pas l'A. B. C. de son métier. Ce n'est pas en communiquant le traité qu'on lui envoie qu'un ministre négocie. Ce traité doit être regardé comme une instruction.

Napoléon.

10.

Fontainebleau, ce 27 octobre 1807.[3]

M. de Champagny, je vous envoie une lettre du Maréchal Soult dont vous lui accuserez la réception. Vous enverrez à M. Bourgoin à Varsovie la convention pour que le Roi de Saxe la ratifie, et il l'enverra après aux plénipotentiaires. Vous ferez connaître au Maréchal Soult qu'il n'y avait pas d'inconvénient à admettre les Saxons à la signature, puisque l'on a senti le besoin de faire ratifier la convention par le Roi de Saxe.[4] Quant à la seconde lettre du Maréchal Soult vous m'en ferez un rapport.

Napoléon.

[1] Copy.

[2] Ambassador in Denmark. Cf. "Corresp.," xvi. 13,215, and "De Clercq," ii. 237.

[3] Refers to a military road connecting Saxony with the Duchy of Warsaw, mentioned in the Elbing treaty between France and Prussia of October 13th, 1807.

[4] "De Clercq," ii. 229.

11.

Fontainebleau, le 31 octobre 1807.[1]

M. de Champagny, il faut répondre au ministre de Prusse que les troupes françaises n'évacueront que lorsque toutes les conditions de la convention faite avec le Maréchal Kalckreuth seront remplies ;[2] que déjà elles auraient évacué si, par une inertie qu'on a peine à concevoir, la cour de Memel avait (!) été deux mois entiers sans répondre ; qu'il ne doit donc laisser concevoir aucune fausse espérance.—Écrivez à mon consul général à Madrid que mes consuls à Porto et dans les autres ports du Portugal doivent quitter la résidence sitôt que les troupes françaises ou espagnoles y seront entrées.

Napoléon.

12.

s. d.
(October 1807).[3]

Note pour servir aux rapports du Ministre des Relations Extérieures.

Les Anglais méconnaissent la souveraineté de toutes les nations. Toutes les nations doivent donc se mettre en état de guerre contre les Anglais. Elles le doivent au sentiment de leur dignité, elles le doivent pour soutenir l'honneur de leurs peuples et l'indépendance de leurs couronnes ; elles le doivent aussi pour remplir toutes les obligations qui lient les souverains de l'Europe.

Les Anglais méconnaissent la souveraineté de toutes les puissances lorsqu'ils obligent les bâtimens navigant sous le pavillon d'une nation à recevoir la visite des vaisseaux anglais, à se détourner de la route où les conduit leur commerce et de la destination autorisée par leur souverain ; lorsque ces bâtimens sont entrainés dans les ports de l'Angleterre et que, sans égard pour les expéditions dont ils sont munis et pour le pavillon qu'ils portent, les Anglais les traitent comme s'ils étaient sans aveu et sans garantie. Par les règles de blocus, établies par les Anglais, ils ont insulté à

[1] Copy.

[2] "De Clercq," II. 223, the treaty of Königsberg, July 12th, 1807.

[3] Copy. Dictated probably by the Emperor as arguments for the proceedings against Portugal, and to produce the impression in public or at least in the Senate that the matter, which was due to his instigation, had only just been brought to his notice.

l'indépendance de tous les pavillons, ils ont violé le droit public de tous les temps qui établit qu'une place n'est en état de blocus que lorsqu'elle est bloquée par terre et par mer et en prévention d'être prise. Le droit de blocus préscrit alors que la place ne puisse recevoir aucune espèce de secours et avoir aucune sorte de communication. Mais en l'étendant à des ports non bloqués, á des empires entiers, à des côtes immenses sur lesquelles ils avaient à peine quelques bricks, quelques frégates, les Anglais ont violé le droit des puissances et attaqué non seulement leurs ennemis mais toutes les nations neutres.

Cependant, il n'est aucun souverain en Europe qui ne reconnaisse que, si son territoire venait d'être violé au détriment de Votre Majesté, il n'en fût responsable. Si un vaisseau français était saisi dans le port de Trieste ou dans celui de Lisbonne, le gouvernement de Lisbonne et le souverain à qui Trieste appartient regarderaient cette violence et ce dommage causé à des sujets de Votre Majesté comme un outrage personnel et n'hésiteraient point à contraindre, par la force, l'Angleterre à respecter leurs ports et leurs territoires. S'ils tenaient une conduite contraire, ils se constitueraient complices du tout fait par l'Angleterre à vos sujets et en état de guerre avec Votre Majesté. Au reste, quand le gouvernement portugais a souffert que les bâtimens fussent visités par les vaisseaux anglais, son indépendance a été violée, de son consentement, par l'outrage fait à son pavillon, comme elle l'aurait été si l'Angleterre avait violé son territoire. Votre Majesté s'était alors trouvé en droit, ou de lui proposer de faire cause commune avec Elle, en déclarant la guerre à l'Angleterre, ou de le considérer comme étant complice du mal qui résulterait pour les intérêts de Votre Majesté et comme s'étant mis en état de guerre avec Elle.

Le gouvernement portugais s'est refusé à confisquer les marchandises anglaises et à arrêter les Anglais voyageant en Portugal, comme une juste compensation des Français enlevés par les Anglais sur des bâtimens portugais et du sort que l'Angleterre, au moyen de cette lâche condescendance, a fait au commerce français. Je propose donc à Votre Majesté d'éxiger que le Portugal se mette en état de guerre avec l'Angleterre, unisse ses forces aux Vôtres et arrête les Anglais qui se trouvent sur son territoire, si non, de traiter le Portugal comme une puissance qui a renoncé à son indépendance, qui a laissé violer les intérêts de la France et l'honneur de son pavillon.

Sire, l'Europe a besoin de paix, le peüple anglais la désire, tandisque, profitant des circonstances où cette nation est sans souverain, un club d'olygarques furibonds, dirigés par les plus viles passions, proclame les principes d'une guerre éternelle. C'est en vain que dans des occasions si multipliées Votre Majesté à proposé des conditions honorables à l'Angleterre ; c'est en vain qu'Elle a accepté la médiation de l'Empereur Alexandre ; l'Angleterre a rejetté toutes ces offres ; elle n'a répondu à des propositions pacifiques que par ce cris affreux de guerre éternelle. Il ne reste plus à la France qu'un seul parti à prendré, c'est de proclamer une guerre générale contre l'Angleterre. Les furieux qui ont élevés ce cri atroce de guerre éternelle se sont placés hors du code des nations civilisées. Ils ne peuvent alimenter cette guerre sans terme qu'au moyen d'affronts faits au commerce de toutes les nations. Il faut donne que toutes les nations déclarent la guerre à l'Angleterre ; il faut donc qu'a l'exemple de la France, de l'Espagne, de la Russie, du Danemarc, toutes les puissances du continent se constituent en état d'hostilité avec le gouvernement britannique, si elles ne veulent pas que Votre Majesté, usant du droit qui lui serait alors acquis, les considère comme attendant des chances de cette guerre perpétuelle l'occasion de se déclarer Vos ennemis et comme déjà liés secrètement avec l'Angleterre.

Votre Majesté a 800,000 hommes sur pied. Aucun de ses ministres n'osera jamais lui conseiller de désarmer tant que l'Angleterre sera gouvernée par les hommes qui se sont faits une ressource et une systéme de la guerre perpétuelle. La prudence exige même davantage, et tout les jours Votre Majesté augmente la force de ses armées. Le continent ne cesse donc point d'être dans un véritable état de crise ; ceux qui lui causent tous les maux qui naissent de cette situation sont donc les ennemis du continent. Votre Majesté doit engager tous les souverains à ne plus écouter les agens de l'Angleterre, et à faire cause commune pour obliger les Anglais à consentir à une paix nécessaire au bonheur des nations. Puisque l'Angleterre refuse d'adhérer à des conditions équitables, la guerre de tout le continent contre l'Angleterre est l'intérêt du continent et le besoin de la génération présente. Votre Majesté, réunie à la Russie et à ses alliés, a le droit et le pouvoir d'exiger tout ce que peut vouloir la justice jointe à la puissance. L'Europe offrira donc le spectacle inoui dans l'histoire d'un peuple honni de tous les peuples et chassé de toutes les nations. Ce n'est pas cependant

que ce peuple ne soit estimable, qu'il ne se soit présenté avec avantage dans toutes les carrières qui honorent l'esprit humain ; ce n'est pas que ses souverains ne soient des hommes justes et généreux ; mais, dominée par une faction turbulente, la voix du souverain ne peut se faire entendre, et la nation languit, opprimée sous des charges sans exemple et sous un système aussi violent qu'il est injuste.

Ces idées doivent fournir la matière de deux rapports distincts. L'un, sur le Portugal, serait envoyé au Sénat le 5 novembre. On s'étudierait à poser les principes applicables à l'Autriche et aux autres puissances. L'autre serait envoyé au Sénat le 15 novembre, lorsqu'on se serait assuré que l'Autriche ne veut pas s'en tenir à des demimesures.

13.

Fontainebleau, le 3 novembre 1807.[1]

M. de Champagny, faites connaître au Sieur Bourrienne [2] que je ne conçois pas ce qu'il dit de Lubeck ; que la Trave et les autres rivières doivent être également fermées ; que son autorité s'étend aussi sur Brême et Lubeck, et qu'il doit même correspondre avec le Sieur Didelot pour que les mêmes mesures soient exécutées en Danemarc.

Napoléon.

14.

Paris, le 27 janvier 1808.[3]

M. de Champagny, envoyez un courrier extraordinaire en Espagne pour porter l'ordre au Sieur Beauharnais [4] de demander que le vaisseau de 120 canons "Le Prince des Asturies" et le vaisseau "Le Montanez" me soyent cédés, et qu'en place je céderai le vaisseau "l'Atlas" qui est à Vigo, de sorte que j'aie à Cadiz 8 vaisseaux, en comprenant ces 2 vaisseaux et le "San Justo" que le Roi d'Espagne a mis à ma disposition.—Faites également demander que des mesures efficaces soient prises pour

[1] Copy.

[2] French Ambassador in the Hanseatic towns. Cf. Vgl. Lecestre, "Lettres Inédites," I. n. 191.

[3] Copy. Cf. the letter to Champagny on the following day ("Corresp.," XVI. 13,495) and one to Decrés on the 27th ("Corresp.," XVI. 13,493).

[4] French Ambassador in Madrid since October, 1807.

faire armer à Cadiz 4 vaisseaux espagnols pour être prêts à se joindre à mon escadre et la porter à 12 vaisseaux.—Faites réitérer aussi la demande que l'escadre de Carthagène se rende à Toulon.

Napoléon.

15.

Paris, ce 30 janvier 1808.[1]

M. de Champagny, il est convenable que vous envoyiez aux journaux de Francfort, pour que cela parte de là, tous les détails relatifs à la reception qu'on a faite à mon ambassadeur Caulaincourt à S. Pétersbourg. Il n'est pas hors de propos que tous ces petits détails qui font connaître la considération qu'on a pour cet ambassadeur se répandent en Europe.—Il faut aussi faire insérer fréquemment dans ces journaux des nouvelles de Jassy, de Bukarest, et même de Constantinople, qui fassent légèrement connaître que les Russes occupent toujours les deux provinces au grand déplaisir des Turcs.

Napoléon.

16.

Paris, le 8 mars 1808.[2]

Le narré qui précède les pièces relatives à l'affaire du Prince des Asturies est bon comme introduction. Mais il faut y joindre toutes les pièces officielles, comme édits du Roi, lettres du Prince, sentences, ordres d'exil, imprimés et fragmens de bulletins auxquels cette affaire a donné lieu et qui peuvent y jeter du jour.

Il faut finir par dire en résultat que les cris de la nation, le calme et la fermeté des principaux accusés, l'énergie de quelques juges ont constaté l'innocence du Prince des Asturies; qu'on l'a

[1] Copy. A German translation of the letter was published by Wertheimer in the "Neue Wiener Tagblatt" of April 2nd, 1889.

[2] Original. Entirely in Méneval's handwriting, but Napoleon's dictation is unmistakable. The query about Alexander, who was to cut the Gordian knot, and his annoyance at being out of pocket for the army and the fleet, would alone betray him. He had commissioned Champagny to draw up a pamphlet on Spanish affairs which he here criticises and returns to have redrafted from the point of view suggested. This revision was carried out and the pamphlet printed but not published. According to Masson, who quotes passages from it, it was entitled: "Précis sur les derniers événements de la Cour de Madrid par un patriote espagnol" ("Napoléon et sa famille," IV. 208).

innocenté par une grâce, et que dès lors la Reine et le Prince de la Paix, qui ont pour but de perdre ce jeune prince, paraissent avoir gagné la moitié de leur procès. Comment placer en effet sur le trône un prince déshonoré qui n'a échappé à l'échafaud que par la grâce que lui a accordée son père ? qu'il y a donc une incertitude, qui intéresse les Espagnoles et leurs amis, sur les suites nécessaires de l'hérédité du trône.

Si le Prince est coupable, pourquoi ne l'a-t-on pas traduit aux Cortès ? S'il est innocent, pourquoi ne pas le déclarer et punir ses calomniateurs ? Voilà ce que demandent les Espagnols de sens. Qui dénouera ce noeud gordien et éclaircira cet horizon nébuleux qui plane sur l'Espagne ?

Il faut appuyer sur les dilapidations du Prince de la Paix, sur ses immenses richesses, sur son origine, parler en détail de ses intrigues criminelles avec la Reine, d'abord de son métier de favori en titre, ensuite de favori servant les gouts honteux de cette princesse, de Malo et autres amans qu'il a donnés à la Reine ; (il faut parler de tout cela avec décence, mais cependant de manière à ce que cela soit senti) ; de ses liaisons avec tous les hommes d'affaires, de la part d'intérêt qu'il prend dans toutes les affaires du Roi, de sa vénalité et de sa corruption, de l'éloignement des grands d'Espagne, de la décadence de ce royaume, de la nullité dont il est pour la cause commune, de l'emploi de l'argent qui est appliqué à toute autre chose qu'à entretenir l'armée et la marine.

Ce mémoire doit être triple de ce qu'il est, il doit paraître l'ouvrage, non d'un Français, mais d'un Espagnol.

Il faut citer le grand nombre d'Espagnols exilés par la seule raison qu'ils avaient de la probité et des lumières, faire sentir le ridicule du système politique, dire que l'on a commencé par laisser la France faire seule la guerre à l'Angleterre, comme s'il n'était pas évident que, dès que les Anglais auraient rassemblé leurs vaisseaux, ils tomberaient sur les Espagnols ; que par cette fausse mesure on a exposé 4 frégates chargées d'or à être prises ; qu'aucun secours ni avis n'a été envoyé aux colonies. Il faut parler de la honte pour l'Espagne, de n'être pas maîtresse de Gibraltar, autrefois maîtresse de l'Europe ; des mauvais procédés de l'Espagne envers la France, d'abord en laissant entrer une armée française pour faire la guerre en Portugal et en faisant brusquement la paix ; 2. en entrant à l'époque de la 3ème coalition dans des intrigues qui furent déjouées par les événemens d'Ulm, mais qui n'en furent pas moins alors à

la connaissance de tout le monde; 3. par la fameuse proclamation et en faisant une levée de bouclier déconcertée par le succès inattendu d'Jéna. Il faut attribuer à ces trois causes la précaution qu'a prise l'Empereur Napoléon de faire appuyer son armée de Portugal par trois corps d'armées qui la misent à l'abri de la mauvaise foi de l'homme qui dirige les affaires d'Espagne.

Il faut prendre la Reine telle qu'elle est, le Roi tel qu'il est, comme un bon homme, mais sans caractère ni lumières, mettre du pathos et des sentimens patriotiques espagnoles, invoquant les mânes des conquérans du Mexique, du Cid, les beaux tems de la monarchie espagnole de Charles V.

Lorsque ce pamphlet sera approuvé on le fera traduire par un bon traducteur en deux jours, et on le fera répandre en Espagne.

(On the margin): Renvoyé à Monsieur de Champagny. Il est nécessaire que j'aie cette petite brochure le 10.

Napoléon.

16.

Bayonne, le 26 avril 1808.[1]

M. de Champagny, écrivez à M. de Caulaincourt que je désapprouve qu'il ait pris sur lui d'écrire au M^al Victor; il doit me rendre compte et se borner là. Il n'a point d'ordre à donner à mes généraux, ni de correspondance à tenir avec aucun.

Napoléon.

17.

Paris, ce mars 1808.[1]

M. de Champagny, je vous envoie un projet de lettre tel que M. Alopéus [2] pourrait l'écrire; faites le mettre au net et rapportez-le moi demain, afin que je prenne un parti définitif là-dessus.

Napoléon.

18.

Saint-Cloud, le 26 mars 1808.[1]

M. de Champagny, je suppose que vous avez envoyé au S^r Daru la copie de la convention que vous avez passée avec les députés polonais, afin qu'il y fasse les observations qu'il jugerait convenable.

Napoléon.

[1] Copy.

[2] Russian Ambassador in London.

19.

Saint-Cloud, le 29 mars 1808.[1]

M. de Champagny, il faut consulter l'article du traité de Tilsit, relatif à la pension du duc de Brunswick et répondre à M. de Tolstoy que cet article sera exécuté sans délai.[2]

Napoléon.

20.

Bayonne, le 14 mai 1808.[1]

M. de Champagny, je ne vois pas d'inconvénient à ce que vous autorisiez M. de Labrador à se rendre à Florence.

Napoléon.

21.

Marac, le 19 mai 1808.[1]

M. de Champagny, je vous envoie des dépêches que je reçois de Madrid ; voyez ce que c'est et chargez-vous de les faire partir par les trois bricks que je vais expédier. N'envoyez que ce qui est nécessaire et gardez des exemplaires, s'il en reste, pour les frégates que je veux faire partir demain soir. Le petit brick peut être expédié pour l'Amérique méridionale. S'il pouvait partir dans trois jours, il faudrait l'expédier. Voyez le commissaire de la marine et faites le marché nécessaire.

Napoléon.

22.

Bayonne, le 21 mai 1808.[1]

M. de Champagny, envoyez à l'intendant général de la Grande armée[3] l'etat que vous a remis le S^r^ Serra[4] et faites voir s'ils sont d'accord.

Napoléon.

23.

Bayonne, le 21 mai 1808.[1]

M. de Champagny, si le corsaire qui est arrivé hier était dans le cas de partir bientôt, on pourrait l'expédir pour la Guadeloupe et le chargerait d'un duplicata des dépêches espagnoles.

Napoléon.

[1] Copy.

[2] It is the 6th secret article in the separate treaty of Paris ("Martins," XIII. 320). Tolstoi was Russian Ambassador in Paris.

[3] Daru.

[4] French Ambassador in Stuttgart.

24.

Bayonne, le 28 mai 1808.[1]

M. de Champagny, un bâtiment américain, chargé de denrées coloniales escorté par les Anglais, est entré à Trieste. Ecrivez-en à Andréossy[2] et à mon consul, et faites porter les plus grandes plaintes sur cette affaire.

Napoléon.

25.

Bayonne, le 9 juin 1808.[1]

M. de Champagny, je désire que vous me fassiez un rapport sur la proposition contenue dans la dépêche du Sr Larochefoucauld de réunir à la France les pays hollandais jusqu'à la Meuse, et de donner une indemnité au Roi de Hollande.[3]

Napoléon.

26.

Bayonne, le 7 juillet 1808.[1]

M. de Champagny, je ne me souviens pas de ce que c'est que les 600,000 frcs que le Roi de Saxe a fait verser aux termes de la convention du 10 mai[4] dans les mains de l'agent envoyé par le Sr Labouillerie.[5] Donnez-moi des explications là-dessus.

Napoléon.

27.

s. d.
(Juillet 1808.)[6]

M. de Champagny, je désire que vous écriviez à Monsieur de Metternich une lettre confidentielle dans laquelle Vous lui direz à peu près ceci : "Quel esprit de vertige s'est emparé des esprits à Vienne? Vous avertissez partout de se tenir prêts à marcher pour

[1] Copy.

[2] French Ambassador in Vienna. Cf. the letters to Champagny on May 26th and July 11th ("Corresp.," XVII. 13,992, 14,177).

[3] Larochefoucauld was French Ambassador at The Hague. Cf. Rocquain, "Napoleon et le Roi Louis," p. 178.

[4] *Vide* the treaty in De Clercq, II. 250.

[5] Paymaster to the Grande Armée.

[6] Copy. Unsigned. The approximate date is indicated by Champagny's letter of July 27th, 1808, to Metternich, which along with others was published as a supplement to the minister's proposal of April

la défense de la patrie; quel ennemi la menace? Vous mettez toute la population sous les armes, vos princes parcourent les champs comme des chevaliers errans. Que direz vous si vos voisins en font autant? Vous provoquez donc une crise? Assurés, comme nous le sommes, que vous n'avez aucune liaison avec la Russie, le secours de l'Angleterre ne vous serait d'aucune utilité. L'Empereur a peine à concevoir ce que vous voulez; il n'a donné jusqu'ici aucun ordre à ses troupes. Pouvez-vous me dire confidentiellement ce que tout cela veut dire, et le moyen d'empêcher que ceci ne tourne en crise? Par ces armemens extraordinaires vous indiquez à vos voisins le besoin d'armer. Jusqu'à ce moment l'Empereur a tout retenu et a écrit que, ne pouvant croire à une telle folie, il fallait attendre, ce que l'on voulait. Les lettres de votre commerce, de vos négocians disent que votre cour est tournée à la guerre, que tout ce qu'elle fait ressemble à ce que fesait la Prusse en 1806, que l'alarme est grande chez vous, et, dans le fait, si vous ne voulez rien, pourquoi perdre tant d'argent, alarmer votre peuple et détériorer votre change? Vous entendez bien que, si vous persistez dans vos armemens, l'Empereur prendra un parti; il armera aussi, mais, certainement, s'il vous laisse faire sans témoigner aucune inquiétude, vous vous ôtez tout moyen de négocier sur les affaires à venir de l'Europe, car l'Empereur ne s'entendra jamais avec une puissance qui, se présentant avec une attitude hostile et menaçante pour négocier, s'en interdit par là le pouvoir. Cette lettre est toute confidentielle, mais jettez quelques regard sur les affaires de chez vous. Après de grandes crises, votre patrie est en bonne situation. Voulez-vous perdre tout cela? L'Empereur veut encore ignorer vos armemens. Je vous écris confidentiellement. Faites qu'on licencie cette garde nationale qu'on lève chez vous; laissez en repos vos cultivateurs, vos soldats; menagez votre argent et ne menacez personne." Il faut que cette lettre soit douce, mesurée, dans la forme confidentielle, mais qu'elle laisse cependant entrevoir ce qui arrivera.

12th, 1809, in the "Moniteur" of April 24th. A comparison of the two letters reveals the fact that various passages are identical with the Emperor's directions, e.g. "Vos princes parcourent vos provinces. . . ."; "Toute la population est mise sous les armes . . ."; "aucun concours à attendre de la Russie, l'Angleterre ne peut lui être que médiocrement utile . . ."; "une puissance qui prend une attitude hostile et menacante," etc.

28.

Saint-Cloud, le 6 septembre 1808.[1]

M. de Champagny, je désire que vous présentiez demain à ma signature une circulaire aux Rois de Bavière, de Saxe, de Westphalie, de Wurtemberg, aux Grands Ducs de Bade, de Hesse-Darmstadt, de Wurtzbourg et au Prince Primat, rédigée selon le projet ci-joint.[2]

29.

Saint-Cloud, le 14 septembre 1808[3]

M. de Champagny, expédiez un courrier extraordinaire pour porter les lettres ci-jointes à Carlsruhe, à Stuttgard, et à Munich.[4] Vous écrirez par ce courrier au S^r^ Otto de le renvoyer sur Francfort avec les nouvelles qu'il aurait. Ce courrier devra être rendu le 23 à Francfort où il m'attendra.

Napoléon.

30.

Erfurt, le 10 octobre 1808.[3]

M. de Champagny, vous répondrez à M. de Dreyer[5] que j'accorde au Danemarc la quantité de poudre qu'il demande et que je donne des ordres en conséquence au P^ce^ de Neufchâtel, auquel il peut s'adresser.

Napoléon.

31.

Erfurt, le 12 octobre 1808.[3]

Renvoyé à M. de Champagny pour faire faire des copies de cette lettre et les transmettre aux Princes de la confédération avec la lettre que je leur écris et dont la minute est ci-jointe.[6]

Napoléon.

[1] Copy. Unsigned.

[2] The enclosure is awanting. Cf. "Corresp.," XVII. 14,294.

[3] Copy.

[4] The invitations to Erfurt. Cf. Schlossberger, "Korrespondenz Friedrichs," I. p. 107.

[5] Danish Ambassador in Paris.

[6] Appendix in the "Corresp.," XVII. 14,382.

32.

Saint-Cloud, le 24 octobre 1808.[1]

M. de Champagny, écrivez au Sr Hédouville[2] de se rendre sans délai à Bayonne et de faire en sorte d'y être le 5 novembre.

Napoléon.

33.

Burgos, le 17 novembre 1808.[1]

M. de Champagny, j'approuve les croix que le Roi de Saxe veut donner au général Suchet et au Sr de Montesquiou.

Napoléon.

34.

Burgos, le 19 novembre 1808.[1]

M. de Champagny, écrivez à mes consuls à Naples et à Trieste pour savoir si ce qu'on m'assure est vrai que le Roi de Naples à permis le commerce dans ses états avec les Anglais, de manière que les lois du blocus ne sont plus observées, et que les denrées coloniales sont reçus dans ses ports.—Donnez des ordres à mon ambassadeur pour que tous les biens appartenant aux Espagnols dans le Royaume de Naples soient confisqués. La moitié de ce Royaume appartient aux grands d'Espagne. Ces biens me sont nécessaires pour indemniser les Français qui ont été pillés en Espagne. Il faut que les revenus soient versés dans une caisse particulière à Naples. Préscrivez la même chose pour le Royaume d'Italie, et parlez-en à Marescalchi.

Napoléon.

35.

Burgos, le 20 novembre 1808.[1]

M. de Champagny, je vous ai envoyé hier ma réponse à la note anglaise et une lettre pour M. de Romanzow.[3] Je suppose que vous avez envoyé un courrier au général Caulaincourt pour lui faire connaître les événemens d'Espagne, afin qu'il les communique à l'Empereur, et pour lui porter les derniers "Moniteurs". Vous avez vu, par le dernier bulletin, notre entrée à S. Ander et notre marche sur Madrid.

Napoléon.

[1] Copy.

[2] French Ambassador to King Joseph (Cf. "Corresp.," XVII. 14,099).

[3] *Vide* "Corresp.," XVII. 14,488 and 14,491.

36.

Aranda de Duero, le 28 novembre 1808.[1]

M. de Champagny, mettez la lettre ci-jointe dans vos premiers paquets pour S. Pétersbourg. Les différens bulletins vous auront fait voir que les choses vont ici au mieux. Il ne peut y avoir que du bien que, de Flessingue à Calais, on donne des "Moniteurs," où il y a des bulletins, aux pêcheurs, pour qu'ils les portent aux Anglais.

Napoléon.

37.

Aranda, le 29 novembre 1808.[1]

M. de Champagny, je reçois votre lettre du 20. Je crois vous avoir mandé d'expédier sous les huit ou dix jours un courrier à S. Pétersbourg, surtout lorsqu'il y a des bulletins marquants.

Napoléon.

38.

Madrid, le 12 décembre 1808.[1]

M. de Champagny, j'ai reçu votre lettre du 1er relative aux affaires de Bade. Je suppose que, conformément aux ordres que j'ai donnés, vous avez fait arrêter les individus impliqués dans cette intrigue. Mon intention est qu'ils soyent traduits devant une commission du Conseil d'Etat.—Faites faire les démarches convenables pour que les Français ne soyent pas chicanés pour les prises. Je ne puis pas prescrire les mesures de détail, je vous en charge.

P.S.—Remettez la lettre ci-jointe à M. de Romanzoff.

Napoléon.

39.

Madrid, le 22 décembre 1808.[1]

M. de Champagny, l'estaffette partie de Paris le 12 a été prise. Heureusement ce n'est pas celle qui portait la réponse de l'Angleterre et le courrier de Russie. Vous sentez l'importance de mettre en chiffre les choses qui en valent la peine, en vous servant du chiffre du Sr Laforêt, en attendant que vous m'en ayez envoyé un, quoique cependant de nouvelles précautions ont été prises pour la sûreté des estaffettes.

Napoléon.

[1] Copy.

III. Napoleon's Letters to Maret.

(In addition to the unedited letters from Napoleon to Talleyrand in the Vienna State archives, there are numerous letters of 1813 from the Emperor to Maret, all of them copies. The unedited letters in this series are here given.)

1.

Paris, le 29 janvier 1813.

M. le Duc de Bassano, je vous envoye un article traduit des journaux anglais qui paraît ministériel et qui est très remarquable.[1]

Napoléon.

2.

Goerlitz, le 21 mai 1813.

M. le Duc de Bassano, écrivez au Baron de Serra[2] pour qu'il voye le ministre saxon, afin de compléter d'abord le contingent du Roi, mais avant tout, pour organiser le plus promptement possible l'artillerie du corps saxon. Il faut à ce corps 36 bouches à feu, et dans ce moment il n'y en a que 12. Il faut un approvisionnement et demi attelé, et il n'y a qu'un demi approvisionnement. Dans les bouches à feu il faut une batterie de 6 pièces de 12. C'est un objet très important et cela peut se faire très promptement. On doit veiller à ce que dans peu de jours toute cette artillerie, personnel et matériel, parte de Torgau pour joindre le corps du général Reynier. Vous ferez aisément comprendre que ce manque d'artillerie expose les hommes à une plus forte perte. Il faut également compléter la cavalerie. Outre ce qui en est revenu de Bohème, il y a plusieurs centaines de chevaux qu'on peut employer à l'armée.

Napoléon.

3.

Neumarkt, le 4 juin 1813.

M. le Duc de Bassano, je vous renvoye les dèpêches qui arrivent de M. Alquier.[3]

Napoléon.

[1] The enclosure is awanting.

[2] French Ambassador in Dresden.

[3] Ambassador in Denmark (cf. "Corresp.," xxv. 20,088).

4.

Neumarkt, le 4 juin 1813,
à 4 heures du soir.

M. le Duc de Bassano, vous trouverez ci-joint la copie de l'armistice qui vient d'être signé. Il n'y a pas d'inconvénient à le faire mettre dans le journal de Dresde et dans celui de Leipsick. Envoyez le à Alquier par un courrier qui, en passant, le remettra au P^ce^ d'Eckmühl, Envoyez-le en Italie par un courrier qui, en passant, le remettra à Munich. Je ne crois pas qu'il faille, à cette occasion, envoyer un courrier extraordinaire à Vienne. Je serai demain, le 5, à Liegnitz, et je vais, de ma personne, avec ma vieille garde m'approcher de Dresde. Toute l'armée restera à Liegnitz et sur la ligne. Faites écrire par les ministres du Roi de Saxe à Luckau et à Torgau. Je suppose que l'état-major aura déjà envoyé l'armistice au général Durosnel ; si ce général ne l'avait pas encore reçu, remettez-lui en une copie pour qu'il l'envoye à Leipsick, à Dessau et partout. Il le signifiera aux avant-postes et aux quartiers russes.

Napoléon.

5.

Dresde, ce 6 juillet 1813.

M. le Duc de Bassano, faites connaître, par mon ministre à Würtzbourg, que je désire que le Grand-Duc envoye à l'armée un nouveau bataillon de 1000 hommes. On pourra y incorporer les détachements composés de vieux soldats qui avaient été laissés pour la garde des forts sur le Mein.

Napoléon.

6.

Magdebourg, le 12 juillet 1813.

M. le Duc de Bassano, mon intention est que, sur l'extraordinaire de votre budget, un million soit mis à votre disposition pour donner des secours aux refugiés espagnols. Il faudra nommer une commission pour la répartition de ces secours. Je désire qu'elle soit présidée par le Comte Otto,[1] qui verra, avec l'ambassadeur d'Espagne, comment cette commission doit être composée et quels sont les réfugiés auxquels il est le plus urgent de donner des secours.

Napoléon.

[1] After his recall from Vienna, Otto was made Minister of State.

7.

Dresde, le 18 juillet 1813.

M. le Duc de Bassano, écrivez au Baron Reinhard [1] afin de connaître ce qui retarde le départ des 1ères et 2des compagnies du 10ème bataillon des équipages militaires qui s'organisent à Cassel.

Napoléon.

8.

Dresde, le 3 septembre 1813.

M. le Duc de Bassano, faites connaître à mon ministre à Cassel que j'ai autorisé le Duc de Valmy à fournir 500 h. de cavalerie légère du dépôt de Francfort pour le régiment de Jérôme Napoléon.

Napoléon.

9.

Dresde, le 30 septembre 1813.

M. le Duc de Bassano, faites connaître au Bon de S'Aignan [2] qu'il sonne mal à propos l'alarme sur tous mes derrières. La lettre du bailli elle-même montre que ce n'est qu'un parti peu important qui rôde de ce côté. Sa nouvelle de Thielmann est controuvée.

Napoléon.

Comment depuis le temps que ce ministre est là a-t-il si peu . . .[3] *et si peu de moyens d'être instruit.*[4]

IV. The Emperor Francis to the King of Prussia and to the Czar of Russia.[5]

Gitschin, le 3 juillet 1813.

Monsieur mon frère! Je charge le Comte de Stadion de soumettre à V. M. les motifs puissans, qui m'ont engagé à proposer à

[1] French Ambassador in Cassel.

[2] French Ambassador to the ducal Courts of Saxony.

[3] Gaps in the manuscript.

[4] The postscript is in Napoleon's handwriting. The copyist adds: "On a souligné ces dernières lignes parce qu'elles étaient ajoutées de la main de Napoléon".

[5] Except in a few details the text of the two letters is identical. The one given here is the letter to the King of Prussia. Cf. Luckwaldt, "Oesterreich und die Anfänge des Befreiungskrieges," p. 332.

V. M.[1] un article additionel à la convention du 27 juin, qui prorogerait au 10 août prochain l'epoque du 20 juillet, fixée comme terme de la négociation qui va s'ouvrir à Prague entre les plénipotentiaires des puissances belligérantes sous ma médiation. Je me flatte que V. M. voudra bien partager avec moi la conviction que la faible perte de tems qui, d'un côté, résulte pour les opérations actives des armées alliées de cette prolongation, se trouve d'un autre côté très compensé par l'éloignement de tout danger imminent pour ma capitale—circonstance du plus haut intérêt—à l'ouverture de la campagne, et par un plus grand développement que je pourrai donner aux forces que je m'empresse d'activer sur plusieurs points exposés de ma monarchie, sans affaiblir l'armée principale destinée à agir de concert avec celles de V. M., au cas où mes efforts pour amener la paix seraient infructueux et n'auraient pu être couronné de succès dans le terme indiqué. Je prie V. M. d'être bien assurée, qu'il m'a fallu des considérations telles qu'Elle les trouvera exprimées dans un mémoire militaire que je charge le Comte de Stadion de Lui soumettre, et la certitude que les mesures militaires françaises se trouveront aussi prêtes le 20 juillet qu'elles le seront le 10 août et n'obtiendront aucune augmentation dans ce court laps de tems, pour avoir pu me déterminer à cette légère extension de l'article premier stipulé dans la convention de Reichenbach.

La sagesse qui caractérise V. M. ne me laisse pas lieu de douter qu'Elle appréciera la valeur de ces raisons, et peut-être trouvera-t-Elle également des avantages à ce délai en ce qu'il facilitera l'organisation ultérieure de ses propres mesures et le rassemblement des corps détachés de la grande armée aux lieux où Elle les aura destinés, surtout dès qu'il n'améliore pas la forte attitude de l'Empereur des Français.

Si V. M. devait juger utile de se faire accompagner par le Comte de Stadion dans la course qu'Elle va faire à Trachenberg, je m'estimerais heureux, si la commission dont je charge ce ministre près du Prince Royal de Suède pouvait influer favorablement sur les résolutions de ce Prince. Je regarde une forte opération dirigée par lui dans un accord parfait avec Nos Armées comme du plus haut intérêt, et je crois que le faible éloignement du renouvellement des hostilités ne sera pas inutile au concert militaire et politique sur lequel il s'agira de s'entendre au plutôt avec lui.

[1] Russian letter: "Le Comte de Metternich que j'envois conférer avec le Comte de Nesselrode développera à celui-ci les motifs puissans qui m'ont porté à proposer à V. M. J." . . .

Il est superflu sans doute que je renouvelle à V. M. plus que je ne l'ai fait l'assurance des voeux que je forme pour le prompt rétablissement d'une paix telle que nous la désirons et que l'exige le bonheur de Nos Etats et de ma détermination la moins sujette à varier, de défendre la justice de Notre cause par la somme de moyens les plus imposants possibles.[1]

Unis par principes et par un commun intérêt, mais plus encore par les sentimens d'amitié inaltérable que je voue à V. M., j'aime à croire qu'Elle appréciera la confiance entière[2] avec laquelle je m'adresse à Elle et qu'Elle agréera les assurances du plus sincère attachement comme de la considération très distinguée avec laquelle je suis, etc.[3]

V. Metternich to Maret.

Prague, le 21 août 1813.[4]

Je m'empresse d'adresser á V. E. un office qui lui prouvera que les Cours de Russie et de Prusse ont accueillies avec le même sentiment que l'Empereur mon Maître la proposition de S. M. l'Empereur des Français. Le courrier porteur de la proposition à l'Angleterre partira encore aujourdhui. Comme c'est à cette puissance principalement à se déclarer sur le grand objet en question, nous partirons dans nos ouvertures de tout ce qu'il peut y avoir de points de veu conciliatoires. Quel est l'endroit que V. E. jugerait le plus propre à la réunion des négociateurs? Je désire beaucoup connaître les idées du cabinet français sur cet objet pour tâcher de les combiner le plus possible avec les nôtres. Je prie V. E. de bien vouloir faire passer l'incluse à M. de Floret à Paris. Je la Lui envoye sub volanti pour qu'Elle puisse prendre connaissance de son objet. M. de Lablanche et les autres individus attachés à

[1] In the Russian letter: ". . . La justice de la cause pour laquelle V. M. deploye de si beaux et de si génereux efforts par la somme de". . . .

[2] In the Russian letter: "La confiance entière et la franchise".

[3] In the Russian letter: ". . . Les assurances du plus sincère et cordial attachement comme de la haute considération avec". . . .

[4] W. St. A., "Prager Kongressakten," draft in Metternich's handwriting with the remark; "Lettre particulière au Duc de Bassano. Expédiée le 3 septembre, passée aux avant-postes le 3 septembre". The letter was intended to accompany the note of the same day (published by Fain, "Manuscript de 1813," p. 221) and to be the reply to the note of 18th August from Maret (Fain, *ibid.*, p. 217) who had proposed negotiations during the hostilities.

l'ambassade de France à Vienne ont à l'heure qu'il est pris la route de la Bavière. Nous dirigerons sur la même route M. d'Aubernon. Je me flatte que M. le Duc de Vicence aura prévenu l'Empereur Napoléon que l'Empereur mon Maître adressera toujours au quartier général de S. M. I. ses lettres pour son auguste fille et qu'Elle désire recevoir de ses nouvelles par la même voye. Recevez. . . .[1]

VI. Graf Neipperg to Metternich.[2]

Florence, le 1er Octobre 1821.

L'abbé Vignali, comme j'ai eu l'honneur d'en faire mention dans mon rapport, n'a pas voulu accepter les secours en argent que

[1] To this letter Maret sent the following reply, in his own handwriting :—

"Dresde, le 3 septembre 1813.

"Monsieur le Comte.

"Je reçois en ce moment la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 21 août et l'office qui y était joint. Je ne pouvais apprendre, M. le Comte, qu'avec beaucoup de satisfaction l'accueil fait à la proposition contenue dans ma note du 18 du mois dernier. Quant à l'endroit le plus propre à la réunion des négociateurs, le choix en lui-même me paraît indifférent ; que ce choix tombe sur un lieu quelconque situé sur les limites réciproques, ou entre Prague et Dresde, ou entre Prague et Würzbourg, il nous conviendra également. S. M. a écrit à l'Empereur d'Autriche après la bataille de Dresde. Les Russes ont arrêté le parlementaire porteur de cette lettre. S. M. l'Empereur Alexandre a fait exprimer des regrets de cet incident. Nous avons été obligés d'envoyer la lettre de l'Empereur à Zittau, d'où nous pensons qu'elle sera parvenue sans obstacle. A la date de nos dernières nouvelles de France, S. M. l'Impératrice était à Cherbourg où Elle jouissait d'une bonne santé et d'un spectacle qui l'intéressait beaucoup. S. M. l'Impératrice n'a point encore envoyé de lettres pour son auguste père ; aussitôt qu'il en parviendra, ellos seront adressées au quartier général du Pce de Schwarzenberg. Celles qui arriveront pour S. M. l'Impératrice au quartier gén. de l'Empereur seront expédiées sur le champ. J'ai l'honneur de vous renvoyer la lettre qui vous m'avez adressée pour M. de Floret. Je prie V. E. de permettre que je place sous ce pli ma réponse à une lettre très obligeante qu'il m'a écrite au moment de son départ de Paris. Veuillez agréer, M. le Comte, tous mes remercîmens des soins que vous avez bien voulu donner au retour des personnes attachées à l'ambassade de France à Vienne et à celui de M. Aubernon. J'ai l'honneur. . . .

"Le Duc de Bassano."

[2] Schlitter, "Die Stellung der österr. Regierung zum Testamente Napoleons I" (Archiv. f. öst. Gesch., Bd. 80), p. 27, quotes a passage from this letter bearing on the will.

S. M. Mme l'Archiduchesse m'avait ordonné de lui faire passer pour la continuation de son voyage à Rome.[1] Cette auguste princesse, voulant pourtant faire quelque chose pour celui qui avait assisté son déffunt époux sur son lit de mort, m'ordonna de lui remettre une bague sans chiffre à peu près de la valeur de mille francs, en lui faisant promettre de n'en faire mention vis-à-vis de personne, ce qu'il fit sans difficulté. Voyant que ce prêtre était très touché des bontés de S. M., je lui fis encore diverses questions auxquelles il me répondit avec beaucoup de franchise.

Je lui dis derechef que S. M. savait parfaitement qu'il existait quelque part un testament de feu son époux mais qu'Elle ignorait où il était et son contenu, que ce qui l'étonnait qu'Elle avait été instruite que plusieurs membres de la famille Bonaparte en connaissaient les détails et ne s'en cachaient point. Sur cette assertion je vis que l'abbé Vignali se troublait assez visiblement, et il me répliqua à diverses reprises que c'était impossible, que ce ne pourrait pas être, vû que personne, excepté les exécuteurs testamentaires, le général Bertrand et le Comte de Montholon, ne pouvait en être instruite, qu'ils avaient besoin encore de quelque temps pour mettre ordre à une affaire aussi importante, que S. M. ait seulement l'extrême bonté de prendre patience, qu'Elle serait instruite exactement des dernières volontés du déffunt. Il y ajouta encore que, tant que MM. de Bertrand et de Montholon seraient en Angleterre, il leur serait impossible de mettre la main à l'ouvrage, qu'à son départ de Londres le Comte de Montholon avait déjà eu la permission de rentrer en France, et que le Maréchal Suchet avait fait part au Comte de Bertrand qui le Roi était très bien disposé pour lui, et qu'infalliblement l'arrêt prononcé contre lui serait levé sous peu. L'Abbé Vignali me répliqua à diverses reprises qu'il ne fallait pas s'attendre à des richesses parceque l'Empereur n'en possédait pas, qu'à Ste Hélène il recevait ses fonds de la Compagnie. (Il m'assura qu'a commencer du gén. Bertrand toute la suite était payée sur le même pied que jadis en France, et exactement jusqu'au dernier instant.)

Je le questionnai en suite sur les fragments de mémoires que le déffunt pouvait avoir laissé. Il me répondit positivement qu'il y avait plus que des fragments, et même des mémoires écrits avec suite. Je ne pus jamais obtenir de lui qu'il me dit où ils se trouvaient et par quels moyens ils avaient été soustraits à la surveil-

[1] Neipperg is here referring to the despatch of September 29th.

lance du gouverneur de Ste Hélène et envoyés en Europe. A la demande que je lui fis, pourquoi le docteur Andromacchi (!) n'avait pas voulu signer avec les médecins anglais le rapport fait lors de l'ouverture du corps du déffunt, il me répondit que ce médecin, quoique ce fut lui qui était chargé de l'opération, n'avait point été invité par les chirurgiens anglais à signer l'acte, que d'ailleurs le docteur n'était point du même avis qu'eux, qui attribuaient la cause de la mort à une lésion de l'estomac, tandis que lui croyait quil était mort d'une maladie au foie, que d'ailleurs le docteur Andromacchi publierait un mémoire circonstantié sur la maladie et la mort du déffunt.

L'abbé Vignali me chargea de dire à S. M. que son époux avait reçu les sacraments sept jours avant sa mort et avait montré les sentimens les plus religieux.

L'abbe Vignali retourne à Rome où il m'a dit qu'il comptait reprendre ses anciennes fonctions dans une école où il avait été employé avant son départ pour Ste Hélène. Peut-être que, si le Comte Apponyi [1] cherchait à faire sa connaissance, il pourrait en avoir des détails sur lesquels je n'ai pas cru devoir trop appuyer dans ce moment. Il a été ici chez Louis Bonaparte à sa campagne à 4 mille de Florence, et aussi chez Mad. de Possé, fille de Lucien, qui se trouve ici avec son mari.[2] Aucun de ces personnages n'a demandé à se présenter à S. M. qui en tout cas les leur aurait refusé.

Je suis persuade, mon Prince, que le ministère anglais aurait pu se procurer plus de lumières dans toute cette affaire de la succession de Napoléon, pour peu qu'il eût donné plus de suite à ses recherches, et que le testament, à l'heure qu'il est, se trouve dans les mains de quelque individu de la famille Bonaparte, peut-être même en Amérique près de Joseph. Le mystère qu'on a répandu sur cet objet tient sans contredit à des vues politiques, et encore plus à des vues particulières d'intérêt de quelque membre de la famille du déffunt qu'il sera difficile de pénétrer.

Daignez agréer, mon Prince, l'hommage de mon très-profond respect.

Le Lieutenant Général Comte de Neipperg,
Chevalier d'honneur de S. M.

[1] Austrian Ambassador in Rome.

[2] Christine, Lucien's second daughter, had married the Swedish Count Arvid Posse in 1818.

INDEX.

Abdication, the first, II, 369; the second, 433.
Abensberg, II, 83; battle of, 84, 86.
Aberdeen, Lord, II, 328, 330, 333.
Abo, interview between Czar and Bernadotte at, II, 212, 253.
Aboukir, defeat of French fleet off, I, 156; 157, 173; French victory over Turkish army at, 174, 176.
Abrantès, Duke of, I, 58, *vide* Junot.
Achmed Pasha, I, 159, 161; invades Egypt, 163.
Acqui, I, 61, 94, 95.
Acre, siege of, I, 167, 169; siege raised, 170; rumours of disaster at, 227.
Act, Additional, to the Constitutions of the Empire, II, 403, 406, 409.
— of Mediation, I, 305.
Adam, Albrecht, II, 195, 207.
Adda, the, I, 96, 234, 350.
Addington, makes overtures to Napoleon, I, 254, 257, 313.
Adige, proposed Austrian boundary, I, 116, 119, 128, 129, 244, 245.
Adriatic Sea, mastery of, I, 131; French position on, 345; Russian squadron in, 406.
Aix-la-Chapelle, Napoleon holds his court at, I, 348.
Ajaccio, Napoleon born at, I, 3, 4; returns to, 18, 29, 31, 32; in concealment in, 48, 150; revisits, 181.
Albania, Czar's claim to, I, 412.
Albanian sharpshooters at Acre, I, 169.
Albe, Count d', head military secretary, II, 180, 183.
Alessandria, I, 94, 235, 237.
Alexander, I, Czar, succeeds Czar Paul I, I, 254; attitude of Britain and France towards, 255, 256; demands restoration of Sardinia, 257, 344; reverts to the policy of the Empress Catherine, 345; acts as mediator, 346; attitude towards Prussia and Austria, 359; declines request for armistice, 379; joins his army, 380; defeated at Austerlitz, 383; withdraws, 385; recalls his troops from Naples, 393; 410, 412; sends an army to the Lower Danube, 434, 451; requests a truce, 454; hatred of Britain, 455, 456 ff.: meets Napoleon at Tilsit, 458; declines offer of Kingdom of Poland, 460; Constantinople refused to, 462; serious misgivings of, II, 25; refuses to ratify treaty with Turkey, 28; relations with Sweden and Finland, 29; letter from Napoleon to, 37; maintains alliance with Napoleon, 55; visits latter at Erfurt, 56, 57; conversations with Talleyrand, 58; 73; attitude towards Sweden, Poland and Turkey, 108; 113; relations with Poland, 149; intrigues at Warsaw, 151; refuses Napoleon's overtures, 153; connection with Oldenburg, 155; resolved on war, 157; negotiations, 159; delivers ultimatum, 175; confidence in his army and the climate, 181; in Vilna, 189; 202, 209; meets Bernadotte at Abo, 212; 213, 254; relations with Prussia, 261; at Bautzen, 276; overtures to Austria, 280; 333, 336; ambitious to enter Paris, 339; leaves Langres, 341, 345; opposes Castlereagh, 346; upbraids Metternich, 356; enters Paris, 366; receives Ney and Macdonald, 370; 396, 412.
Alexander the Great, influence of, on Napoleon, I, 111; Raynal's description of, 147, 152; II, 210.

Alexandria, capture of, I, 152, 153; Sir Sidney Smith at, 173; 175; Napoleon returns from, 176.
Algeciras, I, 255.
Allies, the, their armies and commanders, II, 270; receive reinforcements, 276; Barclay made commander-in-chief, 278; terms offered Austria, 280; Austria joins Allies, 288; plans discussed, 291, 292; proposals of peace made to Napoleon, 328, 329; manifesto to the French nation, 332; cross the Rhine, 337; advance on Paris, 347; proclamation to the Senate, 367, 396, 412; state of the various armies, 413; treaty signed by, 440.
Alps, passage of, I, 233.
Altenburg, negotiations at, II, 100; broken off, 102.
Alvinczy, character of, I, 105; defeated at Arcole, 107.
Amiens, Treaty of, I, 257, 272, 280; criticisms in England on, 310; stipulations of, not kept, 310; effect of, on French trade, II, 157.
Ancona, surrendered to France, I, 100, 109; Napoleon at, 111; its effect on Venice, 120; captured by Russians and Austrians, 229; occupied by the French, 396.
Andréossy, sails for Egypt, I, 150; returns with Napoleon, 176; Ambassador to Vienna, 434; 446, 447, II, 52.
Ansbach, French troops in, I, 378; ceded to Bavaria, 407; occupied by the French, 413.
Antilles, the, taken from the French, I, 254; 311.
Antommarchi, arrives at St. Helena, II, 451; 452, 457.
d'Antraigues, Bourbon agent, I, 123, 124.
Antwerp, British troops at, II, 100; 132.
Apennines, passage of, I, 94.
Arcis-sur-Aube, battle of, II, 360.
Arcole, battle of, I, 106, 107.
Argenteau, defeated at Montenotte, I, 95.
Arndt, E. M., I, 419; II, 74.
Artois, Comte d', I, 322, 324; II, 380; 447, 458.
Aspern, battle of, II, 88, 89.
Astorga, Napoleon at, II, 69.
Auerstadt, battle of, I, 427, 428.
Auerstadt, Duke of, *vide* Davoût.
Augereau, I, 95, 102, 106; sent to Paris, 122; appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Rhine, 123; Radical deputy, 196, 198, 203; appointed a marshal, 333; 341, 437; at Prussian Eylau, 442, 443; made Duke of Castiglione, II, 10; 125; concentrates troops at Lyons, 351; abandons Lyons, 368, 387; proscribed, 390.
Aulic Council, I, 102.
Austerlitz, battle of, I, 382-4, 387, 390.
Austria, military position in Italy and Germany, I, 91; army defeated at Lodi, 96; endeavours to regain her position in Italy, 102; importance of Mantua to, 103, 107; relations with Russia and England, 108; agreement with Pope Pius VI, 109; losses in Italy, 113, 114; diplomatic reverse at Leoben, 115; acquires territory of Venice, 117; agreement with Russia, 186; recovers possession of Lombardy, 190; quarrel with Russia, 228; defeated at Marengo, 236-7; negotiations with France, 241, 242; compelled to sign peace at Lunéville, 245; changes in the constitution of, 307; deferential to Napoleon, 347; threatened in Italy; 349; enters the coalition, 359; harsh treatment from Napoleon, 361; defeated at Ulm, 372; and at Austerlitz, 383; negotiates for peace, 385; losses in Italy and Germany, 389; resolved on war, II, 71; aim of the war, 75; preparations, 76 *et seq.*; stands forth as champion of the freedom of Europe, 80; defeated and forced back on the defensive, 86, 99; signs peace at Schönbrunn, 102; attitude towards Prussia, 169; alliance with France, 170 *et seq.*; effect of the Russian campaign on, 255; armed intervention, 266, 273, 280, 282; declares war, 288; joins the Allies, 291; signs an agreement with Murat, 340, 383; attitude towards Napoleon, 396; towards the Allies, 412, 450.

Autun, College of, I, 6; Bishop of, 9, 16; ex-Bishop of, 263.
Auxonne, I, 18, 27.
Avignon, I,51, 53; II, 244.

Baccciocchi, Pascal, married to Elise Bonaparte, I, 295.
Badajoz, Treaty of, I, 255.
Baden, concludes peace with France, I, 104; increase of territory, 389; alliance with, 401; made a grand Duchy, 403; II, 164.
Bagration, General, I, 377; II, 186, 187, 193; junction of, with first army, 195; at Smolensk, 199.
Balearic Islands, I, 411.
Balcombe, II, 441.
Balkan Peninsula, I, 345, 389; II, 27.
Bank of France, founded, I, 273; II, 146, 324.
Barbé-Marbois, I, 262; head of the Treasury department, 271; II, 6.
Barclay, General, II, 186, 195, 199, 200; deposed from the chief command, 200; leaves the army, 211, 276, 277; made Commander-in-Chief, 278; 296.
Bard, Fort, I, 233.
Barras, I, 49; helps Bonaparte, 64; receives command of the Army of the Interior, 70; relations with Josephine, 77; present at marriage of Bonaparte and Josephine, 82; in the Directory, 120; unscrupulous policy of, 183, 190; dealings with Bonaparte, 195, 198; resigns office, 202, 206.
Bar-sur-Aube, II, 351, 353, 356.
Barthélemy, I, 90, 120, 123.
Bartenstein, treaty of, I, 447, 454.
Basle, I, 142; II, 351, 402.
Bassano, Duke of, *vide* Maret.
Bastia, I, 30, 31, 62.
Batavian Republic, *vide* Holland.
Bautzen, battle of, II, 275 *et seq.*, 305.
Bavaria, I, 87, 129; peace signed with, 257; increase of territory and status, 388, 389, 401, 407; Bayreuth promised to, 422; II, 164; army of, in Russia, 194, 251; joins the coalition, 307.
Bayanne, Cardinal, at Paris, II, 34, 35, 36.
Baylen, Junot capitulates at, II, 50.
Bayonne, Napoleon at, II, 40; interview with the Spanish Royal family, 47 *et seq.*, 51.
Beauharnais, Eugène, I, 79; Viceroy of Italy, 363; marriage of, 401; defeated by the Archduke John, II, 81; avenges his defeats, 94; 97, 107, 113; declines throne of Sweden, 143, 160, 164; commands in the Russian Campaign, 185; at Malo Jaroslavetz, 216; succours Davoût, 218; 220, 222, 232; succeeds Murat in the chief command, 242; 263, 271, 274, 330, 351, 410.
Beauharnais, Alexandre, Marquis de, I, 76, 77.
Beauharnais, Hortense, I, 76, 143; marries Louis Bonaparte, 294; 354; II, 110; receives Napoleon after Waterloo, 435.
Beauharnais, Stephanie, I, 401.
Beaulieu, General, I, 94, 95, 105.
Belgium, incorporated in France, I, 86; 108, 116, 270; II, 331.
Bennigsen, General, I, 377; commands one of the Russian armies, 437, 440; frustrates French plans, 441; succoured by Scharnhorst, 442; lack of enterprise, 450, 452; defeated at Friedland, 453; requests a truce, 454; II, 306, 311, 313.
Beresina, the passage of, II, 224-9.
Berg, grand-duchy of Cleves and, I, 403, 413.
Berlier, I, 261; revises the Code, 274.
Berlin, I, 420; Napoleon enters, 430; decree issued from, 435, 436; II, 259.
Bernadotte, I, 60, 76; represents France at Vienna, 140; forced to leave Vienna, 149, 185; becomes Minister of War, 191; made Marshal, 333; 341, 369, 370; Prince of Ponte Corvo, 395; 437, 440, 441; commands expedition to Sweden, II, 29, 30, 88, 94; his troops disbanded, 98; candidate for the throne of Sweden, 142, 172; enmity to Napoleon, 173; relations with the Czar, 212, 253; and with Britain, 264, 285, 291; defeats Ney, 303; 305, 309, 311,

316 ; hopes of the French Throne, 339 ; 367.
Berne, occupied by the French, treasure seized, I, 142.
Berthier, chief of the general staff, I, 126 ; 135, 140 ; beside Napoleon in the *Coup d'état*, 206 ; made Minister of War, 214, 231 ; made a marshal, 333, 334, 363, 381, 416 ; issues martial law against political publishers, 420 ; 422, 444 ; Prince of Neufchâtel, II, 10 ; 63 ; in command of the army in Germany, 81 ; in Vienna, 113 ; 165, 198, 242, 317, 361, 365, 369 ; takes leave of Napoleon, 374.
Berthollet, accompanies Napoleon to Egypt, I, 147 ; 162 ; returns with Napoleon, 176 ; 337.
Bertrand, General, I, 376 ; negotiates separate peace, 446 *et seq.*, 454 ; II, 290, 306, 315 ; accompanies Napoleon to Elba, 376, 377 ; approves Napoleon's resolve, 385 ; 410, 427 ; accompanies Napoleon to St. Helena, 436 ; grand marshal, 443, 457.
Bessières, accompanies Napoleon to Egypt, I, 150 ; made a marshal, 333, 335 ; Duke of Istria, II, 10, 23 ; is victorious at Medina, 50 ; 63, 67.
Bisamberg, Austrian armies at the, II, 88, 97.
Blake, General, II, 64 ; defeated at Espinosa, 65.
Blücher, General, in Westphalia, I, 414, 421, 428, 429 ; in command in Pomerania, II, 93, 241, 270 ; wounded at Lützen, 272 ; 277, 291, 293, 294 ; defeats Macdonald, 299 ; skilful retreat of, 303, 305, 308 ; unites with Bernadotte, 309, 311, 315 ; generous spirit shown by, 316 ; pursues Napoleon, 319, 336 ; crosses the Rhine, 337, 338 ; defeated at Brienne, 341 ; victorious at La Rothière, 342 ; 344, 346, 347 ; defeated at Vauchamps, 248 ; 351 ; advances on Paris, 352, 353, 354, 356, 359, 362, 363 ; commands the Prussian troops in Belgium, 412, 413, 414 ; at Sombreffe, 416 ; at Ligny, 417 ; defeated, 418, 420 ; captures Planchenoit, 426, 436, 442.
Bologna, surrendered to the French, I, 100, 105 ; ceded to France, 110 ; ceded to Venice, 117 ; II, 35.
Bonaparte, ancestry, I, 2, 3.
Bonaparte, Carlo, I, 2 ; character of, 3 ; death of, 4 ; 6, 9, 12 ; commercial ventures of, 18.
Bonaparte, Caroline, at Montebello I, 125 ; married to Murat, 295 ; disappointment of, II, 70.
Bonaparte, Elise, at school at St. Cyr, I, 44 ; married to Capt. Bacciochi, 125 ; distinguished literary circle of, at Paris, 295.
Bonaparte, Jerome, I, 4 ; at Montebello, 126 ; in America, 295 ; projected alliance with Princess Katherine, 401 ; made King of Westphalia, 462, 463 ; marriage of, II, 23, 141 ; extravagance of, 164 ; in the Russian campaign, 185 ; returns to Westphalia, 193, 251, 288 ; leaves Westphalia, 322 ; elected to the Chamber of Peers, 410.
Bonaparte, Joseph, I, 5, 6 ; Napoleon's estimate of, 8 ; 9, 30, 31, 48 ; marriage of, 75 ; 84 ; at Montebello, 125 ; at Lunéville, 244 ; his attitude towards Napoleon, 293 ; position at court, 333, 340, 341 ; King of Naples and Sicily, 393 *et seq.*, 396, 410, 411 ; 436 ; II, 34 ; offered the throne of Spain, 44 ; accepts it, 48 ; enters Madrid, 49 ; withdraws with the French army to Northern Spain, 50, 54, 67 ; threatens to abdicate, 66 ; 67, 124 ; sends his minister to protest at Paris, 126 ; 140, 176, 330 ; advises Napoleon to make peace, 357 ; Regent of France, 365 ; authorizes capitulation of Paris, 366 ; 410 ; interview with Napoleon on board the "Saale," 437.
Bonaparte, Lætitia, I, 3 ; character of, 4 ; protests against Napoleon entering the navy, 10 ; escapes from Corsica, 48 ; at Montebello, 125 ; in Paris, 295 ; joins Napoleon at Elba, II, 385.
Bonaparte, Louis, I, 32 ; rescues Napoleon, 107 ; at Montebello, 125 ; marries Hortense Beauharnais, 294 ; 331, 354, 397 ; King of Holland, 398 ; 424, 425, 463 ; II,

47; 137; difficulties in Holland, 138, 139; abdicates, 140.
Bonaparte, Lucien, I, 18, 32, 47; his description of Josephine, 77 *et seq.*; War Commissioner in Corsica, 125, 191; 193, 197; his action during the *Coup d'état*, 207, 208, 209; addresses the Council of the Five Hundred, 210; Minister of the Interior, 214; incurs Napoleon's displeasure, 294; 298, banishment of, 397; meets Napoleon in Mantua, II, 44 *et seq.*, 111; in Paris, 410; 431.
Bonaparte, Pauline, at Montebello, I, 125; marries Prince Borghese, 295; at Elba, II, 378, 385.
Borissov, engagement at, II, 224, 225 *et seq.*
Borodino, battle of, II, 204 *et seq.*, 212, 218, 235.
Bouley de la Meurthe, I, 191; supports Napoleon, 210, 217; member of the Council of State, 262; revises the Code, 274.
Boulogne, fleet at, I, 146; Nelson baffled at, 256; army assembled near, 321; Napoleon at, 340; harbour of, 342; Straits of, 343; camp at, broken up, 364; army at, 368.
Bourbons, the, Napoleon's attitude towards, I, 124; 183, 195, 220, 228, 257, 289; attitude of, towards Napoleon, 322; warning to, 326; Lucien and, II, 45; in Sicily, 143; 195, 280, 321, 325, 330; attitude of populace toward, 363, 366, 368; Wellington's comment on, 380; 399, 402, 428, 435; Napoleon reckons on expulsion of, 447; 453, 455, 456.
Bourrienne, I, 136, 144; in Egypt, 158, 164, 165; with Napoleon during *Coup d'état*, 203, 206, 210; private secretary to Napoleon, 261, 292; proscribed, 398.
Bourrienne, Madame, description of Napoleon, I, 74.
Braunau, occupied by the French, I, 405; Palm shot at, 420; evacuated, II, 32.
Breisgau, the, I, 129, 245, 379, 389.
Breslau, King of Prussia at, II, 259; Treaty of, 262, 263.
Brienne, Napoleon in Military School at, I, 6, 7, 8, 11; battle of, II, 341.
Brinkmann, letter of, I, 212.
Broglie, Duc de, II, 106, 287, 391, 406.
Brueys, Admiral, at Aboukir, I, 156; instructions to, 157.
Bruix, Admiral, I, 175; at the *Coup d'état*, 202.
Brumaire, *Coup d'état* of 18th and 19th, I, 199 *et seq.*
Brune, General, in Holland, defeats the English, I, 194; succeeds Masséna in the chief command in Italy, 244; made a marshal, 333, 446; loyalty to Napoleon, 410.
Brunswick, Duke of, I, 42; 410, 421, 422; Commander-in-Chief of the Prussian army, 425, 426; at Auerstädt, 427; wounded, 429.
Brunswick, Duke of, Frederick William, II, 93.
Bubna, General, conversation with Napoleon, II, 88, 98, 101; sent to Paris, 256; interview with Napoleon, 273 *et seq.*, 281, 288, 307, 351.
Bülow, General, in command in Pomerania, II, 93, 241, 279; defeats Oudinot, 299; co-operates with Bernadotte, 303; enters Holland, 337; in Belgium, 352; at Soissons, 353; 354, 416, 419, 421; advances on Waterloo, 424; joins in the action, 425; captures Planchenoit, 426.
Burgos, capture of, II, 65; Napoleon at, 67.
Busaco, battle of, II, 127.
Buttafuoco, General, I, 28, 29, 31.
Buxhoewden, General, I, 375, 437.

Cadiz, I, 360, 362, 364; French and Spanish fleets at, 373; II, 235.
Cadoudal, Georges, leader of the "Chouans," 281; plots against Napoleon, 322; shot, 323, 324.
Cafferelli, General, I, 169.
Cairo, captured by the French, I, 155; revolt at, 161 *et seq.*; Syrian army in, 173; surrendered, 255.
Caldiero, I, 106; Masséna defeated at, 373.
Calendar, Revolutionary, abandoned, I, 352.
Cambacérès, Napoleon and, I, 71;

Minister of Justice, 214 ; Consul, 219, 220, 274 ; restrains Napoleon, 282, 283, 284 ; *re* Duc d'Enghien, 321 ; high dignitary, 333, 443 ; II, 4 ; letter from Napoleon to, 8 ; Duke of Parma, 10 ; rejoins Napoleon, 392, 406.
Cambronne, General, II, 386 ; at La Mure, 387, 427.
Campbell, British Commissioner, II, 375, 377 ; absent from Elba, 385.
Campo Formio, Treaty of, I, 129 *et seq.*, 137, 179, 227 ; suggested basis of negotiations, 229, 240 ; conditions of made more rigorous, 245 ; 306, 308.
Caprara, Cardinal, relations with Napoleon, II, 18 ; 34.
Carnot, share of, in army reforms, I, 59 ; recognizes Napoleon's merit, 62, 82, 91 ; letter from Napoleon to, 97 ; army organization of, 102, 110 ; opinion of Napoleon, 111 ; in the Directory, 120 ; ousted, 123 ; 128, 136 ; in exile, 188, 240 ; opposes the Imperial dignity, 330 ; II, 230 ; Minister of the Interior, 393 ; 399, 414, 432 ; member of the Provisional Government, 434.
Caroline, Queen of Naples, I, 345 ; defies Napoleon, 393 ; II, 143.
Carteaux, at Avignon, I, 51 ; at Marseilles, 53 ; superseded, 55.
Castaños, General, defeated by Lannes, II, 65, 67.
Castiglione, battle of, I, 103 ; 230, 333, 357.
Castiglione, Duke of, II, 10, *vide* Augereau.
Castlereagh, Lord, I, 448 ; II, 175 ; at the Allies' headquarters, 339 ; 346 ; energetic measures, of 355 ; 383, leaves Chatillon, 384 ; 385 ; succeeded by Wellington, 396 ; 399, 400, 439, 450.
Catechism, political, II, 18.
Catherine II, Empress, I, 87 ; death of, 108 ; policy of, 345.
Cattaro, Gulf of, I, 345 ; incorporated in Italy, 388 ; surrendered to Russia, 406, 410 ; given to France, 463.
Caulaincourt, I, 334 ; Duke of Vicenza, II, 10 ; Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 26 ; the Czar and, 30 ; 37, 109, 110, 113, 149 ; dissuades Napoleon, 181 ; accompanies him to Russia, 184, 189, 198 ; returns with him, 232 ; at the enemy's outposts, 274, 275 ; interview refused, 278, 280 ; sent to Prague, 284, 285 ; sounds Metternich, 287, 330 ; becomes Minister of Foreign Affairs, 333 *et seq.* ; at Lunéville, 339, 340 ; given "carte blanche," 343 ; negotiations, 344, 345, 346 ; truce rejected, 350 ; temporizes, 351, 355 *et seq.* ; his thankless task, 357 ; rejoins Napoleon, 363 ; accompanies him to Paris, 365 ; sent to the Czar, 367 *et seq.*, 369, 370 ; at Paris, 372, 432 ; member of Provisional Government, 434.
Certificates of origin, II, 130.
Ceylon, retained by Britain, I, 256, 320.
Chaboulon, Fleury de, II, 383 ; at Porto Ferrajo, 384.
Chamber, of Deputies, action of, I, 25, 196, 405, 406, 409, 431, 434.
— of Peers, replaces the Senate, II, 404 ; 410, 432, 435.
Champagny, Duke of Cadore, II, 10 ; Foreign Minister, 24 ; letter to Caprara, 34 *et seq.*, 43 ; at Altenburg, 100 ; his demands repudiated, 101, 103 ; letter to foreign ambassadors, 115 ; report of, 150, 151 ; recalled from St. Petersburg, 157.
Champaubert, battle of, II, 347, 348.
Championnet, General, evacuates Rome, I, 185, 189 ; defeated at Genoa, 229.
Champ de Mai, II, 390 ; description of, 407 ; effect of, 409.
Chaptal, Member of the Council of State, I, 262 ; Minister of the Interior, 265 ; 266, 267, 410.
Charlemagne, I, 111, 334 ; Napoleon in the palace of, 348 ; II, 35, 36, 145, 147, 150, 178, 327.
Charles IV, of Spain, I, 320 ; II, 40, 43 ; accuses his son of high treason, 44 ; appeals to Napoleon, 45 *et seq.* ; at Bayonne, 47 ; trusts his crown to Napoleon, 48 ; leaves Spain, 49.
Charles XIII, of Sweden, declares war on Britain, II, 142 ; 173.
Charles, Archduke, of Austria, succeeds to the chief command in

Italy, I, 104; 113; defeated at Tarvis, 114; sends Napoleon's letter to Thugut, 115; crosses the Lech, 186; 187, 189; defeats Masséna, 190; in Switzerland, 228; resigns chief command, 231; plan of operations of, 366; sent to Italy, 367; compelled to withdraw, 373; advances on Vienna, 378, 380; interview with Napoleon, 388, 447; II, 79; declares war, 80; defeated, 84, 85, 86; concentrates his army near Vienna, 88; attacks Napoleon, 89; effect of victory at Aspern, 91, 94; falls back on the defensive, 95; position at Wagram, 96; defeated, 97; requests a truce, 98; withdraws from the army, 99; acts as proxy for Napoleon, 113.

Châteaubriand, I, 289, 295; banished from France, II, 12.

Châtillon, Congress of, II, 340, 351, 355, 357.

Chaumont, Treaty of, II, 356; renewed, 397.

Chénier, I, 283; II, 14, 15.

Church, property of confiscated, I, 87; jurisdiction of, 109; political importance of, 110; relations with the State, 251.

Cisalpine Republic, I, 141; terminated, 190; to be restored, 239; constitution of, 301; changed into "Italian Republic," 302.

Clark, General, I, 108, 115, 117, 128; letter from Napoleon to, 249 *et seq.*; in Tuscany, 303; Duke of Feltre, II, 10; 98; Minister of War, 278, 366.

Clausewitz, II, 199, 261, 269.

Cleves, Duchy of, I, 386, 403, 413.

Coalition, German states join the, I, 87, 148; effect of Marengo on, 239; against Britain, 247; against France, 358; 373, 378, 381, 396; collapse of, 409; new coalition, 447; II, 236, 265; Napoleon's concessions to, 275; Bavaria joins, 307; 383.

Cobenzl, Count, at Campo Formio, I, 128; at Rastatt, 129, 136; at Paris and Lunéville, 243; agrees to separate negotiations, 244; 261; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 302, 303, 350, 366; forced to resign, 388; comment on Napoleon, 465.

"Code complet de politique," of Napoleon, I, 138, 139.

Code Napoléon, I, 273, 274, 275; countries where still used, 276, 282; II, 6, 9.

Coignet, Captain, at Fort Bard, I, 233, 340; at Berlin, 430, 439; sees Napoleon leave, II, 375; 409.

Committee of Public Safety, instituted, I, 50; resistance to, 51, 56, 62, 66; peace party within, 89, 223, 224.

Communal property, sold by the State, II, 246.

Concordat, signed, I, 251; accepted by the Legislature, 252, 272, 280, 283, 296; II, 120; "Italian Concordat," 121; new Concordat signed, 245, 327, 381.

Confederation of the Rhine, I, 401; formation of, 403; forces of, 404; charter of, signed, 405, 411; Berlin Court notified of, 414; Emperor Francis' consent to, 416, 431, 447; fresh troops demanded from, 450; Czar acquiesces in, 463; II, 4; the Princes of, at Paris, 23; and at Erfurt, 56; accessions to, 103, 134, 141, 160, 164; Napoleon threatens, 165; Princes of, at Dresden, 176, 249; fresh troops required of, 250, 251; summoned to resist Napoleon, 262; dissolution of demanded, 280, 287, 314; in arms against Napoleon, 323, 327.

Consalvi, Cardinal, at Paris, I, 251, 351; dismissed at Napoleon's request, 397.

Conseil, ecclesiastique, II, 121, 122.

Constant, Benjamin, I, 280, 283; supports King Louis XVIII; won over by Napoleon, 393, 395, 396; drafts Napoleon's concessions, 402, 403; opposes Napoleon's views, 405.

Constantine, Grand Duke, I, 453; II, 161, 212.

Constantinople, I, 67, 72, 159, 165, 168, 170; intrigues of the Directory at, 223; aim of the Czar's policy, 345; Sebastiani's mission to, 434, 439; refused to the Czar, 462, 464; II, 22, 37, 38, 174.

Constitution, new, formulated, I, 36, 45, 53, 83; infringement of, 121; extolled by Napoleon, 137; Napoleon's views upon, 138, 139; plans for reorganizing, 190, 191, 195, 196; violated, 205; condemned, 210; Siéyès' Constitution, 215-7; revised and amended, 218; Consular Constitution, 220, 282; age limit of, 283; amended, 285; new Imperial Constitution, 330-2; oath required by, 338; II, 14, 247, 248; Constitution granted by Louis XVIII, 380, 402; additions to, 403, 406, 408.

Consul, First, office of, I, 217, 218; Napoleon appointed, 219; term of, 283; increased powers of, 284, 285, 330.

Consulate, replaces the Directory, I, 213, 214, 215; principles of the Revolution retained by, 221, 222; for life, 284; replaced by the Empire, 330.

Continental system (blockade), I, 89; contemplated by the Directory, 223, 248; Napoleon's methods in, 319; 436; II, 2, 3; action of Britain, 25; universal opposition to, 26, 33; Austria forced to join in, 103, 105; effect of, on Britain, 128, 129; severities entailed by, 132; Holland a victim to, 137; German seaboard and, 142, 145, 148; Russia's attitude towards, 153; "The Continental system is everything," 159, 160; Napoleon's aims in, 234; no longer enforced, 250; abandoned, 275; "a chimera," 330.

"Contrat Social, Le," quoted, I, 1; Napoleon attracted by, 15.

Convention, the, I, 45, 47; rival factions in, 50, 53; rewards Napoleon's services, 56, 59; leaders of, 63; plots against, 67, 69; troops of, defeated, 70; command of latter entrusted to Napoleon, 71, 72; condition of the administration under, 87; initiates programme of conquest, 89; instructions to generals, 93; financial methods of, 268; treatment of national debt by, 269, 277.

Corfu, I, 120, 131; occupied by the Russians, 345, 347, 393, 405; fortified by Napoleon, II, 27.

Coronation, of Napoleon and Josephine, I, 352; of Marie Louise and the King of Rome, II, 245, 390.

Corsica, I, 1; conquered by France, 2; Napoleon's hopes for, 10; interest of Europe in, 13, 21, 27; rival parties in, 29; annexed to France, 30; Paoli and, 35; military measures in, 37, 43; Napoleon returns to, 45; Paoli's influence in, 46; Napoleon forced to leave, 49; reconquered by France, 132; Napoleon detained at, 180; incorporated in France, II, 33.

Council of Ancients, I, 196; decrees of, 199 *et seq.*; Napoleon at, 201; held at St. Cloud, 203, 205, 207, 210; appoints a commission, 211.

Council of the Five Hundred, I, 112, 120, 196, 197, 198, 200; adjourned, 201; held in the Orangerie, 203; hostile element in, 204; Napoleon in, 206 *et seq.*, 210, 211.

Council of State, I, 218; members of nominated by Napoleon, 220; functions of, 261; first members of, 262, 271; civil code discussed by, 274, 353; report of, II, 2; prolonged sittings of, 22; Napoleon's reply to address from, 237; his intentions with regard to, 247, 331; in Elba, 376, 405; summons conscripts of 1815, 411.

Coup d'état, in Corsica, I, 38; in the Directory, 123; Napoleon prepared to attempt, 139; idea abandoned, 144; of 18th Fructidor, 183; plans discussed, 197; preparations for, 198, 199; carried into effect, 200-9; completed, 211, 212; influence of, on *Rentes*, 214.

Craonne, battle of, II, 354.

Croatia, extensive armaments in, I, 105, 106, 347; II, 103.

Cromwell, I, 205.

Czartoryski, gives outline of Russian policy, I, 347; letter to the Czar, 381, 383, 385; advises the Czar to terminate the war, 454, 460; "Poland" and, II, 151, 156, 254, 259; at Kalisch and Warsaw, 266.

Dalberg, Archbishop, I, 401; suggests German National Church, 402; becomes "Prince Primate," 403; in Paris, II, 23; servility towards Napoleon, 164; equips two battalions for Napoleon, 251.
Dalmatia, Duke of, *vide* Soult.
Dalmatia, offered to the Emperor Francis, I, 112, 117; incorporated in Italy, 388; dukedom of, 394; demanded by Napoleon, 405; Czar insists on surrender of, 412; Napoleon prepared to renounce, 447; to be ceded to Austria, II, 273.
Damascus, I, 169, 170.
Danton, in the Convention, I, 58, 63.
Danube principalities, I, 276; to be renounced by France, 412, 434; to be evacuated by Russia, 462, 465; Czar aims to secure possession of, II, 26, 27; Russian and French intrigues for, 28; Napoleon refuses Czar's demand for, 29; Russian troops withdrawn from, 30, 54, 58, 59, 152, 153, 161; offered to Austria, 169, 174; Czar's troops recalled from, 198, 288.
Danzig, Duke of, *vide* Lefebvre.
Danzig, Napoleon demands surrender of, I, 431, 440; besieged by the French, 445, 448; fall of, 450; raised to a fortress of the first rank, II, 160; depot at, 182; Napoleon at, 183; Macdonald's corps at, 242; 259, 268, 275.
Dardanelles, I, 347; Russia renounces, 456; II, 174.
Daru, Count, I, 364, II, 306.
Davidovich, I, 103; in the Tyrol, 105; defeated at Arcole, 107.
Davoût, accompanies Napoleon to Egypt, I, 150, 293; made a marshal, 333, 341; commands a corps, 369, 370; defeats Austrians, 375, 376, 378; at Austerlitz, 381; defeats Prussians at Auerstadt, 427, 428; in Poland, 437; at Eylau, 441, 442, 443; Duke of Auerstadt, II, 10; Napoleon's comment on, 23, 26; withdraws from Poland to Silesia, 52; in Germany, 76, 83; defeats Austrians, 84; at Eggmühl, 85; at Aspern, 89, 95; at Wagram, 96; on the Elbe, 156; army of increased, 160, 185; receives chief command of the third army, 193; at Minsk, 195, 196, 197, 198, 201; at Borodino, 204; reaches Krasnoi, 223, 226; resentment at Dresden against, 263, 268; occupies Hamburg, 279, 290, 291; Minister of War, 392, 410; refuses control of the army to Napoleon, 432; interview with Napoleon, 435.
Decaen, General, interview of, with Napoleon, II, 39, 414.
Decrès, Minister of Marine, instructions to, I, 345, 356, 362; orders issued by, 364; letter from Napoleon to, 373; II, 19.
Denmark, joins coalition against Britain, I, 246, 253, 447, 463; attacked by Britain, II, 25; complies with Napoleon's demands, 142.
Departments, administration of, I, 264 *et seq.*
Desaix, sails for Egypt, I, 150; repulses Murad, 155; in Upper Egypt, 165; at Aboukir, 174, 235; at Marengo, 236; decides the victory, 237; credit due to him, 238.
Desgenettes, in Egypt, I, 163.
Directory, composition of, I, 68; Napoleon's relations with, 80, 81; appoints Napoleon Commander-in-Chief in Italy, 82, 91, 92; treaty with Piedmont, 97; instructions to Napoleon, 99, 104; policy of, towards the Papacy, 109, 110; hatred roused by war policy of, 112, 115; Napoleon's relations with, 117, 118; severe criticisms of, 121; Napoleon's defence of, 122, 123; his attitude towards, 126; eager to remove Napoleon from Paris, 134; jealousy of Napoleon, 135; fêtes given by, 136; attacks the Papal Government, 140; policy of, in Switzerland, 142; Napoleon attempts to be made a member of, 143; unpopularity of, 144; invasion of England abandoned by, 145; embarrassments of, 148; demands of, at Rastatt, 149, 160; letter to Napoleon, 168; despotic methods of, 183; critical position of, 184, 188, 190, 194; Napoleon's exclu-

sion from, 195; proposed changes in, 196; ceases to exist, 203, 210; replaced by consuls, 214; German policy of, 224; policy of "liberating" neighbours, 225; lives sacrificed by, 260, 264; paper money issued by, 268; sale of Government property by, 269; financial methods of, 270, 271, 272; treatment of emigrés by, 279; Paris under, 287; policy of, in Switzerland, 305; II, 116.
Divan, of Cairo, instituted by Napoleon, I, 160; bulletin to, 173.
Dommartin, General, I, 168.
Dresden, the Princes of the Confederation at, II, 176; Napoleon at, 183; 272; Metternich at, 281; allies advance upon, 294; battle of, 295, 299; Napoleon returns to, 304; occupied by St. Cyr, 309.
Drissa, entrenched position at, II, 186, 193, 196, 197.
Drouot, General, at Hanau, II, 320, 368, in Elba, 376, 385; in Paris, 410.
Düben, Napoleon at, II, 310.
Dubois de Crancé, sent against Lyons, I, 51, 59; army organisation of, 102.
Ducos, Roger, enters Directory, I, 191, 192, 197, 200; resigns, 201; member of provisional government, 210; made a Senator 219; member of the Chamber of Peers, II, 410.
Dugua, General, in Egypt, I, 150; at the battle of the Pyramids, 155; in the Delta, 165.
Dumouriez, I, 322, 325.
Dupont, General, I, 372; II, 44; surrenders at Baylen, 50.
Duroc, sent to the Czar, I, 255, 293; made Grand Marshal, 334, 365; after Eylau, 443; made Duke of Friuli, II, 10; signs secret treaty with Spain, 43; dissuades Napoleon, 181, 198; killed at Bautzen, 277.

Eggmühl, battle of, II, 85; comment on, 86.
Eguillette, Fort, I, 54; captured by the Convention troops, 55.
Egypt, I, 132, 133; French expedition to, 146, 147; Napoleon's aims in, 149; landing of the French, 152; discontent of the troops, 154; effect of Nelson's victory, 157, 158; Napoleon's administration of, 160, 161; French papers published in, 162; Napoleon returns to France, 176; position of French army in, 177, 178; blockaded by England, 288; restored to Turkey, 256; Sebastiani's report on, 316; proposed new expedition to, II, 39, 158.
El Arish, I, 163; garrison of capitulates, 165, 166.
Elba, declared a French province, I, 303; incorporated in France, II, 33; assigned to Napoleon, 372; Napoleon at, 375-9,
Elchingen, Duke of, *vide* Ney.
Enghien, Duc d', I, 324; arrest of, 325; death of, 326, 327; Napoleon's comment on, II, 457.
England, war with, I, 45; influence of, in Corsica, 62; treaty with Austria, 87, 91; withdraws fleet from Mediterranean, 108, 114; Austria's hopes of help from, 115, 130, 132; threatened invasion of, 134; Constitution of, 138; intrigues in India against, 164; alliance with Russia and Turkey, 185; defeated in Holland, 194; opponent of France, 223; French hostility towards, 224; blockades Malta and Egypt, 228; holds France in check in the East, 241; agrees to a truce, 242; takes possession of Malta, 246; coalition against, 247; change of ministry in, 254; peace signed with, 256; comments on peace, 257, 258, 299, 302; influence in Switzerland, 305; combats France's aggressions, 310, 311; increasing hostility towards France, 313, 314; Napoleon's attitude towards, 315; alarmed for India, 316; militia called out, 317; ultimatum rejected, 318; war with France, 319; Spain declares war against, 321; Bourbon agents in, 323; threatened invasion of, 341, 344, 345, 346; joins the coalition against France, 353; plans resumed for invasion of, 355, 356; agreement with Sweden; sub-

sidies promised to Austria, 359; undisputed mistress of the sea, 375; refuses subsidies to Russia, 455; hatred of the Czar towards, 459, 463; sends fleet to Denmark, II, 25; replies to Napoleon's blockade decrees, 31, 32; Pius' attitude towards, 35, 36, 39; secret understanding of, with Portugal, 42; promises help to Spain, 50; British troops in Portugal, 51; victory of forces under Sir John Moore, 65, 68; sends new army under Wellesley to Spain, 99; sends an expedition to Walcheren, 100; troops recalled from, 102; financial condition of, 128, 129; edicts issued by, 130; confiscation of British goods, 132; Holland requests repeal of the Order in Council of 1807, 138, 139; Sweden declares war against, 142, 143; Bank of England, 146; Russia's attitude toward, 153, 154; gives subsidies to Prussia, 167; threatens Turkey, 174; United States declares war against, 235; signs treaties with Sweden, 264; and with Prussia, 265; Napoleon baffled by, 274; attitude towards Spain, 326; subsidies paid by, 355; signs treaty of Chaumont, 356; endeavours to counteract Russia's preponderance, 383; blamed for Napoleon's escape, 385; troops ready in Belgium, 413; Napoleon requests refuge in, 438; he aims at influencing opinion in, 440, 447; ruins his cause in, 450.

Erfurt, II, 54; meeting of Napoleon and Czar at, 56, 57; treaty signed at, 58; Napoleon's ill-humour at, 59; Napoleon's intercourse with Goethe, 60; and with Wieland, 61.

Eril, Melzi d', I, 301, 349.

Erlon, General Drouet d', in command of a corps, II, 414, 415; recalled by Ney, 418; at Waterloo, 422, 425.

Esslingen, battle of, II, 89, 90.

Etruria, kingdom of, I, 248, 318; hostility to France in, II, 33, 42.

Exelman, General, II. 420.

Eylau, battle of, I, 441, 442; Bennigsen withdraws from, 443; great loss of life at, 444.

Fain, secretary to Napoleon, I, 336; II, 377.

Feltre, Duke of, *vide* Clarke.

Ferdinand, Archduke, assumes chief command, I, 368; reaches Bohemia, 372; II, 79; victorious in Poland, 81, 86, 108, 111.

Ferdinand, Crown Prince of Spain, II, 41; intrigues of, 44; proposed marriage of, 45; at Bayonne, 47, 48; under surveillance in France, 49; regarded as King of Spain, 50; signs treaty at Valençay, 326.

Ferdinand, King of Naples, compensation for, I, 411; Sicily restored to, 412; II, 40.

Fère Champenoise, II, 347, 364.

Fesch, Cardinal, I, 5, 28; in Italy, 126; Archbishop of Lyons, 296; Grand Almoner, 333; officiates at marriage celebration of the Empress, 352; represents France at the Vatican, 365, 396, 402; in Paris, II, 410; sends Corsican surgeon to St. Helena, 451.

Finland, Swedish province of, I, 455; Czar's designs on, II, 26, 29; Russian troops invade, 30; ceded to Russia, 108, 173; Russian army in, 186; meeting of the Czar and Bernadotte in, 212.

Flahault, General, II, 366.

Floret, II, 110, *vide* "Journal" in Appendix, vol. I.

Flotilla, at Boulogne, I, 146; Nelson fails to destroy, 256, 342; reduced, 343.

Fontainebleau, Imperial court at, II, 24, 25; treaty of, 43; decree issued from, 132; the Pope at, 244; Concordat signed at, 245; Napoleon withdraws to, 366, 368; treaty of, 372; Napoleon leaves, 374.

Fouché, Minister of Police, I, 214, 240, 263; discovers plot to assassinate Napoleon, 280, 281; loses office, 292; advises court martial of d'Enghien, 325; to be reinstated, 328, 330; again made Minister of Police, 333; Duke of Otranto, II, 10; advocates Napoleon's re-marriage, 21, 23; re-

conciliation with Talleyrand, 69, 70; Napoleon's distrust of, 124; Governor of Illyria, 286, 373; resumes office, 393; plots against Napoleon, 398; Napoleon thinks of arresting, 402, 430, 431; negotiates for peace, 432; member of the Provisional Government, 434, 435; urges Napoleon to leave, 436.

Fourcroy, member of the Council of State, I, 262; educational plans of rejected, 278; report of, II, 16.

Fox, meets Napoleon in Paris, I, 257; strange proceeding of, 409; death of, 411.

France, intervenes between Corsica and Genoa, I, 1, 2, 3; condition of, 22-7; new Constitution formulated, 36; political factions in, 50, 51, 58, 59, 63; financial crisis in, 67; Royalist agitation in, 69; reaction after the Terror, 73-5; description of, by a contemporary, 88; state of political parties after the 18th Fructidor, 183-5, 188, 190-5; alienation between army and people, 209; state of the country after the *Coup d'état*, 211-13; "Equality" in, 221; tragic history of, 225; Hautrive's pamphlet on, 258; political programme of, 259, 260; administration of the country, 263-6; industrial condition of, 267; financial condition of, 268-73; Code Napoléon, 273-6; education in, 277, 278; treatment of emigrés, 279, 280; prosperous condition of, during the Consulate, 287-90; Imperial court in, 333-8; state of public opinion in, II, 1, 2; Jewish population of, 5, 6; state of the finances, 7-9; condition of literature, 11-15; Imperial University founded, 16-19; effect of the Continental blockade upon, 105; confusion in ecclesiastical affairs of, 121, 122; commercial warfare with England, 129-39; financial condition of, in 1811, 147; burdensome nature of the Imperial rule in, 161-4, 237, 238, 240; deficits in the Budgets, 245-7; proposed changes in the Constitution, 247, 248; state of the country after the campaigns of 1813, 323-6; fresh sacrifices demanded from, 334; attitude of the nation towards the Bourbon government, 379-82; and towards Napoleon, 398-401; state of France after Waterloo, 438, 439.

Francis I, Emperor of Austria, I, 86; orders relief of Mantua, 103; hesitating policy of, 108, 116; consents to treaty of Campo Formio, 130; design of, in Italy, 228; replies to Napoleon's letter, 240; requests extension of truce, 242; acquiesces in France's intervention in Germany, 245; protests against plan of indemnification, 309; conciliatory towards France, 347, 348, 354, 355; enters coalition, 359, 376; communications from Napoleon to, 379; conference with Napoleon after Austerlitz, 384; Czar refuses further co-operation with, 385; signs peace of Pressburg, 388; renounces Imperial crown of Germany, 404, 405; consents to the Confederation of the Rhine, 416; remains neutral, 448; Stadion's advice to, II, 71, 75, 87; sues for peace, 99; sends plenipotentiary to Schönbrunn, 102; favours family alliance with Napoleon, 112, 149; attitude towards Prussia, 169, 172; at Dresden, 176; treaty signed by, 191, 255; summoned by Napoleon to double contingent, 256, 257; refuses request of Viceroy Eugène, 258; remonstrates with Napoleon, 267, 274; goes to Bohemia, 280, 286; issues declaration of war against France, 288; present with the allied armies, 296; Napoleon requests armistice from, 314, 320, 335, 336, 356; at Dijon, 366; protests against choice of Elba, 372; persuades Marie Louise to return to Austria, 378; resolved to oppose "the adventurer," 396; letter from Napoleon to, 397.

Frederick Augustus, made King of Saxony, I, 461; meets Napoleon at Dresden, II, 233; concludes secret agreement with Austria, 263; reasserts friendship with Napoleon, 272; made prisoner, 319, 323.

Frederick the Great, writings of, studied by Napoleon, I, 101, 365, 424; Napoleon visits tomb of, 430.
Frederick William, King of Prussia, I, 246, 247; indemnification promised to, 308, 353; refuses to join coalition, 358; forced to form alliance with France, 386; diplomatic difficulties with Russia and England, 406; oppressive treaty with Napoleon, 407; alliance with the Czar, 410; despondency of, 412, 414; gives orders to mobilize, 415, 418; issues ultimatum, 421; anxiety of, 422, 426; requests a truce, 431; rejects terms proposed, 432; Napoleon reopens negotiations with, 446, 447, 456; at Tilsit, 462; visits the Czar, II, 73; refuses to go to war, 74; again thinks of abdicating, 75; condemns the national movement for war, 91; vacillating conduct of, 92, 93, 102; appeals to Russia and to England, 166; refuses to join with them, 167; humiliating treaty with Napoleon, 168; at Dresden, 176; repudiates Yorck's defection, 252; leaves Potsdam, 259, 260, 261; treaty with Russia, 262; treaty with England, 265; at Bray, 350, 352; accusations against the Austrians, 356; enters Paris, 366; dispute settled with Russia and Saxony, 396.
Fréjus, Napoleon lands at, I, 182; embarks at, II, 376.
Frèron, at Toulon, I, 55, 63; favourable to Napoleon, 64, 72.
Friedland, battle of, I, 432, 453.
Friuli, Duke of, *vide* Duroc.
Fructidor, 18th, *Coup d'état* of, I, 123, 124, 183, 184; peace party defeated, 185, 250.
Fuentes d'Onoro, Masséna defeated at, II, 127.
Fulton, gives practical demonstration at Paris, I, 342.

Gaëta, Duke of, *vide* Gaudin.
Gallican church, articles of, II, 119, 244.
Gaudin, minister of Finance, I, 214, 268; resorts to loans, 270; Duke of Gaëta, II, 10; head of the Treasury, 392.
Gaza, surrenders to the French, I, 165, 172.
Genoa, at war with Corsica, I, 1, 2, 3; Napoleon at, 58; becomes a republic, 132, 145, 150; Championnet defeated at, 229; Masséna blockaded at, 232, 233; Masséna capitulates at, 234, 235; II, 343.
Gentili, General, I, 131, 132.
Gentz, review of Hauterive's pamphlet, I, 259, 348, 420; advises the Czar to make peace, 455; manifesto written by, II, 60.
George III, King of England, invites Paoli to England, I, 62; calls out militia, 317, 319; replies to Russia's declaration of war, II, 32.
Gérard, II, 349, 368; in Belgium, 414.
German Empire, disintegration of, I, 307, 308; dissolution of, 404.
Gibraltar, I, 224; II, 28.
Girard, II, 290, 292.
Girondists, I, 42; character of, 50; recalled by the Convention, 63; ideals of, 111.
Gneisenau, I, 430; II, 53, 92, 290; Blücher's chief of the staff, 292; strategic genius of, 303; advises assuming the offensive in Belgium, 335; advice discarded, 347; in Belgium, 412; directs the retreat, 419; comment on Waterloo, 430.
Godoy, "Prince of Peace," head of the government in Spain, I, 248; complaisant towards France, II, 40; detested by the people, 41; intrigues at Paris, 43, 44, 45; taken prisoner, 46; retires to Italy, 49.
Goethe, "Werther," I, 17, 147; intercourse of Napoleon with, II, 60, 61; "Lines to Marie Louise," 177; his appreciation of Napoleon's historical significance, 177.
Gohier, I, 191; Napoleon seeks his support, 195; breakfasts at the Bonapartes, 202; detained by Moreau, 203.
Gourgaud, II, 437; accompanies Napoleon, 440; at St. Helena, 442, 443, 445, 455.
Grenoble, Napoleon issues manifesto at, II, 387; receives deputation of magistrates at, 389, 439.

Gross-Beeren, Oudinot defeated at, II, 299.
Gross-Gorschen, II, 270, 271.
Grouchy, II, 348; member of the Chamber of Peers, 410; in Belgium, 414, 415, 417; sent in quest of Blücher, 420, 421; at Wavre, 424, 426, 428; saves his corps, 434; blamed by Napoleon at St. Helena, 453, 454.
Guard, Old, in Poland, I, 439; allowed to return to France, II, 11; at Borodino, 205; Napoleon's favouritism of, 220; Napoleon's appeal to, 223; at the Beresina, 226; specially privileged, 289; at Hanau, 319, Napoleon's farewell to, 374, 375; at the Champ de Mai, 409; at Waterloo, 422, 426, 427.
Guard, Young, sufferings of, II, 192; at Borissov, 228; at Planchenoit, 426.
Guards, National, I, 29, 42, 200, 201; II, 239, 325.
Guerrillas, formation of, II, 123; terrible significance of, 124, 127.
Gustavus, IV, of Sweden, II, 29, 142.

Hal, detachment of Wellington's Army at, II, 422.
Hamburg, Cossack patrol at, II, 263; occupied by Davoût, 279, 290.
Hanau, battle of, II, 319, 320, 322.
Hanover, invaded by French troops, I, 319; occupied by Bernadotte, 341, 344, 346; proposed transfer of, to Prussia, 406, 408, 409; to be restored to King George, 411, 414, 415, 418; II, 262, 268, 314.
Hanseatic towns, contraband trade in, II, 130, 138, 146, 256; independence of, 280.
Hardenberg, I, 378; advises King of Prussia to disarm, 407; popularity of, 421; Chancellor of State, II, 166; counsels the King to join with Russia and England, 167, 168; hopes of Polish territory, 252, 253; intercourse with Metternich, 255; diary quoted, 259; in favour of Russia, 260, 262, 319; diary quoted, 345, 358, 430.
Hatzfeldt, Prince, special mission to Paris, II, 252; interview with Napoleon, 259.
Haugwitz, Count, advises occupation of Hanover, I, 344; sent to Napoleon, 378; detained at Iglau, 379; 386; signs treaty with France, 407; advises war against France, 414; disliked by the army, 421.
Hauterive, pamphlet of quoted, I, 258, 259; programme of, 297; II, 33.
Haye, La, II, 425.
Haye Sainte, La, II, 422, 425, 426, 427.
Helvetia, *vide* Switzerland.
Hiller, II, 79, 80; defeated at Landshut, 84, 85; defeated at Ebelsberg, 87; drives back Eugène's troops, 323.
Hoche, I, 60; popularity of, 83; Napoleon's jealousy of, 112, 113; defeats Austrians, 117; death of, 123.
Hohenlinden, victory of Moreau at, I, 244.
Hohenlohe, Prince, in command, I, 426, 427; defeated at Jena, 428, 429; capitulates to the French, 431.
Holitsch, I, 383; allied monarchs withdraw to, 384.
Holland, King of, *vide* Louis Bonaparte.
Holland, Lord, II, 401, 450.
Holland, conquered by France, I, 86; English defeated in, 194; Russian prisoners in, 246; contributes to French Exchequer, 253; loses Ceylon and Cape of Good Hope to England, 254; "Code Napoléon" in force in, 276; new Constitution of, 300; "at the disposal of France," 306, 310, 311, 315; evacuation demanded by England, 318; compelled to furnish troops and ships for France, 320; changes in government, 397; Louis Bonaparte King of, 398, 399; trade of crippled, II, 135; British expedition in, 137; threatened annexation of, 138; harsh treatment of, 139; abdication of King Louis, 140; declared a constituent part of France, 141; riots in, 185;

Napoleon refuses to surrender, 256; separation from France demanded, 280; 314; irrecoverably lost, 330.
Hougomont, II, 423.
Hudelist, II, 310.

Ibrahim Bey, I, 153; retreats eastwards, 155, 157, 173, reappears on the Syrian frontier, 174.
Ildefonso, Treaty of, I, 248.
Illyria, formation of, II, 103; ceded to Württemberg, 164; riots in, 185, 280, Fouché made governor of, 286; proposed surrender of, 288.
India, French designs on, I, 89; 131, 146; Napoleon's aims in, 164; the Directory's designs on, 168; French intrigues in, 223; Britain alarmed for, 316; Napoleon jealous of Britain's power in, 436; proposed expedition to, II, 37; influence of, on Russia, 38, and on England, 39; Napoleon's designs on, 148, 158, 210; plans postponed, 250.
Ionian Isles, acquired by France, I, 129; 131, recaptured by Russia and Turkey, 159, 185, 410, to revert to France, 463.
Istria, Duke of, *vide* Bessières.
Istria, offered to Austria, I, 117; incorporated in Italy, 388, 394, demanded by Napoleon, 405.
Italy, Viceroy of, *vide* Eugène Beauharnais.
Italy, Republican propaganda in, I, 90; French and Austrian troops in, 91-3; Napoleon's liberty of action in, 98, requisitions levied in, 99; compensation in, 104; Napoleon's designs in, 110, 111; Bourbon intrigues in, 123, 124; Austrian victories in, 232; "Code Napoléon" in force in, 276; "Italian Republic," 301, 302; extension of France's power in, 302, 303, 304; Napoleon crowned King of, 356; commercial importance of, for France, II, 4; opposition to the Continental System in, 33, 34, 75; Napoleon maintains his control of, 249; new army demanded from, 274; Austrian supremacy not to be restored, 314, Murat's ambition in, 323; 330, proposed surrender of, 343.

Jacobins, I, 36, Napoleon connected with, 39, 42, 43; government of, 50; opposition to, 51; Napoleon's attitude towards, 56; effect of the Jacobin revolts, 67; 89, policy of, 120; Jacobin clubs reopened, 184; increasing activity of, 191; successes of, 192; 195, threatening movement of, 199; hatred of, 212; plots against Napoleon, 280; 281, 287, destroyed by proscriptions, 321.
Jaffa, I, 165; massacre of the prisoners at, 166, 167; sufferings of troops on the march to, 171.
Janissaries, revolt of, I, 458.
Jena, battle of, I, 427, 428, result of, 430; influence on Prussia, II, 178.
Jews, under the Revolution I, 275; 438, Sanhedrin held at Paris, II, 5; special measures for, 6; Napoleon appeals to, 192; 223.
Joachim, King of Naples, *vide* Murat.
John, Crown Prince of Portugal, appointed Regent, II, 42, sails for Brazil, 43.
John, Archduke, I, 242; defeated at Hohenlinden, 244; rouses the Tyrol, II, 79; defeats Eugène, 81; defeated at Raab, 94; slow movements of, 96, 97; panic created by troops of, 98.
Jomini, on the war in Spain, II, 69; in Poland, 188, 197, 277.
Josephine, Empress of France, early career of, I, 76; personal appearance, 77, 78; acquaintanceship with Napoleon, 79-81; marriage of, 82; faithlessness of, 84; 202; Lætitia's aversion for, 125, court of, 290; rumours of divorce, 294; 331, extravagance of, 333; religious marriage and coronation of, 352; difficult position of, II, 20, 21, 23; divorce decided upon, 106; reasons for, 107; withdraws to Malmaison, 108; conversation with Countess Metternich, 111; Napoleon's comments on, 446.
Joubert, I, 113, commander-in-chief in Holland, 141; in command in

Italy, 168; 181, 189, 192, defeated and killed at Novi, 193.
Jourdan, I, 60; driven back by the Austrians, 91; defeated at Würzburg, 104; Jacobin, 184; Napoleon's conversation with, 199; 203, in Piedmont, 302; made a marshal, 333; elected to the Chamber of Peers, 410.
Junot, accompanies Napoleon to Genoa, I, 58; sails for Egypt, 150; 293, invades Portugal, II, 42; enters Madrid, 43; capitulates at Cintra, 50; 65, 125; at the Beresina, 227.
Juntas, origin of, II, 50, issue appeal to the nation, 123.

Kaiser-Ebersdorf, II, 88; partial destruction of bridge at, 89; Napoleon at, 90.
Kalisch, Reynier defeated at, II, 258; negotiations at, 261; treaty signed at, 262.
Kalckreuth, General, I, 429.
Katzbach, the, II, 279; Ney at, 290; 293, Macdonald defeated at, 299; 302.
Kellermann, General, I, 97; 98, at Marengo, 237, 238; made a marshal, 333; II, 5, at Waterloo, 422.
Kléber, General, I, 60; in Egypt, 150; in Syria, 165; at Mount Tabor, 169; character of, 170; chief command entrusted to, 176; assassinated, 255.
Klein-Görschen, II, 270, 271.
Kleist, General, II, 271; 276, 295, defeats Vandamme, 301; 347; joins Blücher, 348.
Knesebeck, sent on confidential mission to Vienna, II, 253; 254, 257; recalled, 260; 261, 263.
Knobelsdorff, General, in Paris, I, 416; 417.
Königsberg, Prussian court at, II, 72; Czar's visit to, 73; Stein at, 261.
Koran, I, 147, 164.
Kray, General, in command in Suabia, I, 231; signs armistice, 241; superseded, 242.
Krusemarck, I, 157; Prussian ambassador in Paris, II, 243.
Kulm, Vandamme defeated at, II, 301; 302, 303, 304.
Kurakin, Prince, Russian envoy at Paris, II, 109; 159, 176.
Kutusoff, General, Commander-in-Chief of the allied armies, I, 375, 376; successful ruse of, 377; defers to the Czar, 380; replaces Barclay as Commander-in-Chief, II, 203, 204; enters Moscow, 206; Napoleon makes overtures to, 211; 213, 215, 216, 217, excellent light horse of, 218; avoids encounter with Napoleon, 222, 223; slow pursuit of, 225; death of, 270.

Labédoyère, Colonel, joins Napoleon, II, 388; 389; death of, 439.
Labouchère, confidential mission of, II, 138.
Lacépède, Chancellor of the Legion of Honour, I, 279; member of the Chamber of Peers, II, 410.
Lafayette, I, 240; II, 410; heads the revolt of the second chamber, 431; 433.
Laforêt, French Ambassador in Berlin, I, 407; 418.
Laharpe, I, 94, 95, influence of with the Czar, II, 336.
Lainé, Deputy, report of, II, 334, 335, 390.
Landshut, battle of, II, 84, 85, 86.
Lannes, defeats Papal troops, I, 109; in Egypt, 150; in Syria, 165; at Aboukir, 174; returns with Napoleon, 176; captures Ivrea, 234; 235, at Marengo, 236; 333, 369; reaches the Danube, 370; against the Russians, 376, 377, 379; at Jena, 428; in Poland, 437, 438; at Friedland, 452; Duke of Montebello, II, 10; courage and independence of, 23; 24; victorious at Tudela, 65; at Eggmühl, 85; at Lobau, 88; death of, 90.
Laon, battle of, II, 354.
Laplace, letter from Napoleon to, I, 8; Napoleon examined by, 12; Minister of the Interior, 214; succeeded by Lucien, 220.
Larévellière-Lépeaux, in the Directory, I, 89; 118, 120, 184, 191.
La Rothière, battle of, 342, 344, 345.

Las Cases, Count, II, 437, 440; at St. Helena, 442, 443, 448; arrested, 451.
Lauderdale, Lord, English negotiator, I, 411, 418.
Lauriston, General, sent with overtures to Kutusoff, II, 211; 271, taken prisoner, 318.
La Valette, Bonaparte family at, I, 52.
Lavalette, surrenders to Napoleon, I, 151; English take possession of, 246.
Lebrun, Consul, I, 219; at the Tuileries, 261, 265; revises the Code, 274; 325, Arch-Treasurer, 333; Duke of Piacenza, II, 10; Stadtholder of Holland, 140.
Leclerc, General, married to Pauline Bonaparte, I, 125; in Portugal, 255; at St. Domingo, 312; dies of fever, 313.
Lefebvre, in Egypt, I, 150; marshal, 333; Duke of Danzig, II, 10; in command in Spain, 63; 64; compelled to retreat, 65; recalled from the Tyrol, 94; advises Napoleon to abdicate, 369; member of Chamber of Peers, 410.
Leghorn, French fleet defeated off, I, 62; 98, extortionate requisitions at, 100; English goods stored at, II, 33; 385.
Legion of Honour founded, I, 279; 283; universal regard for, 340; titles attached to, II, 9.
Legislative Body, functions of, I, 216, 218, 220, 282, Napoleon's address at, II, 2; 8; changes in, 14; Napoleon's intentions for, 247, 248; meeting of, 333-5; closed, 335.
Leipzig, battle of, II, 316-19.
Leoben, I, 114, negotiations at, 115, 116; Merveldt defeated at, 375.
L'Estocq, in command of the Prussians, I, 440; pursued by Ney, 441; 442, 452.
"Letters from the Cape," II, 450, 453, 454.
Licences, lucrative trade in, II, 132, reason for, 136.
Liechtenstein, Prince, losses of, at Austerlitz, I, 383; negotiates for Austria at Pressburg, 387.
Ligny, battle of, II, 417, 418, 421.
Ligurian Republic, I, 132; independence of guaranteed, 247; 300, 302, new Constitution for, 303.
Liverpool, Lord, Prime Minister, II, 439, 450.
Lobanoff, at Friedland, I, 453; requests truce from Napoleon, 454; 456, 457, 458.
Lobau, island of, occupied by the French, II, 88; 90, 91.
Lodi, Napoleon at, I, 96.
Lombardy, I, 86; offered to Austria, 108; Republic of, 116; communications with France, 141; Austria's designs upon, 228; new Constitution for, 301; name changed to Italian Republic, 302.
London, preliminaries of peace signed at, I, 256.
Longwood, II, 441, 442, Napoleon buried near, 452.
Louis XIV, I, 133; 256; bureaucracy of, I, 265, II, 145.
Louis XV, I, 23; II, 145.
Louis XVI, I, 23; 25, 27; declares war on Austria, 41; takes refuge with the National Assembly, 42; execution of, 45.
Louis XVII, I, 69.
Louis XVIII, in exile, I, 69; loyalty to, 280; rejects compensation, 322; partisans of, II, 366; 367, 370, does not pay stipulated income to Napoleon, 376; 379, character of, 380; 382, 383, 390, 397, 400, returns to Paris, 437; 459.
Louise, Queen of Prussia, I, 421; appeals to Napoleon, 464.
Louisiana, relinquished by Spain, I, 248; 300, proposed colonial base, 311; sold to the United States, 317.
Louverture, Toussaint, government of, I, 311; defeated, 312; death of, 313.
Lowe, Sir Hudson, arrival of, II, 441; character of, 442; Napoleon's feud with, 447; 451.
Lucca, Republic of, I, 303, 394.
Lucchesini, Prussian ambassador, comment on d'Enghien's death, I, 327; 341; sends word of proposed restitution of Hanover, 414; 415, recalled from Paris, 416; 417, negotiates for peace, 431.

Lunéville, proposed congress at, I, 242 ; negotiations at, 243, 244 ; peace signed at, 245 ; 252, 305.
Lützen, battle of, II, 270, 271 ; its influence on Austria, 272.
Lycées, education at, I, 277.
Lyons, conference with Lombard notables at, I, 301.

Macdonald, I, 189, evacuates Naples, 190 ; Duke of Taranto, II, 10 ; in Poland, 185 ; 196, 241, troops in confusion, 242 ; 290, at Dresden, 293 ; defeated at the Katzbach, 299 ; gloomy report from, 302 ; 308, 312, wounded at Leipzig, 318 ; 337, 347, 348, 349, defeated at Bar-sur-Aube, 353 ; 359, letter to, captured, 361 ; advocates continuing the struggle, 363 ; advises Napoleon to abdicate, 369 ; interview with the Czar, 370 ; 372.
Mack, General, I, 167 ; defeated by Championnet, 185 ; character of, 367 ; plans of, 368 ; 369 ; delusion of, 370 ; defeated at Ulm, 371 ; capitulates, 372.
Madrid, surrender of, II, 66 ; Napoleon at, 66, 67.
Maitland, Captain, II, 437 ; 438.
Malet, conspiracy of, II, 230, 231, 237.
Mallet du Pan, reports of, I, 91 ; shrewd forecast by, 111 ; 112, 143, 223.
Malmaison, Napoleon withdraws to, II, 435 ; 436.
Malojaroslavetz, battle at, II, 216.
Malta, I, 145, captured by the French, 151 ; 185, blockaded by England, 228 ; fall of, 242 ; offered to the Czar, 246 ; renounced, 254 ; surrendered by England, 256 ; importance of, for India, 313 ; England refuses to evacuate, 314 ; 316, 318, 345, proposed exchange of, 346 ; 411.
Mamelukes, I, 152 ; cavalry of, 153 ; 155, 160, property of, confiscated, 161.
Mantua, I, 65 ; Austrians take refuge in, 96 ; besieged by the French, 101 ; 103, importance of, 104 ; failure of Austria's attempts to relieve, 107 ; incorporated in the Cisalpine Republic, 129 ; capitulates, 190.
Marboeuf, Count, I, 3 ; intimacy with the Bonapartes, 4, 10 ; death of, 18.
Marengo, battle of, I, 235-8.
Maret, ability and loyalty of, I, 263 ; drafts Constitution for Lombardy, 301 ; Duke of Bassano, II, 10 ; 70 ; 230 ; meets Napoleon at Vilna, 233 ; 242. 257, 262, signs convention with Metternich, 282 ; 313, deprived of office, 333 ; negotiates for Napoleon, 343, 344 ; 363 ; 373 sends envoy to Elba, 384 ; 392, 402.
Marie Louise, II, 110 ; leaves for France, 113 ; marriage of, 114 ; Goethe's lines to, 177 ; 244, 257 ; Regent, 285 ; intercepted letter to, 361 ; takes flight, 365 ; proposed regency under, 367 ; 369 ; Napoleon's letter to, 372 ; 378, proposed coronation of, 390 ; Napoleon's comment on, 446.
Mariotti, French Consul at Leghorn, II, 378, 382, 385.
Markoff, Russian Ambassador, I, 256 ; II, 346.
Marmont, at Genoa, I, 58 ; 67, at Arcole, 107 ; in Egypt, 150 ; 157, memoirs of, quoted, 158 ; returns with Napoleon, 176 ; in command in Holland, 341 ; 378, 451, Duke of Ragusa, II, 10 ; at Lobau, 91, 94, 97 ; chief command in Spain, 127 ; defeated at Salamanca, 204 ; 267, 270, 271, 290, at Dresden, 296 ; 297, 301, at Leipzig, 312 ; wounded, 318 ; 337, 341, 347, 348, 349, opposes Blücher, 353 ; at Laon, 354 ; Napoleon's censure of, 355 ; 360, surrenders Paris, 366 ; 368, writes to Schwarzenberg, 370 ; 387, proscribed, 390.
Marseilles, Jacobins at, I, 51, 52 ; victory of Convention troops at, 53, 55.
Martinique, La, Tascher family at, I, 76 ; expedition to, 312, 313.
Masséna, at Montenotte, I, 95 ; at Caldiero, 106 ; 107, 113, cuts Austrian communications, 114 ; victories in Switzerland, 194 ; defeats Russians at Zurich, 228 ; 229 ; at Genoa, 232, 234 ; in com-

mand in Italy, 239 ; succeeded by Brune, 244 ; marshal, 333 ; invades Naples, 393 ; Duke of Rivoli, II, 10 ; at Augsburg, 78 ; 81, 84, at Lobau, 89, 90 ; at Wagram 96 ; 98, in command in Spain, 125, 126 ; defeated and deprived of the command, 127 ; at Lisbon, 144, refused reinforcements, 156 ; rejoins Napoleon, 388.
Melas, General, I, 231, 232, 233, 234, defeated at Marengo, 235, 237 ; obtains armistice, 239.
Menou, General, in command of the Convention troops, I, 70 ; in Egypt, 150 ; 161, 253, defeated at Alexandria, 255.
Merlin, I, 63, in the Directory, 191.
Merveldt, General, at Leoben, I, 115 ; defeated at Leoben, 375 ; II, 313 ; taken prisoner, 314 ; sent to negotiate for an armistice, 315.
Metternich, I, 342 ; II, 39 ; at St. Cloud, 52 ; 57 ; exaggeration of, 70 ; gives advice at Vienna, 71 ; 75, 77, favours French alliance 110-12 ; 115, shrewd prediction of, 152 ; secret advice to Napoleon, 153 ; 169, culpable conduct of, 170, 171 ; interview with Napoleon at Dresden, 188, 247 ; 248, 255, advocates a general pacification, 256-8 ; policy of disliked in London, 265 ; seeks to strengthen Austria, 266, 267 ; states conditions insisted on by Austria, 280, 281 ; interview with Napoleon at Dresden, 282 ; reproached by the Allied Sovereigns, 284 ; 286, sends ultimatum, 287 ; calculations justified, 288 ; Napoleon sends secret messenger to, 300 ; 322 ; sends offer of peace to Napoleon, 328 ; 329, 330, issues a manifesto, 332 ; 333, offer of peace accepted, 334 ; 335, 337 ; alienation of the Czar and, 339 ; negotiations with the Allies, 340, 341 ; at Troyes, 350 ; upbraided by the Allied Sovereigns, 356 ; letter to Caulaincourt, 357 ; abandons Napoleon, 358 ; 363, disapproves the choice of Elba, 372 ; 373, letter to Fouché, 398.
Milan, Napoleon's triumphal entry into, I, 96 ; 115, 116, Austrians enter, 190 ; Napoleon at, 239 ; new Constitution granted to, 301 ; Napoleon crowned King of Italy at, 350.
Milhaud, General, at Waterloo, II, 422 ; 425.
Mincio, I, 239, 244, 245.
Miollis, General, confiscates British goods, II, 33 ; occupies Rome, 36.
Miot de Melito, notes the changes in Paris, I, 289 ; memoirs of quoted, 297, 298, 329 ; 342 ; *ibid.* speech of Napoleon, 353, 354 ; intimacy with Joseph Bonaparte, 396, 399.
Möckern, Marmont driven from, II. 313.
Molé, Count, conversation with Napoleon, II, 243 ; 320, 401.
Mollien, I, 272 ; character of, II, 246 ; 247, rejoins the Emperor, 391 ; Minister of Finance, 392.
Moncey, General, I, 293 ; marshal, 333 ; Duke of Conegliano, II, 10 ; in Spain, 63 ; at Saragossa, 66.
Monge, at the "École Militaire," I, 11 ; at Montebello 125 ; in the Egyptian expedition, 147 ; returns with Napoleon, 176 ; elected to the Chamber of Peers, II, 410.
Moniteur, Le, I, 323 ; II, 13, 14.
Monk, I, 288, 322.
Montebello, castle of, Napoleon's court at, I, 125, 126.
Montebello, Duke of, *vide* Lannes.
Montenotte, battle of, I, 95.
Montgelas, Bavarian Minister, friendly to France, I, 186, memoirs of, quoted, 400 ; *ibid.* 448 ; II, 7 ; at Erfurt, 60.
Montholon, joins Napoleon's suite, II, 437 ; accompanies Napoleon, 440 ; at St. Helena, 442, 443 ; Napoleon's conversation with, 447, 452.
Montmirail, battle of, II, 347, 349.
Mont-Saint-Jean, village of, II, 422 ; battle of, *vide* Waterloo.
Moore, Sir John, in Portugal, II, 65 ; at Salamanca, 67 ; at Corunna, 68.
Moreau, in Germany, I, 104 ; 113 ; in Italy, 189, 192 ; in Paris 197, 198, 199 ; in Switzerland, 231, 232 ; occupies Zurich, 239 ; signs armistice, 241, 243 ; at Hohenlin-

den, 244; troops of, sent to St. Domingo, 313; overtures from Napoleon and the Bourbons, 322; banished, 323; 324; II, 230.
Morfontaine, Treaty of, I, 246.
Mortier, Marshal, I, 333; at Dürrnstein, I, 375; at Mainz, 425; Duke of Treviso, II, 10; in Franconia, 52; reports sufferings of the Young Guard, 192; at Moscow, 215, 217; at Langres, 338; opposes Blücher, 353; 354, 360; outside Paris, 366, 368; member of the Chamber of Peers, 410.
Moscow, entry of the French into, II, 207; Napoleon at, 207-11; departure of "Grand Army" from, 215; attempted destruction of the Kremlin, 217.
Moulins, at the *Coup d'état*, I, 200, 203, 206.
Mouton, General, in the Russian Campaign, II, 198, 216; returns with Napoleon, 232; in Belgium, 414, 415; at Plancenoit, 424, 425.
Müffling, General, at Waterloo, II, 426.
Munich, occupied by the French, I, 239; Napoleon's threat against, II, 331.
Murad, Bey, at the battle of the Pyramids, I, 155; in Upper Egypt, 165; 173, driven south, 174.
Murat, I, 71; in Egypt, 150; at battle of Aboukir, 174; returns with Napoleon, 176; at the *Coup d'état*, 209; married to Caroline Bonaparte, 295; in Tuscany, 303; marshal, 333; 369, misleads Mack, 370; reproached by Napoleon, 375; successful losses of, 376; victory of at Hollabrunn, 377; 386, Grand Duke of Cleves and Berg, 403; friction with Prussia, 413, 414; 425, at Eylau, 441; pursues the Russians, 443; hopes of a crown, II, 43; enters Madrid, 46; King of Naples, 49; 117, arrests the Pope, 119; opposes the English in Sicily, 143; in the Russian campaign, 185, 195, 197, 200, severe losses of, 205; defeated 214; 215, 216; the "Cavalry Butcher," 220; in chief command, 231, 236, 242; blamed for the loss of the army, 243; 266; cavalry reserves under, 290; at the battle of Dresden, 296, 297; Napoleon's comment to, 308; 309, 311, deserts Napoleon, 322; Napoleon's anxiety about, 330; joins coalition against France, 340; makes overtures to Napoleon, 379; 412; defeated at Tolentino, 413.

Naples, joins coalition, I, 87; 125, 148, 152, at war with France, 163; troops of, defeated, 185; King of, abdicates, 186; evacuated by the French, 190; Russia's intervention on behalf of, 248; significance of French occupation of, 344, 345; change of policy at the Court of, 393; Joseph Bonaparte King of, 394; 411, Murat succeeds to throne of, II, 49; 143, intrigues of Murat at, 379.
Napoleon I, Emperor of France, birth of, I, 4; school career of, 5-12; enters the army, 12; at Valence, 12-16; character of, 17; returns to Ajaccio, 29; recalled to France, 32; books studied at this time, 33; literary efforts, 33-5; takes oath to the new Constitution, 36; adventures in Corsica, 37-41; returns to France, 41; failure of plans in Corsica, 47-9; reinforces Carteaux at Avignon, 52; "Le souper de Beaucaire," 52, 53; commands batteries at siege of Toulon, 55; associates with the Robespierres, 57-9; allies himself with the Thermidorians, 64; saves the Convention on the 13th Vendémiaire, 71; appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Interior, 72, acquaintance with Josephine, 80-2; marriage of, 82; Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Italy, 92; skilful tactics in Italy, 94-6; remonstrates with the Directory, 97; struggles for Mantua, 99-107; influence of Alexander the Great, 111; letter to the Archduke Charles, 114; treatment of Venice, 120, 121; supports the Directory, 122, 123; at Montebello, 125; frank statements of plans and views, 126, 127; negotiates treaty of Campo Formio, 129; Oriental schemes,

131-4; reception to, given by the Directory, 136, 137; political creed of, 138, 139; tests feasibility of landing in England, 144, 145; sails for Egypt, 146; captures Malta, 151; battle of the Pyramids, 155; administration of Egypt, 160-3; in Syria, 165-73; baffled at Acre, 173; entrusts command of the troops to Kleber, 176, 177; returns to France, 178, enthusiasm of the populace, 182; 183; reason for this, 193, 194; preparations for the *Coup d'état*, 198, 199; the *Coup d'état*, 200-11; made Consul, 210; prudent conduct, 213; unanimously chosen First Consul, 219; reason of his powerful position, 227; at Marengo, 236-8; negotiations with England, 241; "Master of Europe," 247; signs the Concordat, 252; schemes of Louis XIV, surpassed by, 256; as peacemaker, 257; influence of, on the social and political conditions of the nations of Europe, 259 *et seq.*; presides at the Council of State, 262; administration of the taxes, 271, 272; "Code Napoléon," 273-6; educational policy of, 277, 278; plot against, 281; made Consul for life, 284; changes in the entourage of, 289-91; programme of, 296-7; conduct of, towards Switzerland, 304-6; proposed colonial system of, 311-13; provocative attitude of, towards Britain, 316-19, 321; plot against, foiled, 322-4; arrest and death of d'Enghien, 324-7; title of Emperor bestowed upon, 330; Court of, 333-9; awkward predicament of, 343; at Aix-la-Chapelle, 348; crowned in Notre Dame, 352; crowned King of Italy, 356; popular belief of supernatural element in, 365; at Ulm, 371-3; triumphal entry of, into Vienna, 376; at Austerlitz, 382-4; signs armistice, 385; negotiations for peace, 387-9; decisive battles in career of, 391; victories exploited by, 392, 393; treatment of Holland by, 398, 399; control of Western Germany by, 401-4; and of Southern Germany by, 406, 407; attitude of, towards Prussia, 416-18; at Jena, 427-9; triumphal entry into Berlin, 430; intrigues with the Poles, 432, 433; in Poland, 436-40; at Warsaw, 440; at Eylau, 441-4; intrigues in Turkey and in India, 448, 449; at Friedland 452, 453; meeting with the Czar at Tilsit; 458-64; treaty signed, 462, attitude of the French nation towards, II, 1, 2; care for the nation's material prosperity, 6-8; system of rewards, 8-11; indispensable to France, 15; control of education by, 15; founds the University, 16-19; state of health of, 22; increasing splendour of court of, 23-5; treatment of the Pope by, 34-6; in Bayonne, 40-2; interview with Royal family of Spain, 48; meeting with the Czar at Erfurt, 59-61; at Madrid, 67; returns to France, 69; reasons for this, 72-4; leaves Paris, 82; skilful manœuvres of Abensberg, Landshut, and Eggmühl, 83-6; "Work is my element," 86; battle of Aspern, 88-91; Wagram, 95-8; imposes burdensome treaty on Austria, 103; life of, attempted at Schönbrunn, 104; increasing alienation of the people from, 104-6; divorce of, 107; marriage with Marie Louise, 113-4; critical period in career of, 116-8; struggle of, with the Pope, 118-22; and with England, 129; desire of, to foster French industries, 134-9; advises the incorporation of Holland, 141; frank statement of plans with regard to England, 145-6; "Master of the Universe," 148; arbitrary behaviour towards Russia, 155, 156; oppression of the States of the Rhine Confederation, 164; Prussia forced to enter into a close alliance with, 167; holds court at Dresden, 176; Goethe's appreciation of, 177, historical significance of, 177-9; camp of, 183, 184; "Grand Army" of, 185; sufferings of, during Russian Campaign, 194; at Vitebsk, 197; at Borodino, 204-6; at Moscow, 207;

failure of his appeal to the Czar, 211; leaves Moscow, 215; at Smolensk, 220; improved health of, 224; crossing of the Beresina by, 226-9; hastens back to France, 231; recapitulation of the Emperor's aims in the Russian campaign, 234-7; indefatigable zeal of, in reconstructing his powerful position, 240; negotiations with the Pope, 243-5; indebtedness of, to the "Idéologues," 248; threatens Prussia, 253, means to wage war as "General Bonaparte," 269; 271, enters Dresden, 272; signs a truce, 279; interview with Metternich, 282; contrasts himself with hereditary sovereigns, 288; at the battle of Dresden, 295-9; warned by Ney, 303; indecision of, 305; at Düben, 310; proposes negotiations for peace, 314; at Leipzig, 317; at Mainz, 320; treatment of the Pope, 326, 327; comments on his position, 330, 331; closes the Legislative Body, 335; prepares to oppose the allied armies, 338; leaves Paris, 341; defeated at La Rothière, 342; consents to negotiate for peace, 343; change of plan, 344; victories of, 348, letter to Joseph, 350; principle underlying Napoleon's obstinacy, 358; at Rheims, 359; defeated at Arcis, 361, plans discussed by, 363; resolves to go to Paris, 364; withdraws to Fontainebleau, 366; signs abdication, 369; says farewell to the Guard, 375; in Elba, 375-9; leaves Elba, 385; reaches Paris, 391; difficulties of the situation, 401, 402; resents restrictions on his power, 405; at the Champ de Mai, 407-9; leaves for Belguim, 411; at Waterloo, 422-8; back in Paris, 430; second abdication of, 434; surrenders to England, 437; reaches St. Helena, 441; court at, 443; varying opinions of, 444-6; desire of, to influence public opinion in England, 448-50; death of, 452; dictated works of, 453-5; recognition of the national forces of the Continent, 456, his justification of his career, 458; interred within the Invalides, 459.

Napoleon II, Napoleon I abdicates in favour of, II, 434; 436, advice to, 459.

Napoleon III, at the Champ de Mai, II, 409; 459.

Narbonne, Adjutant-General, II, 175; sent to the Czar, 175; returns from Vilna, 184; 191, Ambassador to Vienna, 267, informs Napoleon of Austria's intrigues, 273; at Prague, 284.

National Assembly, the monarchy suspended by, I, 42, 43; schools suppressed by, 44, 45.

Necker, I, 19, 20; Minister of Finance, 24.

Neipperg, Count, at Paris, I, 240.

Nelson, Admiral, outside Toulon, I, 150; sails for Syria, 152; destroys the French fleet at Aboukir, 156; at Syracuse, 180; at Naples, 185; forced to withdraw from Boulogne, 256; victory at Trafalgar, 374, 375.

Nesselrode, Count, advice to the Czar, II, 254; interview with Metternich, 280; 328.

Neuchâtel, Prince de, *vide* Berthier.

Ney, in Switzerland, I, 305; 314, marshal, 333; 341, 369, at the Danube, 370; advances on the Tyrol, 378; commands the vanguard at Jena, 428; reprimanded by Napoleon, 440; pursues the Prussians, 441, 442; at Eylau, 443; exposed position of, 450; rejoins Napoleon, 451; at Friedland, 452; Duke of Elchingen, II, 10, withdraws across the Rhine, 53; in Spain, 63, 65, 67; 125, in the Russian campaign, 185, 193; at Valutina-Gora, 200; at Borodino, 205; 219, splendid qualities of, 220; commands the rear-guard, 222, crosses the Dnieper by night, 223, at Borissov, 228; at Lützen, 270, 271; at Bautzen, 275-7; defeated at Dennewitz, 303; recrosses the Elbe, 305; wounded at Leipzig, 318; at Nancy, 338; 347, 349; maintains his ground at Torcy, 360; advises Napoleon to abdicate, 369; signs treaty of Fontainebleau, 372; elected to

the Chamber of Peers, 410; at Quatre Bras, 415, 417; defeated at Quatre Bras, 418; 420, at Waterloo, 422; death of, 439; Napoleon's ingratitude towards, 453, 454.
Norway, proposed conquest of, by Sweden, II, 173; 212, 254, acquisition of, guaranteed to Sweden, 264.
Novi, battle of, I, 181; Joubert killed at, 193.
Nuremberg, political publications at, I, 420.

Ochs, of Basle, plan of revolution drawn up with, I, 142.
Odeleben, description of Napoleon after Leipzig, II, 317.
Oglio, proposed Austrian boundary, I, 116, 119, 243; withdrawn from Austria, 244.
Oldenburg, Duke of, married to the Czar's sister, II, 108, proposed indemnity for, 275.
Oldenburg, territory of, annexed, II, 155; 159, hostility to the French in, 263.
Omm Dinar, French troops at, I, 155.
O'Meara, Dr., on the "Bellerophon," II, 440; banished from St. Helena, 451; 454.
Orange, Prince of, I, 421; II, 92.
Ordener, General, arrests d'Enghien, I, 325.
Orders in Council, II, 130; Holland requests the repeal of, 138; declined by England, 139; 141, 235.
"Organic Articles," I, 252.
Orthez, Soult defeated at, II, 359.
Osterode, Napoleon at, I, 445, 446.
Otranto, Duke of, *vide* Fouché.
Otto, Count, in London, I, 241, instructions to, 314; 319, 341, 345.
d'Oubril, at Paris, I, 410; 412, 416.
Oudinot, made Duke of Reggio, II, 10; 23, in South Germany, 78; on the Lech, 81; in the Russian Campaign, 185; advances on Drissa, 193, 196; 224, successful ruse of, 225; crosses the Beresina, 226; wounded, 229; 269, 279; in command of the "Berlin Army," 290; 292, defeated by Bülow, 299; replaced by Ney, 302; 349; defeated at Bar-sur-Aube, 353; advises the Emperor to abdicate, 369.
Ouvrard, II, 7.

Palafox, General, at Saragossa, II, 65.
Palm, death of, I, 420.
Pampeluna, captured by Wellington, II, 323.
Paoli, Pasquale, regent of Corsica, I, 1; takes refuge in England, 2; relations of, with the Bonapartes, 3, 4; 10; Napoleon's admiration for, 22, 27, 28; returns from exile, 31; 32, 34, 38, 39, breach with Napoleon, 40, 43; his attitude towards France, 45, 46; arrested, 47; Napoleon prepared to defend, 48; 57, invited to England, 62.
Papal States, I, 248; evacuated by Neapolitan troops, 249; become a French province, II, 36; 118.
Paravicini, Napoleon's letter to, I, 8.
Paris, revolts in, I, 26; 41, 42, after Robespierre's death, 63; "the Patriots' Battalion," 69; Convention troops defeated in, 71; National Guards defeated in, 72; social revival in, 73, 75, 77; improvement of, 266; foreigners flock to, 287; changes in, 289; Allied Sovereigns enter, II, 366; under Louis XVIII, 381; Napoleon returns to, 391; anxiety of populace in, 427; contemporary description of, 434.
Parma, Duke of, *vide* Cambacérès.
Parma, truce concluded with, I, 99; ceded to France, 248; allotted to Marie Louise, II, 372.
Parthenopean Republic, founded, I, 185; end of, 190.
Passariano, peace signed at, I, 129.
Paul, Czar, withdraws from Austria, I, 108; enthusiastic for Napoleon, 246; designs of, on India, 253; assassinated, 254.
Persia, I, 223; contemplated alliance with, 434; intrigues in, 448; treaty concluded with the Shah of, 449.
Peyrusse, diary of, quoted, II, 220; 289, Master of the Treasury, 400.

Phélipeaux, Picard de, at Acre, I, 167; 169.
Phull, General, member of the "war party," I, 421; plan of campaign of, II, 186.
Piacenza, Duke of, *vide* Lebrun.
Pichegru, I, 59; implicated in Bourbon intrigues, 123; in Paris, 322; found dead, 323.
Piedmont, I, 65; 233, 234, heavy tax imposed on, 239; fate of, 247; annexed to France, 302; ex-King of, indemnified, 346; proposed surrender of, II, 343.
Pitt, opposes the incorporation of Belgium, I, 86; concludes treaty with Austria, 87; declines Napoleon's overtures, 228; resigns office, 254; death of, 409.
Plancenoit, II, 422; Bülow at, 424, 425; captured by the Guard, 426; retaken by the Prussians, 427.
Platoff, Cossacks under, harass the French rearguard, II, 218; attacks Ney, 223; supports Wittgenstein, 227.
Plöswitz, armistice signed at, II, 279.
Po, Napoleon crosses, at Piacenza, I, 96; French boundary, 116; 129.
Poland, Austria's designs on, I, 86, 108; rumoured restoration of kingdom, 431; Napoleon welcomed in, 432; attitude of, towards Napoleon, 433; Austrian territories in, 434; terrible sufferings of the French troops in, 438; 447, proposals at Tilsit, 460; Napoleon summons troops from, II, 108; French and Russian intrigues in, 109; 113, treaty concerning, 149; Czar's designs in, 151; Napoleon increases his forces in, 156; 169, 170; "the second Polish war," 188, 189, 190; Napoleon's hopes disappointed in, 191-3, proposed surrender of, 274.
Pomerania, ceded by Sweden to France, II, 142; occupied by French troops, 173; offered to Bernadotte, 264.
Poniatowski, in command of the national troops, II, 108; in Paris, 181; in the Russian Campaign, 185; death of, 318.
Ponte-Corvo, Prince of, *vide* Bernadotte.
Pontécoulant, Doulcet, accepts Napoleon's plan of operations, I, 66, 67; appointed prefect, 265.
Pope Pius VI, refuses Directory's proposals, I, 109; Napoleon concludes peace with, 110; dispossessed, 140; refuses to abdicate, 141; in Paris, 351; performs coronation service, 352.
Pope Pius VII, elected at Venice, I, 251; claims unconditional neutrality, 395; refuses to annul Jerome's marriage, 396; strained relations with Napoleon, 397; 402, Napoleon's negotiations with, II, 34, 35; Napoleon's provocative attitude towards, 36, excommunicates Napoleon, 118; arrested and removed from Rome, 118; refuses to sanction Napoleon's divorce, 120; Napoleon's harsh treatment of, 120-2; settlement of dispute with, 243-5; Napoleon resumes negotiations with, 326; remains a prisoner, 327.
Porto Ferrajo, Napoleon arrives at, II, 375; 376, court at, 377; Napoleon leaves from, 385.
Portugal, enters the coalition, I, 87; closes ports against Britain, 248; 253, 255, 320, secret understanding with Britain, II, 42; British troops land in, 43; 45, 46, Wellesley in command in, 50; British masters of, 51, 65; Soult sent to, 69; Wellington in, 125; Masséna defeated in, 127.
Poterat, Marquis de, description of France by, I, 88.
Pozzo di Borgo, I, 28; Napoleon's conduct towards, 38, 39; Napoleon seeks to renew intimacy with, 43; in Vienna, 434; influence of, on the Czar, II, 339, 434.
Pradt, Abbé de, Napoleon's instructions to, II, 190; unsuccessful methods of, 191; meets Napoleon at Warsaw, 233; remark to, 376.
Prague, Congress of, II, 284; methods adopted at Congress, 285, Fouché in, 286; French agents at, 287; Napoleon sends reply to congress at, 288.

Prefects, office of, instituted, I, 264; work for, 265.
Pressburg, negotiations at, I, 387; treaty signed at, 388; article 14, quoted, 400; Napoleon's reason for signing, II, 7.
"Prince of Peace," *vide* Godoy.
Provence, I, 27; 51; hostile to Napoleon, II, 375.
Prussia, I, 65; 87, 224, joins coalition against England, 246; attitude of, towards secularizations, 307-9; 344, neutrality of, 347, 349; declines to join coalition against France, 358, 359; 363, negotiations with Russia, 378; attitude towards the Confederation of the Rhine, 403; Hanover occupied by Prussian troops, 406, signs alliance with France, 407; Britain declares war against, 408; relations with Russia, 410; prepares for war, 414, 415; 419, national feeling in favour of war, 420, 421; presumption of, 422; war unfavourable to, 427; in the power of Napoleon, 430; Napoleon signs truce with, 431; loss of territory, 462; Queen Louisa appeals for better terms for, 464; ferment in, II, 52, 53; the Czar and the Prussian patriots, 55; concessions to, 59; overtures from Austria, 92; Napoleon's attitude towards, 165, 166; alternative offered to, 167; effect of Jena upon, 178; 182, 183, pressure of public opinion in, 241, 242; 252, revolutionary movement in, 261; treaty with Russia, 262; proposed restoration of, 280; 307, 323, signs treaty of Chaumont, 356; claims of, at the Vienna Congress, 366; sends army into Belgium, 412.
Pultusk, battle at, I, 437; hardships on the march to, 438.
Pyramids, battle of, I, 155.

Quatre Bras, Ney at, II, 415, 417, 418, 420.
Quenza, I, 38; Napoleon's co-operation with, 40.
Quosdanovich, General, defeated at Lonato, I, 102; 103, in Friuli, 105.

Radetzky, II, 84; 291, 335, advocates occupation of Switzerland, 337.
Ragusa, Duke of, *vide* Marmont.
Ramolino, Lætitia, *vide* Bonaparte.
Rapp, General, I, 295; II, 185, warns Napoleon of the sufferings of the troops, 200; at Danzig, 268; in Eastern France, 414.
Rastatt, congress at, I, 130; 136, 149, French demands at, 185; Rhine boundary granted to France at, 245; 306.
Ratisbon, Diet of, I, 308; 404; Archduke Charles defeated at, II, 86.
Raynal, influence of his writings on Napoleon, I, 20; 147.
Reggio, Duke of, *vide* Oudinot.
Rémusat, Madame de, Napoleon's remarks to, I, 13; memoirs of; quoted, 70, 71; description of Josephine, 79; love-letter from Napoleon quoted, 81, 82, comment of, on Josephine, 84; extracts from memoirs of, 98; *ibid.* 124; *ibid.* 164; 170; 221, 291, 327, 395, II, 13; conversation with Talleyrand, 15.
Rémusat, M. de, Prefect of the Palace, II, 24.
"*Rentes*" (Government securities), I, 271, II, 8, 246, 324, 359, 398, 429, 430.
Revolution, French, I, 22-32; 36-45; 50-3; Napoleon under the thrall of, 111; 220; 221; principles of, retained by the Consulate, 221, 222; spirit of, in Napoleon, 224; 326.
Rewbell, in the Directory, I, 120; in Switzerland, 142; policy of, 184.
Reynier, in Egypt, I, 150; at the Pyramids, 155; in Syria, 165; commands the Saxons in Russian campaign, 185; 196; at Warsaw, 256; 277, 290, 315, wounded and taken prisoner, 318.
Rhine, as "natural" boundary of France, I, 89; 245.
Richepanse, commands expedition to La Martinique, I, 312.
Rivoli, Duke of, *vide* Masséna.
Rivoli, battle of, I, 107.
Robespierre, Jacobin leader, I, 58, perishes on the scaffold, 59, 63.

Robespierre, the younger, I, 55, comment on Napoleon, 57.
Robespierre, Melle, I, 57.
Rohan, Charlotte de, I, 324.
Roman Law, in use in south of France, I, 273.
Rome, occupied by French troops, I, 140; plundered, 141; the Pope arrested in, II, 119.
Rome, King of, birth of, II, 115; Napoleon's affection for, 378, 401; taken to Blois, 365; closely guarded, 397; *vide* Napoleon II.
Rosetta, important discovery at, I, 162.
Rostopchin, Count, denounces Napoleon as "unbaptized," II, 209.
Rousseau, J. J., prediction on Corsica, I, 1; works of studied by Napoleon, 14, 15, 17, 89, 147; decried as Revolutionary, 289.
Rovigo, Duke of, *vide* Savary.
Royalists, emigration of officers, I, 32; plot against Convention, 67, 68; in power, 120; threatened, 121; well disposed towards Napoleon, 212; loyalty to Louis XVIII, 280; in exile, 321, 322, II, 366.
Rüchel, General, member of the "war party," I, 421; commands the Prussian right wing, 426; forced to retreat, 428.
Rumjantzoff, Russian Chancellor, II, 37, 38; 77; advises peace with France, 161.
Russia, relations with Austria, I, 86; resents France's intervention in the East, 159; alliance with England and Turkey, 185; breach with Austria, 228; joins coalition against England, 246; attitude towards France, 344, 346, 347; signs defensive treaty with Austria, 350; troops of, enter East Prussia, 431; overtures to Austria, 434; declares war on Turkey, 435, 445; alliance with Prussia, 447; projected alliance with France, 454; appeals to Britain for subsidies, 455; negotiations with France, 456-8; peace signed with France, 462; declares war on Britain, II, 28; adheres to alliance with France, 55; condition of trade in, 153, 154; agreement signed with Sweden, 173; sends ultimatum, 175; Napoleon's aim in invading, 188; patriotic sentiment in, 202; growing influence of, 340; signs treaty of Chaumont, 356; anxiety for Polish booty, 383; renews the treaty of Chaumont, 397.

Saalfeld, battle of, I, 426.
Sacken, General, II, 347, 349.
St. Aignan, Baron de, II, 327, brings proposals of peace, 328, 330, 332; overtures of, not communicated to the Deputies, 334, 335.
St. Cyr, General, I, 60; enters Naples, 320; in command of the Bavarians, II, 194; defeats Wittgenstein, 201; 211, 221, at Dresden, 290; defence of, entrusted to, 293, 294, 295, 297, 301; left behind to guard Dresden, 302, 305, 309.
St. Domingo, proposed colonial base at, I, 311; French expedition to, 311-13.
St. Gothard Pass, I, 232.
St. Helena, II, 439, 440, Napoleon at, 441-59.
St. John, Knights of, I, 145, 151.
St. Julian, Count de, I, 240, 242.
St. Ruff, Abbot of, I, 16.
Salamanca, Marmont defeated at, II, 204.
Saliceti, I, 28, in National Assembly, 30; succours Napoleon, 61; 64, with the army of Italy, 93; Ambassador at Genoa, 303.
Salzburg, acquired by Austria, I, 129; 308, 309, 389; ceded to Confederation of the Rhine, II, 103.
San Sebastian, surrender of, II, 323.
Saragossa, heroic defence of, II, 50.
Sardinia, joins Coalition I, 87; 91, conduct of King of, 95; peace with signed, 96; 97, cedes St. Pietro, 132; at war with France, 168; proposed indemnification for, 378.
Savary, sent to the Czar, I, 382; at Osterode, 445; made Duke of Rovigo, II, 10; in Russia, 26; sent to Madrid, 46; Minister of Police, 230; 333, at Malmaison, 436; parting from Napoleon, 440.

Savona, Napoleon at, I, 58; 94, 95, Pope at, II, 119; 122.
Savoy, annexed by France, I, 247.
Saxony, I, 104; advance of the French on, 414; ally of Prussia, 422; Warsaw ceded to, 461; joins the Confederation of the Rhine, 465; armaments in, II, 165; temporising policy of, 251, 252; agreement with Austria, 263; rejoins Napoleon, 272; 285, 288, sufferings of the troops in, 306, 314; King of, made prisoner, 318; 383, 384, territory ceded to Prussia, 396.
Say, Léon, Treatise on Political Economy by, prohibited, II, 133.
Scharnhorst, I, 425, 426; repulses Davoût at Eylau, 442; condemns Bennigsen's retreat, 443; advocates compulsory military service, II, 117; urges King of Prussia to arm, 166; concludes military convention at St. Petersburg, 167; at Vienna, 168, 169; 241, 260, 270.
Schérer, General, in command in Italy, I, 91; succeeded by Napoleon, 92; defeated, 175, 189.
Schill, II, 91, 92.
Schleiermacher, I, 419.
Schönbrunn, Napoleon at, I, 377; treaty signed at, 406; II, 102, 103; Napoleon's life attempted at, 103, 104.
Schwarzenberg, Prince, conversation with the Czar, II, 73; in Paris, 110; 149, signs alliance with France, 171; in the Russian campaign, 196, 213, 221, 236, 250, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, 291; 304, 308, 309, advances on Leipzig, 310; plan of campaign of, 336; at Langres, 339; supports Blücher, 342, 345, 349; indignant with the Czar, 350; anxiety of, 351; 354; at Troyes, 356; withdraws to Trannes, 359; dilatoriness of, 361; Ney and Macdonald conclude truce with, 370.
Sebastiani, in Egypt, I, 316; at Constantinople, 434; Napoleon's instructions to, 448; defeats Spanish army, II, 101; at Vilna, 188; wounded at Leipzig, 318.
Secularizations, scheme proposed by the Convention, I, 224; discussed at Rastatt, 306; ecclesiastical principalities in Germany, 306, 307; influence of, on European politics, 308-10.
Ségur, M. de, Master of Ceremonies, I, 335; memoirs of, quoted, 381; *ibid.* 180; dissuades Napoleon, 181; member of the Chamber of Peers, 410.
Selim III, Sultan, I, 434; Napoleon's intrigues against, 435; distrust of Napoleon, 451.
Senate, I, 218; composition of, 219; suggests amendment to the Constitution, 328; 329, proposals submitted by, 330; sanctions the Imperial power, 331; servility of, towards Napoleon, II, 14; deposes the Emperor, 367; replaced by Chamber of Peers, 404.
Senatus Consultum, grants increase of power to Napoleon, I, 284, 285, 332.
Sicily, Czar's intervention for, I, 248; the English at, 393; 412; II, 28; failure of French plans at, 143, 144.
Siéyès, I, 139; Napoleon's confidence in, 149; in the Directory, 190, 191; closes the Jacobin Club, 192; interview with Napoleon, 196; intercourse of with the Bonapartes, 197; at the *Coup d'état*, 200; appointed Consul, 210, 212; Constitution drafted by, 215-18; made President of the Senate, 219; scheme for secularizations, 224; member of the Chamber of Peers, II, 410.
Silesia, proposed transfer of to Austria, I, 434, 435; retained by Prussia, 460; II, 74; importance of, to Austria, 170, 171; exhausted by war, 307.
Smith, Adam, I, 19.
Smith, Sir Sidney, off Acre, I, 167; at Alexandria, 175; at Cyprus, 176; eluded by Napoleon, 180.
Smolensk, besieged by the French, 199, 200; French leave, 202.
Soissons, II, 354, 355.
Somosierra, Pass of, II, 66.
Souham, General, II, 370.
Soult, General, appointed marshal, I, 333; in the Army of the North,

341; 369, 370, 371, 379, at Austerlitz, 383; 424, crosses the Ukra, 437; at Eylau, 441, 442; Duke of Dalmatia, II, 10; 23; in Spain, 62, 65, 67, pursues Moore, 68, 69; evacuates Portugal, 100; opposed by Wellington, 323; defeated at Orthez, 359; 368, member of the Chamber of Peers, 410.
Souper de Beaucaire, Le, I, 52, 53.
Spain, troops from, at Toulon, I, 54; withdraws from coalition, 86; policy of controlled by France, 247; invades Portugal, 248; cedes Trinidad, 254; concludes peace with Portugal, 255; cedes Louisiana, 311; alliance with France, 320; declares war on Britain, 321; affairs at the court of, II, 40; Napoleon's conduct towards, 41, 42; secret treaty with France, 42, 43; dissensions in Royal family of, 44; King of, abdicates, 46; Joseph Bonaparte made king, 48; new Constitution for, 49; rebellion in, 49-51; French expedition to, 63-9; 124-7; hatred of Napoleon in, 179.
Stadion, Count, at Brünn, I, 379; succeeds Cobenzl, 388; 434, II, 32; advocates resistance to Napoleon, 71, 72, 75, 79, 87; withdraws from office, 102; envoy to the Allies, 273.
Staël, Madame de, hostile to Napoleon, I, 347; exiled from France, II, 11.
Staps, Frederick, attempts to kill Napoleon, II, 103; shot, 104.
Starhemberg, Count, I, 420; in London, II, 31, 32.
Stein, belongs to the "war party," I, 421; co-operates with Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, II, 53; 56, dismissed from office, 72; with the Czar, 212; 241, at Königsberg, 261; 262, 290, head of the Saxon Government, 318.
Stockach, Jourdan defeated at, I, 189; Moreau defeats Austrians at, 232.
Studjanka, crossing of the Beresina at, II, 225-9.
Suchet, in Italy, I, 232; in Spain, II, 125; recrosses the Pyrenees, 323; 368, member of the Chamber of Peers, 410; in Eastern France, 414.
Suez, proposed re-opening of channel at, I, 132; 146, Napoleon's visit to, 146.
Suvoroff, in Italy, I, 193; 228, returns to Russia, 229.
Sweden, joins coalition against Britain, I, 246; 253, 413, 417, joins coalition against France, 447; 448, Napoleon's designs against, II, 29; Russian expedition in, 30; cedes Finland to Russia, 108; concludes treaties of peace with Russia, and with France, 142; Bernadotte chosen Crown Prince of, 143; 253, concludes treaty with Britain, 264.
Switzerland, Republican propaganda in, I, 90; Napoleon's intervention in, 141; "Helvetian Republic," 142; 185, French and Austrian troops in, 189; 190, 298, made dependent on France, 304; 305, granted a new Constitution, 306; England protests against violation of, 314; evacuation of demanded, 318; signs treaty with France, 320; British agents in, 324; Czar guarantees neutrality of, II, 336; allied troops in, 337; independence of, to be restored, 356.
Syria, Nelson sails for, I, 152; French expedition to, 165-73.

Tabor, Mount, French victory at, I, 169.
Talavera, Victor defeated at, II, 100.
Talleyrand, ex-Bishop of Autun, approves Napoleon's Oriental plans I, 133; 134, extols Napoleon, 137; intimacy of latter with, 143; 149, 217, 218, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 220; 229, 230, ruse of, 240; 263; educational schemes of, 276; comment on Napoleon's court, 290; at Lyons, 301; transactions with the German princes, 308; advises court-martial of d'Enghien, 325; receives court appointment, 333; negotiates at Vienna, 386; advises peace with Austria, 387; remonstrates with Napoleon, 389; Prince of Benevento, 394; Constitution of Confederation of the Rhine drafted by,

402; signs Treaty of Tilsit, 462; advises marriage of Spanish king with French princess, II, 49; at Erfurt, 56-60; reconciliation of, with Fouché, 69; Napoleon's distrust of, 124; shrewd comment of, on Napoleon, 267; undermining Napoleon's power, 326; entertains the Czar, 367; represents Louis XVIII at the Vienna Congress, 382, 383; proscribed by Napoleon, 390, 396.
Tallien, I, 63; Napoleon intimate with, 71; obtains Josephine's release, 77.
Taranto, Duke of, *vide* Macdonald.
Tauroggen, Yorck signs convention at, II, 241, 242.
Tchitchagoff, Admiral, joins with Tormassoff, II, 211; 213, defeats French troops at Borrisov, 224; duped by Oudinot, 225; cautious pursuit of, 227; description of Studjanka, 229; advances westwards, 242.
Terror, the, I, 60; the end of, 63; 69, the reaction after, 73-7.
Thibaudeau, member of the Council of State, I, 262.
Thugut, Austrian Prime Minister, I, 86; concludes treaty with Pitt, 87; not prepared to negotiate, 108; accepts Napoleon's terms, 115, 116; ignores the French threats, 186; declines Napoleon's overtures, 229; protracted negotiations with, 230, 231; dismissed from office, 245.
Tilsit, meeting of Napoleon and Czar at, I, 458-62; treaty of, 462-4.
Tolentino, treaty concluded at, I, 110; Murat defeated at, II, 413.
Toll, General, adviser to Kutusoff, II, 217.
Tormassoff, in command of the Russian reserves, II, 196; joins Tchitchagoff, 211; 213, replaces Kutusoff in the chief command, 270.
Torres Vedras, French defeated at, II, 127; 186.
Toulon, siege of, I, 54, 55, 56; miserable condition of, 266.
Trachenberg, conference at, II, 285; plan of campaign discussed at, 291; 329.
Trafalgar, Nelson's victory at, I, 374, 375.
Transpadane, Republic, founded at Bologna, I, 105.
Treviso, Duke of, *vide* Mortier.
Trianon, edict issued at, II, 136.
Tribunate, function of, I, 216; Constitutional Liberals in, 280; Napoleon's resistance to, 282; 283, offers Napoleon Imperial dignity, 330; 332, dissolved, II, 14.
"Tugendbund," founded at Königsberg, II, 52.
Tuileries, mob enters, I, 42; defended by Napoleon, 71; Consuls reside at, 261; military reviews at, 292; court etiquette at, 335.
Turin, I, 94; Austrians at, 190; 235.
Turkey, downfall of, I, 131, 132, Napoleon's designs on, 157, 158; declares war against France, 159; 160, 170, Egypt restored to, 256; neutrality of, 346; Sebastiani's mission to, 434; English expedition to, 448, 449; failure of Napoleon's plans in, 451; 456; 457, Sultan Selim succeeded by Mustapha, 458; Czar's designs on Turkey, 462; 463, 464, Napoleon checkmates the Czar in, II, 27; Napoleon's demands from, 28; ports of closed against Britain, 29; proposed partitioning of, 32, 33; Sultan Mustapha driven from the throne, 53; 57, Russian troops withdraw from, 108; source of friction between France and Russia, 152, 153; Napoleon's relations with, 173; threatened by Britain, 174.
Tuscany, treaty with France, I, 86; compensation to Grand Duke of, 245; Kingdom of Etruria, 248; dependent on France, 303; annexed by France, II, 33; anxiety regarding, in Vienna, 51.
Tyrol, ceded to Bavaria, I, 388; Bavarian troops defeated in, II, 81; 91, victory of the Tyrolese at Isel, 93.

Udine, negotiations at, I, 128; peace signed at, 129.
Ulm, Austrian base at, I, 368;

bombardment and surrender of, 371-3.
United States, treaty signed with, I, 246; Louisiana sold to, 320; trade of affected by Continental System, 130; declares war against Britain, II, 235; Napoleon receives offers of rescue from, 447; Grouchy in, 454.
University, Imperial, II, 16-19.

Valais, formed into a Republic, I, 304, 305.
Valençay, Spanish Crown Prince at, II, 49; treaty signed at, 326.
Valence, Napoleon at, I, 12-16; 32, 36.
Valutina Gora, II, 200.
Vandamme, fear of Napoleon, II, 24; at Eggmühl, 85; 94, in command of the Westphalians, 185; at Bautzen, 290; 293, at Pirna, 295, 296, 297; taken prisoner at Kulm, 301; in Belgium, 414.
Vauchamps, battle of, II, 348.
Vendée, La, civil war in, I, 69; 230, peace secured in, 231, 321; heroic courage of, II, 49; royalist revolt in, 414.
Vendémiaire, 13th, I, 70-2.
Venice, Austria covetous of, I, 86; territory of, 99; proposed exchange of, 115; to be acquired by Austria, 117; democratic revolution in, 118, 119; decline of, 120; 128, ceded to Austria, 129; incorporated in Kingdom of Italy, 388.
Ver Heull, Admiral, interview with Napoleon, I, 398.
Verona, Louis XVIII at, I, 69; counter-revolution at, 119.
Viasma, II, 217; fighting at, 218; losses at, 219.
Vicenza, Duke of, *vide* Caulaincourt.
Victor Amadeus, King of Sardina, I, 95, requests a truce, 96; signs peace, 97.
Victor, Marshal, at Austerlitz, I, 235, 236; Duke of Belluno, II, 10; "mediocre," 23, recrosses the Rhine, 52; in Spain, 63; 67, defeated at Talavera, 100; crosses the Niemen, 206; succours St. Cyr, 221; 224; at Studjanka, 227; at Dresden, 296; 302; on the Rhine, 328; at Montereau, 349.
Vienna, Murat at, I, 375; Napoleon's entry into, 376; surrender of, II, 88; French and Austrian armies at, 93.
Vienna, Congress of, II, 382, 385, 396, 438, 440.
Villeneuve, Admiral, at Aboukir Bay, I, 157; hazardous task set, 355; ordered to the Channel, 360; dispatches of, 365; at Cadiz, 373; defeated at Trafalgar, 374; death of, 374.
Vilna, entry of Napoleon and the French troops at, II, 189, breakdown of the transport service at, 192.
Vincent, Austrian Ambassador at Paris, I, 405; at Erfurt, II, 57.
Vitebsk, Barclay at, II, 195; Napoleon at, 196, 197.
Vittoria, defeat of the French at, II, 284.
Voltaire, I, 1, 14; Napoleon's writings in imitation of, 19; 249, II, 443.

Wagram, battle of, II, 95-8.
Wahlstatt, Macdonald defeated at, II, 299.
Walcheren, English expedition to, II, 100, failure of, 137.
Waleska, Countess, Napoleon's intimacy with, I, 441; at Elba, II, 377, 378.
Warsaw, French intrigues at, I, 432; Napoleon at, 433; occupied by the French, 437; duchy of, 461; rival aims of Napoleon and the Czar in, II, 149; Napoleon's intrigues in, 190-2; proposed surrender of, 273; 275.
Waterloo, British headquarters at, II, 421; battle of, 422-8; decisive effect of, 430; 445, 453.
Wavre, II, 419, 421, 424.
Wellesley, *vide* Wellington.
Wellington, in Spain, II, 99, defeats Victor. 100; genius of, 123; in Portugal, 125, 126; 127; defeats Marmont, 204; chief command of combined forces, 235; routs the French at Vittoria, 284; advances on France, 323; 325, 336,

defeats Soult, 359; comment on Bourbons, 380; at the Vienna Congress, 396; co-operates with Blücher, 412; 413, 415, 416, at Quatre Bras, 418; 419, at Waterloo, 421-7, dispatches of, 436.
Wesel, fortress of, I, 413.
Wessenberg, Count, conversation with Napoleon, II, 364.
West Indies, I, 355, 360.
Westphalia, secularization of, I, 307; French troops in, 414; kingdom of, 460; 463, financial condition of, II, 164; 167, deserts from France, 322.
Whitworth, Lord, audience with Napoleon, II, 317; leaves Paris, 318.
Winzingerode, advances on Belgium, II, 352; at Soissons, 353; at St. Dizier, 363.
Wittgenstein, General, Russian right wing under, II, 194; at Drissa, 196; 197, defeated at Polozk, 201; 213, 221, 224, deluded by Oudinot, 225, 226; Victor's rearguard surrenders to, 227; 228, Commander-in-Chief, 270; 275, 276, 277, advances on Paris, 349.
Woronzoff, Russian Chancellor, advocates co-operation with England, I, 344.
Wrede, General, in Paris, II, 148, Bavarian troops under, 251; at Hanau, 319, 320; defeats French right wing at La Rothière, 342; advances on Arcis, 360.
Wurmser, General, in Italy, I, 91; advances to relief of Mantua, 101, 102; defeated at Castiglione, 103; superseded, 104; Napoleon's comment on, 105.
Würtemberg, treaty with France, I, 308; 400, 401, changes in, II, 164; complies with Napoleon's demands, 251.
Würzburg, Jourdan victorious at, I, 104; occupied by the French, 414.

Yarmouth, Lord, in Paris, I, 409; 414.
Yorck, General von, signs convention of Tauroggen, II, 241; 242, 250, defection of, repudiated by King of Prussia, 259; reinforcements granted to, 261; advances on Paris, 347; withdraws to Châlons, 348.

Zach, at Marengo, I, 237.
Ziethen, General, at Ligny, II, 417; at Waterloo, 426.
Znaim, armistice of, II, 97-99.
Zurich, Russians defeated at, I, 228-246.

ABERDEEN: THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

WORC. COLL.
LIBRARY
CANCELLED

E Y/M
757/M